Proceedings of the 6th Tokyo Conference on Argumentation: Argumentation and Education

Reflecting upon the 20 years of the Tokyo Conference

August 10-12, 2020

第六回議論学国際学術会議報告集
議論と教育：二十周年記念大会
Proceedings of the Tokyo Conference on Argumentation, Volume 6

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December 4, 2021

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ISSN 2436-8067 (online)
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Abstract
As teaching English as a foreign language (TEFL) has developed from the heyday of the grammar-translation method to the present time—when a heavy emphasis is placed on communication—the concept of the successful learner of English has changed over the years, and we teachers now face a new challenge: the responsibility for helping learners to avoid crises in communication. There are some inadequacies in TEFL in Japan that need to be addressed if we are to equip learners with an ability to handle those crises. One of the problems is that learners are being given virtually no explicit instruction in using English in argumentative discourse. I propose that TEFL should cover ‘argumentation-and-language integrated learning,’ which may be thought of as a subcategory of content-and-language integrated learning (CLIL).

Keywords: argumentation, CEFR, Course of Study, crises in communication, critical thinking, TEFL

Introduction

The purpose of this talk is to review the changes in priorities that have taken place in teaching English as a foreign language (TEFL) in Japan for the last several decades and share with the audience some of the proposals that I have made, as an English teacher and material writer, for a set of new ideas in TEFL which I think are better suited to the situation in which many of our learners in Japan find themselves at present. Through this discussion I hope to argue that there is one area of TEFL that should receive more attention in this country than it has received so far: the teaching of argumentative skills. Training of learners in this area is urgently needed if they are to prepare themselves successfully for the communicative challenges that they are bound to face once they leave the classroom and plunge into the real world.
In this presentation I shall be using three sets of terms that need to be defined: (a) ‘Critical thinking’ shall mean analytically examining ideas and propositions. I shall also be using the term ‘critical thinking skills.’ (b) ‘Argumentation’ shall mean interaction in which a difference of opinion needs to be settled between parties representing different positions. I shall also be using phrases such as ‘argumentative skills’ and ‘argumentative discourse.’ (c) Finally, I shall be using the term ‘logic,’ which is often used by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan (hereafter ‘MEXT’). When used in connection with the secondary school subjects English and Japanese, its meaning usually covers both critical thinking and argumentation.

In the past, English was taught at schools in Japan primarily for the purpose of enhancing learners’ general education rather than for practical purposes. Only a small proportion of students finished formal education and went into professions that required a high proficiency in English or some other foreign language (only 7.9 percent of 18-year-olds entered university in 1954 according to a MEXT survey). Most young people who were learning English at schools were doing so in order to pass entrance examinations to be admitted to a secondary school or university and then to pass intramural examinations to graduate.

While this picture still applies to much of what is being done in the teaching of English in Japan, a new way of thinking is emerging among TEFL teachers, learners and education policy makers: As a result of the recent phenomenal increase in the volume of information exchanged internationally, proficiency in English is beginning to be regarded by TEFL stakeholders as a real communication tool. What has enabled the robust traffic of information is of course the development of communication technology. Ironically, however, the technological innovations that have been promoted to make communication easy have in fact brought home to us how communication can be difficult. The problems that people encounter while being engaged in communication—I would like to call them ‘crises in communication’—are of many different kinds, of which I shall cite some examples later. Whatever sorts of problems are likely to arise in the process of communication, it is the responsibility of language teachers—I am one of them—to try to teach in the classroom in a way that would prevent learners from experiencing such crises when they use English for communication in the future. In this talk I would like to propose that we language teachers need to shift the balance of our work to focus more on helping learners to acquire skills in coping with these crises.
What does it mean to know English?

Ideals of the grammar-translation method

The history of TEFL may be regarded as a history of changes in people’s perception of what it means to know English. Of the major language teaching methods, the earliest one will be the grammar-translation method. It is the method that has been followed at virtually all schools in Japan ever since foreign language education was started in earnest in the 19th century. This method typically uses a coursebook in which each chapter focuses on a particular grammatical rule, or a set of rules, with explicit mention of grammatical terminology. Use of the grammar-translation method, or some variations thereof, is still prevalent at schools in Japan. A successful learner who has learned a language by this method may be defined as someone who knows many rules of the grammar of the target language and who is good at translating the target language into his or her mother tongue and vice versa.

The grammar-translation method helps learners to accurately grasp the grammatical structure—and often the semantic structure, too—of sentences in learners’ target language. Also, use of learners’ native language as a reference system is helpful for comprehension. On the other hand, it has some demerits: Because slow transmission of ideas is inherent in the translation process, learners do not develop proficiency in using the target language efficiently. Another weakness of this method is that it tends to make learners focus on grammatical concepts and the terminology needed to discuss them rather than on learning the language itself. Furthermore, because it does not emphasize oral communication, it is likely to produce learners who are not proficient at speaking.

Ideals of the direct method

There were some methods that emerged as an answer to the limitations of the grammar-translation method. One of them was the direct method, which is often associated with Berlitz schools (Brown, 2007, p. 50) and goes back to language teaching reforms, particularly in Europe, towards the end of the 19th century (Howatt, 1984, pp. 169-189). It is characterized by exclusive use of the target language as the medium of instruction and by avoidance of the use of learners’ native language. Grammar is not explicitly taught but is supposed to be discovered by learners themselves through exposure to materials in the target language. ‘[A] first attempt to make the language learning situation one of language use,’ the method views language learning ‘as analogous to first language acquisition’ (Stern, 1983, p. 459). Thus, a successful student learning a language by the direct method is someone who can
perform well in an environment where the target language is the only means of communication. Two major problems have been pointed out with the method: Use of the target language as a means of instruction may make it difficult for the teacher to convey meaning to learners; application of the method to the training of learners beyond elementary levels could be challenging (Stern, 1983, p. 460).

Ideals of the audiolingual method

Sharing some major features with the direct method but originating later, chiefly in the United States, was another antithesis of the grammar-translation method: the audiolingual method, exemplified by the ‘Army Method,’ which was used in the American language programmes during World War II for the training of military personnel in foreign languages (Stern, 1983, p. 102 and p. 463; Brown, 2007, p. 111). The theoretical underpinnings of this method were behavioural psychology and structural linguistics: Its basic idea was that language use should be interpreted in the framework of the relation between stimulus and response; learners learning by this method were able to practice language items ‘without having to think hard’ (Stern, 1993, p. 341). A successful student who has learned a language by the audiolingual method is thus someone who would respond quickly to a situation using the target language, namely someone who has accumulated a large number of sentence patterns and who has achieved enough automaticity in the use of those patterns. This idea led to methods of practice such as pattern practice, which aimed at enabling learners to produce speech instantly, without having to go to the trouble of translating sentences in their mother tongue into the target language. Work in the language laboratory was considered an effective way of learning a language by the audiolingual method. In Japan, in fact, there was a time when almost all public junior and senior high schools devoted one class period per week to training in the language laboratory; the Ministry of Education stipulated the Audio-visual Educational Media Teacher Training Curriculum Standard in 1973, and the Ministry’s programme for training English teachers in leadership roles covered training in the use of the language laboratory (Ochiai, 1980).

Focus on communication

It turned out that the audiolingual method had its own weaknesses. Criticisms were levelled against it by those who thought that this method viewed learners merely as stimulus-response mechanisms (Richards and Rodgers, 2001, p. 28). Indeed, when learners were engaged in mechanical drills such as pattern practice, they were not communicating: They were either memorizing or rehearsing sentences, and it was even possible that they were saying sentences without paying much attention to what
they meant. These criticisms gave rise to new thinking in language teaching, in the
1970s, which was called communicative language teaching (CLT) or the
communicative approach. CLT centred around the idea that the purpose of language
use is communication and that a successful language student is someone who is able to
convey meaning. As Widdowson (1978, p. 1) put it, “Someone knowing a language
knows more than how to understand, speak, read and write sentences. He (sic) also
knows how sentences are used to communicative effect.” CLT is not a specific
language teaching method. Rather, it is a general philosophy in language teaching that
recognizes the importance of communication. In CLT, communicative competence in
a language is regarded as embracing not only its grammar, pronunciation and
vocabulary but other factors including sociolinguistic competence, namely an ability to
use language appropriately to suit the situation where one finds oneself, e.g. an ability
to judge whether one should use one’s interlocutor’s first name or not.

TEFL today places an increasingly heavy emphasis on communication. Learners’ language proficiency is often measured against a set of criteria formulated by
the Council of Europe, called the Common European Framework of Reference for
Languages (CEFR), whose updated version has just been made public (Council of
Europe, 2018). This framework is meant to assess language users’ communicative
ability, namely what they can actually do using language. For example, according to
this framework, someone at level C2—the highest level—in the area of interaction in
formal discussion can do the following:

Can hold his/her own in formal discussion of complex issues, putting an articulate
and persuasive argument, at no disadvantage to other speakers. Can advise
on/handle complex, delicate or contentious issues, provided he/she has the
necessary specialised knowledge. Can deal with hostile questioning confidently,
hold on to his/her turn to speak and diplomatcally rebut counter-arguments. (p.
87)

Note that this is a purely communicative goal rather than a goal set in terms ‘language
skills,’ in the narrow sense of the term. In Japan, the CEFR has been incorporated
extensively into TEFL. MEXT has adopted the thinking behind the CEFR and
instructed schools to prepare their own lists of ‘can-do’ statements which teachers and
students should refer to as they assess students’ progress in English (MEXT, 2013).
The thinking behind CLT provided theoretical bases for such new approaches as
Content-Based Instruction (CBI), which attaches importance to content as the
communicative purpose for language learners (see Snow, 2001, for a summary of major
characteristics), and Content-and-Language Integrated Learning (CLIL), an approach in
which content and language are taught at the same time in an integrated way (see
Dalton-Puffer, 2011, for a review); there is a growing interest in CLIL among TEFL specialists in Japan (Watanabe et al., 2011, for example). A successful student who has learned English with a syllabus designed on CLIL principles is thus someone who has mastered both the content of a certain field and the language needed to discuss it.

As indicated by these developments in the history of language teaching, there have been different images of a successful language learner, each associated, loosely or closely, with a specific teaching method or way of thinking followed in TEFL.

**Does TEFL in Japan address crises in communication?**

At present, acquisition of an ability to communicate is regarded as key to successful language learning, and such an ability can hardly be considered real if it does not include both an ability to convey meaning and an ability to handle the sociolinguistic aspect of communicative situations. Failure to perform well in a communicative situation can easily put a language user into one of a variety of ‘crises in communication.’ Here are some of the familiar examples of such crises: In one-on-one interactions, understanding may be hindered because of lexical, grammatical, and/or phonological errors. A message may be distorted because the speaker mentions the bottom line too late. Misunderstanding may be caused by cultural assumptions which are not shared between the participants of an interaction. A speaker may be refuted by his or her interlocutor and cannot argue back. When one communicates with two or more individuals at the same time, all of the aforementioned kinds of crises may arise and, in addition, there is a possibility that one faces another type of crisis, namely a turn-taking problem: One may be unable to ‘step in’ when the other participants of the conversation are speaking with each other continuously. The foregoing are crises that concern oral communication, but crises will of course occur in writing and listening comprehension as well. Language teachers are responsible for trying to lower the risk of learners’ facing these crises and to minimize their impact once they do arise.

Some aspects of the target language are stressed in TEFL in Japan while some are not. The residual influence of the grammar-translation method is strong, and grammatical training, reading comprehension and vocabulary build-up have occupied a central place in TEFL in Japan. For example, the ‘Course of Study,’ which is a set of guidelines published by MEXT and is to be followed by educators including teachers, local authorities and textbook writers, mentions specific grammatical structures in English and approximate numbers of vocabulary items in the language to be covered in junior and senior high school (MEXT 2017, 2018a). Learners’ English-Japanese dictionaries label English words to indicate explicitly which ones they recommend
should be learned by junior high school students, which ones by senior high school
students, etc. (Konishi and Minamide, 2014, for example). By contrast, work in some
areas of TEFL falls short of preparing learners for crises in communication. One such
area is argumentation.

Skills in critical thinking and argumentation

One may summarize the status quo as regards the teaching of argumentative skills
by saying that there is only a limited measure of explicit instruction in what I would
categorize as critical thinking skills, and, when it comes to argumentative skills, learners
in Japan are being given virtually no instruction. The following paragraphs provide
the details of this situation.

Under the current Course of Study for senior high schools, revised in 2009 and
put into effect in 2013, there are such subdivisions under the subject English as English
Communication (I, II and III) and English Expression (I and II). Specifications for
items to be covered in those courses include items such as exchanging opinions,
drawing conclusions on the basis of information obtained, choosing a stance on a topic
open to debate, etc. (MEXT, 2009). In fact, the current version of the Polestar English
Communication series, for example, which is a set of MEXT-authorized English
textbooks for high schools published by a private publishing house and meant
to be used in the English Communication classes, includes at the end of every lesson in
books I and II a section entitled ‘Route Map,’ which makes learners do a task of filling
blanks in a table that summarizes the content of the text in that lesson (Matsusaka, 2017,
2018).

As regards assessment of English proficiency, there are occasions on which
learners are tested on their ability to follow the logic of a text. For example, the
English language test prepared by the National Center for University Entrance
Examinations in Japan has traditionally included a section in which applicants are
invited to weed out unnecessary sentences from a passage. Some of the past English
language tests given as part of the University of Tokyo entrance examination (the 2020
version, for example) included a question in which applicants were told to read a
passage with blanks and fill them with appropriate items from a set of sentences to
choose from.

Looking at those teaching materials and test questions, one may be led to think
that critical thinking is taught as a fairly important part of TEFL. If so, the situation is
in line with the general perception in CLT that communicative competence means more
than just language. Indeed, as Suzuki (2009, p. iii) put it, ‘simple communicative
exercises focusing on language production, such as those in conversational English,
cannot provide the learner with sufficient communicative competence; acquisition of an
ability to analyze and discuss messages of social interest critically is essential’ (translation by Matsusaka). Nevertheless, the status quo is that the teaching of critical thinking skills and argumentative skills is not central to TEFL. The level of the exercise in the MEXT-authorized textbook cited above is elementary. Both in the case of the National Center for University Entrance Examinations test in English and in the case of the University of Tokyo entrance examination in English, the test questions that explicitly focus on critical thinking skills account only for a small portion of the entire score. Ways in which these university entrance examinations are written may affect the priorities that teachers give to classroom activities, with the possible result that discussion of logic is sidelined in the classwork.

As general skills in producing language are prerequisite to acquiring argumentative skills, the subject subdivision English Expression will be the subdivision most suited to the training of argumentative skills. Magoku and Erikawa (2019) analyzed 11 English Expression I textbooks published by a total of four publishing houses and found out that, of the exercise questions given in those textbooks, 81% are ones that concern linguistic forms, 4% are ones that require inferencing and 15% are ones that require an ability that they call ‘critical thinking.’

The situation mentioned above suggests that, although some importance is attached to critical thinking skills in TEFL in Japan, it is not on the centre stage. One can also say that, even in the classwork where critical thinking is the theme, it is generally not taken to the level of argumentative skills. This is serious, as learners of English with poor training may be disadvantaged when attempting to handle argumentative discourse in the future.

Education for international understanding

There may be a case for saying that the weak focus on argumentation in TEFL is partly a manifestation of the psyche running deep in Japanese society. In fact, there is a theme in education that has been promoted as part of TEFL for about half a century which may suggest that such a psyche does exist: One of the pillars of school education in Japan is what is often called ‘education for international understanding,’ and foreign language teaching has been considered to be responsible for providing students with opportunities to receive education with that theme. The cultural aspect of TEFL goes as far back as the early days after World War II: The 1947 Course of Study said that one of the purposes of English language learning was to learn about the English-speaking people, about their customs and about their everyday life. This basic policy did not change until 1969 and 1970, when the Course of Study for junior high schools and that for senior high schools were revised respectively and the aforementioned purpose of English teaching was replaced by the purpose of forming the
basis of international understanding (Koizumi, 2010). The Course of Study for junior high schools currently in effect states that one of the purposes of foreign language education is to deepen students’ understanding of the target language and the cultural background to that language (MEXT, 2008). The same purpose is stated in the current Course of Study for senior high schools (MEXT, 2009). The specific content of education for international understanding is not clear from these Course of Study stipulations, but, from the wording used in them, ‘understanding of other cultures’ seems to be the theme of overriding importance in education for international understanding, rather than preparing students for argumentation with those from other countries and/or cultures.

One gains the same impression from the activities carried out at schools where the theme ‘international understanding’ is explicitly stated. The Japan Association for International Education has a database of examples of educational activities for international understanding, which carries 35 examples (Japan Association for International Education, 2020). My assessment is that six of them have themes incorporating clash between different standpoints. All the others aim at expansion of students’ knowledge about other cultures, or sympathetic understanding of them, or both. Also, the website of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has a section for development education and international understanding education, where examples of classwork are given. Of the 60 examples under the category of senior high school education, there are no examples where argumentation, as I have defined it in this presentation, is taught (there is one case where part of the classwork is a role-playing exercise designed to teach how to turn down an offer or suggestion—an exercise which in a way concerns conflicting interests but certainly does not amount to argumentation). All of the examples, including the one with the role-play exercise, are examples of classwork aimed at acquiring knowledge about other countries or disseminating knowledge about Japan to people in other countries (Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2020). Inadequacies in education for international understanding were mentioned by a study group in the Central Education Council, an advisory council at MEXT: It reported that problems with international education include tendencies that (a) it is equated with activities in the English class and (b) it is not developed beyond making students experience something or organizing activities for international exchanges (MEXT, 2005).

The situation that I have outlined seems to indicate that success in education for international understanding is considered by many stakeholders in education to consist primarily in success in having students learn about other countries and cultures and also helping the rest of the world to learn about Japan, rather than success in equipping students with an ability to solve differences with those from other countries and/or cultures through argumentation. Education for international understanding as it is
being carried out today is immensely valuable and should be promoted even further, but perhaps a broadening of its scope is in order so that it also covers argumentation as a means of managing crises in international and cross-cultural communication.

The subject subdivision ‘Logic and Expression’

Despite all of that, the teaching of English may soon make a new turn in Japan. Discussion centring on the need for a clearer focus on critical thinking education arose, particularly in the last decade. Kusumi (2012) made a proposal at the 7 September 2012 meeting of the Central Education Council, in which he argued that critical thinking skills are ‘the most important [ability] that high school students should be equipped with’ (translation by Matsusaka) and cited Japanese, Civics, Mathematics and other subjects as examples of subjects in which students could develop critical thinking skills. As if to put this idea into practice, MEXT revised the Course of Study in Japanese for senior high schools in 2018 and announced that a new subject subdivision focusing on logic would be started under the subject Japanese. The subdivision will be called Logical Japanese (translation by Matsusaka), and its objective will be ‘to aim to foster an ability and skills in accurate comprehension and effective expression in Japanese’ (MEXT, 2018b, translation by Matsusaka). Before the revision of the Course of Study, however, a move towards an emphasis of logic in the subject Japanese may already have started in the classroom. One study guide in Japanese for high school students includes exercises in following the logic when reading a passage, such as exercises in distinguishing between the concrete and the abstract, locating expressions of concession, etc.11 Some space in the book is devoted to the training in asserting one’s opinions (Nanba et al., 2017).

In 2018, the same year as the year of the publication of the aforementioned Course of Study in Japanese, MEXT published a new Course of Study for senior high schools for the subject English. It provided that a new subject subdivision in English by the name of Logic and Expression (I, II and III) (translation by Matsusaka) should be introduced in April 2021 (MEXT, 2018a). Publishing companies have put together their textbooks for this subdivision and presented them to MEXT for authorization. I am unable to comment on the content of these textbooks because, at the moment, the inspection process is not finished yet at MEXT and the content of the books has not been made public. Nevertheless, I can report on the content of this subdivision as specified in the Course of Study. The content is divided into three levels, I, II and III, meant to be taught typically in the first, second and third years of senior high school respectively.

The objectives of this subdivision have been stipulated for three areas: interaction, presentation and writing (MEXT, 2018a, pp. 87-120). In all of these areas, the aim is
to enable students to convey a message about an everyday topic or a topic of social interest to others or to each other, by presenting the message with an appropriate logical structure or an appropriate path of logical development. In the area of interaction, students are to learn to participate in a debate or discussion; in the area of presentation, they are to learn to give a speech or presentation; in the area of writing, they are to learn to write one or more paragraphs.

As students approach and finally reach the highest level, Logic and Expression III, they are to learn to make use of multiple materials such as news reports or newspaper articles to support their opinions and to use a wide range of phrases and sentences that fit their purpose, in an attempt to persuade their interlocutor or reader. They are to learn to make their message well organized, and, in the area of writing, they are to learn to produce a text consisting of multiple paragraphs.

The above description of the subject subdivision applies to the ordinary curriculum, offered by most senior high schools across the country. Apart from this curriculum, there are special curricula offered by some high schools: vocational courses, such as ones in agriculture, commerce, fishery and nursing, and specialized courses, such as ones in science and mathematics, physical education, music and art. One such specialized course is a course in English, and students enrolled in this course naturally follow a curriculum with a heavy concentration on English. With the start of the instruction under the new Course of Study, the curriculum in this English course will include a subject subdivision **Debate and Discussion (I and II)** (MEXT, 2018a, pp. 190-201). The objectives of this subdivision include enabling students:

(a) to assume a position for or against a proposition and present a logically coherent argument in an attempt to persuade others;
(b) to show effectively how their own opinions are superior to others’ and to ask questions or present counterarguments in an attempt to persuade them;
(c) to advance their own opinions in an attempt to reach a consensus with others on a solution to a problem;
(d) to propose solutions with persuasive reasons so as to reach an agreement with others on the best solution to a problem.

Thus, at least from the stipulations in the new Course of Study, it appears that TEFL in senior high school education in Japan will change so that greater importance will be attached to combining training in the target language and training in the use of logic.

There are two concerns about the effectiveness of the new policy, however. First, Logic and Expression I, II and III will be introduced in the senior high school curriculum in 2021, 2022 and 2023 respectively, and instruction at level III, which
covers logical use of English in earnest, will not start until 2023. At the moment, it is thus too early to predict how effective the whole three-level sequence will be. Second, while the Course of Study will be reflected in the content of the MEXT-authorized textbooks, it is unclear how much of the content will actually be learned by students. Senior high school classwork tends to be affected to various degrees by what university entrance examinations cover. Therefore, unless universities begin to prepare more English-language entrance examination questions designed to measure applicants’ ability to use logic in English, some high school teachers and students may not be motivated to direct much attention to the content or spirit of the new Course of Study. On the other hand, there is cause for optimism: As the volume of international communication increases and awareness keeps growing among the general public of the value of English language skills accompanied by argumentative skills, TEFL may change over time so that the emphasis will shift from teaching the language in the narrow sense of the term to helping learners to acquire the language as it is combined with skills in critical thinking and argumentation.

**Attempt to teach critical thinking and argumentation: An example**

Having outlined the situation at the senior high school level, I now turn to university-level TEFL. As MEXT-authorized textbooks are not used at university-level, and instructors for many university classes have more latitude in deciding what to teach than secondary school teachers, it is difficult to ascertain exactly what is being taught in university English classes. Rather than attempt to present an overall picture of education in critical thinking or argumentation at university level in Japan, I would like to describe some of the challenges I myself faced in the past as I set up a debate course in the curriculum of the English department where I taught, for I think that my case epitomizes some potential problems involved in the teaching of argumentative skills as a way of teaching English.

It was in the year 2000 that I started teaching a debate course at my university. Around that time, I was noticing that the term ‘debate’ was sometimes used loosely in the description of courses in English in which students were engaged in informal conversations over controversial issues (such as the merit of making secondary school students wear a school uniform). I ruled out the possibility of teaching such a course as I doubted that students would really acquire argumentative skills through unstructured talk. On the other hand, I wanted to avoid teaching formal debating, too, at least at the beginning of the course, because I thought that teaching it would mean making students spend a certain amount of time learning about the rules and the format
of the game, honing skills in speaking within the time limit, etc., which would not be the same as learning about argumentation per se.

So I chose to organize a sequence of two semesters: a critical thinking and argumentation course in the first semester and a course in formal debating in the second. The syllabus for the first semester included the following topics:

(1) Introduction to the course
(2) Talking about assumptions
(3) Talking about assumptions, contd.
(4) Dealing with figures
(5) Using quotations
(6) Analysis of the status quo
(7) Carrying arguments far
(8) Pointing out contradictions
(9) Explaining a seeming contradiction
(10) Solvency
(11) Analogy
(12) Fallacies

Most of the topics were dealt with in the framework of the Toulmin model (Toulmin, 1964), which was applied to many of the exercises in its skeletal form—what I called the debate triangle, with the three corners representing the claim, the data and the warrant—and with technical terminology kept to the minimum (I used the word ‘reason’ to refer to the ‘data’ and the word ‘assumption’ to refer to the ‘warrant’). The exercises required students to examine the acceptability of a proposition and argue a case for or against it. Here are three examples of the exercises:

Example 1 (centres around a fictitious situation in which a brilliant scientist, a young girl and an old man are stranded on a desert island after a shipwreck and find a small boat that can take only one person; concerns topics 2 and 3 above)

Question 1: Who should escape from the island in the boat?

Question 2 (if students choose the scientist as the answer to Question 1, for example): Why?

Question 3 (if students’ answer to Question 2 is that the scientist is more likely to contribute to humankind through inventions or scientific discoveries than the others, for example): What assumptions are hidden behind that argument?

Question 4: If you are trying to refute the above proposition and have come up with the following two assumptions, which one is more useful for you? (a) The scientist can row the boat; (b) The sea will not dry up during the scientist’s journey.

It was my observation that, after learning about the debate triangle mentioned above, students were usually able to answer Question 3 with ease. Question 4 took slightly more time to answer: Students sometimes needed to be told, before being able to choose (a), that the more disputable an assumption is, the more useful it is in refuting the proposition.
Question 5: Present a hidden assumption on your own which you think would be
most useful for refutation.
In response to this last question, one may say, for example, that one assumption hidden
behind the argument is that the value of a person’s life should be judged by the kinds of
contributions that he or she could make to humankind. It is a useful assumption
because one could argue that it is based on an ethically questionable view that people’s
lives can be arranged in order of importance.

Through exercises of this kind students learned about argumentation and
language simultaneously. Some of the lexicalized sentence stems (Pawley and Syder,
1983) that can be taught in the course of these exchanges are:

*What make-TENSE you say that/(clause)?*

*Your argument be-TENSE based on an assumption, which is (clause).*

*Are you sure the assumption is correct?*

*Your argument be-TENSE based on an assumption which is incorrect (or: unacceptoble,
questionable, etc.).*

Example 2 (centres around an argument that science education should be made
completely free of charge because it makes our country rich; concerns topic 7)

Question: How would you refute the argument by taking it far?

To answer the above question, one can point out, for example, that, if the argument
were carried far, it could mean (a) that the learning of all subjects would have to be
made free of charge because students in any field of academic study could make a
country rich (e.g. music education may produce musicians who can sell their music
abroad), (b) that all textbooks would have to be made free, and (c) that even shoes that
students wear to school would have to be made free. Relevant sentence stems would
include:

*If you carried that argument far, you would have to say (clause).*

*What you are saying is really the same thing as (clause).*

Example 3 (centres around an argument that, as a person’s life is invaluable, someone
who takes someone else’s life deserves the death penalty; concerns topics 8 and 9):

Question: Would you say that the above argument involves a contradiction? If
yes, explain your answer. If no, explain your answer.

It was my observation that, while the ‘yes’ answer was easy for students to explain, for
obvious reasons, the ‘no’ answer was not. They needed to learn to say that there is no
contradiction in the argument because (a) the criminality of murder is based upon an
assumption that it is bad for a private individual to take someone else’s life whereas (b)
the justice of the death penalty is based upon an assumption that the government can
take someone’s life as a form of punishment.
Some of the sentence stems that can be taught are:

*I think you are contradicting yourself.*

*You say (clause), but you also say (clause). These points contradict each other.*

*There is no contradiction in what I am saying because the point (clause) means (clause or NP) and the point (clause) means (clause or NP).*

**Challenges**

There were four sorts of challenges that I faced as I taught the course which will be worth reporting here. First, it was sometimes difficult to help students (a) to find assumptions behind an argument, (b) to evaluate them from the opponent arguer’s point of view and (c) to produce an assumption most useful for refutation. For instance, in Example 1 above, some students made irrelevant points in response to Question 3, such as: ‘The island is very small,’ or ‘The scientist is famous.’ I had them try turning the sentences into the negative and see if the argument still stands. For example, I asked whether the argument is still valid if the island is not small or if the scientist is not famous. These interactions did help students to distinguish between real assumptions and irrelevant sentences, but the interactions were time-consuming. Some students did find some assumptions successfully but were unable to evaluate them and had difficulty in answering Question 4. But by far the greatest difficulty that students experienced was in being original and coming up with a sentence which would serve as a *useful* assumption, such as the one given above as a response to Question 5. I have yet to find a teaching procedure whereby a teacher could methodically help students to work out such an assumption.

Secondly, I had difficulty in accumulating useful sentence stems. The more specific the topic taken up in class was, the less applicable the expressions related to it were to other topics and therefore the less worthwhile it seemed to be to have students memorize them for future use.

Thirdly, when students were having difficulty responding to a question that I put to them, the cause of the difficulty was not clear-cut: It could have been (a) their lack of language skills, (b) their lack of analytical skills, (c) their lack of argumentative skills or (d) a combination of two or all three of them. I was unable to provide appropriate feedback until the cause was clear.

Fourthly, it was not easy to arrange the exercises in order of difficulty. This issue is closely related to the third kind of challenge mentioned above: As the level of difficulty of an exercise depended upon at least three factors, namely (a) the language, (b) students’ analytical ability and (c) their argumentative skills, what exercise was difficult for them to what extent in general seemed to be an insoluble question.
Concluding remarks

I have discussed argumentation as an area of TEFL where more attention is needed if learners are to learn to cope with crises in communication. For improving the quality of TEFL in that direction, two lines of research seem to be called for.

First, it will be necessary to ascertain the cause of the present situation in Japan as regards education in argumentation: Argumentation has never been treated as a key element in education; use of ‘logic’ will be covered in TEFL in Japan under the newest Course of Study in English, but the extent of the Ministry’s commitment to education in argumentation is unclear. This state of affairs may be a reflection of the mindset still prevalent in Japanese society; in fact, Suzuki (2019) pointed out some concrete manifestations of this. It is possible that, as argumentation as a decision-making process has not yet taken root in many parts of Japanese society, no sense of urgency is being felt in educational circles as yet about teaching it. Whatever the cause, shedding light on it will be the first step to changing the situation.

Secondly, in the TEFL community, it will be necessary to search for ways to establish and refine a new type of TEFL in which language skills and argumentative skills are combined as the general aim. It would be a subcategory of CLIL and could even be called ‘argumentation and language integrated learning,’ to name it after its superordinate concept. My own attempt in this regard, which I outlined above, is only of an experimental nature. Work needs to be done so that (a) aspects of argumentative skills are sorted out and organized into a syllabus and (b) specific expressions in learners’ target language are assigned to the items in the syllabus (despite the fourth kind of challenge mentioned in the previous section).

Whichever of the two lines of research one is to embark on, one needs to be aware of the danger of confusion in conceptualization, especially in the Japanese context. As I have pointed out in this presentation, the word ‘logic’ is used frequently in the newest version of the Course of Study for senior high schools to refer to a concept that encompasses both thinking critically and communicating thoughts. Debate, discussion and presentations are mentioned in it as suggested activities, but there are no explicit instructions that debate, as opposed to other activities, must be taught. From the way in which the Course of Study treats the teaching of the use of logic, some may surmise that the distinction between argumentation and critical thinking is not of essential importance. I would contend that, on the contrary, this distinction is actually at the very heart of the issue here. In order to handle crises in communication, learners of English need to do more than just think critically: They need to be prepared to face their antagonists. It is therefore crucial in conducting either of the two lines of research that the focus should be on argumentation, namely ‘a social activity directed at other people’ (Eemeren and Snoeck Henkemans, 2017, p 1), rather than on critical
thinking, which in theory could take place without an element of communication (although it is admittedly impossible to argue without mobilizing critical thinking skills).

In Japan—and the situation will not be much different elsewhere in the non-English speaking part of the world—there is a growing need for TEFL aimed at crisis management in communication. We teachers have the responsibility for identifying the skills that learners need for crisis management. The TEFL policy of the Japanese Government has started to change, but the question is to what extent and at what speed the day-to-day work in the classroom at schools and universities across the country can change.

Notes
1. This topic was originally discussed in Matsusaka (2017) and Maeda and Matsusaka (2006).
2. I am basically following Dewey (1910) who said ‘Active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends, constitutes reflective thought’ (p. 6) and ‘... uncritical thinking [is] the minimum of reflection’ (p. 13). The definition presented by the Foundation for Critical Thinking is in line with the above conceptualization: ‘Critical thinking is that mode of thinking — about any subject, content, or problem — in which the thinker improves the quality of his or her thinking by skillfully analyzing, assessing, and reconstructing it’ (Foundation for Critical Thinking, 2020).
3. I am basically following Eemeren and Snoeck Henkemans (2017, chapters 1 and 2). In argumentation, there is an element of communication: The arguer has another party with whom he or she needs to communicate.
5. This ministry was reorganized subsequently, in 2001, into what is now the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT).
6. There have been various theses about the components of communicative competence. See the following table.

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Based on the illustration on p. 43, which covers the period 1957-1995, and on the discussion on pp. 46-50, which corresponds to the 2008 column, in Celce-Murcia (2008).

7. Of the three levels of the subdivision, **English Communication I** shall cover ‘[d]iscussing and exchanging opinions on information, ideas, etc., based on what one has heard, read, learned and experienced,’ **English Communication II** shall cover ‘[d]rawing conclusions through discussion, etc., on information, ideas, etc. based on what one has heard, read, learned and experienced’ and **English Communication III** shall further develop what is listed under ‘English Communication II.’ The objective of **English Expression I** shall be ‘[t]o develop students’ abilities to evaluate facts, opinions, etc. from multiple perspectives and communicate through reasoning and a range of expression, while fostering a positive attitude toward communication through the English language’; **English Expression II** shall cover ‘[e]xpressing what one wants to say in a coherent and logical manner’ and ‘[d]eciding a stance on a topic open to a range of debates, organizing an argument, and exchanging opinions so as to persuade others’; moreover, as examples of functions of language to be covered in all the subdivisions under the subject English, the Course of Study lists ‘offering, agreeing, disagreeing, asserting, inferring and assuming,’ under the general heading ‘[e]xpressing opinions and intensions’ (MEXT, 2020b).

8. In the case of the University of Tokyo entrance examination, the weight of these questions is not made public but, it can be assumed not to be great from the length of the entire test.
9. It is common for a publishing house to publish multiple textbooks for the same subject aiming at students at various levels.

10. Critical thinking, as the term is used in Magoku and Erikawa (2019), means ‘creatively comment on the truth value of the information given in a text, analyze or evaluate the information, or state an attitude or way of thinking in response to a question given in the text’ (translation by Matsusaka). In fact, they cite the following question as an example of critical thinking questions:

Substitute your own words for the underlined parts of the following sentence and state what you yourself do for the protection of the environment (translation by Matsusaka).

I 

recycle my waste paper

in order to save forests [in order not to destroy forests.]

This definition is broader than the definition of the same term as I am using it in this presentation. On the other hand, what is called an exercise in inferencing in that study may be assumed to be one that requires what I call critical thinking. In any event, regardless of how great a discrepancy there is between the different definitions in question, one can say, on the basis of what was discovered by Magoku and Erikawa (2019), that, of all the exercise questions found in English Expression I textbooks, the proportion of ones that test what I call critical thinking skills is only 19% at the very most, which means that the proportion of questions that test their argumentative skills must be even smaller.

11. The following is a list of exercises given in the book:

(1) reading a passage and identifying the audience;
(2) finding a part of a passage where the author’s point is rephrased or summarized;
(3) identifying the problem that the author wants to address;
(4) distinguishing between the concrete and the abstract;
(5) finding items contrasted against each other;
(6) finding a cause-and-effect relation between points made in a passage;
(7) interpreting graphs and tables;
(8) identifying contentions, reasons and concrete examples;
(9) identifying contentions, reasons, concrete examples and hidden assumptions;
(10) locating expressions of concession;
(11) using deduction and induction.

12. I am referring to expressions related to specific topics like the ones I covered in the syllabus presented here rather than more general expressions found in argumentative discourse such as the ones identified by Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans (2007).
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Abstract
The power of epideictic, write Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, can be seen in the way argumentation instills dispositions in an audience, furthering the aim of durable responses (rather than immediate reactions). In this paper, I explore the role of argumentation in developing, sustaining, and activating dispositions. In particular, I am interested in how we use argumentation to teach values and thereby create dispositions, and I suggest the kinds of deep contextual treatments we can get from teaching argumentation schemes and their critical questions serve as a means to accomplish this.

It is not enough to change ideas; you have to change attitudes—Octavio Paz

Unlike deliberative and legal speeches, which aim at obtaining a decision to act, the educational and epideictic speeches create a mere disposition toward action—Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca

1. The many goals of argumentation

One thing we have learned over the last few decades is that argumentation is not only an interdisciplinary subject, it is also (perhaps because of this diversity) an activity that boasts different ways to contribute to our social well-being. Argumentation is core to inquiry, for example, to negotiation and to persuasion. It modifies environments in which

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1 Paz 1999: 52.
2 Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 54.
we interact, inserting, replacing and supplementing ideas that are important to our self-understanding and the understanding of others. It may assist in the resolution of disagreements; and it may promote the discovery of truth.

One of the important goals of argumentation is consensus building, and this involves exploring positions to arrive at understandings of those positions. This is also what goes on in education, and so is one way in which argumentation can operate there. In fact, as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) argued, there are important associations between argumentation and education, associations that can be explored to the benefit of both activities. What they have in common, we should recognize, is the identification and promotion of values. It was the alleged absence of values from models of argumentation that prompted the New Rhetoric project of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. They were concerned, alarmed even, that in spite of the enormous advances in civilization on so many fronts, the catastrophe of war was still able to erupt in Europe and throughout the world to disastrous effects. What was called for was a return to the human element in argument, and this in turn required a return to the importance of value, and hence to the Greeks for whom argument and value were intertwined.

The emphases involved in this return to value also help to address an apparent conflict at the heart of education generally. Consider: There is a tension at the core of any education program where, on the one hand, there is the aim to create people “like ourselves,” trained in looking at the world in the same way, caring about the same things, and holding the same values. Thus, ideas and values are instilled in order to further the society as an inert entity. Much of the work in argumentation theory that focuses on presumption appeals to such stability and continuity (Hansen, et al 2019). On the other hand, there is the aim to give students the tools to decide for themselves and come to reasoned judgment about what they will believe and what values they will hold. This aim anticipates change and implicitly values it. But it is a measured and not radical change and it operates against the backdrop of a stable community. As much as a tension is apparent between these two aims, the conflict may be no more than that—just apparent. We can reconcile them by identifying a set of common values that underlie both initiatives. Critical thinking, for example, is a social value, as important to the inculcation of accepted values as it is to the development of independence. The kind of reasoned judgement that it encourages and develops is required to fully understand the structure of one’s society and the values on which it is founded. Other values like reasonableness and the fairness involved in treating similar cases alike could be traced in both aims.

Taking a lead from several suggestions of Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, my approach to the question of how values are taught through argumentation is by examining the nature of dispositions (what they call “mere dispositions) and how argumentation can be seen to create such dispositions of character in people. Given that
dispositions are long-term features of a person’s character, I begin with a discussion of
durability in argumentation.

2. Time and the durable argument.

Not all arguments intend an immediate response. This is an idea that Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca stress in the New Rhetoric project. In their discussion of epideictic
rhetoric (to which I shall return), they write that the “intensity of the adherence sought is
not limited to obtaining purely intellectual results, to a declaration that a certain thesis
seems more probable than another, but will very often be reinforced until the desired
action is actually performed” (1969: 49). Several ideas are important here, such as the
concept of “adherence,” at which all argumentation aims (14). But for present purposes
what is noteworthy is the recognition of a delay between the presenting of the thesis and
the performance of the desired action. This interval (“whether long or short”) gives rise
to two consequences of note: (i) that it can be hazardous to evaluate the effectiveness of
a speech. Why? Because we do not necessarily know when it will be effective, or how
much reinforcement or repetition is required. And (ii) the adherence required by a speech
can always be reinforced (50). This openendedness—what might on other terms be
considered defeasibility—is an important but often overlooked feature of argumentation.
But it fits the circumstances of many educational models. I will return to this idea in
section 4 of the paper.

There is, then, an important element of kairos involved. It is not just a matter of
finding the right moment to speak, it is speaking to the delayed moment. Planting seeds
that will be awoken at the appropriate time. Kairos in argumentation also promotes the
invitational response and is sensitive to audience reception. Beyond the temporal sense
of kairos, there is alleged to be a proportionate sense that was common to both Plato and
Aristotle, this forms the basis of the theory of the mean (the right thing at right time and
so forth), and thus has an important ethical aspect that is relevant when questions of values
and education are at issue.³

The ethical thread has an important trajectory, tracking from Cicero’s discussions
of decorum through to Michael Leff’s (2016) contemporary account of this idea. Of
course, there is more than just the ethical involved here. The full sense of kairos speaks
to the “appropriate, as in the right balance” (Sipora 2002). In his essay “The Habitation
of Rhetoric,” Leff ties the kairotic interest in the “occasion” to his understanding of
“decorum.” “Decorum is the term that best describes the process of mediation and balance
connected with qualitative judgment.” As it applies to argumentation, decorum “works to

³ For a fuller discussion of the ideas in the following paragraphs see Tindale (2020a).
align the stylistic and the argumentative features of the discourse within a unified structure while adjusting the whole structure to the context from which the discourse arises and to which it responds. The locus of decorum always depends upon the particular case” (Leff 1987/2016: 159). There is a clear echo here of the judgment involved in Aristotle’s mean, weighing the circumstances of a case in order to decide on the best action to perform. Insofar as such actions have the reciprocal effect of reinforcing the right dispositions in a person’s character then the full import of kairos for human flourishing becomes clearer.

Giving attention to the opportune moment recalls Eric Charles White’s (1987) definition of kairos. White traces the concept to the ancient practice of archery, where an archer’s arrow must follow a particular, narrow path to its target. But it must also do so accurately and with a force required for penetration. This second feature is what can be transferred to our discussion. White concludes: “one might understand kairos to refer to a passing instant when an opening appears which must be driven through with force if success is to be achieved” (13). The kairotic moment, then, is that sudden moment of opportunity in which a speaker sees that a point can be pressed.

Such a moment recognizes a range of features arising in a situation, such as introducing ideas and withholding them. But it also recognizes another important aspect of the temporal tied to argumentative concerns: while sometimes we look to encourage an immediate response in an audience, and can measure uptake (and, perhaps, success) accordingly, a more engaged approach looks to the long-term. We argue not just to achieve a reaction now, but one that has durability, resulting in an action or a series of actions in the future. Again, “the right time,” is at issue, but it is a future time wherein an audience will be moved to act. The intervening time allows opportunities for repetition, reinforcement and revision.

3. Argumentation and Education: The Maieutic Effect

A complete picture of the human reasoner involves processes of the mind and body, reason and emotion, in all their intricate interaction. The model of the sterile reasoner devoid of emotional reactions, seen in figures like Socrates (as traditionally portrayed) or Sherlock Holmes, is a fiction. At times, perhaps, it is a necessary fiction when the focus of attention is on the power of deduction in human reasoning, but it is no less a fiction.

In his seminal paper on deep disagreements, Fogelin (1985) raises the importance of considering “a form of life” underlying human dispositions. He observes the presence

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4 See also the detailed analysis of Cicero’s concept of decorum in “Decorum and Rhetorical Interpretation: The Latin Humanist Tradition and Contemporary Critical Theory” (Leff 2016: 163-184).
not of isolated propositions, but “a whole system of mutually supporting propositions (and paradigms, models, styles of acting and thinking), if I may use the phrase, a form of life” (1985: 6). But he then proceeds:

I think that the notion of a form of life is dangerous, especially when used in the singular. We do better to say that a person participates in a variety of forms of life that overlap and crisscross in a variety of ways. Some of these forms of life have little to do with others. This explains why we can enter into discussions and reasonable arguments over a range of subjects with a person who believes, as we think, things that are perfectly mad (1985: 6).

Indeed, we can still trust the otherwise “mad” person on other subjects. Setting aside whether what is at issue here are multiple “forms of life,” what is being brought to our attention is that the kinds of inner conflicts we so routinely experience are the results of clashing beliefs and commitments.

The shift to the agent poses the suggestion that in order to understand others we must first understand ourselves. That understanding, may be a serious challenge in itself, and is certainly a discussion that warrants far more than could be extended to it here. What matters is that we appreciate the ways in which differentness and problems of comparability of values are assimilated in, and comprise natural features of, the living of lives.

Whatever way such forms of life evolve in an individual, education must have a formative role, laying stress on ideas and values that will interweave like the root ball of a plant. And when playwright William Boyd has one of his characters announce in his play “The Argument”: “I argue therefore I am” (Boyd 2016: 23), while he no doubt goes too far, in recognizing the importance of the “absolutely fundamental human activity” that is argumentation he is identifying a formative factor in the emergence of an individual. Indeed, argumentation contributes to the “cognitive carpentry” that “builds” persons (Pollock 1995) and goes further with its promotion of values and the instigation of related dispositions that are later expressed in thought and action.

I would suggest, then, that dispositions always operate within the distinctive parameters of an individual life (that is, they have no general, abstract quality), with its value-fed goals. And they are intimately related to the expression, understanding and achievement of those goals.

With the foregoing in mind, I return to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s discussion of the relationship between argumentation and education. It is Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s own return to the human through the focus on values that brings these two activities into alignment. This comes through the importance they pay to epideictic speech, the purpose of which is to increase an audience’s adherence to values. We should
recall that the epideictic took its place alongside the deliberative and forensic as one of the three Aristotelian genres of rhetoric. We might also recall that while the deliberative and forensic seemed to receive the more serious attention from Aristotle, each addressing audiences that served as judges, epideictic speech appeared “relegated” to a sort of “left-over” category, reserved for more ceremonial occasions and addressing a more passive audience of spectators. 5 For Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, however, the epideictic is elevated to the primary position for the very reason that it concerns values. The failure to appreciate this importance, they insist, “results from a false conception of the effects of argumentation” (49). Moreover, both of the other genres depend on it, for without such common values upon what foundation could deliberative and legal speeches rest? (52-3). We come then to a central passage in their discussion:

Educational discourse, like the epideictic one, is not designed to promote the speaker, but for the creation of a certain disposition in those who hear it. Unlike deliberative and legal speeches, which aim at obtaining a decision to act, the educational and epideictic speeches create a mere disposition toward action, which makes them comparable to philosophical thought. This distinction between kinds of oratory, although not always easy to apply, offers the advantage, from our viewpoint, of providing a single, uniform framework for the study of argumentation: seen in this way, all argumentation is seen only in terms of the action for which it paves the way or which it actually brings about. This is an additional reason for which we prefer to connect the theory of argumentation with rhetoric rather than with the ancients’ dialectic: for the latter was confined to mere speculation, whereas rhetoric gave first place to the influence which a speech has on the entire personality of the hearers.

There are a number of points to take note of here. Of prime importance is the assumed parallel between educational and epideictic discourse in sharing a goal of creating a disposition in those who hear. It is such a disposition that will account for the delay between argument and action that I drew attention to above. Deliberative and legal (forensic) speeches depend on such dispositions to induce actions. The “single, uniform framework for the study of argumentation” that is advocated aims at action. I imagine this needs to be broadly conceived, although this is a social model of argumentation. It is also a reason to favour rhetorical argumentation (and promote a new rhetoric) because it involves the entire personality.

5 Later (Rhetoric II.18.1), epideictic is also assigned an active audience that judges, but this change is often overlooked.
Keys terms circle each other here in an intricate pattern of involvement: argumentation, disposition, education, and personality. What might it mean to create “a certain disposition”? How is this a goal of education? And how does argumentation facilitate that goal? These are questions I wish to explore in the next section.

4. Dispositions

(i) What are dispositions?

In a very general way, dispositions are powers or tendencies towards some outcome. As vague as this definition is, it serves as a place from which to start. It also reflects the basic understanding that informs philosophical work in metaphysics, where dispositions are recognized as tendencies in things (like a stone is disposed to fall to the ground when released from a height), and the psychological work on attitudes, where dispositions are involved in character formation (as Aristotle had suggested).

The second of these threads is more relevant to my current concerns but let me first say a word about each of them. In metaphysics, dispositions can refer to a type of property, state or condition. This property, state or condition in turn provides for a future state or behaviour to arise. It thus provides a capacity or potentiality. Moreover, dispositions are thought to persist in the object in which they have been instilled. Thus, they continue to influence future states or behaviours (they are not fleeting).6

On the side of attitudinal psychology, we are in the domain of personality studies, many of which follow in the Aristotelian tradition. Drawing on the insights of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, whose theory of argumentation extends and amplifies the work of Aristotle, my discussion builds on that foundation. In the second book of his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle explains his doctrine of the mean—that position of moderate action balanced between extremes of excess and deficiency—by saying that excellence of character is a disposition in a mean. For each excellence of character (or virtue) a person can be said to be well-disposed in her or his judgments.7 Through habituation, they come to hit the mark at which they aim more readily or more often. And that habituation of right judgment somehow requires that the appropriate disposition be in place. In fact, there is reciprocity involved, since habitual performance of the right behaviour reinforces and strengthens the underlying disposition. We are creatures who are naturally moved to anger, or pity, or fear, and so forth. And these natural responses

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6 This précis is informed by the explanations in Mumford (1998) and Mumford (2003), to which the reader is referred for further discussion.
7 Hence, the importance of excellence (along with good will and practical wisdom) in the character of the rhetor (Rhetoric II. 1.5.)—one of a number of parallels between Aristotle’s Ethics and his Rhetoric.
can be trained to meet the emerging desires, goals and beliefs of individuals. While still subject to the possibility of error, dispositions established in a person’s character increase the likelihood over time of better outcomes. Learning how to respond to our emotional nature, we might suggest, is in part learning the cultural endorsements of specific emotional norms. And dispositions, once habitual, are hard to counter.

Jonathan Webber (2013) gives a detailed account of the attitudinal approach to dispositions that has implications for our interest in education. He notes that psychological research into the development of attitudes supports Aristotle’s insistence that habituation is crucial to character formation. Virtue ethics, as it has matured, emphasizes the importance of such a foundation for ethical knowledge. We learn more about what is fair or just from experience than we could do from attending lectures on justice. Because if we do not already have a sense of what is at stake, the theoretical ideas will have nothing to which to adhere. Adopting the right habits becomes important because the assimilation of understanding takes time. As Webber explains this: “Assimilation takes time because it requires repeatedly trying to understand situations in terms of justice and injustice and reflecting critically on one’s performance at this, in order to give content to one’s understanding of justice” (1088). Experience, reflection and judgment are brought together here in a way that does more than decide the appropriate action on any particular occasion; an understanding over and above that instance is assimilated in a way that reinforces a particular attitude. Not only might we become better at “getting it right” on future occasions, but we become disposed to do so.

For Webber, this points towards an understanding of “disposition” as “a power or tendency towards some outcome” (1093). And, this point about the psychological reality of character does not entail any position in the more general metaphysical debate about the nature of dispositions. This is helpful in understanding what dispositions are. Christian B. Miller (2014) concurs in his definition of a personality trait8: a personality trait is “A disposition to form beliefs and/or desires of a certain sort and (in many cases) to act in a certain way, when in conditions relevant to that disposition” (3). A response from the cognitive psychologist Antonio Damasio (1999), based on his experimental work in clinical neuropsychology, physiology and anatomy, is less definitive since he believes the content of dispositions can never be directly known because of their unconscious state and dormant form. We can “never know the contents of dispositions directly….They are abstract records of potentialities” (332). As Michael Burke (2011) glosses this, “[dispositions] can fleetingly come to life, “Brigadoon-like”, as mental images before they wane again into imperceptibility” (66).9 Still, this is largely consistent

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8 Although this is a definition of a “personality trait” and not a disposition per se, I take them to be synonymous for the purposes of this discussion.

9 Indeed, Damasio compares dispositions to the fictional Scottish town of Brigadoon, which was invisible to the outside world; with both of them “wanting to come alive for a brief period” (Damasio 1999: 332).
with what we have uncovered: potential states, activated from their dormancy by the right stimuli.

For both Damasio and Richard Wollheim (1999: 6-11) dispositions, while they act on and modify our mental lives, are never directly experienced and have no subjectivity. But they do have a psychological reality insofar as they have causal properties. At the same time, I would suggest, they can be experienced indirectly in the resistance we feel to breaking long-established patterns of behavior. Consider for example how difficult and unnatural people have found the call to self-isolate during a time of pandemic (Tindale 2020b). It becomes very difficult to act against our inclinations, whether that be performing an act of violence or failing to trust a friend or withdrawing from social contact. As a provisional definition of dispositions arising from this discussion, I will judge them as ‘durable tendencies of character to act in the future in regulated and relatively predictable ways’.

(ii) How are dispositions formed?

In addition to understanding the nature if dispositions, a major question for this discussion is whether or not a person possesses a particular disposition. The work of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca speaks clearly about the importance of instilling or encouraging certain dispositions. But left to be addressed in all of this is the how of the matter. Our interest in argumentation and education must be in how dispositions arise.

“Speech influences the entire personality of the hearers” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 54). We can now appreciate the depth of insight captured in this statement. It is not a casual remark but recalls the age-old power of language recognized in the rhetorical tradition together with the philosophical account of character recognized in the Aristotelian tradition. It announces the ways in which rhetorical argumentation modifies ideas in the cognitive environment, introducing, supplementing and reinforcing values.

I want to suggest that to know on the terms that I have been discussing, that is, to be disposed to see things a certain way, a way that consistently influences emotions, judgments and actions, is to be in possession of strong arguments that we hold with confidence (but not certainty) because they have, in Perelman’s terms, “survived all objections and criticisms” (Perelman 1963: 117), while remaining open to revision should further evidence come to light. Thus, positive character traits and appreciating strong arguments must work in tandem.

10 In a similar vein, Martha Nussbaum (2001: 69) draws a distinction between background and situational emotions to suggest what persists through situations of different types.

11 There are accounts of torturers having to be trained to behave against their natural inclinations, and subsequently requiring help to rebuild their lives (see Glover 2014: 326).
Also related to this question of how dispositions arise in an individual is the larger one of how values are instilled in a society, because dispositions activate those values, express and reinforce them. We know that values can be activated, reinforced, promoted, and encouraged through speech. We see this whenever a political leader appeals to values as an argument in support of certain practices or behaviours. For example: People should self-isolate because the community is supported by values of care and concern for others and self-isolation is the best way to express those values at this time. But how is argumentation brought into the activity of instilling values in the first place?

One way we use argumentation to instill values as well as to then promote them in a community or society is by arguing that specific people instantiate those values in some way. These are people who manifest the valued kinds of dispositional behaviour, who are looked up to because of positive qualities of their character, and in such arguments an appeal is made to those people (perhaps on a specific issue; perhaps generally). This is the understanding that informs the tradition of epideictic speeches that take the funeral oration as the paradigm. On such occasions, the qualities of an individual are praised in a way that the individual comes to represent a standard expressing those qualities and thus is someone to be emulated. This further recognizes the private, hidden (Brigadoon-like) nature of dispositions. We look for some public demonstration of them, as Aristotle pointed out (EN 1104b5), an outward sign of what resides within.

Some people are listened to more than others. We listen carefully to the views of those we respect, to people who have achieved a certain position in a community or organization, to people whose judgment we trust, like teachers or religious leaders. In fact, people can hold what we will call moral authority on issues for a number of reasons. One important way in which people hold a type of authority is by virtue of what they know. Informal Logic has approached such matters by developing analyses of the Appeal to Expert Opinion. But a person can be knowledgeable independent from having a strong character that warrants listening to their judgments. That is, experts can be people of poor character. So, appeals can be made that focus specifically on the character of a person rather than any knowledge they possess, and those appeals can be seen to have a regular pattern to their nature.

This is to turn attention to one of the more prominent tools of contemporary Informal Logic: argumentation schemes and their associated critical questions. Argumentation schemes are patterns of reason that have a common usage and that are defeasible. The patterns involve a series of sentential forms with variables that are replaced in actual arguments by the specifics of a case (See Tindale 2020c: 254). Schemes also have critical questions associated with them. These questions derive from the specific features relevant to each scheme (that is, they are “bottom-up” descriptions of how reasoning works rather than “top-down” prescriptions of how they ought to work).
Informal logician Robert C. Pinto (2001) insists that the normative force of an argument is not to be found in the way it exemplifies an argumentation scheme, but in the contextual considerations that reveal rhetorical factors specific to a case: “considerations that would justify the use of this sort of evidence in this sort of context to settle this sort of question” (Pinto 2001: 111). It can’t be the scheme itself that provides the validation of such presumptive reasoning, because the use of the scheme on any occasion itself requires validation. Thus, Pinto observes, the real value of analyzing argumentation schemes lies in the tool that the critical questions represent, this is where the rhetorical dimension involved becomes apparent. What I say below about “thick” descriptions is intended as an extension of Pinto’s insight: we need tools to open up the context as fully as possible, and critical questions serve this purpose in a particularly effective way.

The appeal to the person that I identified above has the alternative name of Ethotic Appeal. In this scheme, we see a thread linking the epideictic tradition to contemporary Informal Logic. The Ethotic Appeal relates to the attention the ancient Greeks gave to the importance of character in reviewing the rightness or wrongness of actions. As might be recalled, one of Aristotle’s three main sources of persuasive force was \textit{ethos}—that is, character. People can be persuaded, Aristotle thought, not just by what is said but also by who says it. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca extend the same idea to further actions (that is, not just speech acts) in the concept of “prestige”: that “quality of the person which is known by its effects” (1969: 303).

This argument scheme has carried some weight in the history of Western thought. For long periods, for example, it was judged disrespectful to challenge the views of \textit{the} Philosopher—Aristotle. He had achieved such a status within intellectual circles that there was a burden of proof in favour of anything he had said. That is, he was assumed to be correct, and anyone who thought otherwise bore the burden of showing so—if they dared. This respect for status was so strong that when John Locke first introduced the fallacy of \textit{ad verecundiam} (sometimes simply called the fallacy of authority) in 1690, it was based on the idea of feeling shame for having challenged someone who ought to be respected for the authority they hold.

It matters, of course, what supports the moral authority or status of the person appealed to. It could be the status of the office they hold (president; elder), or it could be some exemplary act or acts they have performed (in time of crisis, or for a charitable organization). Here is a version of the scheme, slightly adapted from Walton, Reed and Macagno (2008: 336):

\begin{itemize}
  \item P1: If a person is of good character, then what that person says should be accepted as more plausible.
  \item P2: \(a\) is a person of good character.
  \item Conclusion: Therefore, what \(a\) says should be accepted as more plausible.
\end{itemize}
This is a simple scheme, but such is the argument involved. Like other similar schemes it is unlikely to stand alone in making a case but would certainly constitute some of the contributory argumentation for doing so. Also, presented in this way, this scheme (like all argumentation schemes) is notably “thin.” But this is the skeleton on which greater detail is then laid. Informal argumentation schemes are considered to be defeasible—that is, where the argument is a strong instance of the scheme, the conclusion follows on the evidence, but further evidence might require a revision.

By identifying this pattern or scheme as thin, I suggest a contrast with what should be considered “thick.” After all, we might still wonder how dispositions can be encouraged by such a scheme, how, to recall the language I used above, experience, reflection and judgment can be brought together here to instill a disposition. Thin descriptions capture surface details and lack penetration, they are more—to follow Pinto—identification tools rather than evaluative; it is the "thick description" of an argument that adds features absent from that which report the minimum, the thin layer of premises and claims.12 Thick descriptions draw on and open up the argumentative situation in all its contextual variety. Thick descriptions facilitate reflection and judgment. For scheme theory, access to a thick description of an argument is through consideration of its critical questions. For this scheme, the questions are as follows:

CQ1: What grounds are there for believing that \( a \) is a person of good character and are those grounds plausible?

CQ2: Is character relevant in the argument in question?

CQ3: Is the weight of presumption claimed warranted strongly enough by the evidence given?13

All three questions take us beyond the thin description of the scheme’s structure and into the contextual details, the “total argumentative situation,” in which the scheme was first recognized. The first question seeks to establish the nature of the authority involved and the grounds on which it is established. “Good character” is notoriously vague and it needs to be left to the context to determine it. Still, the question ensures that we begin by looking at the nature of good character in the specific situation and what support has been provided for it.

The second question asks about the relevance of character to the argument in question. It is a question concerned to uncover what is at issue in the discourse. Some matters would seem to stand on their own merits irrespective of who says what about

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12 Elsewhere (Tindale forthcoming), I give considerably more attention to the distinction between thin and thick descriptions and its importance for argumentation.

13 Again, these are modified versions of the critical questions introduced by Walton, Reed and Macagno (2008: 336).
them. But other matters involve societal debates that bring to light the underlying values and the importance of embracing them.

The last question concerns how much weight the person supporting it has given to a claim. Again, this is something that can only be assessed in the context of a specific case. It involves the relationship between the power of character and the claim in the conclusion. Does the appeal make a difference to how we look at the claim, and if so, how much?

Of course, people do a lot of different things over the course of their lives and our opinion of them might change. As such, the Ethotic Appeal is also a fitting scheme to illustrate just how important the standard of defeasibility is in the use of argumentation schemes. This standard, you will recall, points to the ways in which the arguments involved remain open to revision even after they appear settled by the circumstances available to us.

Consider, as an example, the organization L’Arche and its founder Jean Vanier. The mission of this international organization, established in 38 countries including Canada and Japan (Muramoto and Kosaka 2017) is “to make known the gifts of people with intellectual disabilities, working together toward a more humane society.”

In 2015 Jean Vanier’s accomplishments were brought to wide attention after he was awarded the $2.1 million (Canadian) Templeton prize. This prompted a laudatory editorial in a national paper that involves a clear ethotic appeal:

The ideals of humanity, to say nothing of humanity itself, have been made better by Jean Vanier.

The 86-year-old Canadian, son of the 19th governor-general, disenchanted naval officer, restless philosopher and unbounded explorer of the soul, was awarded the $2.1-million Templeton Prize last week for his exceptional contribution “to affirming life’s spiritual dimension.”

Spirituality is too often defined within sectarian limits. But the values expressed by Jean Vanier, as he’s lived a humble life of compassion for wounded humanity, transcend the Biblical message and Catholic theology that inspired him.

In 1964, troubled by the grim state of psychiatric institutions he’d visited after finishing a doctoral dissertation on Aristotle’s principle of happiness, Mr. Vanier invited two mentally disabled men to leave their hospital and come to live with him in a French village.


15 The Templeton prize is an annual prize awarded by the Templeton Trust to a living person whose work harnesses the power of the sciences to explore deep questions.
This was the beginning of a now-global community called L’Arche, named for Noah’s Ark—a refuge. Drawing on his own transformative experience, Mr. Vanier saw how doing good was mutually beneficial—people without egos or an inflated idea of success brought their so-called normal counterparts down to size. By doing so, they awakened a sense of humanity lost in the combative world of ego, ambition and economic winners and losers.

In this challenging vision, it’s not until we share our lives with people who’ve been rejected by society that we come to recognize our own flaws and deeper needs. Mr. Vanier had the courage and the humanity to turn his spirituality into action. As his Templeton nomination eloquently states, he “exposed his ideas to the most challenging test of all—real people, real problems, real life.”

This epideictic praise clearly encourages consideration of the values that underlie the man: specifically, an ethic of care. Although any ethotic appeal here which is reduced to the argumentation scheme alone would be thin, the deeper evaluation of the reasoning prompted by the critical questions, and especially the consideration of the second premise of the scheme (Vanier is a person of good character) would involve a thick recovery of contextual features that bring to light the values involved and encourage a reflection on those values as ones to emulate: the encounter with those values promotes a dispositional attitude that will in turn arise in future actions of a similar kind.

Consider, for example, some of the statements in the editorial: “the ideals of humanity...have been made better by Jean Vanier.” The “values expressed by Jean Vanier” include humility and compassion; they involve values of shared experiences with people of very different mental capacities that result in mutual benefits to those involved. These ideas combine to give substance to the understanding of “good character” that this context supports, all of which would be part of a thick response to the first critical question.

But I introduced this case as a purported illustration of defeasibility, and some of my readers will already be eager to raise objections because they know how this story ends (or, at least, how it has continued). The case of Jean Vanier is indeed a striking example of the notion of revisability captured in the scheme’s feature of defeasibility. Jean Vanier was respected and admired throughout the world as the founder of L’Arche in 1964. This was a community where people with and without intellectual disabilities lived together on an equal footing. By 2020 there are 154 such communities in 38 countries. Vanier himself lived for decades in such a community and wrote extensively about the bonds of spirituality that united the members. All of this is reflected in the above account.

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Vanier died in 2019, and after his death the L’Arche authorities conducted an internal study based on rumours of improprieties on Vanier’s part. Made public in February 2020, the report corroborated six cases of sexual assault by Vanier on women associated with the organization. Although none of these women had disabilities, they had all struggled to gain a hearing in part because of the status of moral exemplar that Vanier enjoyed.

Such revelations should not undo the valuable work that Vanier did, but they do lead to necessary revisions of his status as a moral exemplar. Instead, he stands revealed as a flawed individual like any other (and this itself is a lesson to be acknowledged). Those conclusions of 2015 needed to be rethought. This is the recent judgment of several leaders of the organization:

> For many of us, Jean was one of the people we loved and respected the most. Jean inspired and comforted many people around the world ... and we are aware that this information will cause many of us, both inside and outside L’Arche, deep confusion and pain. While the considerable good he did throughout his life is not in question, we will nevertheless have to mourn a certain image we may have had of Jean and of the origins of L’Arche. “\(^{17}\)

Beyond what this instructs us about defeasibility, it has further lessons about the relationship between ethos and value—the person and his or her actions (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 293-305). That “durable being” or “stable structure” that underlies a person’s acts “permits us to prejudge” those acts. But the success in doing so depends very much on the accuracy of our information about the person in question. And this is where the import of the third critical question comes to the fore: CQ3: Is the weight of presumption claimed warranted strongly enough by the evidence given? In 2015, the answer to this was a confident affirmative. It is in the light of new evidence that the 2020 judgment about the person changes. It does recommend against placing people on pedestals that are too lofty. But I don’t think it undermines the argumentative strategy of using ethotic appeals to place the spotlight on community values and encouraging the adoption of those values and the appropriate dispositional attitudes that can follow. When we use argumentation in the services of education we are rarely in the domain of certainty, and when we deal with the complexities of social argumentation we are always in the domain of uncertainty. But the rewards of adopting effective strategies outweigh the perils that can accompany them. As we struggle to find and adopt strategies that connect dispositions with values, we are most concerned with the public expression of those

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17 [https://www.larche.org/news/-/asset_publisher/mQsRZspJMdBy/content/inquiry-statement-test, accessed June 18, 2020.](https://www.larche.org/news/-/asset_publisher/mQsRZspJMdBy/content/inquiry-statement-test)
values. Other aspects of character may indeed be left in the private sphere of individual life. But in the end, we detach the value from the life as any epideictic speech ultimately aims to do. That is the force of representation. The life with the character it possesses is a conduit to values presented, just as the centripetal force of argumentation aims to infuse those values into the characters of those who are learning. It is again related, as Aristotle observed, to habituation. We get better at recognizing the right kinds of cases, and we get better at acting in the right kinds of ways. We become better disposed.

5. Conclusion

In closing, I want to return to one of the points made in the introduction: the tension between being like “us” and being one’s own person; the tension between common values and the value of autonomy. The discussion of dispositions clearly promotes individuals over the societies from which they emerge. But that emergence is crucial, because as the Aristotelian lessons stress, we arise against a background of ready-formed values that we take up and express in our own ways. That earlier tension is founded on a mistake of thinking that common values require commonality of belief and actions. But experience tells us that we understand and live such values like fairness and compassion in quite distinct ways, ways that can even bring us into conflict over those values. This is what considering “forms of life” illustrates. And this is the nature of argumentation within the social realm.

We have further reinforced the insight of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca regarding the fundamental role that epideictic must play in argumentation and education involving values. While for some in the tradition, epideictic has been relegated to the sidelines while the important roles were extended to the deliberative and forensic genres, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca promoted it to the centre of our concerns for the very reason that it is essentially concerned with values and both of the other genres cannot escape the involvement of values (we do not deliberate, for example, in a value vacuum).

Argumentation has many uses, many goals. Among them is the modification of our cognitive environments and, as we have seen, the subsequent modification of the persons who operate in those environments. Following the remarks of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, I have tried in this paper to make some headway in understanding the importance of dispositions as part of this modification. Michael Burke (2011) adopted the term "disportation" to describe the kind of affective change that takes place in a reader as she engages a text (2011, p. 232). We are concerned with more than readers, but the import of affective change is similar: the whole person is transformed by argumentation. The deeper sense of cognition this involves is why the idea of the cognitive environment needs to be expanded to include not just belief, but also emotion and value (Tindale, 2016).
And the central role that the emergence of character plays in all of this is why education will always rely on argumentation.

References


Public Ears and Auditory Shields: Sound Spaces for Democratic Education

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John Dewey is credited with a philosophy of democratic education that identifies the conditions necessary for critical communication and pedagogical interaction to manifest. One such condition is that educational spaces must be insulated from the broader public and public life, and that education must itself be a vehicle for creating community. In this essay, I extend on Dewey’s work by arguing that sound plays a vital role in satisfying the condition that educational spaces must be separated from public life. I theorize an “auditory shield,” a practice that excludes the public ear from educational spaces and allows for play and experimentation with convictions and beliefs. To demonstrate how sound constitutes pedagogical interaction, I offer a case study of “the spread” in American style intercollegiate policy debate. I define spreading as the practice of providing as many arguments as possible within the time limits for a debate. While I apply this theory of the auditory shield to a set of intercollegiate American style policy debates, the argument is that the auditory shield can help explain a broader set of auditory publics, how they deliberate while navigating the public ear, and how sound constitutes the pedagogical interactions that produce dialogue and deliberation.

Keywords: Sound, Pedagogy, Auditory Shield, Debate, John Dewey

In Fall 2008, a reporter from the Las Vegas Review Journal, Richard Lake, came to report on the success of the local college debate team in Las Vegas, Nevada. When he listened to the first speech, he was horrified. He reported, the speaker “waves his arms, sucks in breaths so quick and deep he sounds like a dolphin. What comes out of his mouth seems ridiculous.” Lake smashed lines of letters together to illustrate how it might have sounded and wrote that it “made no sense” and remarked “it sounds like, one long string of unseparated words, like a comedic performance without the comedy.” The reporter confronted what is known in the debate community as “spreading.” Spreading describes the practice of speaking rapidly to offer as many arguments as possible within the time limits. And, for Lake, it was “completely incomprehensible.” Lake’s experience resonates for those who imagined competitive debate as an exercise in public eloquence but are shocked to find it is otherwise. Yet, those familiar with competitive debate, specifically American style policy debate, recognize that the activity’s aims are not training better public speakers, but better critical thinkers.

Many have noted that spreading produces critical thinking by asking students to calculate the best counter attacks, weigh outcomes, evaluate claims, and make tactical concessions. I am not interested in making these arguments—because these studies are primarily concerned with the students evaluating content of the speech—cleaving the content from sonorous form. Studies focusing on the content of speeches views debate as a disembodied series of reading texts. But, spreading also involves breath, vibrating vocal cords, and smacking lips. What is missing from studies about the content of debate speeches is sustained study of the sonic dimensions of spreading. In this context, sound is defined as “vibrating air molecules apprehended by the body and consciously registered as” culturally significant. Beyond overwhelming an opponent with reasons, spreading creates an auditory space for both sides in a debate to experiment with ideas.

In ordinary settings, students must contend with “public ears,” or a listening practice that assumes a spoken commitment represents convictions (people believe what we say). This essay argues spreading provides a paradigm case
of an “auditory shield,” which I define as the spontaneous creation of an ephemeral, sonorous space precludes the public ear from listening, and facilitates experimentation with commitment without fear of them being mistaken as a conviction. That is to say, it allows students to advance position they might not actually believe, to test out different positions, beliefs, and identities. Sound’s capacity to exercise form, flow, and force, enables the auditory shield to exercise unique forms of sonorous privacy that ensures students have mobile spaces to play with ideas, identities, and commitments without public risk of distraction or interference. This is a position that is underscored in an era when spaces are increasingly digitized, uploaded, and propagated. While an auditory shield does not guarantee the best protection, its sonorous qualities hold some hope of preserving spaces for democratic experimentation where people can play creatively with novel ideas before carrying them out in public life, enhancing their critical thinking skills.

The next section outlines John Dewey’s philosophy of education to explain the importance of critical experimentation as a foundation of democratic pedagogy. However, for experimentation of ideas to remain democratic, students need a space separate from the public, and an auditory shield is an example of such a space. I then apply the theory to the practice of spreading. Here, I turn to a personal performance of spreading, reviewing the many, contradictory positions circulating online. The key point is that the auditory shield makes it difficult, if not impossible for the public ear to make sense of what is said. Finally, I conclude by speculating on the cacophony of auditory shields.

The essay offers two interventions. First, this work extends into sound studies and pedagogy. Christopher McRae and Keith Nainby explored “listening in the classroom as a starting place for considering what a pedagogical emphasis on an ethic of listening might sound like” by arguing that listening is “a necessary constitutive element” of pedagogy that reveals “our ethical relation to one another.” I extend this work by moving from ethics to politics, arguing that sound provides pedagogical resources that facilitate a robust democratic culture. When sound creates enclaves for people to test commitments and eventually forge convictions, it enhances democratic decision-making. Second, the auditory shield intervenes in the sub-discipline of debate pedagogy and its influence on democratic education. While the experimental “switch side” format is integral to most debate pedagogy; very few have considered its sonorous elements. A more robust account of the sonority enables study of the practice outside the logocentric language of “strategic trade-offs” that are common to prior research on debate pedagogy.

DEWEY’S PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRACY, EDUCATION, AND PUBLIC LIFE

The relationship between education and public life centers on the democratic potential of learning environments. Some suggest that pedagogical interactions connecting education and public life ought be a process that directly involves the public ear for dialogue and experimentation. Rosa Eberly called for students and academics to become citizen critics, where individuals gather in public and deliberate over issues of common concern. However, I diverge from this line of research on pedagogy and democratic citizenship, since if individuals in learning environments are viewed as citizen critics, then anything they say may become an assumed belief. The pressure that anything said in public sticks as a potentially permanent belief would chill speech and experimentation. For some students, they need an opportunity to fail with ideas, before they are held accountable for those ideas. Or, they may need to advocate and test those ideas, before they are held accountable to those beliefs. There must be a space for playing with ideas without the possibility of public sanction.

John Dewey argued that educational environments create space for members of a community to develop shared values, a sense of social identity, and to test ideas. Dewey is credited with a comprehensive theory of the relationship between education and democratic experimentation in his germinal works, Philosophy of Education and The Public and its Problems. Members of a society need educational spaces to explore ideas and to figure out who they are, individually and collectively, by testing those ideas. Dewey contrasted educational spaces and public life by arguing that the former was a necessary condition to produce the latter. He claimed, “If we do not ask what are the conditions which promote and obstruct the organization of the public into a social group with definite functions, we shall never grasp the problem.” The public, Dewey argued, is a
“community as a whole,” involved in “not merely a variety of associative ties which hold persons together in diverse ways, but an organization of all elements by an integrated principle.”

Individuals with associative ties beyond temporal and geographical localizations, in Dewey’s view, were “too narrow and restricted in scope to give rise to a public.” Although education is a cornerstone of the general public, pedagogical interaction must constitute itself free from the complexity and influence of forces outside of educational spaces.

As a foundation of public life, Dewey conceived of pedagogy as a series of educational spaces where students could form and shape their mental and moral dispositions. However, to accomplish this goal, educational spaces could not be open to the entire public for two reasons. First, educational spaces function as simplified social organs. The public, Dewey claimed, is too complex for students to be assimilated in toto, meaning that educational spaces gradually introduce its members to “Business, politics, art, science, religion,” and more. In other words, the intimacy of learning environments prepares students for the social and political arenas they may eventually enter. This is not to say educational spaces lack social qualities or that they are entirely disconnected from public life. “Many private acts are social,” Dewey argued; “their consequences contribute to the welfare of the community or affect its status and prospects.”

Educational spaces have bestowed communities with “works of art, with scientific discoveries, because of the personal delight found by private persons in engaging in these activities,” making the exclusivity of such spaces “socially valuable both by indirect consequences and by direct intention.” The social value of an educational space extends beyond creation and discovery. It also indirectly teaches students to take risks, becoming open and vulnerable to alternative, unfamiliar, and sometimes-uncomfortable perspectives.

Second, educational spaces are free from the influence of outside stakeholders. According to Dewey, educational spaces, insulated from public life, could free its inhabitants from the influence of social and political environments to which they ordinarily belong, allowing them to test ideas from new perspectives. He claimed that students participating in dialogue with multiple perspectives created a private, transactional learning process that prepared them for tackling public problems later on:

When A and B carry on a conversation together the action is a trans-action . . . the activity lies between them; it is private . . . The public consists of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared for.

This transactional process, Dewey argued, was “the line between private and public,” a line that was “to be drawn on the basis of the extent and scope of the consequences of acts which are so important as to need control, whether by inhibition or promotion” in order to maintain learning environments as an experiential medium. Without separating educational spaces and public life, “they tend to encroach on one another.” If public life encroaches on the sanctity of education, the moral and social quality of pedagogy suffers.

Dewey contended “effective moral training” could only occur in educational spaces if certain conditions were met. The most significant condition for an educational space to thrive is that it must “be a community life in all which that implies. Social perceptions and interests can only be developed in a genuinely social medium – one where there is give and take in the building up of a common experience.” To be a genuinely social medium, educational spaces must be set apart from public life, yet form “a miniature social group in which study and growth are incidents of present shared experience.” The ideal educational space for Dewey was “a special territory” for individuals that could form “the whole ground of experience,” yet “remain within its own boundaries.”

While Dewey theorized an educational space insulated from the public, he was primarily conjuring a material space. Since the “ultimate value” of an educational space was determined by its “distinctively human effect,” Dewey called for “direct tuition or schooling” as the desired site of learning. Learning was most likely to succeed in specific material spaces, when “Intentional agencies—schools—material—studies—are devised.” Building intentional agencies for learning, like the schoolhouses Dewey imagined, were the most effective avenue to “transmit all the resources and achievements of a complex society.”

The physical structure of a school was the primary means for insulating education from public life and regulating learning. Dewey argued that “the only way in
which adults consciously control the kind of education which the immature get is by controlling the environment in which they act and hence think and feel. We never educate directly, but indirectly by means of the environment.”

To shape educational environments, members of the community could weed out undesirable influences, omit things from the environment, “and to see to it that each individual gets an opportunity to escape from the limitations of the social group” they were born in, coming “into living contact with a broader environment.”

Since schools were material sites that were “deliberately regulated” for educative effect, Dewey treated them as “the typical instance of environments framed with express reference to influencing the mental and moral disposition of their members.”

However, because of the available communication technologies at the time, Dewey may not have explicitly imagined the potential for educational spaces to be defined by not just their static material properties, but also by their sonic properties.

There may be temptation to treat educational spaces as static, material entities. Starting with sound, this essay expands how pedagogical interaction is understood; beyond a material, static site for learning, toward a sonorous activity that can be created anywhere. It begins that expansion by asking questions like: How do educational spaces sound? Who can listen to what happens in an educational space? What are the acoustics of those spaces? These are important questions; the answers have strategic effects on pedagogy, the parameters of professional communities, and the boundaries between public and private.

THE PUBLIC EAR AND THE AUDITORY SHIELD

Ordinary, everyday argumentation involves offering conclusions and supporting them with data. Yet, rarely is an argument so explicitly formulated in common discourse. People do not make conclusions and data so explicit. An auditor must rely on sonorous cues like inflection, emphasis, and pause to make sense of an argument and reconstruct it. The kind of listening involved in the process of arguing with others in the role of citizen is generally called the public ear. The “public” acknowledges the dynamic social nature of engaging anyone in their capacity as a fellow member of a community. A public ear is related to, but different from what Justin Eckstein called a public mode of audition. While Eckstein used a public mode of audition to underscore how some sounds supply generic topoi for an arguer to draw from to offer a reason to do something, the public ear describes how we listen to argumentation as an interactional activity. The public ear describes how citizens listen to others arguing over what is in the interest of the common good. Such an act asks citizens to reconcile the costs and benefits of a potential policy action to the community against any possible ethical implications. Listening to a member of the public relies on a series of audible assumptions required to reconstruct ordinary language into a series of propositions and statements, complete with assumptions to turn vibrations into audible sound. In addition to interpreting linguistic content, the public ear involves a meta-assessment of sincerity of a speaker’s proposal. When someone advocates positions in public, the public believes that person is genuinely advancing her position. Most often, the person believes the position they have staked out, it is their conviction; an advocate would not risk being wrong in public if they did not believe in their cause. In short, the public ear operates to suggest that a public commitment is a conviction. Sincerity has a ring to it; conviction has a tone, a volume, and a resonance.

While the public ear allows for citizens to meet in the public square to debate over the costs and benefits of a position, citizens also need strategies to evade being tied to a conviction in order to formulate beliefs. An auditory shield
provides a temporary reprieve from the public ear to experiment with ideas. As Dewey indicated above, enclaves for belief formulation are especially important. Yet, in the digital age, students may fear that their static learning environments may not be safe for exploring identity positions, ideas, or advocating for unpopular beliefs without the distraction of public interference. The notion of a space must be tweaked to accommodate that rapidly changing nature of our contemporary moment to recognize the realization that classrooms themselves are becoming enclaves that are shaping public discourse.

As a strategic tool, sound provides three ways to exclude the public through its form, force, and flow to create different kinds of privacy. Sound can manipulate intensity, frequency, and timing that may require virtuosity to discern (form), it can increase or slow down the speed of a sound (flow), or it can amplify sounds (force) in ways that are designed to exclude the public ears. Any one of these vectors can be used to exclude the public ear and create an auditory shield and enable free experimentation. The form of an auditory shield may require some kind of virtuosity to discern a source of information available only to members of that community. For example, a group that primarily communicates via telegraph would need to understand Morse code in order to interpret messages. The flow of an auditory shield may have a high velocity, moving at a rate outsiders do not understand. As this essay demonstrates with the practice of spreading, only a community trained to listen to speech at high rates of delivery can understand what is being said. Or, the force of an auditory shield may simply be too much for an outsider to withstand. 32 It is important to note that an auditory shield may form if any one or more of these three characteristics are present. The form, force, and flow of sound may each provide an invitational site to create an auditory shield.

Ultimately, the creation of an auditory shield demands unique modes of audition for its members, and when the need for argumentation between members arises, a set of judges or “referees” to evaluate the arguments made by those members. 33 Beyond evaluating claims in the content of a speech, the form of communication itself will have characteristics unique to a private group. When considering the sonority of a speech act, private sounds require specialized modes of audition, providing degrees of intimacy to the speakers. Given the expertise needed to meet the demands of a specialized knowledge form, members of the public are unlikely to offer substantive contributions for evaluating the arguments made by requisite experts. The lack of public oversight also allows members to loosen convictions, exploring potential avenues without being beholden to the whims of public popularity. This allows space for democratic experimentation and informed judgments. As this essay makes clear, the capacity for members of a community to produce democratic judgments on a range of issues depends on auditory privacy to keep the influence of outside stakeholders at bay.

In the next section, I demonstrate how an auditory shield functions by analyzing a series of speeches that occurred during an intercollegiate debate tournament. A debate tournament occupies an in-between zone; students are debating issues of public concern. Even though students are in a school building, they must contend with the public ear, they are debating issues concerning the common good. Yet, students rarely offer positions in a competitive debate that align with their convictions. A debate tournament employs a method known as “switch side” debate, which Gordon Mitchell noted is a “malleable method of decision making, one utilized by different actors in myriad ways to pursue various purposes.” 34 Debaters “switch sides” by defending one side of a controversy in one debate competition and then defend the opposite side of that controversy in the next. While debate utilizes an insular jargon that excludes the public, it is the form, flow, and force of spreading that precludes public apprehension of what is being discussed, provides auditory privacy, and a pedagogical space to play with commitments and form convictions.

AMERICAN STYLE POLICY DEBATE AND “THE SPREAD”

The goal of spreading in a debate is to overwhelm an opponent with arguments, force concessions, and exploit those concessions. This practice is accomplished by speaking as quickly as possible, modulating tone, rhythm, and breath to maximize words per minute. Many debate practices spend time on “speed drills” to increase debaters’ speed. If debaters are not fast, they will get “spread out of a round,” they will be unable to keep up with all of the arguments, make too many concessions
and lose. Some speed drills include asking debaters to read evidence for thirty minutes at maximum speed to increase endurance, others might ask debaters to randomly increase vowels to enhance clarity, and other may tell debaters to read backwards to remove the need to read for comprehension. In competitive debate, the team who wins is often decided by how much of that team’s arguments are addressed or conceded by their opponents. Spreading allows a team to overwhelm an opponent with arguments, increasing the likelihood that the opponent will be unable to address all of the arguments in the given time limit.

The rise of spreading in competitive debate can be traced back to chronicles in the Journal of the American Forensics Association (JAFA), the journal of record for the National Debate Tournament, in 1968. In his study of rate of delivery in the final round of the National Debate Tournament from 1968 to 1980, Kent R. Colbert found that “the average (speaking rate) of all debaters observed in this study has risen from about 200 wpm (1968) to 270 wpm (1980).” Colbert extended his study into 1985 and found upward trend with speeds around 300 wpm.36

The following speeches I analyze are from American style intercollegiate policy debates sanctioned by the National Debate Tournament. In this switch-side debate format, a single controversy area and corresponding resolution is chosen for the entire academic year. Throughout a given season, debate teams conduct an abundance of research as arguments and strategies develop. It is not uncommon for individual members of policy debate teams to conduct research equivalent to a thesis project to satisfy requirements for a Master’s degree. Policy debate teams prepare both a set of affirmative propositions and negative strategies that respond to the range of all potential affirmative propositions other teams may offer. Debate teams travel across the nation and compete against other colleges and universities at tournaments during the course of a season.

The controversy area for the 2011-2012 American policy debate season centered on the U.S. response to protest movements in the Middle East and North Africa, known as the Arab Spring. Specifically, the resolution for the topic was “Resolved: The United States Federal Government should substantially increase its democracy assistance for one or more of the following: Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen.” This topic was introduced to debate significant issues revolving around whether or not the United States should assist protest movements achieve a peaceful transition in the aforementioned countries or whether such intervention would cause unnecessary interference.

Key arguments developed by affirmative teams included an obligation for the United States to reduce instability caused by state-sponsored crackdowns on protest movements, the need to maintain U.S. leadership in the Middle East and North Africa, and the benefits of reducing the sphere of influence other great powers, such as China or Russia. Conversely, negative teams relied on arguments that included the risks of incidentally propping up authoritarian regimes, overstretching the U.S. military, and criticisms of promoting democracy and meddling in elections of other nations. Clearly, the core controversies established by this topic required debate teams to take contradictory positions that often introduced highly sensitive issues. As a result, it was important that competitors did not feel pressured by the influence of outside stakeholders and the public ear when taking such positions.

I analyzed speeches from three debates from the 2011-2012 season, all of which occurred at one policy debate tournament. Each debate features the same two-person policy debate team from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV), competing on both sides of the resolution against a different university. In the debate against “Team A,” UNLV argued for a policy increasing local governance assistance in the Republic of Yemen in order to blunt the threat of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Then, in the debate against “Team B,” UNLV refuted a policy calling for military education democracy programming in Egypt. Finally, in the debate against “Team C,” UNLV took a unique approach, proposing that the youth movement in the United States join forces with protest movements in the Arab Spring as a rejection of U.S. democracy assistance. The key point is that UNLV made contradicting arguments in each debate, arguments they may not have made in reach of the public ear. In the first debate, UNLV was in favor of democracy assistance, while in the second and third debates, UNLV opposed democracy assistance. Despite the series of contradictions in their positions between debates, the content of each debate was highly informative and tested a variety of arguments from multiple perspectives.
Debate #1: Affirmative versus Team A

Against Team A, on the affirmative, UNLV made a number of controversial claims that, if mistaken for their convictions, may have invited public backlash. These claims included arguments that making drone strikes more effective was an ethical act, that the U.S. had an obligation to defeat a group characterized as a terrorist organization, and that imperialism was a necessary evil. While none of these claims necessarily represented the team’s convictions, they certainly represented the team’s commitments in the debate given the policy they had proposed and the arguments presented by the negative in response.

UNLV proposed the following policy: “The United States Federal Government ought to substantially increase its local governance assistance for democratic capacity-building to Shaykhs and the Yemeni Youth Movement in the Republic of Yemen.” They made two arguments to support this policy. First, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was a growing threat in Yemen. This threat would culminate in three types of attacks on the United States, an attack involving the use of bioweapons, an attack on domestic forests resulting in mass forest fires, and an attack involving the theft of nuclear material. Second, UNLV argued that supporting local populations in Yemen’s regime transition was necessary for a peaceful transition. This support would encourage Yemeni civilians to cooperate with the United States and form a human intelligence network, increasing the effectiveness of U.S. drone strikes targeting members of AQAP.

UNLV’s arguments in their debate against Team A required several controversial commitments. First, they claimed that existential threats, such as an AQAP attack, must be prioritized over epistemological considerations, including whether or not the motivations for their policy were ethical. This was a sensitive position given debates heard by the public ear about the ethicality of U.S. drone strikes. Second, they argued that realism was the most accurate theory of international relations, and the AQAP threat was legitimate and true, another commitment that was highly contested in public deliberation. Third, UNLV claimed that criticisms of security logic would not affect the U.S. realist approach to Yemen, nor would they stop AQAP. UNLV’s fourth argument was that a U.S. imperialist agenda was inevitable; it was only a question of its effectiveness. In other words, UNLV adopted a commitment that if the AQAP threat was legitimate, action was necessary, even if the motivations for doing so were unethical. Finally, UNLV’s most controversial commitment was that abandoning U.S. imperialism was itself an unethical act, since U.S. leadership had prevented global conflagration since World War II and that the alternative was the rise of other great powers, such as China or Russia, advancing an equally imperialist agenda.

UNLV and Team A argued about several complex social and political issues, made clearer by utilizing competition as a simplified social organ for learning. At its conclusion, UNLV had covered topics including: international relations, democracy promotion, civil instability in the Arabian Peninsula, U.S. imperialism, the motives of non-state actors to incite terrorism, and the relationship between the War on Terror and drone strikes. The auditory shield created by spreading created sonic distance between the debate and outside stakeholders. Fear of distracting interference from a university, certain Internet groups, or even government officials, would no doubt implicate UNLVS’ ability to play and experiment with sensitive issues pertaining to the ethics of U.S. democracy promotion.

Debate #2: Negative versus Team B

Against Team B, while on the negative, UNLV made a number of controversial claims that posed a risk of public rebuke. These claims included a call to eliminate democracy assistance for Egypt, that Iran did not pose a threat to Middle Eastern or North African stability, that democracy assistance would mobilize the Egyptian military to foment a coup and take over the Egyptian government, and that a relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood was desirable. These claims did not necessarily represent UNLV’s convictions, but rather their commitments given the policy their opponents had proposed and the arguments needed to refute it.

Team B proposed the following policy: “The United States Federal Government should offer military education democracy programming in Egypt to substantially increase Egyptian participation in military education democracy programming.” Team B made three arguments to support this policy. First, they argued growing protest movements in Egypt made it likely that the Egyptian Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) would crack down on protestors, resulting in failure of Egypt’s transition to a democracy. A failed transition presented an
opportunity for Iran and Israel to engage in proxy conflicts, leading to an escalatory war. Second, the U.S.-Egyptian alliance was necessary for the U.S. to maintain its global leadership, dampening the likelihood of conflict. Third, Team B’s policy could alleviate these risks by offering Egypt military-to-military cooperation via the Expanded-International Military Education and Training program (E-IMET). This cooperation, they claimed, would improve civil-military relations in Egypt, allowing Egyptians to maintain civilian control of their government. UNLV refuted Team B’s policy with five arguments. First, UNLV argued that, rather than increasing democracy assistance to Egypt altogether. This was a controversial commitment at the time given burgeoning conversations heard by the American public ear to support democratic protest groups in Egypt. Second, UNLV claimed democracy assistance in Egypt was unpopular with the Egyptian public, military, and government. Augmenting U.S. democracy assistance in Egypt, UNLV argued, would cause anti-American populism. The implicit commitment that underscored this argument was that the reaction by Egyptians who preferred authoritarian rule outweighed the calls for help from democratic protesters. Third, UNLV argued that democracy assistance to Egypt was unnecessary because there was no risk of Iranian or Israeli aggression in North Africa. This commitment would have obviously drawn criticism if heard by the public ear, since there has been a constant debate in U.S. discourse about the looming threat of the Iranian nuclear program and support for Israel. Fourth, UNLV claimed the SCAF would control the media spin of the aid package, drumming up public support for a military coup and causing the peaceful transition to a democracy in Egypt to fail, resulting in the Muslim Brotherhood radicalizing. UNLV contended this would change Israel’s strategic calculus, making a war between Iran and Israel more likely. Finally, UNLV argued that phasing out U.S. democracy assistance to Egypt would ensure the Muslim Brotherhood remained moderate, enabling a peaceful transition to an Egyptian democracy and a sustained U.S.-Egyptian alliance. If mistaken for a conviction by the public ear, this argument may have been understood as UNLV calling for the U.S. to actively support the Muslim Brotherhood, a position that may have proven unpopular.

In this debate, the auditory shield created by spreading created distance between the debate and the influence of outside stakeholders. The fear of being characterized as unpatriotic for criticizing the military, of right-wing backlash to calling for an end to foreign aid to Egypt, or even a pro-Zionist critique for arguing that Iranian threats to Israel were overblown, would no doubt implicate UNLV’s ability to play and experiment with sensitive issues pertaining to the role that the U.S. military plays overseas.

Debate #3: Affirmative versus Team C

Against Team C, while on the affirmative, UNLV took a non-traditional approach by refusing to advocate a policy proposal to increase democracy assistance to any of the countries included in the resolution. Instead, UNLV argued that democracy assistance was unethical, a commitment that directly contradicted the one that UNLV adopted in the debate against Team A. While U.S. citizens have rights that afford them the freedom to criticize the federal government and its policies, the arguments UNLV made in this debate certainly risked their public face and could have incited interference from those in public earshot.

UNLV proposed the following advocacy statement: “The topic countries should provide democracy assistance to the youth movement in the United States.” UNLV made five key arguments to support this advocacy. First, the epistemological justifications for democracy assistance policies rely on the logic of economic exploitation and imperialism. They cited democracy promotion policies in Iraq from the George W. Bush presidency as an example of how claims of building democratic nations can be a veneer for more sinister objectives. Although support for the Iraq War had dwindled, the commitment that democracy assistance was a ruse for economic imperialism may have drawn harsh criticism from public supporters of the democratic protest movements overseas. Second, UNLV argued that foreign aid packages in general and democracy assistance programs in particular are crafted out of calculated, strategic interest. UNLV claimed that the United States offered democracy assistance programs to nations it perceived as hostile in order to monopolize its own form of democracy and to build alliances that would help advance its imperialist agenda overseas. Third, they contended that economic exploitation in foreign nations was the most accurate historical explanation for the rise of racist, imperialist,
movement in the United States needed to join the growing anti-imperialist, anti-racist youth movement in the United States to reclaim a form of democracy devoid of imperialist undertones. Members of the public may have likened this line of thinking to groups such as Occupy Wall Street, groups that were not universally popular in public discourse. Finally, UNLV argued that this combined movement would position U.S. citizens as the students of the unfolding democratic revolution, and not its professors. In taking this approach, powerful youth who would eventually have their hands on the levers of power could abandon the type of colonial management the U.S. had long employed through the façade of democracy assistance and promotion packages.

If the public ear had heard all of UNLV’s debates at this lone tournament, they may have been confused or even outraged. Against Team A, UNLV advocated for democracy assistance, claiming it was necessary for the U.S. to be involved in Yemen’s transition to a democracy. Against Team B, UNLV advocated for phasing out democracy assistance in Egypt to maintain a strong U.S.-Egyptian alliance. Against Team C, UNLV advocated against democracy assistance, claiming it increased economic and imperialist exploitation; thereby criticizing the types of government-to-government alliances they defended against Team B.

The ability for UNLV to advocate the plethora of positions taken during one debate tournament reflects Dewey’s call for educational spaces that permit entry-level access to complicated social and political issues and to be able to share those ideas in the process of collective learning. There were clearly arguments presented in each debate that, if mistaken for UNLV’s convictions or beliefs, would incite backlash from outside stakeholders. Fortunately, the auditory shields provided by spreading enabled the competitors to engage in democratic, educational experiments over the issues without fear of being reprimanded for engaging in playful pedagogical interaction.

ASSESSING THE AUDITORY SHIELD IN SWITCH-SIDE DEBATING

Although this essay’s analysis of three American style policy debates begins from the starting point of the material status of a competition room, the static location of the debates did not factor at all into exploration of the auditory shield. In fact, the focus was on the vocality of the speaker, the topics discussed, and how they were communicated. The auditory shield shines light on the mobile potential of democratic learning environments. Had the competitor analyzed not engaged in spreading, then the material elements of the space, such as the walls of the classrooms, may not have protected them from the reach of the public ear. The form, flow, and force of spreading made it much more difficult for the public ear to conflate the content of the speeches with the speaker’s convictions because the auditory shield was only accessible to those participating in the switch-side debate format, individuals accustomed to the acoustics of a speaker rapidly delivering information, the force of the delivery bouncing off of the walls. Given the propagation of American style policy debates online and the mobility of an auditory shield, particularly the practice of spreading, the competitor analyzed needed the ability to turn the shield on or off depending on the space in which discussion was occurring.

When an auditory shield is not in play during a competitive debate, particularly if a recording of the debate is circulated online, the public ear has access to the content of the discussion and the participants lose control of their dialogue, subject to attention by outside stakeholders. For instance, in fall 2012, during an intercollegiate policy debate at Harvard University between the University of Oklahoma and the University of West Georgia, the participants spoke at a much slower speed than is typical of intercollegiate policy debates and tackled sensitive issues involving structural racism. The University of West Georgia offered a critique of whiteness, advocating for a metaphorical “end to white life.” This metaphor was not a suggestion that white folks literally die, but rather that life as we know it, life that structurally disenfranchises black
people, must end. Several online periodicals obtained footage of the debate, spliced up portions of speeches, and published editorials about “white genocide” with inaccurate information about intercollegiate policy debate that spread like wildfire. The Daily Wire referred to the debate as “insanity,” labeling the debaters from West Georgia “pro-genocide activists.” LifeZette magazine published a similar editorial, mistakenly labeling the debaters from West Georgia “Black Lives Matter student activists” that were calling for white debaters to commit suicide. Although the gap created by debating multiple sides of an issue and debaters’ personal convictions yields the potential for switch-side argument to emerge “as the proper method of adjudicating disputes in a democratic culture,” it must be done with the protection of an auditory shield, else it risks drawing unwanted attention from those that cannot separate competitive debating from participants’ personal convictions. While this essay provided one example of what this may look like in the world of competitive debate, there are many examples of debate rounds that circulate online and become subject to distracting public interference when they are not protected by an auditory shield.40

Reception to intercollegiate policy debates by the public ear demonstrates why Dewey called for educational spaces that are insulated from the influence of outside stakeholders who may have interests that exceed or contradict the issues discussed in learning environments. When outside stakeholders become involved in intimate learning environments, the possibility of a dangerous form of distraction is heightened. The danger is that public involvement in technical or intimate dialogue may conflate individuals’ commitments and convictions in the democratic experimentation process or shift the focal point of the conversation altogether. If these are the outcomes, individuals’ ability to utilize learning environments as a space for free play with ideas is hampered, undermining democratic potential, assigning static properties to interlocutors, and preventing them from carrying out their ideas in public life. The auditory shield allows for switch-side debate “to animate rhetorical processes such as dissoi logoi,” offering a sonorous umbrella of protection for participants. Despite the clear contradictions in UNL V’s arguments between debates, each set of arguments is the product of rigorous research, tackling significant issues and producing knowledge from a multitude of perspectives, forming a bond between debate and deliberation.

The rapid rate of delivery in the switch-side debate format, combined with the auditory privacy it affords, allows for community members to engage in socially valuable dialogue, gently introducing complex ideas and problems that impact the health of democracy and public life. This format enables students to discover politics, art, science, and religion, covering a wide breadth of topics without the overwhelming task of being fully assimilated into large social organs. While Dewey may have imagined a more static, material-learning environment, the auditory shield reveals how educational spaces have dynamic and mobile potential when specific sonorous elements are in play. Sonic activity may function as a mechanism for auditory privacy, but also as the foundation for pedagogical interaction in the first place.

The auditory shield is a necessary tool to carve space for pedagogical interactions without fear of social or political influence from public life. Auditory privacy enables educational spaces to serve their ideal purpose, to function as a special territory for study, growth, and shared experience through a give and take that culminates in effective moral training. Without the protection of an auditory shield, the line between educational spaces and public life becomes blurred, leading to Dewey’s fear that the social and political predispositions of the public ear would encroach on pedagogical interactions occurring in educational spaces. The above example demonstrates what that encroachment may look like, when a group of online periodicals acquired video footage of an intercollegiate debate not protected by an auditory shield. Although an auditory shield may not protect students from outside forces that dictate how learning environments are funded or who is assigned to maintain them, the sonorous qualities of an educational space impacts whether and how intimate sharing of knowledge and values among its members is circulated within and beyond that space. As this essay has shown, the static, material structure where deliberative discussion takes place pales in comparison to an auditory shield in terms of offering students protection from the public ear.
CONCLUSION

In this essay, I theorized the auditory shield as a mechanism for excluding the public ear from democratic educational spaces where students experiment with convictions and beliefs by testing commitments that are often contradictory in nature. The auditory shield makes a necessary move from static, material conceptions of educational spaces toward the dynamic, mobile, and sonorous potential for pedagogical interaction in learning environments. My analysis reveals the sonic potential of educational spaces beyond the classroom. If learning environments realize their democratic potential, then once they become unmoored from the schoolhouse or similar static spaces, students can establish new experimental learning environments elsewhere. The mobility of auditory privacy is especially important in the digital age, where individuals are constantly subject to the influence of outside stakeholders, requiring adaptive techniques to preserve auditory privacy and prevent unwanted distraction. This requires that educators and students alike acknowledge that static material privacy is not always available, but this analysis suggests that an auditory shield is a suitable adaptation in those circumstances. My claim is not that the public ear should always be excluded from the content of learning environments, but rather that the auditory shield functions as a sonorous on/off switch when the issues being explored in such environments require auditory privacy.

Theorizing the auditory shield also offers insight on pedagogy and sound studies more broadly. By studying switch-side American policy debate, I demonstrated that the sonorous elements of spreading enable participants to temporarily suspend their convictions in order to examine, explore, and experiment with a variety of contradictory commitments that could otherwise incite unwanted distractions or responses if heard by the public ear. There is a need for scholars of debate pedagogy to more seriously consider the sonorous elements of argumentation and deliberation. Although sound studies has previously explored how sound can produce a public ear, this analysis begins a conversation about the ways that sound can impact educational spaces and produce auditory shields, and the ways that sound may insulate and/or protect those auditory shields from the public ear. While Eckstein argued that “sonic signals . . . must adhere to the auditory context to be relevant to the discussion,” this analysis reveals some ways that “sounds can create a new context,” insulating auditory shields from public exposure by imposing specific types of sonorous form, flow, or force. Future research should continue exploring the relationship between sound and a cacophony of other private communities, including but not limited to: the climatology community, the military, labor unions, the argumentation community, and others. In each of those private communities, there is often a need for auditory privacy in order to prevent distraction or interference from the public ear that may undermine the goals of each group.

While this essay identified a specific set of benefits to an auditory shield and hope to expand that analysis to a range of other auditory shields, future research should also consider the ways that auditory shields may cultivate a problematic relationship with evidence, argumentation and debate, and community. With regards to evidence in American style policy debate, the “confluence of speed, evidence, time constraints, and a burden of rejoinder cultivates . . . a sound to listener relationship, where the veracity is assumed and significance is dictated by strategies, not the least of which is vocal.” In other words, auditory shields in American style policy debate allow for the experimentation of ideas, but encourages a form, flow, and force of evidence proliferation that may trade off with a demand for high quality research, in depth discussion of specific bodies of literature, and the substitution of evidence for reasoning. Moreover, when the quantity of evidence trumps the quality of individual arguments, a condition of auditory shields in policy debate, “the rationality used to organize the evidence relegates veracity to the epiphenomenal. This fosters an epistemic leveling, indexing expertise according to its exchange-value.”

In addition to evidence and argument, the auditory shield may cultivate a problematic relationship with community. Although the auditory shield offers a layer of protection from the public ear, the exclusion of individuals from participation has the potential to fracture community. The reality is that persons who wish to belong to an auditory shield such as intercollegiate American style policy debate may be unable to engage the form, flow, and force typically associated with the activity. Future research must engage this issue in a manner that
balances protecting debate participants from the public ear with fostering space for all individuals wishing to compete, coach, and judge in the activity. Auditory shields are designed to exclude the public ear, and I have argued there are benefits to this exclusion; but it should not inhibit interested persons from participation. If an auditory shield is a necessary condition for pedagogical interaction in isolation from the public ear, certain individuals will never be able to fully participate. This demands additional study aimed at investigating the acoustics of competitive intercollegiate policy debate and how to optimize the activity for testing argument while creating space for all competitors to gain the benefits from participation.

Despite the potential pitfalls of an auditory shield, it produces necessary conditions for pedagogical interactions that allow students to play and experiment with convictions and beliefs. The ability to engage in such dialogue better prepares students for the moment when they are fully assimilated into public life and must defend their convictions and advocate for their beliefs. Moving forward, the auditory shield is a foundation for exploring the ways that sound creates and enacts critical communication. While this essay analyzed intercollegiate American style policy debate, the analysis paves the way for additional inquiry into the ways that auditory shields constitute and shape dialogue and deliberation more generally. For instance, one particular avenue of inquiry worth exploring involves the intersection between auditory privacy and argument spheres. In that type of research, scholars may be interested in the use of technical language or community-specific communication techniques that heighten auditory privacy when significant political issues are subject to deliberation by experts. Additional inquiry in this area of research has two tangible benefits, it will teach us more about the conditions under which dialogue and deliberation succeed and fail, and it will help us to more completely understand the role that sound plays in critical communication.

32 For example, consider the metal band Myrkur. You have to have a particularly attuned ear to understand it, the tempo is so fast some may not consider it music at all, and it has such a force that it is painful for some to listen to.


One Theoretical Consideration on Significance of Dichotomy in Argumentation Education

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In argumentation education, the issues to be addressed are sometimes expressed in the form of dichotomy. This is often criticized as narrowing students’ horizons and putting them off the consideration of more various options, and critics conclude that dichotomy should be discarded. However, they jumble different types of dichotomy. Thus, I sort the meanings of “dichotomy” depending on some thinkers like Trubetzkoy, and find that those who criticize dichotomy trigger the very polarization that they fear by too simple separation: dichotomy or not-dichotomy. Additionally, to conclude argumentation education practices using dichotomy (like debate) should be discarded is invalid even if dichotomy has negative aspects, so I make this point clear by referring to the nature of logics/argumentation and of education. From these theoretical considerations, this paper tries to determine the cause of wrong dichotomy in education and give some proposals and notions to solve it at last.

1. PROBLEM

In argumentation education, the issues to be addressed are sometimes established in the form of dichotomy which is typical of debate (for instance, “Japan should abolish the death penalty or not”). This is often criticized as narrowing students’ horizon and putting them off the consideration of the third, fourth or more options (e.g. Isozaki 2006; Tomano 2017). As Conti (2013, 280) pointed out, many scholars (e.g. Johnson & Johnson 1994; Suzuki 2013) conclude that debates should be discarded from this reason.

However, dichotomy is significant basis of logical thinking. According to Jacobson, dichotomy is the “child's first logical operation” (Jakobson & Halle 1956, 60). And it is the flame of thinking used in various fields, not in a specific area. Dascal (2008) expresses this fact by saying “dichotomies are ubiquitous”. Thus, dichotomy in argumentation education is worth consideration.

In addition, today the worth has increased especially in Japan, because argumentation education has been introduced into public education. When the voting age was brought down to 18 in 2015, debate style activities were welcomed to let students have interests in politics and elections. In a couple of years, “Debate & Discussion I” is made compulsory in high school English. Nevertheless, the discussions on dichotomy in argumentation education is messed up as we saw above and will see in the next chapter. Therefore, now we need to reconsider the concept of dichotomy and examine the criticisms on it.

To accomplish this goal, I set 2 questions in this paper: ① Are the criticisms of dichotomy we saw above to the point? ② Even if they are to the point, is it valid to conclude that dichotomy should be discarded?

2. APPROACH

Most of the existing studies to examine whether dichotomies have polarization effects are quantitative investigations (ex. Budesheim and Lundquist 1999; Felton et al. 2009). By contrast, this paper makes a theoretical consideration from the perspective of philosophy of education and argumentation. Of course, quantitative research is important, but in my opinion the theoretical basis has to be done before quantitative research. Were it not for the shared basis, we might criticize one another with our different definitions of dichotomy and end up with...
collapsed communications. As D. Kuhn (1991, 5) described, “Without such a knowledge base, there exists no firm basis for judging the soundness or the effectiveness of educational programs designed to teach thinking skills.”

Actually, according to Yoshikawa (2018), the word “dichotomy” is used differently; used even in cases where it is suspicious that the two terms are really opposed. Then he tried to examine the concept of dichotomy, which was an important attempt. However, he classified and examined dichotomy with deficient reasoning: there was no citation that guarantees the trustworthiness of his study.

Conti (2013) is one study that deals with the very question this paper engages in, but he answered this question by focusing on the other features of argumentation activities. For instance, he insisted that experiencing both affirmative and negative sides in debate activities can minimize polarization effects and rather contribute to the de-polarization. Needless to say, this indication is appropriate and very important, but the nature of dichotomy itself isn’t examined in his paper.

To overcome the problems described above, I would like to consider dichotomy itself in a philosophical manner. Since it is too difficult, almost impossible, to review all dichotomies in various fields, my purpose isn’t to unify the definitions and to establish only one “true” dichotomy, but is to examine dichotomy used in argumentation education.

In chapter 3, I cope with the first question, “Are the criticisms of dichotomy to the point?” by taking advantage of knowledge in linguistics. In chapter 4, I answer the second question, “Even if so, is it valid to conclude that dichotomy should be discarded?” from the perspective of logic/argumentation and education. After that, I make a tentative suggestion to improve argumentation education in chapter 5.

3. ARE THE CRITICISMS OF DICHOTOMY TO THE POINT?

The dawn of dichotomy dates back to Plato and Aristoteles. Although at that time dichotomy was used to separate the genus into two species as we can see in Physics, now after the development of symbolic logic, it expresses the fundamental distinction in thought between position and negation (Baldwin 1911, 279). Then it has become a tool of philosophical thinking and ubiquitous owing to the big stream called structuralism: Saussure established the dichotomy of signifiant and signifié in linguistics and Lévi-Strauss applied the flame of dichotomy to cultural anthropology (Hashizume 1988).

Their interests, however, did seldom lie in questioning what dichotomy is; rather, they focused on what is revealed by looking at something through the lens of dichotomy. Then people has come not to pay attention to what is meant by using the word dichotomy as we saw in chapter 1. Therefore, we need to make it clear.

3.1. Rethinking of what dichotomy is

Here is a clue to unravel the confusion that caused by using the word dichotomy differently. Trubetzkoy, a Russian linguist, made great work on the concept of Opposition in Principles of Phonology [Grundzüge der Phonologie] (published in 1969), which is convertible to the concept of dichotomy. He organized extensional meanings of Opposition by focusing on characteristics of phonemes. One of the most important extensions is the distinction of “privative Opposition” and “äquipollente Opposition”. The privative indicates the difference between A and not A, the unmarked [merkmallos] and the marked [merkmaltragend] (figure 1), whereas the äquipollente indicates the difference between A and B (figure 2).

![figure 1) privative Opposition](image)

![figure 2) äquipollente Opposition](image)

Also, he referred to the distinction between digital differences and analogue ones. He called dichotomy whose difference is analogue “graduelle Opposition” and distinguished it from privative Opposition, whose difference is digital.
This distinction has something common with Bergson and Deleuze’s argument. They separated the discrete and the continuous and warned us not to mix them up (Deleuze 1966)3. For instance, it makes sense to give an answer for the proposition “The average distance between the sun and the earth is about 150 million kilometers” by choosing true or false (Wrenn 2019, 157-159). This is a privative Opposition and there is no gradation between true and false. In contrast, if we are shown viridian and aquamarine and asked “Are these colors blue or green?”, it is difficult to answer.

3.2. Inevitability of dichotomy

Now we understand the some differences among those which are called dichotomy, we can answer the first question, “① Is the criticism of dichotomy to the point?” The main claim of the criticisms is that dichotomy makes us overlook third, fourth or more options.

To tackle this question, we need to understand the next point: To some propositions we cannot avoid giving an answer Yes/No or True/False as we saw in the example of the distance between the sun and the earth. The questions discussed in argumentation education have such nature. One of the purposes of argumentation education is to develop problem-solving and decision-making skills (Sanaga 2001). In order to practice decision-making, we have to let students decide to do / not to do a certain action as training. In fact, the policy-making style is often used in debate, discussion, mock election and other argumentation education activities (e.g. Mori 2004, 52; MEXT 2018).

Based on Guilford’s classification of our ways of thinking, which differentiate 2 external groups of thinking—the convergent and the divergent (Guilford1959, 469-479)—, arguments can be separated to problem-solving arguments and creative arguments (Kato & Maruno 1996, 90)4. The convergent is parallel to problem-solving arguments, and the divergent is to creative ones. When we give students questions to practice decision-making in argumentation education, they need to answer “do” or “not do”, which is privative Opposition with no gradation.

Let me take a proposition that Japan should abolish Citizen Judge System as an example. On this theme, there are many and various opinions like “We should remove sex crimes from the system”, “Jury System is superior as an alternative”, and “I have no idea, so support the status quo for the present.” On one hand, there is gradation. On the other hand, it converges to the binary in that we have to answer the question “Should we abolish the system?” and decide to repeal of the Citizen Judge Act or not in practice. “Jury System is superior as an alternative” belongs to “Yes”, and “We should remove sex crimes from the system” and “I have no idea, so support the status quo for the present” belong to “No”. We must make a decision by the deadline, that is unavoidable. In short, dichotomy is inevitable when we make decisions.

From the examination of dichotomy above, we can notice that what we call dichotomy include some different types of dichotomy and that we have to make sure not to mix them up. The rebuttal to the criticisms of dichotomy in argumentation education is summarized in the next sentence. Those who criticize dichotomy, thinking that it causes polarization, mix up different types of dichotomy and trigger the very polarization that they fear by too simple separation: dichotomy or not-dichotomy.

4. IS IT VALID TO CONCLUDE THAT DICHOTOMY SHOULD BE DISCARDED?

As we saw, the criticisms of dichotomy in argumentation education is not to the point in that critics mix up different types of dichotomy. Then we can cope with the second question: ②“Even if the criticism is to the point, is it valid to conclude that dichotomy should be discarded?” Let me announce that the answer is NO in advance. Then I’d like to see the reasons from two perspectives: form the perspective of argumentation (4.1.) and of education (4.2.).

4.1. The nature of argumentation

Some critics insist that dichotomy polarizes our thinking and should be discarded because they believe the issues in reality cannot be divided into dichotomy with ease (for example, Kodama (2012) mentioned this claim by reviewing statements and discourses in politics). Certainly, when we vote someone in elections, issues seem so compounded that we have difficulty in making decisions.

However, concluding that dichotomy is useless and should be discarded from this reason sets the perspective of logics and argumentation at defiance. The significance of logics and argumentation cannot always be explained by itself; its significance becomes clear when we
understand its nature as a tool. Hurley & Watson (2018, xxii-xxiii) compared studying logics to going to the gym to train the muscles. Though we do not do something with treadmills or bench presses in our dairy life, we go to the gym and use such machines to train our muscles. It is because doing so is necessary for other activities or preserving our health. This characteristic is common with logics and argumentation. In studying natural science, economics, and humanities, or in setting an alarm at 8 a.m. in order to arrive at school in time for the morning class, logics and argumentation are essential as foundation.

This is applicable not only to logics and argumentation as a whole, but also to dichotomy as a part of logics and argumentation, because dichotomy is a fundamental and ubiquitous logical operation as Jakobson and Dascal explained (chapter 1.). Even in the example of elections, we are making decisions in the form of dichotomy for each issue at last (3.2.). When we take this instrumental nature of logics and argumentation into consideration, to insist that dichotomy, a logical operation, be discarded since there are many cases unable to be divided into dichotomy with ease in reality is not valid.

4.2. The nature of education

Education is a package of plural programs. It is composed of many kinds of activities that is extended in both “length” (chronological extent) and “width” (extent of variety).

From the point of the “length”, we need to understand that the level of contents is raised gradually. For instance, the Archimedes’ constant is regarded as the clear number “3.14” in elementary schools in Japan*5. This is wrong, because π is not 3.14 but an infinite decimal (3.141592…). However, we do not determine to discard the approximation due to the fault. This arrangement is accepted because elementary school students are thought to be too young to understand the character expression in mathematics. Such considerations can be seen in various areas. The world where there is no friction and resistance is a fantastic story because everything causes friction and such assumption never comes true in reality. But it helps beginners of physics to concentrate on understanding the pure connection between falling motions and gravity by laying other obstructive and complicated concepts aside.

From the point of “width”, we need to understand the complementary relationship with other subjects. In education after childhood, the fact is that separate programs are developed and held by subjects (Kimata 2018), so we have to catch the whole image of education. For example, teaching the history of the mother country is sometimes criticized for encouraging the ethnocentrism (Kato 2007), but this negative aspect will not lead immediately to the conclusion that teaching the history of the mother country should be stopped. The conclusion can come only after examining alternatives to weaken the disadvantage (for instance, to write various theories on textbooks and to teach the world’s history in parallel) and comparing the disadvantage with the advantage of teaching the history of the mother country.

In short, we need consider the process of development of students and the curriculums as a whole. We must not decide to discard something without such consideration.

5. DISCUSSIONS

5.1. A suggestion by reviewing action research

As described in chapter 3 and 4, the criticisms are not to the point. In the critics’ argument, the premise is “in some classes dichotomy is used wrongly” and the conclusion is “using dichotomy is wrong”, which is a typical fallacy called “cherry picking”*6. However, it is true that there are some classes where students engage in wrong form of dichotomy, like asking “Which do you choose for pet, dog or cat?” To such practices, the criticisms of dichotomy make sense in that they drop other options. The question is äquipollente Opposition (meaning “A or B”) and there exist potentially C, D or more options like rabbit, hamster… etc. Excluding those options and presenting just dog and cat is also a typical fallacy called “false dilemma”*7.

We had better avoid the fallacy by presenting all available options in propositions to be argued. To do so, we need to inquire into the cause of fallacious practices in school.

In my opinion, one possible cause is textbooks on argumentation education. Many textbooks indicate standards that the propositions to be argued should meet. For example, Konishi, Kanke and Collins (2012, 23-25) propose seven standards like “easy to research” and “the conditions on the proposition won’t change until finishing the arguments”. So do argumentation education textbooks in US. The textbooks that
Hansen (2007, 69) lists up as the most appropriate for preparing debate classes show the standards for the proposition, but all the textbooks do not say that the propositions have to avoid omission of additional options (Huber & Snider 2005, 14-18; Snider & Schnurer 2006, 79-86). This standard is obvious in logics, but because of its obviousness it is not written in textbooks, and fallacious practices in school might be born.

Even English argumentation education textbooks are so, much more are Japanese ones because its history in Japan is not so long as in America. Furthermore, the textbooks have more significance in Japan since Japanese teachers don’t have much experience to teach and/or to be taught argumentation, and what they can rely on might only textbooks.

The fact that not telling to avoid omission of additional options causes wrong classes using fallacious dichotomy is suggested by the action research. Miyawaki (2019) let her students make proposition to be argued by giving them six standards that the propositions should meet and some examples of propositions*. All of the examples avoided omission of additional options, but the standards the teacher showed didn’t include it as a norm. The result was all of the propositions students made caused false dilemma like “Is it good or bad to listen music while studying?” and “Do you like Western music or Japanese music?” Nevertheless, after the teacher noted that propositions should be the form of “Should …… or not?” or “Is A better than B?”, which could avoid omission of additional options, the students reformed the propositions and circumvented the fallacy even though they were studying argumentation for the first time.

This research suggests that we should mention the need to avoid omission of additional options in the textbooks and we can keep away from wrong dichotomy by doing so.

5.2. Warnings
Nonetheless, concluding that such logically fallacious themes should be extinct is premature. Somehow the propositions like “Do you like Western music or Japanese music?” may have advantages that ones avoiding omission of additional options do not have.

One example that intimates that we get benefits by fallacious dichotomy is the division of significant/non-significant in statistics. P-value, which is continuous, is classified into significant or non-significant depending on the lowness of the value. Though this operation has fallacious problems and the controversy has continued for a long time, we have to accept the fact that the division of significant and non-significant has helped arguments on statistics go on smoothly. In short, we must not decide to discard something without checking the advantages of it and balancing them against the disadvantages. This indication overlaps 4.2.

What is important is, not to conquer all practices with the one standard that seems to be absolutely true, but to use different and various standards properly to the purposes of education and to take advantage of them. Since there is no only one truth anymore, we need to establish the basis that as many of us as possible can share by making consideration philosophically, as Perelman explained (Perelman 1977=1980, 226-227).

5.3. Limitations and future issues
In the end of this chapter, I’d enumerate the limitations and the future issues of this paper.

I worked on the concept of dichotomy itself, but it was difficult to make clear the connections of dichotomy and each argumentation education activity (like discussion, debate) for want of space.

When it comes to considering the cause of fallacious practices in school, I mentioned the standards taught to students as a possible cause, but yet there must be other causes. It is needed to identify the plural causes and to examine the weights of them.

I wrote “we need consider the process of development of students and the curriculums as a whole” in the last part of chapter 4, but I could not get involved in examining the concrete contents to be taught in detail. To consider the connection of the nature of argumentation and the purposes of education, it would be needed to make a reference to psychology where the process of development of logical thinking is studied.

It is just an excuse, but I could not much research as had expected because COVID-19 made libraries close for a long time and the heavy rainfall in Kyushu area delayed materials flow. The conditions seem to be getting better little by little, so I’d like to make more efforts for the next thesis.
6. CONCLUSION

Dichotomy has been criticized. The fact is that the criticisms fall into fallacies by jumbling different types of dichotomies and causing the very polarization that the critics fear by simple separation: dichotomy and not-dichotomy. According to the nature of logics/argumentation and education, it is too premature to conclude that practices using dichotomy should be discarded. As I referred in chapter 1, the significance of argumentation education is getting greater, so we need to make more reconsiderations on dichotomy which is the fundamental logical operation like this paper.

NOTES

*1. Kan (Hiroshi) Suzuki is the former Vice Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and technology in Japan.

*2. The classification of the unmarked and the marked is made up of the divisions of voiced and unvoiced, rounded and unrounded, and so forth. He indicates that these sorts of Opposition is not only for but also able to be applied to the general.

*3. This distinction is said to be a reworking of the idea introduced by the mathematician G. B. Riemann, who is famous for the Riemann Hypothesis (Ansell-Pearson & Mullarkey 2002, 2).

*4. Problem-solving arguments aim to reach the goal concerned with a certain problem. Creative arguments don’t have such a goal and are held to find more perspective and possibility.

*5. The approximation varies from 3, 3.1, 3.14 to 22/7 depending on the countries, but almost all textbooks let students school use the approximation in elementary and “π” appears in junior high school (National Institute for Educational Policy Research 2009, 71-202).

*6. Cherry picking is the fallacy of pointing to individual cases that seem to confirm a particular position and ignoring the other cases. The expression “cherry picking” is said to come from picking up only ripest and healthiest cherries.

*7. False dilemma is a fallacy in which all relevant possibilities are not considered in an either-or situation.

*8. The standards are (a) Both affirmative and negative side, (b) Both sides have enough and similar amount of arguments, (c) Easy to research, (d) One sentence, (e) Questioning the need of the action or value, (f) Pay attention to the agent of the action in the proposition. The examples are

“Every healthy adult should donate blood”,
“Doraemon should go back to the future” and other three propositions. (Doraemon, the robot came from 22nd century, is a character in Doraemon, which is a famous Japanese manga drawn by Fujiko F. Fujio.)

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No Participation Trophies:
How Competitive Frameworks Keep Advocates Accountable

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Most debate formats are governed by a few constitutive rules: teams must be given equal time, they must debate the same topic, and they must have the right to rebuttal. These rules encourage advocates to focus their arguments and directly compete with their opponents through argumentative clash. The general principle is that the clash of ideas is the best way to test the relative strength of arguments. This paper examines a criticism of clash-oriented debate practice from the perspective of motivated cognition. While it finds that agonistic processes are a good way of judging between advocates, they are a poor way of judging the merits ideas. In place of clash, the authors advocate a form of dialectic manifest through Ethics Bowl. This paper argues that the constitutive rules of clash-oriented debates are a better cure for the ills of motivated cognition than the civility-minded dialectic instantiated in the Ethics Bowl.

For in the courts, they say, [272e] nobody cares for truth about these matters, but for that which is convincing; and that is probability, so that he who is to be an artist in speech must fix his attention upon probability. For sometimes one must not even tell what was actually done, if it was not likely to be done, but what was probable, whether in accusation or defence; and in brief, a speaker must always aim at probability, (Plato, Phaedrus, Page 272).

1. INTRODUCTION

The complaint is as old as argument itself: people care more about winning than they do about the truth. The rapacious pursuit of victory undermines rational decision-making and rewards conduct that prevents clear apprehension of the facts of a matter. The critique, fully fleshed out in Plato, finds echoes in current discussions of the relationship between debate pedagogy and rational deliberation.

Here, I want to examine a publicly available iteration of the argument published by the New York Times. The opinion editorial by Philosophy Professor Joseph Ellis and law student Francesca Hovagimian lays out a case against academic debate, particularly policy debate (Opinion | Are School Debate Competitions Bad for Our Political Discourse? - The New York Times, 12 October 2019). The critique follows well-worn paths and concludes that case-study organized public discussion along the lines of an Ethics Bowl would result in better public decisions and superior advocacy skills. While the observation that policy-oriented academic debates tend to reward popular conventions rather than good politics is not new, it reflects Plato’s argument that rhetoric is the knack of flattery where one makes the convenient appear good, and politics is the art of doing what is good regardless of popularity. These arguments do not capture the fullness of argumentative possibilities offered by policy debate.

I will argue that policy debate is an effective means of engaging students in the details of policy work and that it encourages creative thinking about problems and solutions in a context where debaters are encouraged to frankly discuss and interrogate information in an environment where they are solely responsible for their advocacy. On the other hand, Ethics Bowl-type discussions are not especially cooperative and lack many of the qualities that are likely to result in more creative and forthright approaches to public problems. In the end, the dynamics of Ethics Bowl are more likely to super-charge the problem of motivated cognition.
and significantly reduce the quality of deliberation.

I am uniquely qualified to speak to the distinctions between the two. After a career of coaching policy debate at both the high school and college level, I have spent the last decade coaching Ethics Bowl. In that time, I have coached teams to the national finals, semi-finals and quarter-finals multiple times. I know that Ethics Bowl is a competitive activity that lacks some of the argumentative principles that mark contemporary policy debate formats. Consequently, it is a far cry from a candid cooperative discussion between peer. While Ethics Bowl does prize collegiality, it does so at a cost.

I will start with a discussion of the history of critiques of policy debate and then discuss how Ethics Bowl attempts to compensate for some of the shortcomings of this variety of debate. I will then identify a few of the structural and performative elements that advantage policy debate as a means of learning public deliberation.

2. THE CRITIQUE OF POLICY DEBATE

Ellis and Hovagimian focus more on critiques of policy debate than they do defenses for their alternative. However, both sets of arguments draw from the same pond. That is, Ellis notes that he is working on a book discussing motivated cognition. The motivated cognition thesis holds that people are much better at defending their positions than they are at generating arguments that appeal to others. Consequently, people are unlikely to change their mind even when confronted by strong counter-arguments (Taber & Lodge, 2006; Haidt et al., 2009; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). The apex of this argument line is found in Mercier & Sperber (2011) who argue that rational argumentation is little more than a socially oriented evolutionary advantage which has nothing to do with good decisions or decision-making.

The result is that their critiques look a lot like the motivated cognition critiques. They argue that debate is no more than credentialing for aspiring leaders (read evolutionary advantage), that it is just a way of demonstrating superiority over others, that the reasoning is always created in the context where advocates justify a pre-existing conclusion, and that only real material effect is to drive out voices that, while accurate and correct, lack the bloodlust necessary to survive.

Clothed in the language of political psychology, these observations appear new and fresh. However, they reflect critiques of debate that go back millennia. The history of the debate over whether academic debates are best viewed as gamesmanship or as an effort at policymaking has been covered by Stephen Llano’s (2017) recent essay. It has a long history with many twists and turns. Here, I will deal with the substantial critiques of debate a pedagogical instrument.

Debate has traditionally been seen as a variety of combat. Williams and McGee (2000) traced the long history of American debate texts that have focused on how to win debates. The adversarial nature of the debate injects competitions with a combative element that serves to advantage the loudest and most aggressive while silencing disparate voices that do not reflect popular conventions. More important, the agonistic quality of debate competitions polarizes arguments and undermines qualities necessary for cooperative engagement (Gehrke 1998; Mitchell, 2000)

Even more damning, agonistic debate systematically excludes participants that do not reflect contemporary conventions of style or outlook. The win at all-costs orientation of debates exclude women and minorities and others that view cooperation and coalition building as a more legitimate and productive venue for decision-making (Bergmaier & Johnson, 2017; Tannen, 1999).

As an alternative to debate, argument theorists offer permutations to the competitive positioning of persuasion and epistemic ends (Palczewski, 1996). A paradigm example of this position is offered by notion of “cooperative argumentation” (Makau & Marty, 2001). This approach to argument is that the focus should be “to get things done” rather than “being right” (Makau & Marty, 2001). Consequently, the focus has increasingly turned to creating conditions that encourage participants to reach out and to help in the creation of constructive dialogue to generate constructive consensus.

Despite attempts to pose the persuasive and coalition-building elements of debate as invitational, some traditional characterizations of debaters persist. From popular depictions of debate, it appears that debate involves a pack of young apes pounding their chests and screaming at the top of their lungs and that, in the end, the
result of this lawless and irrational display is that the most forceful and threatening ape wins. However, an examination of policy debates indicate that they are more nuanced. When judged by what happens in actual academic debates, it is not clear whether the Ethics Bowl alternative is a step forward or a step backward.

3. THE ETHICS BOWL ALTERNATIVE

Ethics Bowl is a forensic competition for universities sponsored, since 1997, by the Association for Practical and Professional Ethics. Each year, teams compete to analyze ethical case studies before a panel of judges, working their way from a regional to the national tournament. There is also a spin-off national Bioethics Bowl and high school Ethics Bowl that function similarly.

The goal of the Ethics Bowl competition is to have students practice analyzing ethical case studies. At the start of each year, teams are presented with 12-15 case studies designed to highlight a particular ethical quandary. At the tournament, teams of up to five students compete against each other in a conversation about the proper ethical approach to a question presented by the judges.

Over the course of these discussions, teams are paired and rounds take place in two parts. In the first part, a team will present an analysis of the question related to the case study, the other team will respond, and then the first team will get a rebuttal. What most distinguishes Ethics Bowl from traditional debate formats is that judges actively participate in the deliberations. Not only do they pose an ethical question derived from the case study, but they also participate in a long cross-examination of the presenting team. At the end of the first part, the teams are posed with a second question regarding a different case and the team positions are reversed. In the end, the judges evaluate the teams and award points. The result of a judge’s decision may be a win, loss or tie based on the combined points of the two halves of the discussion. Recently, they have added a rule so that the disposition of the judges (win, tie or loss) is more important than the total number of points after a series of incidents where judges sandbagged teams so that the team that had the most votes did not win the contest.

The distinctiveness of this approach, rooted in the forensic and dialectical notion that there is a single best answer to the question, becomes most clear when juxtaposed with academic debate rules and norms.

Academic debate, by which I mean formats such as Public Forum, Policy Debate and several kinds of Parliamentary debate, tends to focus on the effects of a future action. As deliberative efforts, they deal almost exclusively in probabilities—because future actions cannot be known absolutely. When we take a rhetorically forensic/epideictic question (“was what was done good?”) and translate it into the deliberative context (“what should one do?”) such as Ethics Bowl does, the distinctions between truth and probability become confusing. This is precisely the confusion that Plato complains about the sophists creating when they displace forensic questions with deliberative ones.

Policy debates, while manifesting a variety of formats, are united by a few constitutive rules: there should be equal time for participants, there should be a right to rebuttal, they should debate the same topic and the decision should be zero sum—that is, there should be a winner and a loser. Ties are not possible. By contrast, Ethics Bowl does not give equal time on any case study (presenting teams get upward of 20 minutes while the opposing team gets only 5 minutes on any particular topic)—though the binary nature of the contest gives equal time to the ballot. In this format, the opposing team does not get any chance at a rebuttal. Additionally, there is no real expectation that teams will address one another or discuss the same topics. The convention is that the opposition can offer some “thought provoking” questions, but that they should avoid directly contradicting the presenting team. Also, because the questions are not determined before the contest, teams often take radically and non-intersecting tacks on issues—so the two teams can end up focused on discrete non-clashing issues. Conversely, because they do not know what the other team will say, there is also a good risk that they will end up with the same position. Finally, the judges are participants, but are not required to render a decision for or against a team. As often or not, contests end in a tie with no decisions rendered.

It is clear that Ethics Bowl, by design, looks more like a dialectic than a debate. It prioritizes civility and cooperation over difference and distinction. The thought is that a civil environment, where people follow rules of decorum, soften lines of critique from argument to question and defer actively to the judges is more likely to result in a good decision than one
where the advocates vigorously defend their own positions, present propositional clashing arguments, do not actively cooperate with one another and treat the judges as objective or independent observers. However, the game-like nature of the contest and the opportunity to avoid the other team or to have a tie lead to some contrary outcomes and substantially reduce the quality of decision-making.

Whether Ethics Bowl is a forensic or deliberative activity, there is still plenty of incentive for students to win the debates. In fact, because the case studies are available months beforehand, students spend much of their time developing strategies that they believe will most likely appeal to the perceived biases of judges. Because there are few preliminary rounds, and a single tie will generally end a team’s run in the tournament, there are additional incentives to be exceptionally conservative when developing strategies. Consequently, there are several reinforcing structural incentives that encourage teams to take the most conservative positions.

Ethics Bowl contests focus on case studies as a way to access a finite set of ethical frameworks. One team gets to present a case study in each half of the debate, and their presentation provides the focus for the discussion. For regional tournaments, there are 12-15 case studies. Then, there are an additional 12-15 case studies used for the national tournament. While the case studies are unique narratives, the actual discussions tend to focus on a few well-established frameworks. These frameworks are presuppositions to the debates. In the end, half of the teams will have discussed half of the case studies and the rest the other half. There is little room, from round-to-round, to improve strategies since once the case studies are used they are not re-used, there is a priority on choosing different kinds of case studies for future debates and tournaments.

The emphasis on getting through a diverse number of case studies stands in contrast to the policy debate habit of having multiple debates on a topic and having participants debate both sides of the topic, what is often called switch-side. The Aristotelian notion that debaters, as advocates, should have experience with all facets of the arguments before they render an individual judgement is unique to the policy debate orientation. In contrast to Ellis and Hovagimian’s characterization, policy debaters and judges generally have a lot of interaction with a topic over the course of a tournament or season from which they can draw their own personal opinion.

The notion is that switching sides fights against the motivated cognition issue by forcing advocates to engage all sides of an issue. Additionally, it serves to blunt the common criticism that debaters act unethically when they advocate for positions that they do not actually hold. In this sense, the switch-side innovation probably leads to greater engagement with dissonant argument than Ethics Bowl where critiques have to be offered in the form of “interesting questions” rather than substantial counter-arguments and where advocates only engage with one half of any ethical question.

In policy debate, judges are expected to judge the debate solely on the presentations of the debaters and are encouraged to bracket their individual knowledge, attitudes, and bias to focus down on only the arguments that the students articulate. As such, judges ideally accept a position as passive observers of the debate who float at the will of the advocates. However, there is generally some acknowledgement that judges bring some small degree of subjectivity to the debate, so policy debates typically require (sometimes elaborate) judging philosophies that overtly lay out those biases. This is an easy thing to do in a world where the judges are often professionals, alumni participants, or at least trained in the practice and rules of debate.

Ethics Bowl judges are not typically professional or trained debaters. Most have not participated in the activity and are generally people drawn from the community. The quality and ability of the judges varies radically from round-to-round and region to region. While they are encouraged to listen to the debaters, they also have to perform in the dialectic as interrogators of the presenting side (and get as much time to do it as the opposition time does to ask questions). In general, they come to the discussions because they have some interest or experience in ethical issues, many are nurses or doctors or religious professionals, and often want to lay this knowledge on the competitors. If motivated cognition is a problem for policy debate advocates (where their conclusions drive their strategy), it is also a problem for a good number of the judges that participate in Ethics Bowl. The difference is that competitors have to design their strategy to anticipate these turns of interest and engage them. In policy debate, debaters generally work only within the small number of overt biases identified in a philosophy.

The position of the judges highlights problems arising from the disposition of the
discussions. The notion that competitors can go for the tie fundamentally changes the nature of the argumentation. Because the stakes are high and the judges generally have an identifiable outside bias (they are chosen for it), strategies tend to be conservative and play upon what can be assumed about the judges. In contrast to policy debate, which often encourages advocates to take radical positions to clearly differentiate themselves from their opponents, Ethics Bowl encourages participants to work within a very limited number of frameworks. In general, these are Aristotelian virtue ethics, Kantian ethics, Rawlsian ethics, Utilitarianism and a handful of special topics (medical privacy or animal rights, for example). The case studies are designed to highlight one of the frameworks which puts the opposition in a hard position. In general, as the authors of the editorial note, this limited number of frameworks, conservative judge orientation, and bias toward civility encourages teams to often argue for the same conclusion and agree with one another. The fact that both teams argue for the same conclusion does not mean that it is the best conclusion. It only means that it was the easiest conclusion to win.

The focus on agreement, which is an element of strategic maneuvering which seeks to eliminate points of clash and focus the discussion, often hijacks the entire discussion (Van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2000). The question, then, is how do you judge a debate when there is no argumentative clash, no required competitive intersection between claims to distinguish between arguments?

The answer is simple, when arguments do not inherently compete, they can be distinguished on the basis of presentation. The judge picks the team that does a better job of stating what is obvious and agreed upon. Unfortunately, this has little to do with the quality of the argument or its epistemic standing. It has more to do with saying things in a way that the judges are most likely to feel validated or in being an agreeable sort of person. The fact of the matter is that my best performing teams have gone the farthest with the “yes, and” strategy than a “no, but” strategy. When they mimic the most obvious convention, they appear more civil, more agreeable with the judge’s dispositions and are freed from having to demonstrate their positions to any standard of proof (since the other team has typically already met the standards set by presumption). The effect of a discussion which does not require completion is a reduction to aesthetics.

The fact is that dialectics fail when the interlocutors do not demonstrate the Platonic virtues of humility, honesty and intellectual ability. They must be open to change and to new ideas, to seeing the world in a new way, in having their notions interrogated without bias. They cannot just rehash what is already known or agree for the sake of agreement or for victory. If the interlocutors fail, so does the dialectic, and the truth becomes inaccessible or corrupted.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The Ethics Bowl format is explicitly designed to recreate a Platonic dialogue centered on creating honest and civil dialectics. However, there are structural dimensions of the contest form that prevent this from coming to fruition and perhaps make the situation even worse than it would be otherwise. For its flaws, policy debate has a long history that accommodates many of the objections levelled at it. The essay by Ellis and Hovagimian straw persons debate to advance a form of discussion that often results in inferior results and is more likely to reify the status quo than reform it.

First, both policy debate and Ethics Bowl deal with questions of what should be done. This is generally future-looking and presents more a deliberative question than a purely forensic one. The fact that the ethical decisions are contingent (“it depends” probability levels are the reason a discussion of alternatives can be entertained), undercuts the dialectic as an appropriate tool to this instance. It is not about defining a past action, but rather about establishing normative standards for future action.

Second, whereas policy debates attempt to pose the judge as a neutral participant by limiting their decision to what happens in the debate, or, checking their bias with detailed philosophy statements, Ethics Bowl positions the judge as an active participant. Judges are chosen specifically because they come with background knowledge that the participants are left to discern by any means possible. Additionally, they are posed as participants in the discussion and drive both the topic and the interrogation of the topic. This interjection and the fact that only one team is the object of their examination means that teams have incentives to act conservatively and appeal to biases or the most conventional answers to questions. This, plus the expectation that advocates will prioritize civility over other goals,
including a critique of the question or the facts of the case, means that there is little incentive for participants to engage or correct judges. Ethics Bowl creates tremendous incentives for teams to agree with the judges and, if the motivated cognition thesis is true, there is little to no incentive to question or disagree with them.

The focus on agreement extends to the structure of the debate. Where academic debate generally requires that participants debate the same topic and that they debate both sides of a topic (switch-sides), Ethics Bowl is a one-off. Each case is presented once in the tournament and by only one team. While all teams prepare all of the cases beforehand, they will only present half of them and respond to the other half. Because they do not know the specific question beforehand, there is little ability to stake out specific or unique argumentative ground. Consequently, it is better to think of the debates in terms of debating five or six frameworks than to think about having a detailed discussion of the case studies. This focus on narrow frameworks (which are a presupposition for the discussion rather than a subject of it) added to the lack of opportunities to stake out argumentative difference and clash means that teams have an incentive to embody the most conservative and predictable positions. Because teams, especially the opposition team, do not have an opportunity to rebut positions, they have little incentive to stray far from argumentative convention of claims that can be immediately understood. The result is that agreement becomes more important than a candid interrogation of a problem.

The structure of the tournament super-charges this conservative orientation. We begin in a situation where the participants have little incentive to be candid and add to this the fact that debates can end in a tie, or that agreeing with an opponent reduces the burdens that it takes to win to pure stylistic differences. It appears that nearly every incentive to actively engage and clash with others disappears. Additionally, the one-off nature of debates means that Ethics Bowl does not have the kind of learning curve that most varieties of debate possess (where one takes lessons from each debate and builds on them over time). The fact that only half of the teams really get to discuss a case means that there is no curve at all.

Fourth, the focus on civility as a condition for conflict undermines any honest interrogation of arguments. It starts with the assumption that all that we need to know is already known and radical ideas are summarily dismissed. Ethics Bowl discourages participants from going beyond familiar frameworks or interrogating the value of those frameworks. An argument that centers on the paternalism or racism inherent in the Aristotelian notion of virtue ethics is unimaginable. Instead, the frameworks are presuppositions for the discussion and a way for participants to signal that they are knowledgeable about the nature of the field of ethics. This constitutes ethics as a closed system that rejects future creativity. In this way, participation in Ethics Bowl is a variety of credentialing that is often and materially useful for medical school applications, but not materially helpful in establishing new ethical boundaries.

Finally, the ability to go for the tie undercuts the sense of argumentative obligation—the obligation to interrogate arguments and to find what is true beyond probabilities and conventions. If competitive debate is good at anything, it is good at moving boundaries. In recent years, debate’s ability to reject conventions and to interrogate the way things are has resulted in radical changes to the varieties of contestants and arguments that participate(Atchison & Panetta, 2009). Encouraging the judges to defer to the debaters, and having the debaters feel free to compete as hard as possible has enabled a creative and heterogeneous pool of arguments, participants and judges. Asking to be an advocate and to keep an open mind is an impossible task under their theory.

REFERENCES


Persuasion and Agreement: “the Noble Lie” in Plato’s Republic, III

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In this paper, I will discuss Plato’s Republic III, 414b-415d. Here Socrates proposes that the citizens in the ideal city should believe a fictional story called “the Noble Lie.” Socrates recounts that during their education, the citizens were nurtured within the earth, and that the god used gold as part of mixture for those fit to rule; silver for the auxiliaries; and iron and bronze for the farmers and the craftsmen. Beginning with Rowett’s illuminating interpretation of that passage, I will argue that Socrates addresses the political question of how to educate ordinary citizens so that agreement among all social classes can be attained. According to this view, Plato assigns substantial roles to images such as stories and analogies for persuading when one communicates philosophical truths to non-philosophers. Then, I will assert that the above-mentioned general conclusion can be arrived at without taking Rowett’s potentially problematic approach of reading 415c7-d4.

1. INTRODUCTION

In this paper, I discuss an aspect of political philosophy presented in Plato’s Republic by considering a story Socrates narrates toward the end of Book III. This story is typically referred to by interpreters as “the Noble Lie.”

Before proceeding to the main subject, I will briefly explain the broader context of the Republic, which is relevant to the purposes of this paper. In Book V of this dialogue, Plato, or the character Socrates, states that the ideal city (hereafter, Callipolis), which he constructs in speech, should be governed by philosophers, who have knowledge (epistēmē) as their cognitive state rather than mere belief (doxa). Knowledge and belief are distinguished in terms of the types of objects each are concerned with. That is, knowledge is concerned with the Form, a transcendent entity that can be grasped only by our intellect (nous), whereas belief relates to sensible entities, such as sounds and colors. In Books VI–VII, Socrates describes how toilsome the epistemic advance required to acquire knowledge is when he discusses the Form of the Good, also described as the “largest thing to learn” (megiston mathēma) for those who rule the city properly. According to Socrates, what enables such an epistemic advance is dialectic (dialektike)—the method that he regards as starting with the Form, proceeding through the Form, and ending with the Form (VI, 511b-c).

While the issue of how to add substance to the content of this dialectical method is highly controversial, for the purposes of the present paper, it suffices to say that Socrates characterizes knowledge as something that can be acquired only by “intellectual elites.”

Callipolis, however, does not consist solely of rulers as philosophers. There exists a social class known as the auxiliaries, whose main job is to support the rulers. There is also another social class known as the producers, who are the largest in terms of population and whose role is to produce and trade stuff. Although Socrates seems to imply that the auxiliaries by definition collaborate with the rulers, and hence share much of the information available to them, it is unclear how the producers would agree with a regime in which they are deprived of political power, or indeed how much information is available to them. This is partly because Socrates, in attributing mere belief to the producers in Callipolis, does not dwell on their cognitive state.

This lack of explanation leads Popper and others*1 to claim that the rulers acquire and maintain their political power over the producers through a form of deception. Therefore, according to this line of interpretation, most of the citizens in Callipolis are manipulated by rulers who employ the Noble Lie as a means of deception. As a matter of fact, there appears to be no other place in the Republic where Socrates explicitly discusses what is to be delivered to the
ears of most citizens, namely the producers. Therefore, if the Noble Lie is designed to induce such a perpetually delusive situation, and if this is the situation in which most of the citizens in Callipolis are placed, then we have to conclude that Callipolis is in fact an extremely unjust society. Hence, Socrates substantially fails to describe the most just city (cf. IV, 427e), despite his later contention that he does so when he utilizes Callipolis as a paradigm upon which one should arrange one’s own city (IX, 592b).

Nevertheless, as I argue momentarily, we need not impute this obviously uncharitable interpretation to Plato. Catherine Rowett has recently offered an illuminating interpretation of the Noble Lie, according to which Socrates, in this passage (or, for that matter, anywhere in the dialogue), does not maintain that the rulers deceive the producers into regarding their governance as the most legitimate. Rather, in the Noble Lie, Socrates is to be viewed as striving to create an agreement among the three classes as to who should rule the city.*2

In the following section, I scrutinize the Noble Lie passage in detail (Section 2). I then briefly introduce Rowett’s interpretation and explore a potentially problematic point arising from her interpretation, although I agree with her in terms of what to make of the Noble Lie in general (Section 3). I then provide and support an alternative interpretation of a specific passage in the Noble Lie, my reading of which deviates from that of Rowett (Section 4). I conclude this paper by first summarizing my discussion and then raising a question for future inquiry (Section 5).

2. “THE NOBLE LIE”

In Book III, after depicting at length the elementary education provided to the guardians of the city, which consists of poetry and gymnastics, Socrates divides the guardians into two classes: the complete and finished guardians (pylakas panteleis) and the auxiliaries (epikourous), also known as the defenders of the rulers’ belief (414b). The former refers to those who, having passed every type of test, are able to defend their conviction that, in any situation, they must do what they think is in the city’s best interests (412d-414a). This implies that the “conviction” held by auxiliaries is not as firm as that of the completed and finished guardians, even though auxiliaries are superior to ordinary citizens in terms of their general ability to govern a city.

Socrates goes on to ask the present interlocutor, Glaucgon, one of Plato’s older brothers, the following question:

“So,” I said, “how can we contrive to use one of those necessary falsehoods (pseudon) we were talking about a little while back? We want one single, noble lie (gennaion ti hen) which will convince the rulers too, if that can be managed, but if not, all the rest of the city?” (414b7-c2, italics mine. Rowe’s translation with modifications)

Does Socrates really feel that it is more difficult to convince the rulers than the rest of the citizens in Callipolis? If so, why? I return to this question in Sections 3 and 4. After telling Glaucgon that the type of story he is about to narrate is nothing new—a story with a Phoenician flavor—and after showing some hesitation in narrating it (414c4-10, d1-2), Socrates finally starts divulging the content of the Noble Lie. This can be divided into two parts.

The first part is as follows. The entire upbringing and education Socrates gave the rulers and the soldiers (the latter probably identical with the auxiliaries) was something like a dream; throughout all the events that they imagined experienced, in reality, they remained deep under the ground, being molded, nurtured, and provided with their weapons and other equipment. When they were deemed completely finished, Mother Earth released them above the earth. From this point onward, it was their duty to defend their country against any attack, perceiving the earth to be their mother or nurse and the rest of the citizens as their brothers, born from the earth (414d4-e5).

Socrates then narrates the second part of the story, which he delivers directly to the citizens by addressing them as “you.” Socrates recounts the first half of the second part as follows:

“The god who was molding you used gold as part of mixture for those of you fit to rule; silver for those of you fit to be auxiliaries; and iron and bronze for those of you fit to be farmers and craftsmen.” (415a3-7)

Apparently reminding Glaucgon of the myth of metals in Hesiod’s Work and Days, Socrates
characterizes the three classes of people in Callipolis as citizens with gold, silver, and iron or bronze, respectively. Socrates continues to narrate the second half of the second part, which involves paying attention to social mobility among the three classes and god’s instruction regarding such mobility:

“And because you are all akin to each other, though for the most part you will have children like yourselves, there are times when silver offspring will be generated from gold, or gold from silver, and so on with the other permutations. So the first and the most important instruction given by the god to the rulers is that they must guard over nothing as well or as watchfully as they do over each new generation, looking to see which metal it is that is mixed into their souls.” (415a7-b7)

In the remainder of the second half of the second part, god urges the citizens to secure mobility among the three classes by means of demotion and promotion. Thus, if an offspring among the rulers transpires to have bronze or iron, he or she must be, without mercy, demoted to the craftsmen or the farmers; if, by contrast, an offspring in the producers has gold or silver in their soul, he or she must be raised to be a ruler or an auxiliary, respectively (415b7-c6).

To conclude, Socrates asks Glaucon once again, “Can you think of any way of contriving that they believe this story?” (415c7-8). Notably, Glaucon replies, “No, not the actual people you tell it to. But their sons may, and later generations, and the rest of humanity after that” (415c9-d1). Socrates responds that even this would encourage them to care for the city and for one another, adding that he kind of understands what Glaucon is getting at (schedon ... ti manthanō ho legeis, 415d2-3).*3

3. ROWETT’S INTERPRETATION

Rowett offers an insightful interpretation of the Noble Lie passage discussed in Section 1. This section considers how she addresses the following three interpretative questions: (1) How could the citizens have believed the apparently false story that, during their education, they were in reality being molded deep under the earth? (2) Was the Noble Lie designed to be delivered only to the first generation of citizens in Callipolis? Or was it intended for all generations? (3) What should we make of the exchange between Socrates and Glaucon at 415c7-d4, where Glaucon implies that it is more difficult to persuade the first generation of the Noble Lie than to persuade later generations? As will become apparent, my answers to questions (1) and (2) coincide with Rowett’s. It is with respect to question (3) that I disagree with her.

Focusing first on question (1), Wardy substantially responds*4 that the citizens are “brainwashed” in such a way that they cannot be consciously aware of how they are being educated. According to this “literal” reading, the citizens are subject to an ongoing delusion, regardless of whether the issue is the rulers or all the citizens in Callipolis.

Rowett correctly rejects this reading by arguing that it is unconceivable for citizens to literally believe that they were underground. This is because, as she observes*5, Mother Earth supposedly releases them above ground when their education has been completed at the ephebic age of about 18 or 20 years old (cf. VII, 537b1-c3). How could such adult citizens possibly forget what happened to them and instead (literally) believe that they were under the earth? Even if there were some devices available that could force them to believe this, it would be extremely uncharitable to ascribe to Plato the idea of a society based upon such an apparently awful manipulative means. Rowett understands the content of what the citizens are led to believe as a general idea embedded in the story, to the effect that they should treat other members of society as family members. This is on the grounds that their entire upbringing is due to this common society, regardless of which social class they end up belonging to.*6

According to Rowett, the main reason why Socrates exhibits some hesitation in telling the Noble Lie (cf. 414c4-10, d1-2) is because he (and, for that matter, Plato) anticipates that the thought he plans to deliver through the Noble Lie will astonish the interlocutor Glaucon (as well as readers on Plato’s part), who is from an aristocratic family,*7 for it abolishes any privilege due to parentage and establishes that a person’s social role is determined solely by their aptitude, which is tested and revealed when their education has been completed (i.e., metaphorically, when Mother Earth releases them).
Regarding question (2), Schofield presupposes*8 that the Noble Lie is only concerned with the first generation of citizens. He seems to believe this primarily because other ancient myths of autochthony are only concerned with the first generation. Socrates calls the Noble Lie a story with a Phoenician flavor.*9 Contemporary readers of the Republic must therefore immediately recall the Cadmean myth, according to which Cadmus, having killed the dragon, sowed its tooth on the earth; from this tooth came soldiers (spartoi) who began to fight one another. In the end, only five survived and became the ancestors of the citizens in Thebe.*10 Because this episode is a type of foundation myth, Schofield seems to assume that it is natural to regard Socrates’ version as such.

Regarding this line of reading, Rowett correctly objects that what is at issue, especially in the second half of the story, is not so much how social mobility is maintained within the first generation. Rather, what matters to the survival of the city is whether the current generation is properly classified by the metals (i.e., aptitudes) of their souls. Therefore, Rowett contends that, because the metals have to be checked for all citizens, the Noble Lie must be about every generation, and hence it is designed to be delivered to everyone, which, of course, includes the producers.*11 Therefore, although Socrates mainly speaks to the rulers in the Noble Lie passage, Rowett contends that this does not mean that the story is intended only for them.

So far, so good. Rowett is correct in thinking that the Noble Lie is far from being a means to plant a false belief in the citizens’ souls to manipulate them on behalf of the rulers. Rather, the point of introducing the Noble Lie rests in the fact that Socrates finds it necessary to invent a rhetorical device with which to communicate a philosophically difficult but significant idea: that it is not parentage (or, for that matter, sex) but one’s aptitude (metaphorically, what type of metal a person reveals in their soul when entering into society after education) that determines what kind of job they should pursue.

Such a device seems necessary for two reasons. First, in Book III, Socrates has not yet revealed that the guardians he has described thus far are actually the fully-fledged philosophers. (This point is important and will be returned to in the next section). In fact, the entire educational program Socrates has illustrated consists solely of musical poetry and gymnastics. Therefore, for now, he cannot appeal to a philosophical argument to persuade even the rulers in his imaginary city. Second, although Socrates has primarily described education for the future-rulers, in the Noble Lie passage, he appears to broaden the scope of education to all citizens, assuming that our interpretation of this passage is correct.*12 This indicates that the medium with which he transmits his philosophical message must be easily accessible to and understandable by the producers. There is nothing more suitable than a fictional story or a “lie” for communicating the message and thereby encouraging people to endorse the regime of Callipolis.*13

However, as I noted earlier concerning question (3), I hesitate to accept Rowett’s view. Instead, I am inclined to understand the apparently awkward exchange between Socrates and Glaucon at 415c7-d4 somewhat differently. After briefly reviewing what is said in this passage, I will explain Rowett’s interpretation.

At 415c9-10, Glaucon, responding to Socrates’ question, “Can you think of any way of contriving that they believe this story?”, states that later generations of the city, rather than the first generation, might be more inclined to believe it. What does this exchange imply? Rowett enumerates three possible alternatives to make sense of this conversation, which otherwise might appear to speak for the first-generation-only interpretation that she rejects.

(A) Glaucon simply misunderstands what Socrates has in mind, mistaking the Noble Lie for a myth like the existing ones.

(B) Glaucon understands Socrates’ proposal, and correctly notes the quite general truth that stories learned at the knee of one’s mother are more readily assimilated. Thus, later generations are easier to persuade because they are assumed to have heard the story from infancy onwards.

(C) Socrates has actually presented Glaucon with a false problem because he knows that the rulers to whom he has mainly been speaking are actually philosophers. Eventually they will no longer need the Noble Lie as a rhetorical device because they will fully understand its message by listening to philosophical arguments. Therefore, although Glaucon feels there may be a problem to solve with regard to whether rulers in the first generation are fully persuaded by the philosophical message contained in the Noble Lie, in reality, there is no problem at all.*14
Rowett rejects interpretation (A) because it is the least charitable to Glaucon. She seems to regard (B) and (C) as equally charitable to Glaucon. However, she eventually accepts (C), deeming it as (presumably, philosophically and/or hermeneutically) more interesting than (B).®

4. CHARITY FOR GLAUCON?

I now explain why I am reluctant to accept Rowett’s interpretation of the conversation at 415c9-10. The main reason is that she seems unnecessarily charitable to Glaucon. It is true to say that when interpreting Plato, the principle of charity demands that we read a given text in such a way as to ascribe the least absurd idea to the author. In the same vein, at least in contexts where the character of Socrates is most naturally taken to be expressing the same sorts of ideas Plato himself endorses, we should understand Socrates most charitably by accepting an interpretation that ascribes to him (and via him to Plato) the least absurd idea.

But what about Socrates’ interlocutors? Amongst other factors, it depends on how Plato describes each of the characters and what kind of role he attributes to them in the dramatic scenario. Generally speaking, in the Republic, Glaucon is described as a person who is, to a degree, familiar with Socrates’ philosophical discussion (cf. 475e-476a, 596a) but who, nonetheless, does not possess any professional knowledge about complicated philosophical matters.

Thus, although Glaucon may be an enthusiast of philosophy and sometimes reveals a reasonably strong understanding of the discipline (cf. II, 357b-361d), he is neither an expert nor a skillful discussant in philosophical matters. Rowett assumes that there is a need to ascribe the most charitable interpretation to Glaucon; hence, she rejects (A), which is the least charitable.® However, in actuality, there is no such need, as Glaucon frequently fails to understand Socrates’ point, especially when he confuses Socrates’ real meaning with that with which he is already familiar.

There are several places where this tendency can be found. At VII, 523b, although Socrates has in mind the opposite appearance of a sensible thing, such as a beautiful thing also appearing ugly, Glaucon mistakenly assumes that he is speaking about skiagraphia, a sort of painting exploiting an optical illusion that was popular in contemporary Athens. At 526d, Glaucon fails to understand why Socrates deems geometry to be useful; he mistakenly regards the usefulness of geometry as relating to military applications, such as setting up camps and concentrating or spreading out one’s forces. At 527d, he makes the same type of mistake in treating astronomy as being appropriate for the rulers because it enables them to have a better sense of seasons. Furthermore, at 528e-529c, although Socrates intends to claim that astronomy enables us to “look upwards” in the sense that this discipline enables the soul to see the intelligible, Glaucon sanguinely assumes that astronomy enables us to “look upwards” in the sense that we literally look up to visible stars with our physical eyes.

It is important to note that in all the passages in Book VII, Socrates also considers a stage of education performed in Callipolis, although the discipline at issue, mathematics, is confined to the selected future rulers. It therefore seems plausible to assume that Glaucon makes a similar kind of mistake and misunderstands Socrates’ point in the Noble Lie passage, where what is at issue is also a stage of education in Callipolis.

I now present my own view as to what Glaucon may think when he has listened to Socrates’ story. Glaucon, like most contemporary readers of the Republic, immediately recalls the Cadmean myth and is misled into supposing that the Noble Lie is a type of foundation myth. He therefore fails to understand what Socrates has in mind, namely that this story is to be delivered to all generations and that Socrates intends citizens to believe the message it contains. Hence, to Glaucon, it does appear difficult for the first generation to believe this story because they should be consciously aware that they do not spend time during their education in the earth. I take this to be the reason why Glaucon implies that it may be difficult to persuade the first generation of the Noble Lie. Therefore, as far as Glaucon’s understanding is concerned, I adopt interpretation (A), which is most uncharitable to Glaucon.

Therefore, in my view, there is a gap in the conversation between the two characters, in that Glaucon fails to understand Socrates’ intention. This gap is indicated by Socrates’ remark at 415d3-4, “I kind of (schedon ti) understand what you are getting at.” Here, “schedon ti” signifies that Socrates is not entirely sure whether Glaucon is following him. This can also be understood as
a sign from Plato, one designed to warn careful readers that something strange is going on in their conversation.

Nonetheless, unlike the aforementioned passages in Book VII, Socrates does not even attempt to highlight Glaucon’s misunderstanding. Why is this? Here, Rowett appears, at least in part, to be right. It is true that Plato, who is planning to describe the rulers as philosophers, must notice that eventually, the rulers will not have any difficulty believing the Noble Lie.*17 Therefore, for Plato, there is no problem with persuading the rulers. Aware that this is a pseudo-problem, Plato may prefer to have Socrates immediately move on to another issue rather than dwell upon Glaucon’s response.*18

We have now seen Rowett ascribing that view to the character Socrates. However, I am not sure this ascription is legitimate because, as Ferrari correctly points out,*19 in general, Socrates, as a character, seems to have motivations different from those of Plato, and hence, his mindset also differs. Not until he is repeatedly asked by Glaucon that Socrates, in Book V, decides to reveal that he has philosophers in mind as the rulers in Callipolis. Moreover, it is only after showing much hesitation that he finally begins to expound the simile of the Sun, the Divided Line, and the analogy of the Cave in Books VI-VII. To me, it is unclear how concretely Socrates, in Book III, envisages the epistemic state the philosopher-rulers are supposed to possess as a result of undertaking higher education consisting of mathematics and the philosophical dialectic. Socrates may already envisage their epistemic state as vividly as Plato does. In this case, interpretation (C) (Rowett’s view) may be true, regarding Socrates’ thinking. However, it seems equally possible to suppose that he leaves out exactly what happens to the rulers’ souls concerning their appreciation of the Noble Lie, even if he is clearly aware that they must be philosophers (i.e., people who contemplate the Forms). In this case, interpretation (B) appears to offer the best explanation with regard to what Socrates thinks. Thus, Socrates regards persuading the first generation as more difficult because they may not be as thoroughly assimilated to the Noble Lie as their successors, who are supposed to have heard the story repeatedly from infancy.

5. CONCLUSION

I now summarize my discussion. Rowett is correct in thinking that Plato considers the Noble Lie to be delivered to all citizens in all generations in Callipolis, and that this is meant to enhance harmony among the three classes. As such, the Noble Lie is not a device with which to deceive or manipulate the citizens; rather, it is a device with which to communicate a difficult philosophical truth in the form of a fictional story (pseudos). However, Rowett is incorrect to posit that we should ascribe the most charitable interpretation to Glaucon at 415c9-10. It is more plausible to suggest, as I have done, that he simply misunderstands Socrates’ point. Nonetheless, I have shown that, regarding Plato’s intention, one of Rowett’s points still holds in that there is actually no need to worry about the way in which rulers in the first generation are persuaded of the Noble Lie. This is because they, as fully-fledged philosophers, will perfectly understand its philosophical message in a non-allegorical way.

Here, a further question arises. Given that the fully-fledged philosophers, in my view, abandon the Noble Lie and comprehend its message with philosophical arguments, do they also eschew analogies or other literary devices in understanding the Form of the Good? Rowett, elsewhere, answers negatively.*20 Further consideration of this issue will be left for future inquiry.

NOTES

*2. Such an effort can be seen in passages where Socrates attempts to convince the multitude of the notion that the philosophers should rule the city (VI, 484a-502a).
*3. Rowe’s translation ignores the presence of “schedon it.” Bloom, Crube and Griffith correctly capture the nuance of reservation indicated in this phrase.
*4. Wardy, 133-34.
*5. Rowett (2016), 68.
*9. Page, 21, 25, suggests that “a Phoenician flavor” indicates an attitude that underlies and motivates the love of money (see IV, 436a).
Thus, Plato may hint that the development of civic virtues among guardians happens to be frustrated by materialistic self-interest.

*10. For the Cadmean myth, see also Laws II, 663e-664a.

*11. Rowett, 90-91. See also Adam, 196.

*12. Pace Reeve, 186-91 and Hourani, 58-60; I assume that the producers also take part in the early education depicted in Books II-III.

*13. Note that Socrates frequently makes use of analogies in his attempt to persuade the multitude of the notion of rule by philosophers in VI, 484a-502a.


*15. Rowett (2016), 82-83.


*17. Although Cross and Woozley, 103, believe that rulers themselves are persuaded of the myth as a result of being deceived, they correctly suspect that the treatment of the rulers in Book III will substantially change in the analogy of the Cave in VII. With regard to what may happen to the prisoner’s soul after returning to the cave, see Nightingale, 131-37; for a unique view, see esp. Krumnow’s analysis of irigaray.

*18. Cf. Charalabopoulos, 323-24, who takes Socrates’ sudden reference to “hé phēmē” (translated as “the popular voice” or “the omen”) at 414d8, immediately after the passage we have considered, as a message from Plato.

*19. Ferrari, 139-40.


REFERENCES
Obama argues for peace at Hiroshima

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Barack Obama traveled to Hiroshima, Japan in the final year of his presidency to participate in a wreath laying ceremony and deliver a speech about the potential for a world without nuclear weapons. In the following paper, I argue that Obama’s case for peace was strengthened by his performance at the ceremony and his use of self-evident truths. Overall, the president argued that war memorials, such as those at Hiroshima, have the potential to change the way we view each other as humans by harnessing rhetorical resources as old as Athens. He urges other leaders like himself to visit and comprehend the potential violence humanity can unleash, and demands they pursue a moral awakening to correct our course.

1. INTRODUCTION

United States President Barack Obama travelled to Hiroshima in May 2016 to participate in a ceremony with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and became the first sitting American president to visit the site of first atomic bomb attack. As Obama neared the end of his tenure, he faced significant constraints in the weeks approaching the ceremony. Service members at home would feel alienated if the president chose to apologize during the ceremony and many in the Japanese public felt that an apology would be appropriate (Donnelly & Vinograd 2016). Obama could not reinforce a narrative of victimization without causing political trouble both at home and abroad (Sneider 2016). Obama expressed that he felt “imprisoned by history” and feared the trip would fail to negotiate the difficult constraints he and the White House communications team faced (Labott 2016). In the weeks leading up to the ceremony, the presidents’ staff indicated that the president would not offer an apology, but instead would focus on his foreign policy priorities of nuclear nonproliferation and global disarmament (McCurry, Smith, & Yuhas 2016). Given the visit was six years in the making, the president clearly understood the risks of a failed visit.

In what follows, I examine the speech that President Obama delivered at the ceremony and outline the arguments the president made for global disarmament. During the speech, the president constructed an argument in support of war memorials, examined the role of narrative and history in human morality, and articulated a method for enacting transformations of attitudes towards weapons of war and violence at large. First, I provide a brief background on the political situation in 2016 facing president Obama as he headed to Japan. Second, I posit that the arguments developed in the speech were magnified by Obama’s performance at the ceremony and outline the ways in which his solemnity and dignity enacted a form of reconciliation and model for future world leaders. Third, I argue that Obama articulated war memorials as positive historical instruments of education and the development of a world without war. Finally, I examine how Obama situates narrative form as the primary method by which humanity can articulate universal principles of empathy and non-violence. At Hiroshima, Obama argued for a world without nuclear weapons and violence writ large. He did so by envisioning the transformation of how we treat our global family and demonstrated how leaders can enact reconciliation.

2. FOREIGN RELATIONS UNDER OBAMA

When Barack Obama entered office in 2009, the economy was in freefall, two wars lingered on overseas with no exit strategy, the world’s most wanted terrorist remained at large, and relations with many United States allies, especially those in the Pacific region, has frayed measurably since the turn of the millennium. The Bush administration’s approach to North Korean nuclearization was primarily to blame for the erosion of the Japanese-American Security Alliance (Bush 2009). Given the proximity of the
Japanese people and territory to nuclear armed dictatorship, the prioritization of the War on Terror understandably destabilized the alliance. Obama’s election in 2008, especially in the context of his promises to scale back overseas counter terrorism operations and begin withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, encouraged leaders in Japan that a new administration would be more amenable to reprioritize politics in the Pacific. Obama’s personal biography as a product of both American and Pacific Islander cultures further deepened this hope and led one Brookings Institute senior scholar to note that “American soft power…can be replenished, and our postwar record, the goodwill of friends in the region, and the special character of the 2008 presidential election create a basis on which to restore it” (Bush 2009). Overall, the situation in 2009 looked promising for a renewal of relations between Japan and the United States and the new administration offered hope that the alliance would begin to restore its role in maintaining the security order in the region.

Early indicators from the administration were promising too. Obama received the Nobel Peace Prize, in large part because of his nuclear disarmament agenda. In his speech accepting the prize, Obama argued directly for a world with significant reductions in nuclear armaments and committed himself and his administration to the principles of global disarmament:

One urgent example is the effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and to seek a world without them … I’m working with President Medvedev to reduce America and Russia’s nuclear stockpiles. But it is also incumbent upon all of us to insist that nations like Iran and North Korea do not game the system. Those who claim to respect international law cannot avert their eyes when those laws are flouted. Those who care for their own security cannot ignore the danger of an arms race in the Middle East or East Asia. Those who seek peace cannot stand idly by as nations arm themselves for nuclear war. (Obama 2009)

Obama not only argues for a world without nuclear weapons, but clearly implies that countries like China and Israel who destabilize their regions either by abetting potential proliferators (China in the case of North Korea) or by sabre rattling so much a regional rival over-securitizes (Israel in the case of Iran). Chinese complicity in North Korean proliferation disrupted the relative balance of power in the region and held millions of people hostage to a nuclear armed Pyongyang. In addition to his commitment to nuclear disarmament, Obama announced his grand strategic shift and redefinition, the Asia Pivot. In a speech to the Australian parliament, Obama made the case that American influence and power was needed in the Pacific more than the Middle East and Central Asia. He stated that he “made a deliberate and strategic decision – as a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with our allies and friends” (Obama 2011). Far from the “what have you done for me lately” attitude of the Bush administration, the tone struck by Obama in his grand strategy speech indicated that he would prioritize, diplomatic, economic, and military engagement in Asia. His commitments in Oslo guaranteed that non-proliferation on the Korean peninsula would play a central role in this strategy shift. Obama would complete the restoration of foreign relations with Japan by constructing the Trans Pacific Partnership trade deal and completing one final visit to Japan, to visit the war memorial and museum in Hiroshima.

3. THE CEREMONY AS HYBRID

The ceremony at Hiroshima took place less than a year before Obama would leave office, and involved a short wreath laying, speeches from President Obama and Prime Minister Abe, and a short reconciliation gesture from the president. Importantly, the ceremony was attended by political figures of both nations and survivors of the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (hibakusha). The ceremony was broadcast around the world on news networks and is available to watch on multiple digital platforms. Clearly, the speech delivered by the president took place within the framework of an epideictic ceremony, so understanding the effect of those situational and occasional elements will help illuminate why congruently constructed arguments are magnified. As Jamieson and Campbell (1982) note in their work on rhetorical hybrids, deliberative elements of epideictic ceremonies are reinforced when the epideictic elements are enacted in a way consonant with the tone and style of the argumentative content. The
situation and occasion direct Obama to strategically construct arguments in concert with the values and attitudes reflected by the audience, the scene, the ceremony, and the purpose of the visit. Jamieson and Campbell note that fusing elements of deliberative argumentation into ceremonial situations can present significant problems for the speaker. If the ceremony seems out of touch the tone of the speech or if the deliberative elements are not congruent with the tone of the epideictic elements, then the fusion can become imbalanced and subvert the intended effect. Fortunately for the president, his particular skill at solemnity and gravity at times of emotional catharsis is self-evident from his speeches to mourning citizens throughout his career (see for example his speeches at Charleston and Newtown). Overall, the speech itself and the arguments contained within it felt well attuned to the occasion and reflected the pacifist attitudes among many members of the audience.

The ceremonial or epideictic aspects of the event implicates the argument analysis in two ways. Primarily, it elevates the importance of sensory and affective elements of Obama’s argument. In the course of making his case for disarmament, he references emotion, memory, imagination, feeling, fear, understanding, sensation, listening, crying, silence, looking, and remembrance. Seeing the speech on video makes clear the affective elements of the moment and ceremony. He looked solemn and dignified throughout the event, his face portrayed a sense of thoughtfulness and contemplation, and his overall demeanor was extremely well suited for the moment. When laying the wreath down, Obama made certain to perform the ceremony without error. Holistically, the elements of the ceremony were perfectly calibrated to support the arguments in the speech. Following the speech, Obama enacted the reconciliation and empathy that he argued for in his discourse. He embraced one of the hibakusha as Abe and the audience looked on, and despite his indication that an apology was not forthcoming, the symbolic gesture offered by Obama after the speech functioned to reinforce his arguments. Through enactment, Obama became a model for other leaders to emulate. In a proper bookend to the speech and wreath-laying, the gesture of peace and friendship invited the audience to witness the potential transformative power of empathy. Both the gravity displayed by Obama during the ceremony and the embrace afterwards strengthened the case made by the president in his speech. As I show in the next section, Obama built an argument for how war memorials and ceremonies of remembrance can build momentum for reconciliation and generate resources towards a global mindset of non-violence.

4. BUILDING AN ARGUMENT FOR PEACE

Obama delivered his speech (Obama 2016) directly following the wreath laying ceremony, and before Prime Minister Abe. Public memory, and the debate over its meaning, remains “partial, partisan, and thus frequently contested,” and arguments over the utility and meaning of memorials and museums has been the frequent object of public debate (Dickinson, Blair, & Ott 2010). The investment in, political and public support for, and construction of a museum, or memorial, also forwards an argument about how to read and understand the past. Statues to great and wicked men have been the center of controversy for millennia, and every commitment to interpretation of events forwards an argument about what those events should represent. Recently, the United States and has begun a reckoning with the meaning and significance of memorials to confederate war heroes. Given the controversy surrounding these places, it is only fitting that the president constructed an argument that advocated for the use of war memorials for the purposes of peaceful coexistence. In his speech, Obama made the argument that war memorials have the capacity to generate resources for new narratives about humanity. Stories we learn from places like Hiroshima and the survivors like the hibakusha can teach us to become more empathetic and just as a species.

He began with a self-evident premise for the arguments, that humanity’s capacity for organization and technological advancement has also been the primary avenue through which dehumanization and violence occur. The president pointed out that this capacity allows us to apply these principles on a mass scale to cause suffering to millions. What Obama called “humanity’s core contradiction” is self-evident to the audience because the ground they sit on was once the site of such suffering. The “very spark that marks us as a species,” he said, “our ability to set ourselves apart from nature and bend it to our will…also give[s] us the capacity for unmatched destruction.” Second, Obama situated
his argument as common knowledge or popular wisdom. “Ordinary people know this” he stated plainly. They consistently reject the war impulse time and time again throughout history and it is not those who suffered in war who need an education on the violence that industrialized technology, xenophobia, profit motive, and ignorance can cause in the right admixtures. If leaders understood what their people clearly have for millennia (and by the way, written down in basically every holy book ever), then war, Obama argued, would disappear. Leaders, however, are not easily persuaded or reasoned with, and so Obama needed to show how places like the Hiroshima memorial can generate the emotional fortitude necessary to forgive ones enemies and build empathetic connections necessary around the globe.

The first argument that Obama constructed around this premise is that war memorials serve a socially and politically productive purpose. Hiroshima, he argued, teaches us about the horrors of war by activating our sensory experiences of the place and infusing those experiences with the memories and recollections of survivors. Former presidents also argued for the utility of war memorials and commemoration of the dead, including Abraham Lincoln at Gettysburg and Reagan in Germany. Constructing memorials, conducting remembrances, and mourning the loss of our fellow global citizens is a productive activity for producing empathetic citizens. Obama told the audience how the memorial forces one to “feel the dread” of the children who ran for safety as their world ended. He called upon the audience to think about a paradox and “listen” to the “silent cry” of the dead who call out from the past. In doing so, he said, we “remember” the “innocents” who did there at Hiroshima, and in turn, we also think of all those dead, unnamed and unfound, on battlefields stretching back to the dawn of civilization. In articulating this experience of the memorial, Obama made a case for why the memorial should exist. He supported his case with warrants about how the memorial works on humans through memory and sensory experience to justify why people should visit it. “Why do we come to this place?” he asked, “We come ponder a terrible force unleashed in a not so distant past. We come to mourn the dead…Their souls speak to us. They ask us to look inward, to take stock of who we are and what we might become.” President Obama pointed to the souls of the dead as audible agents of rhetorical effect, something not dissimilar to the warrant of the dead (Rood 2017) but involving more affective presence for the visitor. What do the dead have to teach us, then? They teach us self-evident truths about the nature of humankind that Obama used to start his argument. “Hiroshima teaches us this truth. Technological progress without an equivalent progress in human institutions can doom us.” War memorials have intrinsic value, his case stated, because they teach us self-evident truths about humankind that are necessary to learn if we are to “take stock of who we are.” As one of the famous inscriptions in the pronaos at Delphi states, γνῶθι σεαυτόν (know thyself). The primary reason to visit and experience memorials like these, Obama stated, is to learn about humanity’s capacity for inhumanity and contemplate the nature of our being.

Second, Obama claimed that Hiroshima not only teaches people about the past, but also invites them to change for the better. Obama took stock of his own response and admitted that “Mere words cannot give voice to such suffering” as was felt on that day. Instead, he said we should feel “a shared responsibility to look directly into the eye of history and ask what we must do differently to curb such suffering again.” We must “fight complacency” with the memory of that suffering because it is the memory of events like Hiroshima that “fuels our moral imagination” and “allows us to change.” Obama provided empirical examples of humanity’s capacity to change for the better. He described the post-war period around the globe and highlighted the great work to reduce structural violence and suffering done in concert between former enemies. Relationships like the Japanese-American Security Alliance make it self-evident that humans are able to change for the better and work on behalf of the global community. There is work to do still though, Obama warned the audience. The most powerful nations in the world still possess nuclear weapons with the power to destroy all life on the planet. The president argued that culture and high-minded ideals will not save humanity from itself:

The world war … was fought among the wealthiest and most powerful of nations. Their civilizations had given the world great cities and magnificent art. Their thinkers had advanced ideas of justice and harmony and truth. And yet the war grew out of the same base instinct for
domination or conquest … an old pattern amplified by new capabilities and without new constraints.

Despite the high minded ideals of the romanticists, the first half of the 20th century proved that there were few, if any, limits to humanity’s capacity for war and oppression. Between the great wars, the nations of the world had tried a plethora of snake oils for the plague of violence that seemed ubiquitous. Obama recounted the different yokes societies have tried to place on human nature to constrain and direct our most violent impulses:

Every great religion promises a pathway to love and peace and righteousness, and yet no religion has been spared from believers who have claimed their faith as a license to kill. Nations arise telling a story that binds people together in sacrifice and cooperation, allowing for remarkable feats. But those same stories have so often been used to oppress and dehumanize those who are different. Science allows us to communicate across the seas and fly above the clouds, to cure disease and understand the cosmos, but those same discoveries can be turned into ever more efficient killing machines.

Religion cannot save humanity if we cannot learn to love those of different faiths, nationalism cannot offer advice on how to cooperate over global problems and develop international solutions, and science may be able to replicate human appearance and mimic its functions, but no instrument or device in a laboratory measures immorality. Rather than look outside ourselves, he said, we need to “change our mind-set about war itself.” If we cannot bind the machinery of human instrumentality to a moral purpose with tools we have built expressly for that purpose, then we need to “prevent conflict through diplomacy and strive to end conflicts after they’ve begun” and “see our growing interdependence as a cause for peaceful cooperation.” Most importantly, he argued, “we must reimagine our connection to one another as members of the human race.” After establishing the case for visiting Hiroshima and contemplating the existence of such a place, Obama then constituted a purpose for people when they do attend the memorial. In order for a place of such hallowed suffering to have its intended effect and inspire change, we must attend to the voices of the dead and allow them to argue for a better future.

Third, to save others the same fate, Obama made the case in his speech for developing a new narrative about humanity. The dead, he argued inveigh upon us a solemn duty to change humanity for the better, to end war. To do so, we must “tell our children a different story” than past generations have told their children. Because we tell stories that exclude or oppress, the narrative of a common fate for humankind is lost. He stated that humans are not “bound by genetic code to repeat the mistakes of the past” but that we can “learn” and “choose” to tell a new story. Barack Obama at Hiroshima did not sound like the newly elected president of 2009 receiving his prize in Oslo, nor did he sound like the upstart senator on the campaign trail promising to usher in a new era of global leadership. Rather than rely on policymaking, international agreements on non-proliferation, or pursuing change through the International Criminal Courts, the president argued in his 2016 speech that we should tell each other stories that “describes a common humanity.” The shift strategy in his second term both reflects the inevitable end of his tenure in office, but also a conscious choice that is evident in his changing arguments on gun control (Kirk 2018). By 2015, President Obama avoided making the case for reform by pursuing legislation. Bitter defeats in 2013 in the Senate led the president to eschew direct deliberations over reform and pursue a value-oriented strategy instead. The speech at Hiroshima reflects this shift in tone by Obama, and his argument that “we are part of a single human family” was the argumentative centerpiece in both Charleston and Hiroshima.

What story should we tell, then? If the memorial and museum speak to us irreducible truths, and we are to tell stories that encapsulate an argument of common humanity, then which stories did the president recommend? Obama started his final argument by giving an example: “We see these stories in the hibakusha. The woman who forgave a pilot who flew the plane that dropped the atomic bomb because she recognized that what she really hated was war itself. The man who sought out families of Americans killed here because he believed their loss was equal to his own.” By holding up the hibakusha as a model for global citizenship, Obama defined a global citizen as one who hates “war itself.” Pacifism becomes the defining feature of citizenship in this story, and heroes are
those who overcome national and other differences to acknowledge and embrace all humanity. Next, Obama provided an example from American history, the Declaration of Independence. Once again echoing Lincoln at Gettysburg, the president said that “The irreducible worth of every person, the insistence that every life is precious, the radical and necessary notion that we are part of a single human family – that is the story we all must tell.” His case rests on self-evident truths established at the start of the speech, the argument that war memorials like those at Hiroshima allow us to commune with history and bear witness to humanity’s capacity for evil, and the argument that we are capable of creating a world without war or weapons thereof: “That is why we come to Hiroshima,” he argued, “So that we might think of people we love. The first smile from our children in the morning. The gentle touch from a spouse over the kitchen table. The comforting embrace of a parent. We can think of those things and know that those same precious moments took place here, 71 years ago.” The lessons we learn from memorials and ceremonies about the dead are lessons of universality and commonality. Obama argued in his Hiroshima speech that our obligation to those who died, to those who gave us the world we have today, is to preserve it for those who inherit the world tomorrow. Only a story of common humanity can enact this future.

In his conclusion, Obama told the audience that these are not lessons that have escaped humanity’s grasp somehow after thirty thousand years of history. Ordinary people “know” these lessons from history already. Whether their family members served in combat, they are estranged from their home country because of conflict, or because they have lost loved ones in war, citizens of the world know the cost of war and they know there is a better way. Obama’s concluding argument was that leaders like himself must reckon with this truth, elsewise the world is in peril. Ordinary citizens do not direct armies, control nuclear weapon launch codes, or build chemical weapons on an industrial scale. Leaders are responsible for war, and it is they, Obama argued, that had the most to learn from stories like those of the hibakusha.

5. CONCLUSION

Overall, Obama’s argument for pacifism and a common humanity were clearly laid out, supported with a variety of materials, and was seen to be largely successful as a foreign visit and ceremony (Donnelly and Vinograd 2016; Labott 2016; Sneider 2016). His use of self-evident arguments were reinforced by the performative elements of the ceremony. Obama’s demeanor and gravitas demonstrated for viewers and audience members that he took the duty seriously and held the lessons of the day in deep contemplation. His argument was supported by a depiction of his own sensory and emotional response to the site, and the wisdom imparted by his visit. Given the timing of the visit (during a heated election year), the approaching end of his term, and the perceived constraints, the president cogently and clearly laid out a case for global peace. The president directly challenged other world leaders to visit Hiroshima and sites like it to bear witness to the cruelty of humanity and its capacity for violence. Despite the potential responses from other nations in the region and United States allies, little negative reaction to the speech was evident (Sneider 2016). Clearly, the president, in his visit to Hiroshima, made arguments that the people and leaders of the world agreed with, the only remaining question now is, will they meet the challenge and listen to the stories of the dead? And if they do, what story will they choose to tell?

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The Rhetorical Progymnasmata – A Teaching Program for Critical Thinking?

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The ancient rhetorical progymnasmata were devised to school students in invention, arrangement and style. But they also contain a well-structured program in three progressive steps for schooling in argumentation and critical thinking. In chreia and maxim, students find arguments for supporting the moral content of an anecdote or proverb following a set of argumentative techniques. In refutation and confirmation, they refute or confirm a narrative according to criteria such as clarity, plausibility, possibility, logical consistency, adequacy, and expediency. In advanced exercises, students apply these skills to arguing for or against an action or a proposed law by producing well-structured arguments and anticipating counterarguments. By this program, students learn to think carefully, avoid hasty inferences, structure their thoughts, and look at problems from various sides.

1. INTRODUCTION

For schooling students in elementary skills in rhetoric and composition, ancient rhetoric had developed a very efficient program consisting in a graded and ordered series of 14 basic exercises called the ‘progymnasmata’ or preliminary exercises. Step by step, these exercises guided students from easy writing tasks to more complex processes of rational argument and decision-making. In early modern times, these exercises were revived and practiced widely in grammar schools from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century. Yet also quite recently, in the 21st century, they have seen another unexpected revival especially in U.S. Christian schools and in the domain of homeschooling. Since 1999, books such as the 4th edition, by R.J. Connors, of E.P.J. Corbett’s Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student (Corbett & Connors, 1999), the 2nd edition, by Debra Hawhee, of Sharon Crowley’s Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students (Crowley & Hawhee, 1999), or Frank J. D’Angelo’s Composition in the Classical Tradition (D’Angelo, 2000) have effectively promoted and adapted the progymnasmata to contemporary use. And Susan Wise Bauer, one of the spearheads of the homeschooling movement, has most warmly recommended them to homeschooling parents (Wise Bauer & Wise, 1999).

The main objective of these exercises was to prepare students for the tasks of rhetorical invention, arrangement and style. Yet I will argue that they also contain a well-structured program for schooling in argumentation and what we today would call critical thinking. Present-day advocates of a revival of the progymnasmata for teaching composition have on various occasions pointed to this feature. “Good writers […] are good thinkers,” says James A. Selby, headmaster at Whitefield Academy, a Christian school in Kansas City, MO, and one of the main promoters of the progymnasmata. For, he adds: “The Progymnasmata begins to develop logical and rhetorical structures in the mind.” (Selby, 2010, p. 97). Likewise, Lene Mahler Jaqua and Tracy Gustilo, proponents of the homeschooling tradition, emphasize that the progymnasmata “come from a writing tradition which has produced many of the best thinkers, authors, and statesmen of the past two thousand years.” (Mahler Jaqua & Gustilo, 2002-2010). Finally, Natalie Sue Baxter, in her thorough analysis of present-day use of the progymnasmata in secondary school teaching, also finds: “Outcomes of teaching the progymnasmata include development of judgment, mental dexterity, and the ability to perform well in speaking or writing on demand.” (Baxter, 2008, p. 2).

My argument will be that the overall curriculum of the progymnasmata encloses, as it
were, a well-devised sub-curriculum in three clearly distinguishable steps that can be regarded as a training course in rational argumentation and critical thinking. Mark Battersby and Sharon Bailin have recently criticized traditional critical thinking instruction for reducing its goal too much to learning not to fall prey to invalid, inadequate or fallacious arguments, and for failing to provide instead the active reasoning skills that students need in order to find, lay out and construct their own arguments (Battersby & Bailin, 2018). Since, as David Hitchcock also well points out, critical thinking is a process involving noticing problems, structuring and solving them, avoiding bias, and generating possible answers, ultimately leading to substantiated judgment (Hitchcock, 2018, sections 5 and 6), and must hence consist in a practical program for achieving an educational goal (see also Scheffler, 1960, p. 19), the ancient progymnasmata might provide the core and outline of such a program.

2. STEP ONE: FORMAL TYPES OF ARGUMENT: CHREIA AND MAXIM


After students have trained their skills in the art of narration with the most basic exercises of fable and narrative, they are for the first time introduced to the realm of argumentation in the exercises of Chreia (anecdote) and Maxim (proverb) (Kennedy, 2003, pp. 97-101). A chreia is a brief anecdote with a moral content, reporting a famous saying or significant action by some historical celebrity. It thus still contains a strong element of narrative. A proverb, by contrast, is as a rule anonymous. Yet students are not simply meant to retell, paraphrase or modify these little stories (as they were in the first couple of assignments), but are requested to elaborate on their moral content in eight mandatory steps. These eight steps are as follows:

(1) Praise of the author
(2) Paraphrase
(3) Cause
(4) Contrary
(5) Comparison
(6) Example
(7) Testimony
(8) Summary

Students will thus begin with a praise of the person responsible for the respective saying or action (1). Then, they will paraphrase the story in their own words (2). Next, they will give a reason for the truth or utility of its content (3). Next, they will support it starting from the point of view of its contrary (4). Then, they will give an illustrative comparison or analogy (5), followed by a significant example (6) and some citation from indisputable authority (7). At the end, the whole argument will be summed up and rounded off by a concluding exhortatory statement (8).

What must interest us in this standard pattern of elaboration, is that in it we find a perfect tableau of possible types or patterns of argument: It has been a truism since Aristotle that arguing may proceed in two basic ways: deductively or inductively. Both these types are represented here. In Cause (3), a direct deductive rationale must be given for the demonstrandum (pretty much in the manner that Aristotle would call an enthymeme). In Contrary (4), however, the starting point must be the opposite of the demonstrandum, which then has to be reduced to absurdity; so what we have is the method of indirect deductive proof. On the side of induction, we get Example (6); for according to Aristotle, it is example that (for the sake of brevity) represents inductive reasoning in a rhetorical context. With Comparison (5), however, we get to the domain of arguments by analogy (which are of a more complex structure, and can involve a combination of deductive and inductive reasoning). But how about Testimony (7)? What we have here, placed last, is the argument from authority (ad verecundiam), a type of argument not really held in very high esteem nowadays, but which used to be a standard argument in ancient and medieval times. If one wishes, one can even find it also in the introductory Praise of the author (1). It might even be regarded as a kind of positive argument ad hominem.

It can rightly be said, thus, that by extensively practicing elaboration of chreiae and maxims,
students will learn and imbibe the various different formal types of argument available and acquire the ability to analyze them when they see them, and to construct their own arguments correctly. They will not really have to invent very much at this stage yet, since mostly the outline of arguments will be given to them by the teacher. But they will learn how to set up an argumentation in a formally correct manner.

3. STEP TWO: ‘FINAL HEADINGS’: REFUTATION, CONFIRMATION AND COMMONPLACE

Having gotten this far, students will have become sufficiently familiar with the formal methods of proof, but they will still be lacking substantial criteria on which to base their arguments. This gap will speedily be filled in the two exercises immediately following Chreia and Maxim, namely Refutation and Confirmation. Originally, in earlier handbooks, these two were not two different exercises, but two aspects of one and the same. It was only Aphthonius who divided them up into two chapters.

In these two exercises, the task set to students is to refute or confirm the truth of a given narrative (in antiquity, mostly a mythical story). The starting point is quite similar to what happened in Chreia and Maxim (and thus familiar to students): In the first place (even before the exposition of the story itself), students are instructed to begin with a eulogy (or, in the case of a refutation, a defamation) of the author of the story, in order to enhance (or, for that matter, undermine) its credibility. But what follows next is not types of proof, but this time criteria by which to gauge the plausibility of any given story or claim. It is clearly arguments of probability or defeasible arguments that are at stake here. But those are also the kind of arguments that critical thinking is mainly about.

These criteria are those that ancient rhetoric used to call ‘final headings’ or ‘final aims’, teliká kephálaia in Greek, and capita finalia in Latin. For a refutation, these criteria are: obscurity, incredibility, impossibility, inconsistency, inadequacy, and uselessness. Some of these, such as obscurity and inconsistency, are rather related to presentational form, others to content. For confirmation, the respective opposite criteria will of course be clarity, credibility, possibility, consistency, adequacy, and utility. One might speak of a list of general topics.

Combining the formal argument types of Chreia and Maxim with the final aims conveyed in Refutation and Confirmation, students will no longer be far from mastering the argumentative section of any speech, judicial or deliberative. In effect, Nicolaus of Myra, another author of a progymnasmata handbook from the 5th century C.E., explicitly states: “Once we have been practiced by the chreia and the maxim in paradeigmatic and enthymematic demonstration, these [i.e. refutation and confirmation] teach us in greater detail how to engage in debate in reply to antitheses, so that in complete hypotheses [i.e. declamations] we shall be able to offer a solution to the objections of the opponents and easily confirm what seems to us best.” (Kennedy, 2003, p.p 144-145).

Let us briefly look at how Aphthonius in his handbook applies these criteria in his model example for refutation (the mythical story about the god Apollo falling in love with the girl Daphne, who, fleeing from the god’s advances, gets metamorphosed into a laurel tree): Obscurity: How is it imaginable that a river (Ladon) and Earth (Daphne’s mythical parents) have intercourse and beget a child? Incredibility: How can two gods beget a mortal child? Impossibility: Daphne could never have grown up with any of her parents, neither under water nor underground. Inconsistency: How can Earth, who has evidently had sexual intercourse herself and begotten a child, advise her daughter against? Inadequacy: It is inadequate for a god such as Apollo to behave like an amorous teenager. Uselessness: Neither Apollo nor Earth in the end achieve what they pursue. Hardly worth mentioning that, in the next chapter, Aphthonius follows this up with a confirmation of the very same story, applying the opposite criteria.

Having reached the level of exercises number 5 and 6, students are hence capable not only of constructing good arguments of various formal types, but also of filling them with appropriate content.

The precepts of Refutation and Confirmation work best in contexts of judicial debate or political deliberation. What falls short, is epideictic speech. This, however, is at least partly made up for by the next exercise called Commonplace, which in a sense completes the argumentative block of exercises 3 to 6. A commonplace in the sense of these exercises is a general line of argument that can be used in favor or against a certain laudable or censurable stereotype of person (in favor of a hero or a wise
man; or against a thief, a traitor, a murderer, an adulterer or the like). In the precepts for this exercise, we find a combination of formal types of argument and final aims. One is supposed to begin with an argument from the contrary, followed by an emotive description, a comparison, and a flashback to the person’s earlier conduct, and in the end, another, typically epideictic set of final aims should be applied: legality, justice, opportunity, possibility, fame, and future consequences.

One can thus rightly say that with the exercise of Commonplace, the students’ range of arguments and topical criteria is substantially enlarged in the direction of epideictic rhetoric.

4. STEP THREE: COMPLETE AUTONOMOUS ARGUMENT: THESIS AND LAW PROPOSAL

The five exercises described so far form a homogeneous block of tasks dedicated to the acquisition of skills in building good arguments. The teacher will, so to speak, not release students until they will have grasped the basic requirements of good rational argument. It would seem that students should by now be well enough prepared for making their own independent judgments and devising their own arguments accordingly and responsibly. Yet before they are allowed to do so, they still have to wait a moment and first deal with a number of exercises of other kinds until they finally get back to the argumentative level with the very last couple of tasks.

In the earlier argumentative block, the actual objective of the argument was always given with the actual assignment. Students would always perfectly know what to argue for or against. This, however, changes profoundly with the last two exercises in the series: Thesis and Proposal of Law. In these two, students are now confronted with a controversial problem, for the solution of which they need to decide themselves which side to take. This means that, before even starting to set up a line of argument, the student must first of all deliberate and consider all the pros and cons. For this purpose, the student needs to apply all the argumentative tools that she or he has so far acquired: the various formal types of proof and the final criteria and topics. But, in order to arrive at a rational and responsible decision, she or he will also need good judgment, which, hopefully, she or he will have acquired in the course of the more rudimentary exercises. If all goes well, the student is now capable of taking her or his own independent position in the face of a difficult problem and of defending it in competent manner.

A thesis, of course, consists in the argumentative analysis of and response to a general problem, either political (i.e. oriented towards action) or philosophical (purely theoretical). A political thesis, for instance, would be the question “Should one marry?” or “Should one fortify cities?”; while a philosophical thesis might be “Is the earth round or flat?” or “Are there many worlds?” There is still a difference between a thesis and what the ancients called a hypothesis, namely an individual case including special circumstances such as individual persons, places, times etc., such as “Should the Spartans fortify their city in view of the Persians advancing into Greece?” A thesis is thus the penultimate step that comes before a complete speech.

Likewise, a proposition of law is almost an independent speech. Since it usually involves a number of special circumstances, it was regarded as being placed half-way between a thesis and a full speech. But in any case, both exercises allow for, nay require a personal decision, which calls for mature judgment on the part of the speaker.

The argumentative criteria or final aims are also identical for both exercises: legality, justice, opportunity and possibility. It is evident that all those criteria are already familiar from preceding exercises. Likewise, the practical procedure is similar for both exercises, except that, in Proposal of Law, one is invited to begin with a description of a situation contrary to the one envisaged by the proposed law.

But what is completely new in these two exercises is the manner in which they are to be executed. The argumentation is perfectly structured by the feature of counterarguments allegedly raised by an imaginary opponent, but in fact made up by the speaker, only to be immediately refuted in due course. In all of Aphthonius’s examples, there are three objections and responses that structure the argument. This feature is highly important, since – in contrast to all earlier exercises – it requires that the speaker consider potential counterarguments and counterpositions and argue for a well-balanced and well-reasoned position of her or his own. This is a clear indication of a more mature, independent and responsible level of reasoning and argumentation meanwhile attained by the student.
5. CONCLUSION

One may thus conclude as a result that the ancient series of progymnasmatic exercises, among many other things, undoubtedly also contained a well-devised sub-program of schooling in the art and technique of good reasoning and good arguing, in fact a highly sophisticated and well-structured program that methodically and gradually guided students from easier and more elementary tasks through progressively more advanced exercises up to the level of highest technicality and expertise. Not only, however, did this program school students in the technical aspects of argumentation, but at the same time it also nurtured a way of thinking that can be called critical, independent and responsible. Not to forget that this series of exercises also served a purpose of moral education. It is a hotly disputed issue whether education in critical thinking should also include moral education, as especially Robert Ennis has requested (1996; 2011). The ancient program of progymnasmata certainly did, as is acknowledged by many of their modern defenders (see, e.g., Mahler Jaqua & Gustilo, 2002-2010: “training in writing cannot be separated from training in virtue.”)

Tutored by these exercises, students will make their arguments meet criteria such as legality, equity, benefit, or feasibility, and check them for relevance, sufficiency, and acceptability, and they will learn to take into account alternative positions, classical requirements of critical thinking. They will learn to think carefully, avoid hasty inferences, structure and balance their thoughts, and look at problems from various sides, in short, to act as autonomous and responsible intellectual subjects. And, as far as the relationship of critical thinking to cognitive and metacognitive abilities is concerned (see Hitchcock, 2018, section 12.1), recent field-research on the practical aspects of the progymnasmata from the viewpoint of cognitive psychology has yielded encouraging results that show that especially metacognitive abilities (i.e. the ability to correctly and responsibly assess one’s own argumentative abilities) are considerably enhanced by schooling in those ancient exercises (see Grialou et al., 2020). There are encouraging signs that the impact of progymnasmata on intellectual and moral education is not without attraction even in our times.

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The Evolution of Marketing in Tourism Studies –
Characteristics of the Theoretical Evolution in Tourism.

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The objective of this paper is to clarify the characteristics of the theoretical evolution of marketing in the context of tourism. The research on tourism has expanded in recent years but it is said that the fundamental framework, particularly that of marketing in tourism, is not making significant progress. This paper utilizes theoretical evolution model based on Karl Popper’s ideas to divide the criticisms made in the course of theoretical evolution into two phases and test them. The first is the tourism marketing theory of Krippendorf, and the second is the tourism marketing theory of Wahab et al.

1. INTRODUCTION

In the tourism industry, as globalization advances and competition intensifies, destination marketing which focuses on destination as the core marketing concept is drawing attention (UNWTO, 2011). There is no clear answer, however, as to what actually constitutes destination marketing. There are of course numerous studies on destination marketing, yet little progress has been made in research into the concept of destination marketing or in a fundamental framework that captures it in its entirety (Pike and Page, 2014).

This paper therefore presents an analysis focused on the discussion of the process of theoretical evolution in which marketing was applied to tourism, in order to promote research on fundamental frameworks of marketing in the context of tourism. We then proceed to identify the characteristics of theoretical evolution in tourism studies.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

In preceding literature, there are two perspectives for analyzing the distinguishing characteristics of marketing in tourism. The first involves depicting transitions by means of article reviews (Pike and Page, 2014). The other involves comparing the views of various researchers with a focus on definitions (Fujita, 2016). Both approaches concern themselves primarily with the organization and categorization of theories.

Notwithstanding the accumulation of previous studies, however, there has been scant progress on foundational frameworks to reach any conclusion (Pike and Page, 2014). One reason that can be cited is that mere organization and categorization of theories cannot fully explain the evolution of theory, and they simply fall into “arguments over definitions”. To correctly understand the characteristics of a particular theory requires not just categorizing and organizing but theoretical analysis, according to Nagano (2015, 2020).

In this paper we make use of a cognitive progress model as asserted in critical rationalism as a way to explain the evolution of theory. This model is predicated on Karl Popper’s notion of “conjectures and refutations”. In this model, according to Nagano (2020, 2015), a first problem (P1) to be solved is established, against which a temporary theory (TT1) is given. Then critical error elimination (EE1) is made against this temporary theory (TT1). In response to this, a new problem (P2) is established, against which a new temporary theory (TT2) is given, and knowledge evolves according to this process (Nagano, 2015).

The use of this model is well-suited to achieving our objectives here. The reason is that tourism marketing theory is born from a criticism of marketing theory, and it is by virtue of that criticism that the concept has progressed. The evolution of tourism marketing can be broadly...
divided into two phases. The first phase involves the criticism of marketing by Krippendorf, the originator of tourism marketing. The second phase is the criticism of Krippendorf’s tourism marketing by Wahab et al. Denoting marketing theory as $T_m$, Krippendorf’s theory as $T_k$, Wahab et al.’s theory as $T_w$, and criticism of theory as $R$, and integrating them to the above model, the theoretical evolution can be shown as in the figure below.

Fig. 1. Theoretical evolution up to marketing theory
First phase $T_m \rightarrow R_1 \rightarrow P_1 \rightarrow T_k$
Second phase $T_k \rightarrow R_2 \rightarrow P_2 \rightarrow T_w$
Prepared by author based on Nagano (2015)

In this paper we analyze the logic and criticism of the theoretical evolution in each phase of Fig. 1.

3. ANALYSIS

3.1. Refutation of marketing theory and establishment of problem
Krippendorf (1971) divided economic development into three stages. In the first stage of economic development, demand constantly outstripped supply, and shortages were well below the saturation level. The imperative for businesses was thus to maximize production and distribution. In the second phase of economic development, which included 1971, the year in which the paper in question was published, the situation is one of continuously increasing productivity, primarily as a response to technological progress. In this phase production has already exceeded demand in many sectors, resulting in businesses starting to face the problem of reductions in sales. In the third phase of economic development then predicted to occur in the future, the situation of the second phase would further accelerate. The change to the third phase would start with the general goods produced by the manufacturing industry, and then would expand in stepwise fashion to all industries, including tourism. He then pointed out that growing competition to capture customers would occur, along with associated difficulties in sales. To solve this problem, the important point would not be to take a production-oriented approach, but to become customer-oriented, the method for achieving which is marketing.

Krippendorf held that current marketing theories were not applicable to tourism in their extant form. The reason was that they targeted the market for general goods, which are different in nature from that for tourism. Shiota (1975) summarizes the fundamental difference between the general goods market and the tourism market as they are viewed by Krippendorf into the following two points. First, tourism businesses comprise a combination of goods and services, with services playing a primary role, and tourism consumption cannot happen without tourists visiting tourist locations. Second is the fact that tourism products are of a supplementary nature. The touristic needs that tourists look for in tourism are not a single service, but the entire experience of tourism, meaning that achieving customer satisfaction levels implies the need for partnerships that would compensate for what each business entity lacks. It is these two characteristics that give rise to the problem that marketing theories cannot be applied as they are to the tourism market.

3.2. Krippendorf’s theory of tourism marketing
Krippendorf argued that achieving customer satisfaction required packaging the tourism experience in order to solve this problem. To this end of meeting tourism needs, a variety of elements need to be aggregated, with resorts, regions, and the country as a whole thought of as a “group business”. The various sections of his work cohere as an attempt to provide a perspective for the definition, role, objective, strategy, means, and decision-making relating to tourism marketing (Shiota, 1975).

One major aspect of tourism marketing that has been identified is that individual problems in the tourism economy have to date been addressed by individual businesses in unaligned fashion. Unlike a marketing theory assuming actions taken by individual businesses, tourism marketing held that they should be undertaken just like by a group business where each entity involved is aligned with the others.

3.3. Refutation of tourism marketing theory and problem establishment
Wahab et al. (1976) criticized Krippendorf’s tourism marketing theory and proposed a new conceptual framework of tourism theory. First, let us overview the concept of marketing of Wahab et al. Their observations divide the marketing concept in the tourism industry into historical,
modern, and future stages. Their thinking is shown in the table below.

Fig. 2. Three marketing approaches for tourism as proposed by Wahab et al.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Historical tourism marketing</th>
<th>Product oriented</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modern tourism marketing</td>
<td>Visitor oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future tourism marketing</td>
<td>Destination oriented</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Prepared by author based on Wahab et al. (1976)

Product-oriented tourism marketing is synonymous with the first stage of economic development as described by Krippendorf. Wahab et al. (1976) and Krippendorf are in agreement that the challenge therein is that the expansion of the tourism market results in supply exceeding demand, and businesses may not be able to remain competitive merely via advertising of their products*1. Tourism marketing as conceived in this paper corresponds to the “modern tourism marketing” of the Wahab et al. marketing approach.

In its details, the tourism marketing of Wahab et al. follows Krippendorf’s discussion closely, arguing that marketing theory for markets in physical goods is not applicable as-is to the tourism market. In other words, they do not reject tourism marketing itself, but rather acknowledge its necessity.

The criticism of Krippendorf’s analysis by Wahab et al. is from two perspectives. The first is the claim that Krippendorf’s analysis falls short. For example, Krippendorf defines tourism marketing as alignment, which Wahab et al. criticize, saying that alignment is a means which in and of itself does not suffice to achieve customer satisfaction. The second is a criticism of direction. Wahab et al. argue that in the future, problems will arise that cannot be solved by visitor-oriented marketing alone. Carrying out tourism marketing increases customer satisfaction and beckons many tourists to destinations. The increase in tourists, however, has both positive and negative effects on the destination in the areas of the economy, politics, and the environment, requiring that the negative aspects be mitigated to the extent possible and the positive ones magnified. Customer-orientation by itself cannot accurately take into consideration the impact on the destination, according to this criticism.

3.4. The tourism marketing theory of Wahab et al. Wahab et al. argue that there are three directional concepts in tourism marketing, and criticized that of those Krippendorf addressed only up to customer-orientation. And they defined the ultimate objective of tourism as “achieving benefits for the destination and its residents”. They argued that effects on tourists, residents of other areas, and external investors are tolerated for the reason that benefits accrue to the destination and the residents. It then follows that the assessment of the impact of tourism marketing should be based on the criterion of whether the advantages outweigh the disadvantages for the destination. Persisting with customer-oriented marketing activities will give rise to this problem in the future, meaning that future tourism marketing must become destination-oriented, in this argument.

It is important to note the following two points, however, with regard to the arguments of Wahab et al. First is that they deny neither the need for nor the importance of tourism marketing. Second is that it is not at present but in the future that destination-oriented marketing should be carried out. Wahab et al. point out that at the time, in 1976, many destinations were still engaging in product-oriented marketing, and the substance of their 1976 paper was research relating to customer-oriented tourism marketing.

4. DISCUSSION

4.1. Common characteristics of criticisms
The target of the criticism of the evolution of theory in Phase 1 of Fig. 2 was the argument that the tourism market has a structure different from that envisioned by marketing theory. In other words, the claims about Phase 1 had as their objective to make it possible to use marketing theory in the tourism market. It was apparently a form of criticism to propose a methodology for pushing marketing theory into the tourism market.

The criticism of the evolution of theory in Phase 2, on the other hand, was that tourism marketing has three stages and that the analysis so far has extended only to stage 2. It was a form of criticism that does not reject tourism marketing itself but one that suggests a direction for the future. As described above, a common
characteristic of the criticisms of the evolution of theory from marketing theory to tourism marketing theory is that they do not reject existing theories.

4.2. Features of the criticism of each phase
Let us now analyze the features of the criticism of each phase shown in Fig. 2. For Phase 1, the issue was the applicability of the theory and criticism was made on the issue of how marketing theory can be applied to the tourism market. For Phase 2, on the other hand, a new problem was raised that negative aspects from the perspective of the destination emerge once tourism marketing achieves a certain level of success. Here the problem was not one of applicability, but of the future of tourism marketing, revealing the intent for an original, new theory. In other words, the difference lies in the fact that in phase 1, the problem is the applicability of a theory of another field, whereas phase 2 attempts to establish a new theory.

5. CONCLUSION
Analyzing the criticisms of the evolution of theory from marketing theory to destination marketing theory has yielded the following insights. First, the debate was not rejecting marketing theory itself, but was rather moving toward applying it precisely to operate it in the tourism market. Second, it was revealed that when tourism research embraces theories from other fields, such theories will be established to the extent that they are applied, and that they will develop into new theories through the process of criticism.

In particular, Wahab et al.’s destination-oriented tourism marketing can be considered the seeds of a tourism-specific theory. This concept has now become a specific issue in the context of the concept of sustainable tourism, and is the topic of ongoing research. Back in 1976, Wahab et al., merely proposed this concept, without going so far as to develop a new theory, but served the role of raising tourism marketing from an application of marketing to a new theory.

Marketing in tourism would thereafter evolve into a separate theory specific to tourism, called destination marketing. This theoretical evolution is something we intend to address in a future paper.

NOTES
*1. The expression “tourism marketing” has also been used in product-oriented contexts, but it has only been used to only discuss the issues of a time before marketing concepts were introduced to tourism, and no concepts specific to tourism have been introduced. It would be more appropriate to discuss it conceptually in terms of promotion and maximization of distribution.

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Debating with Robots: IBM Project Debater and the Advent of Augmentive Automated Argumentation

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First came “Deep Blue” vs. Kasparov (1997), then “Watson” on Jeopardy! (2011). IBM’s latest artificial intelligence “grand challenge” unfolded in summer 2018, when the company’s “Project Debater” unit squared off in a series of public debates against human debating champions. Although that spectacle sparked widespread conversation about whether robots would soon be eclipsing human debate talent, a follow-on event at the University of Cambridge on November 21, 2019 has drawn less notice. That debate, held on the motion, “This House believes AI will bring more harm than good,” featured two teams, each paired with two humans and one Project Debater robot. Using newly unveiled “Speech by Crowd” technology, Project Debater gave the opening speech on each side of the motion, developing arguments based on crowdsourced material submitted by humans to an online portal weeks prior to the event. IBM touted the unique format as a successful demonstration of how Project Debater can work as a support tool to augment (rather than replace) human argumentation. This paper deploys Aakhus and Jackson’s “argumentation by design” perspective to reconstruct the “design hypotheses” inchoate in the format of the 2019 Cambridge Union debate, then tests those hypotheses through rhetorical analysis of the debate transcript and crowdsourced arguments contributed via the “Speech by Crowd” portal. Such analysis stands to contribute insight regarding the evolution of AI technology, IBM’s artificial intelligence business model, and how the prospects of “automated argumentation” implicate argumentation pedagogy, practice, and scholarship.

1. INTRODUCTION

IBM’s “grand challenges” pace the corporation’s technological innovation and dramatize rollout of new products, particularly in the area of artificial intelligence (AI). One memorable grand challenge took place in 1996-1997, when IBM’s “Deep Blue” program defeated chess world champion Garry Kasparov. Following the spectacle, dramatic headlines such as “Big Blue’s hand of God” (Levy, 1997) framed the event as a key moment in the epochal contest of “man versus machine” (Goodman & Keene, 1997). As years passed and IBM’s AI initiatives grew more sophisticated, more difficult grand challenges were arranged, as in 2011, when IBM’s “Watson” artificial intelligence platform competed successfully against human participants in an episode of the quiz show Jeopardy!. Again, headlines such as “Computer finishes off human opponents” (Hanna, 2011) captured public imagination and fueled speculation about what human faculty computers might conquer next.

Cue to 2018, when IBM’s “Project Debater” program sought to bring AI to the realm of argumentation, facing off in a series of formal debates against human counterparts. Features of these events were structured to make the AI task for Project Debater especially challenging, as topics were not announced until minutes prior to the event, and winners were determined by a vote of humans watching in a live audience. Although Project Debater performed impressively, the human debate champions selected for the grand challenge held their own (winning some of the debates in the eyes of the live human audience members), prompting Vanity Fair’s Kenzie Bryant (2019) to quip, “the robot takeover has been held off another day.”

A “grand challenge” gestures toward the concept of a scientific “crucial experiment,” where a single experimental result is framed as a litmus test for a scientific hypothesis, or even an entire scientific paradigm (see Holton, 1969;
Dumitru, 2013). Did the 2018 Project Debater demonstrations mark such an inflection point in the science and technology of AI? This broad question raises ontological and epistemological issues regarding the nature of human argumentation, artificial intelligence and boundaries between human and machine learning, best left for more extended treatment. Following the trajectory of IBM’s Project Debater rollout, a different, more subtle, set of questions emerge.

In November 2019, IBM collaborated with Cambridge University to convene a public debate at the Cambridge Union, one of the world’s most venerable debating chambers. Unlike the earlier series of Project Debater grand challenge debates, the Cambridge debate eschewed the design principle of pitting human versus machine, utilizing instead a format that formed two competing three-person teams, each composed of one Project Debater machine and two human debaters. These teams squared off to debate the motion, “This House believes AI will bring more harm than good,” in a parliamentary style debate conducted in the Cambridge Union.

Another design twist in the Cambridge debate provided a vehicle for IBM to highlight its “Speech by Crowd” application. Whereas in the initial grand challenge, Project Debater generated arguments by drawing from a digital corpus of several million curated news articles on myriad topics, in the Cambridge debate it crowd-sourced content for its arguments. This crowd-sourcing was enabled by contributions of over 1,000 users, who were invited to submit short arguments on either side of the motion to an online portal opened several weeks prior to the event. Using content from this user-generated argument corpora, Project Debater extracted what it determined to be key themes and fashioned them into high quality arguments on both sides of the motion.

With Project Debater positioned as the first speaker for each team, the debate opened with one IBM speech in favor of the motion, “This House believes AI will bring more harm than good,” followed by a second IBM speech against that motion. Thus, before even turning to human speech, the debate format provided audience members with an automated stereophonic *dissoi logoi*, an airing of what the machine selected as the strongest arguments on each side of the question.

IBM’s public statements and promotional materials touting integration of its “Speech by Crowd” application with Project Debater strike quite a different tone in comparison to the common “machine triumphs again over humans” tropes that circulated following the initial series of grand challenge debates in 2018. With “Speech by Crowd,” the script was tweaked to “AI augments human decision-making” and “AI can help human collectivities escape their filter bubbles.” In part this pivot highlighted the machine’s role in supporting human cognition, rather than supplanting it, and was enabled by the fact that Project Debater was serving as something of a stenographer in selecting and tailoring human-generated arguments tailored specifically for the debate and contributed via the Speech by Crowd portal.

Reflection on the form and content of the 2019 Cambridge Union debate promises to yield insight regarding the evolution of debating in a world increasingly transformed by machine learning, artificial intelligence, and the corporate platforms that develop and market such technologies. In what follows, part one reflects on how the pragma-dialectical and argumentation as design approaches provide a useful theoretical scaffolding to support analysis of the structured public debate. Parts two through four examine, in turn, the confrontation, opening, argumentation, and concluding stages of the debate. Reflection on findings and implications of the analysis are offered in a final section.

2. THE DESIGN PERSPECTIVE

The 2018 Project Debater demonstrations showcased results from IBM’s AI research program, including advances in machine listening comprehension (Lavee, et al., 2019), natural language processing (Shachar, et al., 2018), and argumentation mining of large datasets (Levy, et al., 2017). Progress in these areas was particularly notable, because such machine capabilities mimicked the talents of top human debaters who exhibit quick-draw refutation and are skilled in *kairos*—the ability to find just the right words to use in a timely way.

Yet different Project Debater capabilities were on display in the 2019 Cambridge Union debate, an event that featured a substantially different format, recasting the tenor of the debate. Specifically, these features included IBM’s “Speech by Crowd” AI platform for crowd-sourcing decision-support, and a format wrinkle that pitted Project Debater against itself, arguing on both sides of the debate motion. This latter
feature might be understood as *automated antilogic*, drawing from the ancient Greek sophist Protagoras’ term to describe the principle that “Two accounts [logoi] are present about every ‘thing,’ opposed to each other” (Schiappa, 1991).

These unique design features may reveal even more about Project Debater than the nuts and bolts of speech recognition and argumentation invention capabilities, in that they speak to the system’s broader functionality. This is particularly relevant for the present study, which focuses on these more general design questions (as opposed to the specifics of coding). Such an angle of inquiry directs attention to the *telos*, or broader purpose of Project Debater. A robust literature on design in argumentation helps elucidate these dimensions.

Aakhus and Jackson (2005) have elaborated a research program that views argumentation through the prism of design: “The work central to a design enterprise involves creating techniques, procedures, and devices that make forms of communicative activity possible that were once impossible or that realize an improved form of communicative practice” (Aakhus & Jackson 2005, p. 416; see also Aakhus 2007, 2003; Jackson 1998, 2015; Greco, 2018). Adapting nomenclature from the field of architecture, they distinguish between “natural” (pre-designed) and “built” (new) communication.

It can be useful to view public debates from a design perspective, because such events incorporate both natural and built elements. On the one hand, public debates are “built”—each is designed with unique format features. On the other hand, this construction comes on top of “natural” edifices formed by debate history, which stretches back for millennia. Contemporary public debate grows out of an ancient tradition that can be traced back to Protagoras, the Greek teacher of oratory who championed the art of *dissoi logoi*, or “contrasting arguments” (see Schiappa, 1991). Through structured exercises, Protagoras taught Athenians to use the art of debating as a way to measure the strength of competing positions and inform judgments on questions of civic import. Later, the Romans would develop this tradition through a method of instruction they called *in utramque partem*—Cicero’s term for arguing “on both sides of the case” (see Mendelson, 2002, pp. 173-203).

Designed public debates “build” on this “natural” edifice by inheriting the basic foundational infrastructure of back-and-forth argumentation, then inflecting the exchange through deliberate design choices regarding topic wording, format, speaker selection, incorporation of technology, and other design features.

Aakhus and Jackson stipulate that each design feature of communication contains an inchoate hypothesis. In the case of IBM’s 2019 Cambridge demonstration, that hypothesis could be: Project Debater augments, rather than supplants, human decision-making. Testing this hypothesis calls for interpretation and judgment. Pragmadietrical argumentation theory can be useful in this respect, as the approach is concerned with how disagreements are normatively structured and how they play out in practice. This theory can be a useful reference point for exploring the extent to which the design hypothesis implicit in the Cambridge demonstration held up.

In key respects, a structured public debate is designed to resemble an ideal model for critical discussion (see Table 1), with discrete format phases (topic formulation, opening speeches, question and answer, rebuttal speeches) mapping onto the phases of a critical discussion (confrontation stage, opening stage, argumentation stage, and concluding stage) (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, 59-62) “The ideal model of a critical discussion does not represent a utopia,” stipulates van Eemeren (2018), “but a theoretically motivated idealization . . . suitable to serve as a point of reference in analysing and evaluating oral and written argumentative discourse” (p. 35).
Critical Discussion Phase | Description
--- | ---
Confrontation Stage | Difference of opinion presents itself; disagreement arises.
Opening Stage | Protagonist and antagonist identify their initial commitments and standpoints.
Argumentation Stage | Rounds of argumentation as the protagonist responds to critical responses of the antagonist.
Concluding Stage | Determination of whether the protagonist’s standpoint has been successfully defended.

Table 1. Four stages of critical discussion in pragma-dialectical argumentation theory (adapted from Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Snoeck Henkemans 1996), pp. 281-282.

Pragma-dialectics’ ideal model of a critical discussion does not seamlessly match the typical the “built environment” of a designed public debate, but the fit is close, and subtle variations can be instructive. For example, according to pragma-dialectical theory, in the confrontation stage of a critical discussion, the protagonist and antagonist locate grounds for disagreement. Although this element is also present in structured public debates, a third party (typically the organizer or moderator) plays an important role in isolating the points of disagreement and framing the scope of debate. “Public debate propositions do not simply serve to limit the discussion and define the sides of the debate,” observe Broda-Bahm, Kempf and Driscoll (2004, 125); “they also play an important role in gaining attention and communicating the purpose of the debate.”

Similar observations could be made about the opening, argumentation, and concluding stages of a critical discussion, which correlate roughly to phases and features of a designed public debate. Mapping features of the Project Debater Cambridge Demonstration onto the pragma-dialectical critical discussion model yields the following breakdown (see Table 2).

The following analysis considers these format features as they relate to pragma-dialectical critical discussion phases and explores the content of argumentation advanced in each stage. In this case, the fact that the design hypothesis and topic relate synecdochically provides a unique opportunity to generate insight about the event. In other words, the debate motion, “This house believes AI will bring more harm than good,” lays groundwork for speakers to address the debate’s design hypotheses reflexively, as they advance standpoints regarding Project Debater during the debate.
3. ANALYSIS

3.1 Confrontation Stage
In pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, the confrontation stage of a critical discussion involves the “initial situation” where interlocutors come together to assess whether their difference of opinion warrants an attempt to resolve it through critical discussion (van Eemeren, 2018, 36).

In the case of the IBM-Cambridge demonstration, the choice of topic wording—“This House believes AI will bring more harm than good”—reflects the organizers’ intention to shape the critical discussion according to the norms of British parliamentary debate (hence, “This House . . .”), with the debate convened in the venerable Cambridge Union, home to thousands of previous events featuring a basic similar structure. That structure typically includes alternating pro/con (“proposition” and “opposition”), time-limited speeches, delivered by invited guest speakers and Cambridge Union student members, with an opportunity for audience members to participate through “floor speeches” and voting on considered motions.

Whereas the inaugural 2018 Project Debater demonstration featured a one-on-one, machine vs. human format, the 2019 Cambridge event expanded this format, placing three speakers on each side. It is possible that all three speaking roles on one side could have been assigned to Project Debater, with the opposing side being comprised of human debaters (such a format would have largely replicated the dynamic of the 2018 demonstration). Yet organizers of the Cambridge demonstration chose a different approach, one that carried significant design implications. That approach entailed placing, in the confrontation stage, one Project Debater unit on each side of motion, with each machine joined by two human debaters, forming opposing sides of three speakers (one machine and two humans on each side). This design created a dynamic in which Project Debater would be debating against itself (with added intrigue, given the subject matter of the motion).

According to Jackson (2015), a design hypothesis in argumentation is “some notion, theoretical or intuitive, about how argumentation works to achieve its purpose or how it might be conducted to better achieve its purpose” (250).
For the 2018 inaugural Project Debater demonstration, a plausible design hypothesis could be reconstructed as: “AI can hold its own debating against a human opponent.” In comparison, design of the 2019 IBM-Cambridge demonstration reflected a different hypothesis, along the lines of: “AI can augment human learning in a debate context.” Other design features in the confrontation stage reinforce this subtle, yet significant, shift. In the 2018 demonstration, Project Debater generated its initial standpoints in a compressed confrontation stage, crunching through millions of news articles and other information sources from its library, after being given the specific motion for debate, “We should subsidize space exploration,” just minutes before the event.

By way of contrast, the confrontation stage in the 2019 IBM Cambridge demonstration was extended for several weeks, as IBM’s “Speech by Crowd” platform crowdsourced arguments on both sides of the proposition from hundreds of human contributors who logged onto a dedicated IBM portal prior to the event (see Figure 1).

![Image of arguments contributed through the IBM "Speech by Crowd" portal](permission pending)

In all, the Speech by Crowd platform received 1,100 arguments that people submitted to IBM through a website in the week prior to the debate. It categorized 570 comments as being in favor of the idea that AI would cause more harm than good and 511 comments as being opposed. It discarded some comments as irrelevant to the debate (Kahn, 2019).

3.2 Opening Stage
Project Debater’s subsequent speeches exhibited the sort of “defining, specifying and amplifying” typical of the type of argumentation appropriate for this stage in pragma-dialectical argumentation theory (Van Eemeren, 2018, 42). During its opening presentation for the proposition, the machine advanced the following five standpoints, thus establishing the protagonist position in the critical discussion:

- Since AI is not human, its capability for moral decision-making will be limited.
- Data sets that train AI contain bias, which will be amplified in discriminatory AI applications.
- AI will create unemployment by displacing human workers.
- AI will ruin society by instilling human laziness and removing the human element from almost everything we do.
- AI will magnify the power of rogue actors to do harm.

This opening speech covered substantial argumentative ground, although each standpoint was developed cosmetically, and often somewhat haltingly, as illustrated in the following example of Project Debater’s rendering of the proposition argument regarding AI’s tendency to displace human workers:
Let’s move to employment. While my job at IBM is secure, at least I hope so, I know this issue is quite pertinent to our discussion today. AI will make lots of people lose their jobs. It will bring more harm than good in that it will displace a lot of workers and cause employment problems. We risk creating a workforce that puts people out of employment. Jobs involving vehicles such as travel is one of the biggest employers and those jobs will be lost because of AI. (Project Debater, 2019)

Clearly the most engaging aspect of the above sample of argumentation is the use of humor. Where did the joke about IBM come from, and how did Project Debater know to deploy humor in this way? An answer to that question emerges later in the debate, but for now it may be useful to reflect on the fact that the cosmetic nature of the serious content in this passage perhaps reflects limitations placed on contributions to the Speech by Crowd portal, where each of the some 1,100 arguments submitted were constrained to a Twitter-type text box holding only several hundred characters. There were no options, for example, for contributors to submit footnotes, hyperlinks, images, or sounds as supporting evidence.

Indeed, the opening speech by Project Debater for the opposition side reflects similar dynamics, as the machine advanced the following standpoints to initiate antagonist argumentation in the confrontation stage:

- AI will relieve humans from the drudgery of repetitive tasks and reduce human errors.
- AI will open up more opportunities for human leisure time and entertainment.
- AI will create new jobs for humans in certain economic sectors.
- AI will improve medicine, transportation, and even inspire new forms of music.
- AI will general enhance the quality of human life, as fundamentally, programmed machines are governed by the laws of humanity.

Closer scrutiny of Project Debater’s argument regarding AI’s potential to spur technological advances reveals a curious parallel to the standpoint it advanced in the previous speech; the argument begins with a joke, then develops with logos-based reasoning, albeit unspooled with a few inelegant turns of phrase:

At the end of the opening stage, audience members and human debate participants were left to ponder an argumentative tableau crafted by Project Debater: Two mirror-image speeches, each covering five major standpoints, backed by logos-centric reasoning, with the exception of a single joke sprinkled in. With protagonist and antagonist standpoints established in the opening stage by Project Debater, next participants turned to the argumentation stage, as explored in the following section.

3.3 Argumentation Stage
In pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, moves made by interlocutors in the argumentation stage are tied to standpoints established in the previous, opening stage of a critical discussion. A similar convention holds in academic parliamentary debate, where the first speakers establish their side’s interpretation of the motion and build an opening case that sets parameters for subsequent argumentation. The IBM-Cambridge public debate is especially notable in this light, as the first speaker for each side in the opening stage was an AI machine. How would human speakers, in the argumentation stage, work with the material handed to them by their machine partners? Transcript analysis reveals extensive co-ordination between human speakers and machine, with 17 total references to Project Debater advanced in the argumentation stage. Six of these references mentioned specific argumentative content introduced by Project Debater. There were six instances of human speakers making observations about Project Debater’s role in the debate, and five times human speakers deployed Project Debater as a rhetorical synecdoche, pointing to specific dimensions of its presence.
and performance to make a wider point about the general AI motion up for debate. Review of these instances provides vivid texture of the dynamics at play in the argumentation stage.

At times, human speakers would call attention to Project Debater’s role in the debate, offering a window into how the participants were perceiving the experience of including a machine in their distinctively human interaction. For example, in opening the second proposition speech, Sharmila Parmanand (2018) explained, “My role here is to support and extend the arguments of my teammate, Project Debater, and also to respond to what has been raised by my opponent, [chuckle] Project Debater.” Parmanand’s chuckle underscored the double game going on—the debaters were willing to treat Project Debater like a human partner, yet doing so entailed verbal contortions like acknowledging the same speaker arguing simultaneously on both sides of the motion. Parmanand wove a similar reference into the end of her speech, closing with, “So, we on our side are very happy to be with Project Debater, but in general, a bit concerned about AI, so we are proud to propose.”

On the antagonist side, second opposition speaker Sylvie Delacroix (2019) began her speech with a charitable gesture toward the machine, saying, “Actually, first I think it is embarrassing that we still haven’t given a name. I mean, don’t you think ‘Project Debater’ is not a very good name? ‘Debbie’ was given during dinner—I think I’m going to call you Debbie, unless there is any objection.” Having thus anthropomorphized Project Debater, Delacroix continued to identify with the machine, reflecting, for example, how her debate preparation habits bore resemblance to the machine’s search techniques modeled in the 2018 demonstrations: “Just like Debbie, before I came here tonight, I did go and browse the web. Why? Well first, because I wanted to try and anticipate what Debbie might say, because Debbie is very good at browsing the web.” Later in the second opposition speech, Delacroix referred again to Project Debater’s freshly-minted human name, in the process emphasizing her intention to build the opposition side’s case using more than just instrumental patterns of reasoning:

I don’t want to win this debate on the basis of instrumental reasons alone. Sorry Debbie. I mean, you have done a great job at helping here, but I don’t want to win this debate on the basis of instrumental considerations. Why? Well, because we would lose sight of a very important aspect, a very important consideration. And what is it? Well, again, no offense Debbie, but this debate is not so much about you, the AI, but about us—who we are, and who we want to become.

Responding indirectly to Delacroix’s move to “Debbify” Project Debater, third proposition speaker Neil Laurence pointed to the tendency of humans to anthropomorphize non-human objects. This tendency, according to Laurence, stood as a poignant marker of fundamentally different forms of human and machine cognition: “Our own method of computation is, because we’re so limited, is to use our powerful computation in our head to think about the motivations of all around us and to and to anthropomorphise the things we communicate [with] and we do that to these machines that’s why we like to give them names but in reality they don’t have names.”

These passages clearly indicate that the figure of Project Debater cast a long shadow over the Cambridge debate—indeed the looming black obelisk in the middle of the Cambridge Union debating chamber was hard to miss (see Figure 2).

Yet Project Debater influenced the course of the debate in another register, as human speakers referenced argumentative standpoints generated by the machine in the debate’s first two speeches. For example, as a preface to an argument about AI and the labor market in the second proposition speech, Parmanand (2018) stated, “So first, let’s talk about the displacement of labor on a massive scale, and this is something that my teammate discussed at length, right?” Later in the same speech, Parmanand (2018) built on her machine partner’s earlier argument AI’s tendency to stultify humanity:

My teammate was correctly concerned about humans losing things like creativity, staying sharp, staying adaptive, our evolutionary instincts becoming more dull when we outsource everything to robots. I was very concerned when my [chuckle] AI opponent said that maybe we will have machines replacing teachers in the classroom. The quality of education that is likely to ensue won’t be as good because nothing can replace the kind of emotional intimacy that is necessary in a classroom setting, for example.
Parmanand (2018) also drew from her machine partner’s earlier argumentation to bolster the proposition side’s standpoint regarding AI and bias:

> So if you listened to how my opponent explained why AI is better than humans, there was this assertion that AI doesn’t replicate the errors that humans do—right—AI reduces human error—that is precisely why it is going to be very hard for us, as a society, to deal with the biases that AI will entrench, because there is this perception that it eliminates human bias. We just instinctively think if it is math, it is fair. But that is not actually the case.

On the opposition side, Delacroix pointed out how her argument regarding AI’s potential for economic stimulus countered the standpoint that AI would cause unemployment, advanced in Project Debater’s first proposition speech: “This economic and political power is, by far, the most disrupting, and promising aspect of AI. And Debbie, by the way, that means a lot of new jobs.”

Adopting a meta-view in the third opposition speech, Natarajan observed that Project Debater was able to generate impressive content on both sides of the motion in the debate’s first two speeches: “So I don’t think it escaped anyone’s interest that at the heart of the debate is this: That a piece of technology can simultaneously be both terrifying and awe-inspiring,” he said. “I think for Project Debater—on both sides, for my teammate Project Debater, and from both teams, we got elucidation of what some of those risks are.”

Specifically, Natarajan highlighted how Project Debater’s mirror-imaged argumentation in the debate’s first two speeches underscored his point about the transformative effects of AI on the labor market:

> I think this is a realistic problem which many people have identified, in different forms, throughout this debate, starting with Project Debater on the side of the proposition, and my own partner, Project Debater, giving you the opposite side of it, which is this: The economic system that we live under changes massively when we have artificial intelligence doing jobs.

Human speakers also utilized Project Debater in a third way through deployment of the rhetorical figure of synecdoche. As a strategy of persuasion that invokes relationships between part and whole to make a point, the synecdoche can be a powerful tool of argumentation in debates that unfold on multiple levels. In the Cambridge-IBM public debate, the motion (regarding artificial intelligence), coupled with Project Debater’s participation in the debate (as an instantiation of AI), afforded rhetorical resources for human speakers to invent synecdochic argumentative appeals.

For example, in the third proposition speech, Laurence introduced the story of Jean Dominique Bauby, former editor-in-chief of Elle magazine, whose tragic stroke at age 43 rendered him speechless, able only to “dictate” letters by signaling with his left eye: “The remarkable thing about Bauby is we know his story because he
wrote a book. And it took him, I think, 7 months of four hours a day to write this book,” said Laurence. “I think when we think about that we all think about what it would be like to be in that state, and the first important point is [that] relative to our friend Project Debater, we are all in that state. A locked in state.” The structure of Laurence’s appeal was synecdochic—the specific relation between Bauby and Project Debater is deployed to underwrite a larger point about the potential danger of AI. Adding granularity to this line of argument, Laurence invoked information theorist Claude Shannon: “Shannon also estimated the entropy of the English language … and I can tell you that I’m roughly communicating to you at a rate of 2000 bits per minute. Our friend Project Debater is communicating, when it desires to do so, at a rate of around 60 billion bits per minute.” Providing a counterpoint to Delacroix’s move to humanize Project Debater by naming it “Debbie,” Laurence drove home the upshot of his standpoint: “So Sylvie gave Project Debater a name, she called her, him, it … Debbie. I’m going to try the name ‘Cybertronia the All-Knowing’ because in some sense that’s more representative of what we’re dealing with.”

3.4 Concluding Stage
At the end of a critical discussion, according to pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, participants reflect on whether the content of the exchange has led to the protagonist upholding or failing to support their standpoints offered in the opening stage. Correlates in designed public debates come in the form of adjudicated decisions and/or audience votes. For example, it is a Cambridge Union tradition to gauge audience opinion at the end of a debate by inviting audience members to exit the venue through a certain door, corresponding to their final vote in the debate. In the case of the IBM-Cambridge demonstration, this process yielded a mixed result: “Votes were split almost equally for and against the motion, with the team who argued in favor of AI garnering 51% of votes” (Ziady, 2019). Departing from the “human versus machine” narrative invited by the earlier Project Debater demonstrations, design of the IBM-Cambridge debate steered audience members away from viewing the motion as a referendum on the Project Debater technology, and more as a demonstration of how the automated argumentation could be viewed as augmenting human critical thinking. Also in the concluding stage, leading IBM engineer Noah Slonim fielded questions from the audience, pulling back the proverbial designer’s curtain to provide deeper perspective on some of the key moments in the debate. For example, several audience members were intrigued by Project Debater’s attempts at humor, and their exchange with Slonim yielded important insight regarding this aspect of the machine’s design:

**Slonim**: I think I heard the question, actually: “How does the system make jokes”? So, it’s a good question. So the system is not inventing jokes; it has a bank of, I would say more colorful or humoristic comments that it tries to use in the right timing. This is, by itself, is challenging. The system, also, you know, it lacks tact. So sometimes it will make a humoristic comment at, you know, in the wrong moment, which, again, could be amusing but not in the exact way that we planned it. But also, that said, I think it is interesting to point out that the type of humor that the system is using, where the subtext is really about: I am a machine. Alright, so this is the subtext of what this humor is really trying to convey—that this is a machine, not trying to replace humans, but actually to accompany them.

**Audience member**: But I feel like it might reinforce the image of the machine being conscious, or whatever, and like talking to humans about, “Hey, I’m a machine, but I’m talking to you about being a machine,” which requires some consciousness . . .

**Slonim**: . . . Yes, so just to be clear, the machine is not conscious, okay. Alright. So yes, but again, the machine is trying to do it’s best to be more engaging. I think that humor, at the end of the day, is a rhetorical tool that sometimes we use in debates. So ignoring this aspect while developing this machine is wrong, so this is why we added this capability. And again, in some debates, it works well, and in some debates it does not work well, okay?

In clarifying that Project Debater’s humor—perhaps the most “human” element of its performance—was pre-scripted in a “joke bank,” Slonim revealed how IBM’s engineers ventriloquized their own argumentation through Project Debater’s speech. Future research might explore how such a maneuver entails use of **praeteritio**—the rhetorical figure
of pointing to something by saying you are not. Slonim explained that nearly all of the jokes scripted into Project Debater’s bank involve self-deprecating jokes that poke fun at the limitations of AI (recall from the opening stage, Project Debater wisecracking, “While my job at IBM is secure, at least I hope so.”) Of course, the dramatic element of such humor is that it invites audience amazement at the fact that a machine could generate such sophisticated humor “on its own.” Slonim’s exchange with the Cambridge Union audience highlights blurriness of the human/machine boundary and serves as a reminder that some of the most dazzling displays of apparently spontaneous machine intelligence may be more the product of purely human invention than we realize.

4. CONCLUSION

The 2019 IBM-Cambridge demonstration debate showcased IBM’s Project Debater technology in an innovative format designed to demonstrate how the AI platform is able to augment human decision-making through argumentation. The preceding analysis has explored how design of the debate, and content of the argumentation in the event, bear on IBM’s “design hypothesis” regarding this issue. Such analysis may have enduring salience, given IBM’s commitment to integrate Project Debater into its commercial suite of AI applications.

Study limitations include the fact that robust generalizations may be difficult to generate from qualitative analysis of a single event. Indeed, future projects might usefully explore other instances where IBM’s Project Debater and Speech by Crowd platforms have been demonstrated, such as the effort to deploy machine-assisted crowd-sourcing to catalyze public discussion on the value of autonomous vehicles in the Swiss city of Lugano (Curioni, 2019). And when it comes to automated argumentation, IBM is not the only game in town—there are also collaborative efforts by Scottish and Dutch scholars to build comparable platforms (see, e.g. Visser, Lawrence, Wagemans, and Reed, 2019). How do such platforms compare, and how might the emergence of automated argumentation shape the human experience of using dissoi logoi to inform critical judgments and learn alternative perspectives? When future scholars look back on the next 20 years of the Tokyo Argumentation Conference, they may spot trends in which such questions move to the fore of the argumentation studies research agenda.

REFERENCES


Linguistics.
Debate Propositions for Classroom Debate: 
Voices from Debate Instructors in Japan

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In Japan, due to the popularity of debate education, instructors who do not have debate experience are sometimes asked to teach debate. This study focuses on debate propositions, which have a huge influence on arguments in debate, are often given to students by instructors. This study conducted interviews with thirteen debate instructors, with or without previous debate experience. The analysis of the interviews suggests that instructors with no debate experience are more open to student-made propositions. Moreover, the interviews also provide rich ideas and examples of effective and failed teaching methods, and the narratives by debate instructors reveal unique issues embedded in debate education in Japan.

1. INTRODUCTION

In Japan, debate has been a popular teaching method not just for argumentation education but also for active learning, which “involves students in doing things and thinking about things they are doing” (Bonwell & Eison, 1991, p.19). In Japan, due to the popularity of debate education along with the demand for the teaching of active-learning, instructors who do not have debate experience are sometimes asked to teach debate.

Although debate is considered to be active learning, however, propositions, which have a huge influence on arguments in debate, are often given to students by instructors. This study therefore investigates how and by whom propositions in college debate classes should be created. In classroom debates, most students do not have prior debate experience. Creating debate propositions requires expert knowledge about both the subject matter and debate rules. Even with such knowledge, creating good debate propositions is a difficult task (Stromer cited in Kruger, 1968). Are students able to create debate propositions? If so, how can instructors support them to do so? In order to examine those research questions, this study conducted interviews with thirteen debate instructors, with or without previous debate experience. The analysis of the interviews suggests that instructors with no debate experience are more open to student-made propositions. Moreover, the interviews also provide rich ideas and examples of effective and failed teaching methods, and the narratives by debate instructors reveal unique issues embedded in debate education.

2. ACTIVE LEARNING AND DEBATE PROPOSITIONS

The strong connection between debate and active learning has been widely accepted, as debate is a pedagogy in which learners create arguments and discuss with each other (Oros 2007; Dallimore, Hertenstein, & Platt 2010). Positive outcomes of debate education are said to be “critical thinking, logical thinking, quick thinking, listening skill, language skill, and research skill” (Matsumoto, 1998). Students are able to obtain those skills through doing research, constructing and organizing arguments, creating refutations, and writing ballots by themselves. The Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) introduces debate as well as group discussion and group projects as effective methods for active learning (MEXT, 2012). As such, debate has become popular as a
method for active learning among educators in Japan.

However, the process of making propositions, which determine what is to be argued in debates, has not been learner centered. For students, debate propositions are always “given” by teachers or tournament organizers, because making proper propositions is considered difficult and requires a lot of knowledge and experience. For example, debate propositions must meet the following requirements:

1. Room for controversy
2. Multiple arguments for and against the proposition
3. A social issue of interest to the participants
4. Easy access to the written data
5. One central topic
6. Neutral wording
7. The same state of affairs until the debate ends

(Konishi, Kanke, & Collins, 2012, pp.23-25)

In addition to the above seven requirements, if students debate in a foreign language, propositions must fit the level of their language abilities. Furthermore, who the subject in the proposition is plays an important role in the debate that will result. For example, “Resolved: That the United Nations should ban tobacco” and “Resolved: That the Japanese government should ban tobacco” respectively bring different arguments. Thus, creating debate propositions requires precision.

Although creating propositions is not easy, it would be a great active learning method. Miyawaki (2019) reports that student-made propositions actually work, and this pedagogy can boost teamwork, motivation of learners, output tied with learners’ interests, and interaction with the audience. Miyawaki also concludes that instructors with no debate experience can use the pedagogy if they understand the basic rules of debate. Miyawaki does not investigate, however, how instructors understand and teach propositions and what obstacles they may face. Therefore, this study collects voices from instructors and analyzes potential concerns about promoting the pedagogy. In addition, this study also examines the voices of instructors who have debate experience and those who do not. An analysis of the interview results suggests a gap between the two.

3. METHOD

Thirteen college instructors who teach debate, anonymously referred to as 1N to 6N and 1Y to 7Y based on their understanding of their debate experience (See Table 1), participated in this study. Except one focus-group interview with 5Y, 6Y, and 7Y, all interviews were conducted as one-on-one, semi-constructed interviews. Ten open-ended questions were prepared (see Table 2). Each interview took between one and two hours, respectively. The interviews were videotaped by the author with an informed consent form signed by each participant. All interviews were conducted in Japanese, the first language of all participants.

### Table 1: Participants and their debate experiences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alias</th>
<th>Debate experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1N</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2N</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3N</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4N</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5N</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6N</td>
<td>No (one debate class at college)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1Y</td>
<td>Yes (high school)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2Y</td>
<td>Yes (high school &amp; college)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3Y</td>
<td>Yes (college)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4Y</td>
<td>Yes (college)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5Y</td>
<td>Yes (college)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6Y</td>
<td>Yes (college)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7Y</td>
<td>Yes (college)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tell me about your teaching career? How long have you taught debate?

Have you experienced debate as a /debater? If yes, tell me about it. If no, how did you learn debate?

What style of debate do you teach?

How do you explain debate in class?

How do you explain proposition in class?

Who decides debate propositions in the debates that you are involved with?

If you decide, what criteria do you use for your decision?

If students decide, what assignment or class activity do you use?

What would you do if a student say he/she has no idea?

What would you say if a student wants to use a proposition like “Gay marriage should be legalized”?

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How do your students react to the selected propositions?

Please share assignment or activities that work well in debate class.

Please share assignment or activities that do not work well in debate class.

What resources (for example, textbook and teaching manual) would you like for improving your debate class?

Table 2: Prepared questions for the interviews

4. VOICES ON DEBATE PROPOSITIONS

Regardless of their debate experience, each instructor has their own justification for their pedagogy. Some interviewees use teacher-created propositions for the sake of enlarging students’ worldviews, ensuring quality debates, and their research interests. For example, 4Y makes a list of propositions regarding social issues and lets students vote, because “students get into a filter bubble [a situation in which someone only hears or sees news and information that supports what they already believe and like, (Cambridge Dictionary, 2020)]…they are in the world of like or dislike. We [instructors] may need to work to let them out of it, well, it is a bit illuminating.” Furthermore, determining what word would be most appropriate for a debate proposition requires debate experience as well as language skills. 6Y uses a teacher-created proposition because “it is easier for debating in English.” 2Y shares a unique perspective; he uses a teacher-created proposition to analyze differences between classroom debates and tournament debates.

Interestingly, the interviewees who actively employ teacher-created propositions all have debate experiences and teach courses titled “debate,” while other interviewees teach debate as a part of “presentation,” “English,” or “public speaking” courses. This suggests that while using teacher-created propositions has merits for teaching debate itself, it would be less attractive for instructors whose class is not debate-focused. 6N, who does not have experience of tournament debate and teaches debate in public-speaking class, mentioned: “To be honest, I don’t have much knowledge and experience about debate…so making it [which proposition to use in class debate] open is easy for me.”

Some interviewees who use student-created propositions explains this pedagogy can respect the current interests of the students. For example, 4N, who teaches English presentation classes at the department of pharmacy, asks students to find controversial issues in their interest areas, such as phytotoxicity, vaccination, and cervical cancer screening. According to 4N, this approach lets the students “decide a proposition not for the sake of debate but for their own interests.” In fact, Miyawaki (2019) argues that the use of student-created propositions boosts student motivation because the topics are then are tied with their interests. Furthermore, 4Y comments that he once heard a famous debate/English professor saying that letting students decide propositions makes them feel they are participating. Such pedagogy may result in the situation in which both students and teachers enjoy the debate, as 6N mentions: “in terms of propositions, I want students to have fun. In addition, typical propositions and their entailing arguments are boring for me.”

Although teaching with student-created propositions has merits, some interviewees, especially those who have debate experience, are concerned whether or not students are capable of making appropriate debate propositions. 3Y says although he lets students decide propositions, he does a final check to make sure if the proposition is appropriate for the format of the debate that is planned.

On the other hand, several interviewees claim that using a poorly crafted proposition (e.g. only one side can obtain credible sources) is an important learning step for students. For example, 1Y argues: “They [students] cannot do it [making well-crafted arguments and propositions] well. For example, each argument does not clash…but to sum, they have to experience failures, like `oh no this proposition doesn’t work`.” That means making a debate proposition itself is a learner-centered activity. 6N explains that in other classes, like essay writing class, a sentence-statement is always given to students. Debate is active learning compared to essay writing class, so a different approach is suitable. Therefore, 6N wants students to create a proposition by themselves. As 6N says: “Although some students struggle, this is part of the activity,” and “if some problems arise in some propositions, the class can discuss them, and this may have educational value.” Such positive evaluation of propositions that do not result in effective debate can be an answer to the concerns of instructors with debate experience who worry about incomplete debates with inappropriate propositions.
5. MAJOR ISSUES IN CLASSROOM DEBATES

Although it is recognized that classroom debate is a valuable active learning method, most of the interviewees talk about how debates can be superficial or not satisfying. They think effective refutation and cross-examination are not done in the debates, due to the learners’ English (foreign language) level as well as time constraints. For example, 2N sets up a rule that students must refer to two English articles. According to 2N, “Everyone struggles to do it. They are not good at English, but they have to read the articles.” 5N shares her similar experience: “Impromptu debates in English were not effective for students whose English levels are not high...If I wanted to let them experience using logic to argue a point, I should have done it in Japanese.”

Furthermore, due to language issues, students cannot understand the values of debates. 1N mentions that most of his students said they could not express what they wanted to say, but as he says, “I cannot tell if that frustration came from their (lack of/poor) English or debate skills. This may be a problem of having them debate in English. Opportunities for debating in Japanese may be needed, but this is an English class.” Furthermore, the English skill level of each debater has a large impact on judging. 6N comments that: “Students wrote about debater’s ethos, in this case English speaking skill, as a strong point on their judging sheets...they cannot reach to a judgement based on logic.” The narratives described here depict the unique problem of teaching debate in a foreign language.

Another issue raised by some interviewees is the difficulty of making refutations and verifying evidence. Use of a foreign language can cause these issues, but class schedule might also explain them. 2Y, who teaches Japanese debate, spends a fair amount of class time to explain how to use evidence in a debate and how to interpret each piece of evidence when two pieces of evidence clash. However, in class of 30, “probably only two or three students really understand.” In addition, 5N mentions that while some teams can prepare evidence, others cannot due to the amount of time available, and “those students just explain their ideas.”

The time constraints also hinder the types of debate arguments that can be taught. For example, 6N says he does not include counterplans due to time limits. Other interviewees, who are familiar with counterplans and other types of arguments, also mention they stick on merit-demerit debates due to the limited time available. However, this does not mean their students are not capable of logical and critical thinking. 3N explains some reasons behind debate rules and his students get excited for new knowledge. For example, 3N tells students that, in policy debate, the affirmative side has more burden because it has to change the status quo. 3N says his students “enjoy such new knowledge. They may feel they get smarter.”

Due to time constraints, the interviewees struggle to let their students create well-crafted arguments, refutation, and judging ballots. This suggests that debate teachers need to rethink what is the essential in debate education—what do we want students to get from our debate class? For example, examining evidence is an important skill, which boosts the students’ literacy. However, as the interview results reveal, in actual classroom debates, very few students demonstrate such skills. They seem to try their best to follow the format, do research, and create their arguments—mostly in English which is not their first language. This is definitely a great achievement, but this does not reach the goal. What methods would be useful to go further?

6. IDEAS FOR EFFECTIVE TEACHING

Each interviewee shares ideas for teaching debate that have worked well in their teaching contexts. Whether a class activity was judged to be effective or not depends on the teacher’s goal setting and is also difficult to evaluate with objective criteria in the everyday classroom. Some similar ideas were shared by different teachers as successful, however, and this is a sign of their success. Prominent ideas reported as successful in the interviews are impromptu debates, a format for refutation, and ballot writing.

Several interviewees are in favor of impromptu debates, in which students are given a proposition right before the debate. 2N uses impromptu debates as an introductory activity for debate and it works well. He comments: “it was a good opportunity to let students think about what persuasion is like and how they can be persuasive. It may be the first time for them to think about those things consciously.” 1N gives an example of an impromptu debate on the proposition of “Would it better if people could communicate with animals or with people from
every other country?” 1N says this activity lets students generate various arguments. 4N also mentions that impromptu debate in Japanese was effective for her students. Those narratives suggest that such training to speak against someone should be an introductory activity for debate especially in Japan. As 1Y points out, “debate is based on the Western culture that avoids silence…but, it [arguing back] can be regarded as arrogant in Japanese culture.” Therefore, impromptu debate is effective for students from collectivistic cultures to get used to making straight-forward refutations against others. Practicing it can help Japanese students become mentally ready for other debate activities.

Teaching formats for refutation is another prominent idea that emerged from the interviews and is of particular value because it can somewhat resolve the difficulty of making refutations that several interviewees described. 2Y shares his way of teaching refutation formats using counterexamples. He recounts how a student learning this technique responded to the statement that school teachers in Japan often say, “an undisciplined hairstyle [like dyed hair] is a sign of an undisciplined mind,” with “if so, is lack of hair a sign of lack of mind?” 2Y prepares several other refutation formats and examples, and then assigns students to find refutations in their daily lives. The activity is a great example of active learning. In addition, 3Y suggests, writing “a perfect flow sheet, which includes all arguments in constructive speeches and rebuttal speeches is the most important activity in debate class.” This can also lead to students preparing various refutations by themselves.

The last prominent idea from the interviews is ballot writing. 1Y positively evaluates what his students write in ballots: “Students analyze and write what was good and what was not in debates logically…they can’t perform well as debaters, but as audience members, they understand [presented arguments] well.” 3Y further emphasizes the important of ballot writing, as “the goal of debate education is writing [good] ballots. Judges must understand that debate is essentially to write ballots.” From the perspective of active learning, writing ballots enables students to listen critically, organize presented arguments, and draw their conclusions by themselves. Although many classroom debates have constraints like a limited number of class periods and varying levels of English skills, employing the above ideas even partially would benefit students.

7. NEEDS FOR TEACHING MATERIALS

The interviewees all talked about the lack of suitable materials for teaching debate effectively in Japan. Most of the interviewees say model debate videos would be beneficial. 4N is concerned that “some students think that debate is just a quarrel” so she wants teaching materials that teach “manners of debate, like making a constrictive speech and then refuting it… The format of debate rules and a video illustrating them would be great.” 1N shares her preference for model debate videos over textbooks. Videos would be easier for both students and teachers to understand; as 1N suggests, “in class, teachers can play the video. They can stop at an important part and explain what is happening there.” 2N requests similar materials, like model debates with a simple proposition and simple arguments. 1Y also wants good model debate videos, especially by students whose English levels are not native-like. As 1Y explains, “I have seen a few good debates, which flow well logically, with very simple English. Those debates were very interesting.” Such good debates in plain English would “encourage students that they can debate [with their English level].” In addition, some interviewees want a teaching manual that explains model debates. 6N says he was given a model speech [by his supervisor], but how to explain it or what points he should emphasize were not provided. Therefore, model debates should come with a teaching manual, which lists and explains their good and bad points.

While interviewees without debate experience prefer videos to written model debate, debate-experienced interviewees request written ones. 5Y says some examples of written initial arguments as well as refutation would be beneficial. 7Y suggests a list of arguments for a certain proposition, like the White Papers issued by the government of the United States of America. 2Y also wants a “case study that comments on a proposition…for example, in an actual debate round, this argument is evaluated this way.” He says he is working to create a list of ballots as part of judge training.

A list of debate propositions is also desired by both teachers who use teacher-created propositions and student-created propositions. 6N, who uses student-created propositions requests a list of propositions of various levels. 5N, who uses student-created propositions as well as 6N, wants some typical phrases or formats students can use for creating propositions.
2N, who uses student-created propositions, also points out the need for the list as examples for students, and he plans to make one with his colleagues.

Several interviewees with debate experience suggest creating a roadmap for beginners. As 6Y says, “teachers can easily access resources, such as worksheets, through the internet.” However, “it is difficult to select appropriate ones if they do not know debate.” 3Y also mentions “other teachers without debate experience cannot tell which are good debate propositions and which are not.” Therefore, a website or a collection of teaching resources that open for a lot of instructors would be beneficial.

Interviewees, especially those who do not have debate experience, seek opportunities for faculty development or workshops in which they can learn debate basics. 5N expresses her lack of confidence, as “the hardest bottleneck [of teaching debate] is my lack of debate experience...there are few opportunities to study [debate and its teaching methods].” 1Y, who is in the position of supervising other instructors, also claims the need for seminars that target inexperienced instructors: “A Faculty Development workshop that invites debate professionals would be appreciated, like a seminar that covers most important points in teaching debate. The demand surely exists. It is necessary but few can do it.”

In sum, model debates with a manual for teachers, a list of debate propositions, a roadmap of teaching materials, and seminars for teachers are considered to be necessary. The author will create actual teaching materials based on the demands provided by the interviewees, as well as her analysis of existing debate textbooks and resources; but presenting all of them here is out of this essay’s scope. The rest of this essay discusses potential benefits as well as problems of seminars that target debate pedagogy, because it exemplifies the gap between teachers who have and do not have tournament debate experiences.

However, few teachers have experienced debate themselves, and many teachers who have no debate experience but are assigned to teach debate are deeply troubled. Teaching what one does not know is very difficult. Setting up opportunities for such teachers to learn the basic rules and teaching techniques of debate can ease the pressure that they feel and improve the quality of their classes. This can lead to improved evaluations of debate itself in Japan.

However, there are some concerns. 3Y strongly warns against holding “seminars that give easy, how-to techniques.” He clarifies the difference between “teaching debate” and “teaching by debate.” According to 3Y, we [teachers] must teach debate, and in order to teach debate, we must have resources that tournament debaters use.” In other words, there is no easy or short-cut way to get what debate is- --teachers must experience intensive research, arguments and refutations, speaking under pressure, etc. Such expectations of debate instructors are somewhat ideal but can be intimidating for less experienced teachers, and as 3Y himself acknowledges, makes debate only for the elite. 4Y also mentions such elitism underlying debate education: “well, experienced debaters are members of the elite… they are not ordinary people. A certain elitism is immanent in debate…because debate requires intelligence that cognitively clarifies and verbalizes [the social issues].” In addition, debate seminars by debate professionals can create a hierarchy corresponding to each teacher’s debate experience. This should be avoided, because there are many teachers without debate experience who are able to teach debate appropriately, as the narratives by the interviewees here exemplify. Based on the interviews of this study, a teacher’s past debate experience influences his/her choice of teaching method but does not impact his/her teaching skills.

Another concern is about debate itself. 4Y comments “we [debate teachers] must recognize the danger of debate form…we artificially create a topic about which both sides can make arguments…we have to think self-reflectively.” This suggests that debate-teaching materials should embrace a meta-perspective on debate itself, including the risks and limitations of debate education as well as its merits. For example, in any style of debate, there are only two sides and they must have points that clash. This basic debate rule leads to dichotomies and
can cause complexities of the given topic to be overlooked. Furthermore, silence is not valued in debate; however, it plays a significant role in communication (Glenn, 2004). Such less favorable features of debate rarely appear in the context of debate education. Indeed, most debate textbooks write about the merits of debate, but few refer to its negative aspects.

It is somewhat true that debate education consolidates elitism. However, there are literatures arguing debate education serves for citizenship education (e.g. Arthur & Cremin, 2012) and discussion about social class (Robinson & Allen, 2018). In addition, it would be meaningful for teachers without debate experience to teach debate, along with experienced former debaters, in order to overcome the elitism. As Beerman and Shorter (2018) claim, “anyone can coach” and “any student can debate” by developing a community to craft an educational experience (p.189). Furthermore, student-created propositions would play an important role in making debate more accessible and open for anyone. For future projects, debate seminars for teachers should be planned. In order to avoid making a superficial, just-easy-techniques seminar, organizers should provide an opportunity for novice teachers to experience debate as debaters. Using a proposition such as “Debate should be mandatory for all college students” would be beneficial for critically thinking about debate itself.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work was supported by the SPS KAKENHI Grant-in-Aid for Early-Career Scientists 19134358 and Ritsumeikan University Life Support Grant (Fall 2019).

REFERENCES
Deciphering the Trade War Between Japan and South Korea: How to Read the Geopolitics of Past, Present and Future in East Asia

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Following the failure to build up constructive talks, by claiming that this is an act of economic war either for the court’s rulings or for the export restrictions, Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzō and South Korean President Moon Jae-in respectively face citizenries whose misgivings about the other country are hardening. Taking into account the given circumstances, this study first examines what gave rise to the deadlock of current Japan-South Korea relations, and then explores how the media frame of war metaphor leads Japanese and South Korean people to act more like foes than friends. By doing so, the study also shows why it has been pessimistic over the Japan-South Korea relationship of trust from a post-cold war perspective.

1. INTRODUCTION

The war over trade between the United States and China, which account for about forty percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) in 2018, continues to make a considerable impact on the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other existing multilateral trade-government systems. Since his inauguration on January 20, 2017, the global trade system has been overwhelmed by both words and actions by U.S. President Donald Trump for bilateral trade deals in place of multinational free trade agreements (FTA). Threatening to impose tariffs on cars imported into the U.S. market, Trump succeeded in replacing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) by a new pact, the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). Given the globe’s interconnected supply chain, it is easy to understand that the latest escalation in the commercial confrontation between the two superpowers brings about the wider effects of uncertainty on the Asia-Pacific region and the rest of the world (“The twilight,” 2019). Whereas the second largest power challenges to the U.S. economic and political dominance in world affairs, another trade war broke out in the region.

Following the failure to build up constructive talks, Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzō and South Korean President Moon Jae-in respectively face citizenries whose misgivings about the other country are hardening. In the South Korean perspective, Tokyo has not sufficiently acknowledged Japan’s wartime wrongdoings on the Korean Peninsula. In the Japanese eyes, Seoul has fostered such historical animosity for domestic politics and constantly changed its demands for war restitution. In other words, Japan-South Korea talks over the recent past tend to be led more by emotion than by reason. This study first examines what gave rise to the current Japan-South Korea trade war in terms of public diplomacy, and then explores how the frame of war metaphor extended Japan-South Korea rows from the wartime forced-labor lawsuits to economic and national-security issues. By doing so, the study also shows how difficult it has been for the U.S. key allies against China’s growing assertiveness and North Korea’s nuclear armament in East Asia to rebuild their relationship of trust.

2. THE SPIRALING JAPAN-SOUTH KOREA TRADE WAR

The dynamics of public diplomacy takes into account how the national interests should be presented on the international scene because of its significant impact on the making of foreign policy. According to Jarol B. Manheim (1994), the emphasis can be characterized as addressing four distinctive aspects of diplomatic activities, (1) the traditional form of diplomacy (government-to-government contacts), (2) personal diplomacy (diplomat-to-diplomat
contacts), (3) one form of public diplomacy like cultural exchange designed to explain and defend government policies and to present the country to international audiences (people-to-people contacts), and (4) another form of public diplomacy designed to change public opinion in a second nation and to turn the foreign policy of the target nation to advantage (government-to-people contacts) (pp. 3-4). In the age of public diplomacy, international as well as bilateral relations must take a relatively new style of information management to determine how the country is perceived by others. For the sake of domestic political interests, the fourth phase makes a considerable impact on international power politics. In the face of international opinion, the government indeed recognizes the importance of managing the nation’s perceptions that the government and the people of other countries hold.

A year after South Korea’s Supreme Court ruling had ordered Japan’s Nippon Steel and Sumitomo Metal to compensate their wartime forced labor, two plaintiffs filed an appeal with the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council. Not only more lawsuits involved the victims and their bereaved families follow suit in South Korea, but also the appeal to the UN addresses the forced-labor issue in the international community. These voices pressure Japan on changing its tough stance. The Japanese government has opposed any deal mandating war compensations as it goes against the Japan-South Korea Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims and on Economic Cooperation in 1965. Tokyo even cast doubts on how much Seoul is willing to compromise on such history issues. Whereas the conservative Abe administration is less willing to encourage the country’s reckoning about Japan’s wartime wrongdoings, the liberal Moon administration is less willing to take a more forward-looking, pragmatic approach toward Japan. Taking into account each domestic politics, the future of historical reconciliation will be pessimistic. In a broader geopolitical context, since the United States has maintained a low-key stance in current Japan-South Korea conflicts, the stalemate could have knock-on effects for the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategy.

On July 1, 2019, immediately after Prime Minister Abe Shinzō played the chair of the Group of 20 Summit in Osaka in confirming the promotion of free trade and anti-protectionism, not Foreign Affairs Minister Kōno Tarō, but Economy, Trade and Industry Minister Sekō Hiroshi announced that Japan would tighten regulations on the export of three chemicals critical to South Korea’s vast electronics industries from July 4, 2019 onward. This move was soon taken as a de facto embargo because it would likely strike a blow to the South Korean economy. In hopes to break the deadlock on history issues, on that very day, Japan released another export regulation to revise the ordinance to exclude South Korea from preferential treatment under the export control system from August 28, 2019 onward. At first, Tokyo insisted that the curb was a mere review of trade controls, and then claimed its vague, unspecified concerns about national security. In response, Seoul argued against the move as “a retaliatory measure defying common sense” in reference to its consideration of filing a case with the WTO (“Japan-South Korea,” 2019). By calling for national security as a justification for cutting off trade, Japan devaluated the global rules designed to keep trade disputes from spiraling out of control.

In spite of defending its diplomatic strategies, i.e., stricter controls on exports to South Korea, for national security threats, Prime Minister Abe was dubbed a hypocrite in the international news coverage (Dooley, 2019; Kim & Lee, 2019, p. A3). In contrast, the national media highlighted his effort to assuage a series of South Korean explosive reactions with rancor to cancel plane tickets to Japan, to scratch Japanese-made cars, and to launch a boycott of Japanese goods. While labeling Japan’s export controls as economic sanctions, President Moon stepped up safety measures starting with tourism, food and trade (Sim, 2019). He also decided to remove Japan from South Korea’s list of trusted trading partners. As trade measures reflect the broken trust between the two countries, Tokyo and Seoul began accusing each other of having been uncooperative in reaching a diplomatic compromise.

At issue, as ever, are chronic historical grievances, specifically over Japan’s annexation of Korea and the suffering inflicted on its people under the Japanese colonial occupation. Here language plays a central role in rebuilding Japan-South Korea relations by shaping the context in which Japanese and South Koreans fight about the past, the present and the future. At the moment when the potential for nuclear confrontations with North Korea and Iran is rising, the media frame of trade confrontation in
warfare has been symbolic. In the frame of war metaphor, both Prime Minister Abe and President Moon call for total victory. On the one hand, it is useful in concealing reality instead of representing it, in distorting the facts instead of describing them, and in omitting qualities and particulars instead of depicting them (Zarefsky, 1986, pp. 13-19; Macagno & Walton, 2014, p. 5; See also Bolinger, 1980). Tragically, on the other hand, the given frame in itself proves to be dysfunctional in working to the deteriorating relationship of trust in a cool-headed manner.

3. THE FRAME OF WAR METAPHOR

The rise of populism along with globalization spreads and strengthens unilateralism, xenophobia and protectionism in democratic countries, which also deepen division and disunity in society (Stephens, 2019). Here reflects the structure of an argument—attack, defense, and counterattack among others—as “metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 3). Within a particular setting, metaphoric symbols resemble what they symbolize. A metonymic symbol is also related to what it symbolizes not by resemblance, but by contact. As Kenneth Burke puts it, “every perspective requires a metaphor, implicit or explicit, for its organizational base” (Burke, 1941, p. 152). In the national as well as the international media coverage, the deteriorating relations between Japan and South Korea are structured by the concept of war. The ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor structures, at least in part, what the two countries do and how they understand what they are doing when they argue.

In laying hold of new experience, “the language of politics encourages us to see and to feel them as separate” (Edelman, 1975, p. 21). Even though labeling policies is both metaphoric and metonymic, it highlights a similarity to something familiar while masking other critical features. In doing so, it legitimizes a specific kind of political authority while degrading the claim of the counterpart to participate in policymaking. Since the trade war has an argumentation form structured in terms of battle, Japan and South Korea are likely to lose sight of the cooperative aspects, but intensifying hostilities. As with national politics, so with international, Edelman (1975) concludes that “symbolic cues… define the geography and topography of everyone’s political world” (p. 21). Therefore, the overall picture of the Japan-South Korea trade war comes to be partial, not total.

On the whole, the concept of war in developing political arguments plays an effective role in strengthening national identity, heightening a shared sense, and making a political decision within a familiar mental scheme like an enemy, a territory that is fought for, allies, and an ultimate purpose of victory. What follows shows the way in which the war metaphor encourages Japan and South Korea to take an adversarial political stance on economic, national-security and history issues. For the time being, dialectics between right and wrong, and between good and evil leads Japanese and South Koreans to abandon the idea that the economic and diplomatic ties including the relationship of trust are mutually beneficial.

4. THE DECLINING U.S. STRATEGIC SUPREMACY IN EAST ASIA

The day of October 8, 2018 marked the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the Japan-South Korea Joint Declaration by then Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō and then South Korean President Kim Dae-jung. The 1998 declaration was an epochal document that aims to surmount the unfortunate history in the past and to develop the future-oriented relationship. In the joint declaration, while Japan apologizes for damage and suffering inflicted because of its colonial rules from 1910 to 1945, South Korea appreciated postwar Japan’s role in contributing to world peace and prosperity. The declaration was a result of continued efforts by the two nations to improve their ties after diplomatic relations were normalized in 1965. In 2002, Japan and South Korea cohosted the football World Cup in Seoul and a Korean boom generated in the Japanese society. While the number of South Korean visitors to Japan has increased since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the growth of South Korea’s economic power has restructured their anti-Japanese nationalism.

4.1 The Japan-South Korea Trade War
A series of these diplomatic predicaments seemed unconnected at a first glance, but they pointed to a collapse of the regional strategic order by which the United States fostered peace and stability in East Asia. There are three parts to the argument.
The first is that, given growing uncertainties over the U.S.-China trade war, businesses in the two regional democracies are more worried. Indeed, the past forty years have been a period of unprecedented growth and prosperity in the region. The conditions were established in the mid-1970s—with the end of the Vietnam War and the U.S. rapprochement of China. At that time the United States was tolerated, and even helped its new relationship with China mutually beneficial. Around the July and August of 2019, however, a series of tensions between Washington and Beijing emerged over such flashpoints as Taiwan, the South China Sea and Hong Kong, then giving rise to the U.S.-China trade war. China’s growing assertiveness, once viewed by Washington as healthy competition, pushed for the U.S. leadership role and diplomatic predictability no longer to be taken for granted. In addition to the shift of regional power balance, Japan faced the serious deterioration in its relationship with South Korea.

In front of world leaders at the Group of 20 Summits in June 2019, on the one hand, Abe presented himself as a guardian of the global trade order that Trump continued to fracture by issuing the declaration that each G20 country would “strive to realize a free, fair, nondiscriminatory, and transparent trade and investment environment” (“Editorial: Regain unity,” 2019). On the other hand, two days later Tokyo made an announcement to limit South Korea’s access to Japanese chemicals essential to one of its biggest industries due to national-security concerns. In the international light, Prime Minister Abe followed President Trump and President Putin by using national-security exception as a justification for labeling its trading partners as security threats. The move to coerce South Korea over export restrictions was viewed as the challenge to the global trade rules for commerce and economic growth. The concept of national security is indeed open to broad interpretation. According to Japanese officials, some South Korean companies inadequately managed the chemicals that could be used to make weapons, citing concerns that components might end up in North Korea. Taking this as a retaliatory measure linked to the forced-labor lawsuits, South Korean people accused Japan of an “economic invasion” (Rich, Wong & Choe, 2019; See also Choe, 2019, p. A4). Here the deep-rooted cause of broken trust—South Korean historical grievances and Japanese exasperation with its chronic emergence—appeared.

Seeming to wield trade as a political cudgel in Trump’s playbook, Abe made strategic use of national-security grounds to gain a majority of Japanese voters’ support for his Japan First policy (Hwang, 2019). He then turned the tables by claiming that South Korea mishandled materials that could be used for military purposes. In the metaphorical frame of war, President Moon argued against that “we will never again lose to Japan,” reminding the country of Japan’s colonial occupation (White & Lewis, 2019). He also declared that South Korea was to lessen its dependence on Japan-made chemicals and high-tech electronics materials by finding alternative sources for imports. Because of its rapid economic growth, South Korea began to consider Japan as a rival to overcome by comparing the number of Olympics gold medals won to that of Novel Prize recipients. The country also took pride in overtaking Japan in shipbuilding and memory chips manufacturing. Even though the typical rise of nationalism surged against Japan or South Korea—which leaders of each country used to be careful to avoid in state-to-state relations, the Tokyo-Seoul disputes are as much about their painful history rather than about trade conflicts (Harding & White, 2019).

4.2 The Rise of China

The second is geopolitics that the importance of the Japan-the U.S.-South Korea trilateral security partnership could not be underestimated in sustaining the U.S.-established East Asian strategic order. The security environment of each nation is not granted, but founded. In the beginning of the twenty-first century, Beijing started to pressure Seoul to water down its defense cooperation with Japan as well as the United States. This indeed affects each strategic deterrence (“Chaguan: A great,” 2019). By and large, it is high time for Washington to seat its two most important regional allies down for a frank and constructive talk, and to mediate in the spiraling confrontation. For President Trump, however, the major preoccupation has been a deal, especially the trade war with China. What is more, it is Trump himself who has brought about uncertainty rather than offering reassurance by openly questioning the value of the U.S. alliances. As a result, the loss of the U.S. regional authority became apparent as well as the outlasting damage to the U.S. leadership in the world (Wolf, 2019).

For its regional meddling, the United States deliberately left most of the historic disputes and rivalries in the Asian-Pacific region unresolved.
As soon as Tokyo threatened to slow down exports of materials essential to South Korea, Seoul took it as retaliation for the forced-labor and comfort-women issues and threatened not to extend the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). Even though the United States considered this intelligence-sharing agreement crucial to monitoring North Korea’s nuclear build-up and its missile tests, President Trump shrugged off such provocations with a wait-and-see attitude toward the soaring Japan-South Korea relationship (Rich, Wong & Choe, 2019; Borger, 2019; Sanger, Wong & Crowley, 2019, p. A1). The United States has long relied on Japan and South Korea to stand alongside and to help counter the rise of China as well as the nuclear armament of North Korea. Nevertheless, Trump has been reluctant to help mediate a deepening divide between Japan and South Korea (Choe, 2019, p. A9; Johnson, 2019d).

China, sensing such division and disunity, took up a challenge to the postwar U.S. strategic dominance in East Asia (Montague, 2019). While overhauling the economic and diplomatic relations with rising China, the Abe administration wanted Japan to have more self-reliant military (Ikeda & Higa, 2019, P. 2). In the latest Upper House election campaign, he indeed called for a mandate to change Japan’s pacifist Constitution. He implicitly, and yet surprisingly, campaigned on the bitter historical revisionism (“Japanese scholar,” 2019). For all the concerns that Abe is spearheading a right-wing turn in Japan, the rise of nationalism that buoys him seems largely rooted in nostalgia not for the wartime past, but for a nationally unifying moment (“Banyan: Shinzo Abe’s,” 2019). Compared with Japan, South Korea’s relations with China were less encumbered by history issues. But the large U.S. military presence was a constant irritant, symbolized by confrontation between Seoul and Beijing over the U.S. deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile-defense system in South Korea in 2017 (Lee, 2019). Furthermore, Washington’s complaints about unfair trade and defense costs began to raise skeptical voices questioning the U.S. reliability among Japanese and South Koreans (Johnson, 2019b; Johnson 2019a; Denyer & Kim, 2019, p. A14; Armitage & Cha, 2019, p. A17; “South Korea’s,” 2019). As a matter of fact, a lack of consistent U.S. commitment and of vision for East Asia resulted in handing Beijing some easy wins.

4.3 History War
The spiraling tensions between Japan and South Korea evolved from a diplomatic conflict over Japan’s war restitution into trade war and security cooperation (“A slow road,” 2019). The third is that South Korea has played its own version of the historic card which would upend Japan. The two countries are, under the security umbrella of the United States, vital links in the global economic supply chains. In spite of cultural, social and economic affinity, Japan and South Korea have rarely boasted of their cordial ties. In particular, the people of South Korea, keeping the wounds of Japan’s colonial rules on their minds, began insisting that Japan never made a sincere apology for its wartime offenses since the end of the Cold War. In response to such anti-Japanese national sentiments, Japanese people claimed that Japan did enough both legally and politically. In terms of the politics of memory, however, Seoul and Beijing have taken a tough stance on Tokyo by insisting that Japan has never fully reckoned with its past.

In November 2018, President Moon Jae-in, impeaching former President Park Geun-hye, dissolved the foundation established under the comfort-women settlement. It was just a month after that South Korea’s Supreme Court ruled that Japanese firms, which had used South Koreans as forced labor during the war, should pay compensation to surviving victims. Over these two years, the Moon administration neither abolished nor renegotiated the bilateral accord in 2015, but did not accept it. All of a sudden, pledging its support for victim-centered principles, President Moon announced his decision to dissolve the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation founded on the 2015 accord. He stated that the bilateral accord does not sufficiently reflect the opinions of former comfort women and that the comfort-women issue will not be resolved with the accord (Moss, 2019). In response to this unilateral disbandment, Prime Minister Abe criticized that “[i]f international promises are not observed, forging ties between countries becomes impossible” (“Editorial: Unacceptable,” 2019). He also made an additional remarks, “We hope that South Korea, as a member of the international community, will act responsibly” (“Editorial: Unacceptable,” 2019). As a result of these historical conflicts, Tokyo and Seoul failed to hold summit talks in Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in November 2018 or in the Group of 20 Summit in June 2019.
symbolizing deterioration in Japan-South Korea relations (“Editorial: Follow up,” 2019). This shows how the unsettling prospect of the Japan-South Korea trade war stems from the undermined legal foundation of the 1965 Japan-South Korea treaty. On October 30, 2018, the South Korean Supreme Court’s final decision, which rejects the two countries’ common position on the bilateral treaty which the United States brokered in 1965, brought Japan-South Korea relations to a crossroads. Preceding South Korean administrations took a stance that the issue of individual claims was confirmed to have been “settled completely and finally” by the 1965 treaty. Hence the Roh Moo-hyun administration devised a policy in 2015 that the South Korean government would extend relief to those wartime victims. However, the Moon Jae-in administration, showing its respect for the judiciary authorities, introduced a new interpretation to acknowledge the individual rights of surviving wartime victims to claim compensations. Seoul is cautious of being seen as capitulating to Tokyo’s positions on international law and bilateral agreements. The sudden departure from the preceding standpoint leaves the legitimacy of diplomatic normalization in 1965—the final settlement of war reparation matters—questionable.

The root cause of the Japan-South Korea trade war requires the two countries to come to terms with the past. The Moon administration has been slow in taking any diplomatic steps to deal with matters of history. While waiting for Seoul’s deliberative response, the Abe administration reiterated a warning that Japan would take resolute actions. Japan’s trade sanctions triggered South Korea’s reactions to cancel cultural exchanges and to boycott Japanese products. In contrast, Japanese public opinion is not yet vocally anti-Korean, but perceiving South Korean intransigence as “untrustworthy” and “faithless” (“The feud,” 2019, p. 22; “Charlemagne: The risks,” 2019). As their confrontation over history spilled into stable economic relations and then national-security cooperation, the two neighboring countries had difficulty in finding a face-saving resolution or an outside help (Wang, 2019). Without future-oriented relationship-building efforts, it is not yet clear whether and when Japan and South Korea will be able to settle such a contentious issue on history.

5. CONSEQUENCES

The multiplication of historical catastrophes during the first score of the twenty-first century, and their cumulative effects, made the following questions ever more urgent. What do we receive and transfer knowledge of these events? How can we best carry such stories forward, without appropriating them, and without, in turn, having our own stories displaced by them? Some of us still have a “living connection” with a traumatic personal and generational past, and that past is being transmuted into history (Sigrid, 2002; See also Young, 1997). Descendants of victim survivors as well as of perpetrators and of bystanders who witnessed massive traumatic events connect so deeply to the previous generation’s remembrances of the past. It is to be shaped, however indirectly, by traumatic fragments of events that still defy narrative reconstruction and exceed comprehension. These events happened in the past, but their effects continue into the present as well as the future. How is memory transmitted to be repeated and reenacted, not to be worked through?

The trade war between the two neighbors came from South Korea’s Supreme Court decision issued on October 30, 2018. Under the left-leaning Moon Jae-in administration, the court ordered the Japanese companies to pay compensation to 10 South Koreans who were conscripted to work as part of Japan’s wartime effort. In response, the right-leaning Abe Shinzō administration reiterated Japan’s uncompromising line that all wartime claims were settled in 1965 when the two countries normalized relations and Japan paid $500 million for South Korea in aid and loans for war restitution. South Korea invested the Japanese funds to lay the foundation of its economic modernization without paying out to individual war victims. President Moon announced no intention of interfering the judiciary decision. By pointing out such an irresponsible attitude that Seoul leaves the matter to the judgement of its judiciary, Prime Minister Abe thus accused his counterpart of breaching international law and bilateral agreements by going against the 1965 treaty and the 2015 accord. In the media coverage, the frame of war metaphor discourages both Tokyo and Seoul from taking conciliatory steps to reach a diplomatic compromise.

In the short term, Japan scales back its economic relations and security cooperation with South Korea. The on-going Japan-South Korea
trade war shows how vulnerable the interconnected supply chains are to be overturned by nationalistic lines. Instead of banding together against a common adversary, the two crucial U.S. allies chose to be locked in their own bitter battle over history. Without the U.S. mediation, neither succeeded in steering clear of easing tensions over economic, strategic, historical disagreements (Taylor, 2019). By dissociating the trade stand-off from matters of national security as well as history, Tokyo weaponized economic sanctions in order to coerce Seoul into action to change its stance on history matters. Structured in the media frame of war metaphor, playing the untrustworthy card to guarantee domestic support—if the relationship of trust would be restored, trade disputes would be kept from spiraling out of control—has cast a shadow over Japan-South Korea relations.

In the long term, elevating explosive issues of populism and nationalism to the economic sphere will lead the two nations likely to regard each other with hostility. Emphasizing Japan’s lack of sincerity, on the one hand, Seoul seeks to recover the rights of victims who were forced to work for Japanese firms and to have sex in Japanese army brothels. On the other hand, Tokyo must face a challenge to reflect on the recent past in spite of shifting the frame of argument from history issues to economic conflicts. A shift of focus from history to economic and national-security concerns not merely deteriorates Japan-South Korea security cooperation, but encourages North Korea to develop its nuclear and missile technology (Ikeda, 2019, p. 1). On the whole, the bilateral relationship is indeed in transition as it responds to the shift of reginal power balance (“Did Korea,” 2019).

As for public diplomacy, Tokyo should have made through diplomatic efforts to prevent its confrontation with South Korea over history from disturbing the Japan-the U.S.-South Korea trilateral partnership. For resolving the North Korean issue, i.e., its number one priority, Seoul has an alternative. Indeed the Moon administration came to approve a phased denuclearization of North Korea with diplomacy based on ethnic nationalism (Johnson, 2019c). In contrast, the Abe administration remained unchanged, merely calling for North Korea to complete denuclearization. As the U.S. supremacy in East Asia has declined, Tokyo has no alternative but to formulate its diplomatic strategy on the premise that the mending of Japan-South Korea relations will not move forward for the time being (Rafferty, 2019). In other words, Tokyo should avoid emotional exchanges of criticism, and instead put forward its legitimate claim founded on the international law.

Finding a compromise way for Prime Minister Abe Shinzō would not be easy. Even though Tokyo 2020 Summer Olympics and Paralympics have been postponed to 2021, the number of Korean tourists to Japan is falling sharply and Japan’s public image is damaged seriously. Abe failed to establish a communication channel with President Moon Jae-in due to the following three factors of structural change in geopolitics. The first factor was the rise of China. Seoul’s economic dependence on Beijing was increasing further to its detriment (Lee, 2019). In fact, its trade with China has surpassed the sum of its trade with Japan and that with the United States over these ten years. The Second was over North Korea’s nuclear armament. Whereas Seoul focuses on preventing a nuclear pre-emptive war and moves on reconciliation with North Korea, Japan takes the initiative to contain North Korea due to its national-security concern (“Trump expects,” 2019; Withnall, 2019, p. 33). The last but not the least, the shadows of the past require a special sensitivity. Seoul’s shift of high priority from Japan to China with economic and geopolitical considerations allows the country to give rise to its anti-Japanese sentiments and to voice the long-simmering issue on Japan’s colonial occupation of the Korean Peninsula in the lead-up to the Second World War (Chen, 2019; Tan, & Sim, 2019). Overall, Japan’s countermeasures to elevate its conflicts with South Korea to the trade friction will not help settle the issue of war reparations, but face hurdles in building future-oriented relations between Japan and South Korea.

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The feud between Japan and South Korea: Unique low.
1. INTRODUCTION

U.S. intercollegiate academic debate (IAD) has long operated according to two “terministic screens” (Burke, 1966, pp. 44-62). The first and probably most dominant screen is debate as an academic game which tends to view the activity as primarily animated by competition (Baker, 1901; Bartanen & Littlefield, 2014, 2015; Brigham, 2017; Davis, 1916; Keith, 2007; Llano, 2017; Muir, 1993; Snider, 1984). The second views debate as a form of civic education, which tends to emphasize the inculcation of practices and skills necessary for participation in professional and civic life (Baker, 1901; Bartanen & Littlefield, 2014; Davis, 1916; Hogan et al., 2017; Keith, 2007, 2010; Llano, 2017; Paroske, 2011). As Burke (1966) noted, such screens are filters offering only partial perspectives on their subjects: “Even if any given terminology is a reflection of reality, by its very nature as a terminology it must be a selection of reality; and to this extent it must function also as a deflection of reality” (p. 45). For IAD, both perspectives shed light upon and also occlude aspects of the other in addition to leaving out important elements that fit neither perspective perfectly (see e.g., Atchison & Panetta, 2009; Hicks & Greene, 2015).

If taken as mutually reinforcing rather than contradictory, these screens frame a creative/productive tension between competition and education, fun and serious self-cultivation, strategy and preparation for civic life that have defined the activity from its origins in the 19th and 20th centuries to today (Atchison & Panetta, 2009; Bartanen & Littlefield, 2014, 2015, 2017; Brigham, 2017; McKown, 2017; Rief, 2018). Unfortunately, these screens have not achieved a pedagogical detente much less a mutually beneficial interaction. As Bartanen and Littlefield (2014) have argued, the civic screen became a kind of “Trojan Horse” (pp. 161, 163, 174) during the early years of IAD, a way of rendering the game screen suspect:

The attacks on debate practice were rooted in the assumption that the primary purpose of debate was civic training and that the failure of the activity to achieve a narrowly defined set of standards rendered it unjustifiable and thus unworthy of support. (p. 163)

We agree with Bartanen & Littlefield’s (2014) view that, used in this way, the civic screen...
undermines key aspects of the activity, most notably the competitive dimensions that have always to some degree inspired students to join debating organizations (see also, Davis, 1915). However, we also feel they are a bit too fast in rescuing the game from the civic rejoinder. Indeed, the civic screen may be useful in reinventing elements of the game screen in order to proffer more powerful pedagogical opportunities for our students. This very sentiment seems to be at the heart of many criticisms of contemporary tournament debating (Llano, n. d, 2017, 2018.; Mitchell, 1998; Rief, 2018). In other words, the civic screen can act as a mediating force capable of ameliorating some of the excesses of the game screen. In this way debaters might avoid “be[ing] unfitted by being fit in an unfit fitness” (Burke, 1984, p. 10).

However, before embracing the civic screen as a means to moderate the unfitness that may come from the excesses of competition, we must first understand what it can and should endeavor to promote. First, debate practitioners should think critically about the sorts of practices, habits, and ways of being democratic their activity currently offers. Secondly, questions must be posed about the varieties of civic life students should be pursuing. Should debate practitioners try to replicate the democratic theory and practice already in place in “’actually existing democracy’” (Fraser, 1990, p. 56)? Or should they, as Fraser suggests (1990), instead be involved in:

expos[ing] the limits of the specific form of democracy we enjoy in contemporary capitalist societies . . . to push back those limits, while also cautioning people in other parts of the world against heeding the call to install them. (p. 77)

While we do not engage in the precise lines of analysis Fraser envisions here, we do share her impulse to question the status quo practices of democracy in order to open up new avenues of civic, public, and political organization. In this paper, we pose the question: how can a critical notion of the civic screen be embedded within the horizon of the game space of debate? This question is important not only for specific debating communities but also in terms of debate as an increasingly globalized phenomenon. Given IAD practices are being emulated around the world, it is necessary to evaluate its designs, pedagogical motivations, and practical consequences in light of the goals its practitioners hope to achieve (Greene & Hicks, 2005; Hicks & Greene, 2010).

The rest of our essay unfolds in three parts. First, we turn to history to reveal some of the foundations of the civic screen in IAD pedagogy. As we do so, we show how, despite early efforts in the U.S. to articulate debate through the lens of civic education, the nature of this education was often framed by the taken-for-granted activities of American democracy rather than a reflective and constantly critical engagement with it. Second, we move into the contemporary moment and look at how one form of IAD, traditional policy debate, relies on a civic conceit as justification for its design without proffering a coherent understanding of democratic culture to back it up. In fact, the policy model, while often having recourse to the notion of better public advocacy and deliberation as one of its educational outcomes (Harrigan, 2008; O’Donnell et al., 2010; Muir, 1993), is, in its adversarial design, more like a court of law, a space of contesting ideas taking disagreement to its limits and potentially undermining effective and ethical modes of decision making. Third, we turn to an ancient tradition of rhetorical pedagogy initiated by Isocrates that points the way to a critical perspective on civic education embedded within a game space (Walker, 2011), thus resolving the tensions outlined throughout our paper.

2. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE GAME VS. CIVIC EDUCATION MOTIF IN IAD

Why did civic education emerge as a counterpoint to playing the game in the early years of IAD? At the time, Progressive Era pedagogues were invested in the question of how to prepare citizens for democratic life. Higher education was increasingly concerned with creating pipelines from the classroom into professional and civic vocations. The teacher-philosopher, John Dewey, was busy developing a pedagogical platform with the ability to craft communities able to benefit from and even cultivate the future life of American politics and culture. In short, at this time there was a deeply shared sense education was the linchpin to an active, engaged, and productive citizenry. Many IAD practitioners hoped to capitalize on this moment, seeking to articulate the role debate might have in shaping America’s destiny as a

This perhaps explains why some early IAD pedagogues took issue with the game screen, seeing it as a threat to the larger Progressive Era agenda. For them, politics and culture were not games. They were serious business. For example, George Pierce Baker (1901) argued that, despite his commitment to teaching debate at Harvard University, he felt it was much less crucial to the pursuit of civic education than the wider subject of “public discourse” (p. 104; see also McKown, 2017). This is not to say Baker rejected debate. He saw it as a valuable practice that could inspire further engagement with civic and public life (Baker, 1901; Bordelon, 2006; McKown, 2017). But he was careful to put debate in its proper context. Baker (1901) suggested faculty should “leave to interested graduates and undergraduates, themselves, probably, old debaters, the coaching of the men for the particular contest” (pp. 116-117) and that “debating should be placed on the footing of an intellectual sport” (p. 117). As such a sport, Baker saw it as a way to inspire participation in the larger project of learning many methods of public engagement and advocacy rather than the linchpin to civic education (Baker, 1901; McKown, 2017).

Former Harvard debater and teacher at Bowdoin College, William Hawley Davis (1916), would take Baker’s concerns about the game screen to new heights when he declared:

One thing is certain: that, frankly accepted as a game, debating becomes a monstrous affair. A game is engaged in for fun; practices clearly improper in dealing with serious affairs, actual conditions, become permissible and even important in the realm of sport; they are “part of the game.” (p. 175; on this passage, see also Brigham, 2017, p. 78; Llano, n.d., pp. 8-9)

As an alternative, Davis (1916) would advance his famous notion of debate “as a counterfeit presentment of a practical, efficient, necessary, and familiar method of dealing with pressing and important affairs” (p. 177). For him, debate was to become a platform for preparation in democratic activities beyond the contest, nothing less than a laboratory for practicing a “counterfeit” of citizenly deliberation (Brigham, 2017; Keith, 2007; Llano, 2017). At its core, Davis’ critique revealed one of the central dilemmas faced by early debate practitioners hoping to use IAD as a mechanism for civic education: Can a sport, even one reimagined as “a royal sport” (Davis, 1916, p. 177), really deliver on its promise to prepare students for something beyond winning? Davis felt it could. Though he is easily read as a critic of competition, his concerns were more about competition overwhelming other more important goals. In fact, Davis (1915) expounded on the benefits of a competitive ethos in advancing the cause of the activity (p. 107; see also Llano, n.d., Rief, 2018). The trick was to be sure the overriding concern with civic education controlled for the excesses.

Both Baker and Davis raised important concerns about the status and consequences of IAD when viewed exclusively through the game screen. However, their critiques also demonstrate a key problem in how many early IAD practitioners managed the gulf between the game and civic preparation. Both fail to see that inventive engagement in a variety of game-based practices might offer opportunities to innovate rather than simply “counterfeit” civic life (Brigham, 2017). This is not to say that they were both merely thoughtless purveyors of the world in which they existed. For example, Baker was known for his creative reworking of concepts and pedagogical methods on the boundary of argumentation and theater that have been deemed feminist (Bordelon, 2006; on the theater connection here, see also Errera & Rief, in press). In addition, as Llano (2017) has noted, Davis’ approach to debate was empowering for students, who, “in the counterfeit presentment, develop their own agency in solving problems” (p. 100).

But, Davis in particular seems to have been less innovative in his thinking than he might at first seem. Davis intended to “counterfeit” deliberative strategies without necessarily questioning whether they represented good democratic practices to begin with. Indeed, one of his central criteria for the value of a “counterfeit” practice was “verisimilitude” (Davis, 1915, p. 106). Aside from some experimentation with judging strategies to address concerns he had with audience voting (Llano, 2017; Rief, 2018) and some basic critiques of the attributes of the public square he felt his method could resolve offered near the end of his most famous essay (Davis, 1916, pp. 178-179), Davis was a product of his time. Davis’ failure in this regard was deeper than most scholars have noted to date. A bit later in his career, Davis (1926) would give details about the
“parliamentary procedure” (p. 12) he felt was so crucial to democratic deliberation. While outlining it, he reified racist and sexist assumptions regarding the types of individuals he deemed qualified to adequately engage in public deliberations. For these individuals, he argued, “there can be no successful application of Parliamentary Procedure” (Davis, 1926, p. 14). Instead of questioning widely circulating assumptions about the inferiority of some human beings and/or critically questioning the accessibility, applicability, and value of his notion of “procedure,” Davis instead counterfeited it. In this case, the “counterfeit” became a copy rather than an opportunity to reimagine democratic life in early 20th century America. Responding to Llano’s (2017) suggestion that Davis’ theory might provide opportunities for civic innovation, Brigham (2017) argued:

There seems to be a real risk that, should a democratic culture be flawed, debate as counterfeit may be too focused on reproduction of what is already present rather than offering viable counterfactuals of what could become a better civic space. (p. 85)

This risk within Davis’ approach was not isolated to him alone. For example, as Bartanen and Littlefield (2014) have shown, the history of American debate is replete with exclusionary practices that were both racist and sexist (see especially, pp. 241-288; see also Atchison & Panetta, 2009; Rief, 2018) indicating that many practitioners have over time been willing to accept highly damaging norms and ways of life.

In sum, as Bartanen and Littlefield (2014) have argued, debating allows participants to “merge the stimulation of play with the simulation of civic preparation” (p. 216) primarily by enacting elements of debate that “closely paralleled the rules of courts and legislative debates” (p. 217; on this see also Keith, 2010, pp. 15-16). In this way, debate has offered methods for entry into civic life as Davis and others claimed throughout its history. However, this emphasis on replication has left the possibility of debate as a space for developing alternatives to actual practices largely unexplored. While Baker seems to have been critical of at least some elements of the exclusionary practices of his time, both he and Davis appear to have missed this more radical potential of their shared game. This failure to explore and even problematize the nature of civic and democratic culture within the “simulation” of the debate space has continued to be a problem in contemporary IAD, a topic we take up in our next section.

3. PLAYING THE GAME AND CIVIC EDUCATION IN CONTEMPORARY DEBATE

We now turn to contemporary debate in order to show how the game vs. civic education motif has tended to work out in the 21st century. What we see today among some debate practitioners is the tactic of referencing the civic screen as a conceit to defend the game without considering: (1) whether the game actually reflects civic life in any meaningful sense, and (2) whether the activity itself can act as a bulwark against, perhaps even active criticism of, current democratic practices (Fraser, 1990).

For the purposes of this section, we focus on one format of contemporary IAD: National Debate Tournament/Cross Examination Debate Association (NDT/CEDA) policy debate (for a brief primer, see Freeley & Steinberg, 2014, pp. 356-358). Crucially, our focus here is on arguments in favor of the traditional policymaking orientation grounded in the civic screen (Harrigan, 2008; O’Donnell et al., 2010). In the traditional view of this format, students are expected to research and prepare arguments in favor of and in opposition to the annual topic. Over the course of the year, students gather at competitions where they are assigned at random to compete against students from other universities on both sides of the selected topic. This convention of switch-side debating has long been used as a justification both for good gameplay and civic education, the assumption being that arguing both sides of a topic compels students to practice critical thinking and perspective taking (English et al., 2007; Greene & Hicks, 2005; Harrigan, 2008; Muir, 1993; Rief, 2007; Rief & Cummings, 2010).

In addition, the topics for policy debate, as the name suggests, nearly always ask the participants to consider pressing policy questions, generally manifesting in debates about the relative benefits of a hypothetical piece of legislation. The default assumption has been that the affirmative team argues in favor of a specific policy action by outlining its possible benefits and negative teams respond by pointing primarily to its potential
disadvantages. Following this pedagogical design, some have claimed debaters are better equipped to address political crises, approach difficult decisions, and evaluate competing claims and evidence (Harrigan, 2008; O’Donnell et al., 2010). Put differently, role-playing as legislators advancing a particular law or policy is viewed as beneficial because it is a form of civic education.

The issue with this view is that there are other conventions within policy debate that either deemphasize or are at odds with effective, ethical, and collaborative policy making. These include an adversarial mode of engagement much like that used in the court system (on this system and its relationship to debate see Freeley & Steinberg, 2014, p. 9). This mode is fundamentally competitive and undermines the potential of the game to contribute meaningfully to the preparation of students for magnanimous and cooperative citizenship. It also involves the use of a judge who renders a decision about who “wins,” thus inviting a winner-takes-all mentality (on an earlier version of these critiques during the “discussion movement,” see Bartanen & Littlefield, 2014; Keith, 2007). The conventions noted above, which are derived more from the courtroom than the assembly hall, represent the forensic tendency of policy debate (on the many connections between debate and courtroom practices and procedures, see also Bartanen & Littlefield, 2014; Freeley & Steinberg, 2014; Keith, 2007). The problem with this tendency is that the adversarial system sometimes yields poor results because it focuses on standards of proof and procedural tactics that militate against collaborative engagement among interlocutors aimed at deciphering truth (Bakken, 2008). As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (2003) noted: “The law, by determining the issues to be discussed, favors this one-sided attitude and the adoption of a definite standpoint by the advocate, who then has merely to press this point steadfastly against his opponent” (p. 38). While there may be reasonable arguments in favor of an adversarial legal system, it seems to us that it represents a less than ideal model of deliberative engagement for debaters to emulate.

In other words, the notion of policy making as civic education breaks down under the forensic tendency because the contest takes on aspects of the courtroom that are a poor fit for democratic decision making. One such convention is the idea that a one-sided decision must be made at the end of the debate. In policy debate this rendering of a decision takes the form of a judge deciding who most effectively argued for or against a specific policy proposal. While this practice makes sense in terms of preserving a framework for competitive outcomes, it may not serve the goal of preparing students for effective and ethical public advocacy and deliberation.

In addition, it is not simply the act of forcing a decision that is the problem. It is also how judgements are rendered, a subject that takes us beyond the forensic tendency and into another feature of contemporary policy debate: Mutual Preference Judging (MPJ). As mentioned above, policy debates are adjudicated by at least one “judge,” usually a graduate student or coach from another university also attending the competition, who is assigned not at random but rather through a system of preference by the teams competing. This system asks each debate team to rank all of the judges available for the competition. A computer algorithm then assigns judges to each debate based on a combination of preference (how highly each team ranked that judge) and mutuality (how similarly each of the teams ranked that judge). The goal is to give teams some control over who watches their debates.

The practical effect of MPJ is that students tend to debate in front of judges partial to their argument content or style (judges they rank highly) against teams who argue in similar ways. Or, they debate against teams whose argument content and style are very different than their own in front of judges who either have no preference or equally like/dislike both teams’ approaches. What is sacrificed here is audience adaptation -- the notion that debaters should be prepared to debate in front of any number of judges with very different points of view (Decker & Morello, 1984). Featuring this sort of adaptation would potentially cultivate in them an ability to overcome the conflictual features of public discourse in the American political landscape of the 21st century. MPJ is, in short, a competitive feature of the activity that fails the test of the civic screen (on this, see Keith, 2010, pp. 23-24) and raises numerous questions about other pedagogical and competitive downsides (Decker & Morello, 1984). It also fails to provide much ground for engaging in reflecting upon and rethinking democracy as currently practiced. If anything, it tends to overemphasize skills related to persuading those that already agree with one’s fundamental assumptions rather than a diverse audience that challenges the speaker to consider alternative ways of framing conversations and
crafting solutions (Louden, 2013; Paroske, 2011; Rief, 2007), although as some have pointed out it can also foster the development of new and creative argumentative practices and techniques (Louden, 2013; Rief, 2007).

In this section, we have delivered several examples of the ways in which the game screen can occlude a critical perspective on civic education in contemporary debate practice, especially in the policy debate community. While these are not dispositive and we are sure many would disagree with how we have framed the issues, we are confident in our claim that more work is needed to unpack how and to what extent IAD might use its game space as a means to promote civic education (on this, see also Keith, 2010). What’s more, we believe debate practitioners should more seriously consider how contemporary IAD might become a place where civic life is itself brought under the microscope, innovated upon, and ultimately challenged. Of course, critical and transformative strategies in NDT/CEDA and other communities have posed similar questions, thus opening the door for radically rethinking the practices of policy debate (Hicks & Greene, 2015; Reid-Brinkley, 2008). Our main concern here is how the traditional conception of the activity in terms of its basic format, judging, roles, and the like undermines a more critical project of civic education. From our perspective, traditional policy debate has constructed a game space that may not pose the right questions about how civic life is currently constituted and how it may be changed for the better.

4. ISOCRATEAN PAIDEIA

We now develop an alternative to the ways the game and civic education have been managed in IAD history and contemporary practice. Practitioners of contemporary IAD as both a competitive and a public endeavor have often relied on Isocrates’ approach to rhetorical education as a model for articulating the value of debate as a mode of civic education (Errera & Rief, in press; Mitchell, 2011; O’Donnell et al., 2010). What is missed in some of these accounts is how Isocrates, and the tradition he introduced, offered not only ‘mimēsis (imitation, representation)” (Haskins, 2004, p. 6), that is, both encountering and enacting examples of civic discourse, but also critical reflexivity about the actual state of the public square (see e.g., Hariman, 2004; Hawhee, 2004; Herrick, 2018; McGee, n.d.; Mitchell, 2011; Walker, 2011). According to Walker (2011), one of the central assumptions of Isocratean paideia was that classroom practices of rhetorical instruction and performance could and should reflect a kind of democratic ideal that might not be found in the real world. For much of the period after the intellectual and creative heights of the Athenian democracy, citizen participation and civic engagement were muted by dictatorial regime building. From Alexander the Great’s conquests to the apotheosis of Roman influence and beyond, the democratic and rhetorical traditions of the Athenian experience that were so central to Isocrates’ pedagogy could only be practiced in what Walker (2011) referred to as the “fictive” (p. 188) world of rhetorical engagement, a world in which “a democratic imaginary” (p. 212) was recreated over and over again in order to retain some palimpsest of the past that might be re-engaged in the public square at some unknown point in the future.

What did the pedagogical method of Isocrates’ progeny look like throughout the Greco-Roman era and Middle Ages? Drawing upon Russell’s (2009) notion of “the imaginary city of ‘Sophistopolis’” (p. 22) as a context for rhetorical pedagogy, Walker (2011) described an approach he called “Civic Theater,” in which “declamation” was practiced in “a theatrical civic space, an idealized image loosely based on Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.E.” (p. 188; see also, Rief & Errera, in press). Using this approach, students could engage in their development of rhetorical skills: as theater, as game and in so doing could cultivate their dunamis for wise and eloquent speech, thought, and writing in practical situations as well as develop an attachment to a dream paradigm of democratic civic life that would not be realistically possible again until the modern era, but that nevertheless could mitigate the autocratic politics of the Roman Empire. (Walker, 2011, p. 294)

In brief, the tradition of “civic theater” reviewed here involved a central assumption we have been gesturing toward throughout this paper. The game space of debate can itself be a space for reflecting about, critically engaging, even reconstructing civic life. Writing about the use of role-playing in public argument pedagogy,
Mitchell (2000) keyed into a very similar idea: “Students can use the apparent cleavage between simulated and actual public spheres to leverage salient critiques of contemporary practices in public argument” (p. 141). He goes on to suggest role-playing offers “visions of possible public spheres enacted through classroom performance [that] can serve as benchmarks for re-visions of prevailing communication norms in wider public spheres outside the academy” (Mitchell, 2000, pp. 141-142).

Moreover, the “civic theater” model indicates a way to forge a perspectival permutation of the game and civic screens that views them as fundamentally essential to one another. Only in a game space can alternative versions of reality be contemplated and tested. What’s more, “fictive” models of the civic can and do become critical counterpoints to rather than pure imitations of the problematic features of “‘actually existing democracy’” (Fraser, 1990, p. 56). In short, following Walker (2011), we suggest IAD adopt a model beholden neither to the competitive needs of the activity nor the external realities of civic life but to the goal and purpose of promoting better visions of democratic action. We do not assume, as Walker’s (2011) pedagogues did, that Athens is an ideal space for us to inhabit in these efforts. Instead, perhaps the goal of the game of debate could become the construction of “fictive” and yet still feasible forums that might help all of us achieve the kinds of democratic life we hunger for in the 21st century. This is one way for debate to remain “fit” in the “unfit” realities of our contemporary world.

Ongoing efforts to develop the civic features of the game, including the new turn to civic debating which has been lauded as a means to overcome the limitations of traditional formats (see e.g., Civic Debate Conference, n. d.; Keith, 2010; Llano, n.d., 2017; Rief, 2018), should not be focused on mere replication of the public square. Instead, competitive debate should be engaged in the process of developing, testing, innovating, and imparting new and more robust modes of civic and public living than have been imagined previously. We can think of few better times in history for such work to commence.

NOTES

*1. We are aware of emerging research focused on “civic gaming” or the use of video games to assist in civic education (see e.g., Dishon & Kafai, 2019). While we do not have time to address this literature here, we intend to investigate how it might inform our conception of debate as a civically oriented game in a future manuscript, especially in order to address the rapidly accelerating turn to online debating during the COVID-19 pandemic.

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Single-Sex Colleges in the U.S. & the Transgender Exigency

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Increased visibility and interest in transgender issues and politics in the past decade have contributed to a definitional rupture with regard to sex and gender—a phenomenon I call the Transgender Exigency. By definitional rupture I mean a definitional argument or series of disputes that cannot be resolved simply or neutrally but only by considering the process of defining itself—How and why do we define words? Who should have the power to define? What values and interests are advanced by competing definitions? This paper examines how single-sex colleges in the U.S. have responded to the transgender exigency using a framework for analyzing definitional arguments I advanced in *Defining Reality: Definitions and the Politics of Meaning* (2003).

Colleges in the United States began as male-only institutions, typically funded by religious denominations. What is now known as Harvard University was founded in 1636 to train clergy for the growing colonial population from England. Harvard, like other colleges founded before 1800, such as Yale, Princeton, William & Mary, St. John’s, and the University of Pennsylvania, only admitted men. The first coeducational college in the U.S. was Oberlin College in Ohio. Though founded in 1833, its first female students did not matriculate until 1837. The first women’s colleges were Wesleyan College in Georgia, chartered in 1836, and Mount Holyoke College in Massachusetts in 1837.

The exclusion of women from U.S. colleges reflects the cultural norms of the time. Men were educated to participate in the public sphere of business and politics while women were largely confined to the private sphere to care for home and family: “The colonial view of woman was simply that she was intellectually inferior—incapable, merely by reason of being a woman, of great thoughts. Her faculties were not worth training. Her place was in the home, where man assigned her a number of useful functions” (Rudolph, 1962, pp. 307-8). Women’s colleges were founded with a mission to provide young women with an education of the same quality as was available to men.

While some early women’s institutions of higher learning were limited mostly to preparing women to be wives and mothers, others were designed to be seminaries for women, and others still had a more feminist goal of educating and empowering women to be successful leaders in any field (Horowitz, 1993). The idea of women attending college was opposed by some who felt that women belonged in the home, or that women were too frail for college, or would lose their femininity by attending college. In the famous *Declaration of Sentiments* emerging from the first Women’s Rights Convention at Seneca Falls, one of the injuries on the part of man toward woman is that “He has denied her the facilities for obtaining a thorough education, all colleges being closed against her” (Stanton, 1848). Social movements such as women’s suffrage and the abolition movement contributed to the founding of some women’s colleges (Langdon, 2001). The founder of Wellesley College declared in *The Spirit of the College* that “We revolt against the slavery in which women are held by the customs of society—the broken health, the aimless lives, the subordinate position, the helpless dependence, the dishonesties and shams of so-called education. The Higher Education of Women is one of the great world battle-cries for freedom; for right against might. It is the cry of the oppressed slave. It is the assertion of absolute equality” (Durant, 1890, p. 3).
Only some founders of women’s colleges publicly embraced tenets we would now call feminist (indeed, some felt the need to be circumspect in their politics), but in hindsight the establishment of high quality women’s colleges was a profoundly feminist accomplishment.

We have moved from an age when all U.S. colleges were single-sex (specifically male) to an era where single-sex colleges are a rarity. Of the 233 women’s colleges in 1960 (Langdon, 2001), less than 40 remain operating today, and there are only four men’s colleges left. Women’s colleges persist largely for what can be described as feminist reasons—to counteract the discrimination and sexism that is still evident in coeducational institutions, and thus to provide a more supportive and favorable climate for women’s learning and achievement (Langdon, 2001).

Describing how these single-sex colleges have responded to the definitional challenges of the Transgender Exigency is the objective of this paper.

WOMEN’S COLLEGES

In 2013, Calliope Wong, a transgender senior in high school, was denied admission to Smith College because her Federal Student Aid application form identified her as male. Her application and application fee were returned to her with the explanation that Smith College required applicants to be female at the time of admission. Wong certainly was not the first trans woman to seek admission to an all-women’s college, but aided by the power of social media, she became a cause célèbre as her blog and her story were widely shared and became national news. Sympathetic Smith students formed Facebook groups in support, and national organizations such as the Transgender Legal Defense & Education Fund rallied to her cause (see, for example, McQuade, 2013). Wong ultimately chose to attend the University of Connecticut. Nonetheless, accounts of women’s colleges’ policies toward transgender applicants typically point to her efforts as a catalyst for women’s colleges to clarify and publicize their policies. Admission policies involving transgender applicants ultimately turn on a question of definition: “What does it mean to be a woman?” (Davis, 2017, p. 580).

A year later, in May of 2014, Mills College became the first U.S. women’s college to create a formal written admissions policy that includes transgender and gender fluid applicants. Their stated policy says “Mills admits self-identified women and people assigned female at birth who do not fit into the gender binary” (Mills, 2020). Both Mills and Smith Colleges claim to have been open to transgender students before their official policy statements, but because such decisions were made on an ad hoc basis, there was a lack of clarity that could lead to controversies such as Wong’s denial of admission to Smith (Bennett-Smith, 2013; Martin, 2013; Mitchell, 2014). Smith College followed suit in May of 2015, and in a remarkably short period of time, most women’s colleges in the U.S. have published policies allowing transgender women to apply.

As of April, 2020, a substantial majority of the 39 colleges that are members of the Women’s College Coalition have revised their policies to permit transgender women as applicants (North, 2017). The precise definitional criteria at work at these various institutions vary. At one end of the spectrum, some institutions merely require applicants to self-identify as women. Smith College’s admission policy declares, “We welcome applicants who identify as women, including those who were assigned male at birth. No specific documentation is required to verify an applicant’s gender” (Smith, 2020, emphasis added). Bennett College for Women, Cedar Crest College, Mills College, Russell Sage College, Simmons University, are others who simply ask for self-identification, and Cedar Crest explicitly says “We do not require government issued documentation for purposes of identifying an applicant’s gender identity” (Cedar Crest, 2020). Mount Holyoke’s admission webpage states simply, “We welcome applications from female, transgender and nonbinary students” (Mount Holyoke, 2020). Put into the form of a regulatory definition (X counts as Y in context C), then the sole definitive attribute is self-identification: Anyone who self-identifies as a woman (X) counts as a women (Y) in the context of applying to this institution (C).

A second common definitional approach goes a step further to require applicants to have an established history as women. The most common wording here requires applicants to “consistently self-identify and live as women.”
Similar wording to “consistently live and identify as women” can be found at a variety of schools, including Alverno, Barnard, Bryn Mawr, Spelman, and Wellesley. The FAQs for some colleges answer the obvious follow-up question of “What does it mean to consistently live and identify as a woman.” Barnard College states: “The applicant must identify herself as a woman and her application materials must support this self-identification. If the applicant is concerned about discrepancies in her application materials, she can speak with an admissions counselor or address any concerns in the essay or personal statement” (Barnard, 2019). It is not unusual at these institutions to seek supporting evidence of this self-identification (see also Bryn Mawr, 2020; Wesleyan College, 2020). Hence the regulatory definition could be formulated as: Anyone who consistently lives and identifies as a women (X) counts as a women (Y) in the context of applying to this institution (C).

The first definitional approach, explicitly requiring only self-identification, varies from this second approach primarily based on the reduced emphasis on the definitive attribute of duration. Sherie Gilmore-Cleveland, Director of Admissions of Mills College, states, “Students’ self-identification does not have to match school documentation. If we have questions regarding a student’s self-identification we inquire with the student based on their answers for clarification. The question of eligibility is based on the student's self-identification not a span of time” (Gilmore-Cleveland, 2020). The President of Cedar Crest College, Dr. Elizabeth Meade, noted that decisions about gender identity sometimes emerge late in adolescence, and some students may come from homes where gender nonconformity might not feel comfortable or safe. A decision to transition to female might begin at the start of college, in other words. Accordingly, at Cedar Crest there is no specific requirement about the previous duration of an applicant’s self-identification as a woman, but there is an “expectation that you will come to the college and continue to identify as a woman” (Meade, 2020).

A third and less common definitional requirement is that applicants must have completed the process of legally changing their sex on official documents. According to the survey conducted by Vox (North, 2017), Converse College, Cottey College, Salem College, and Scripps College will admit trans women if they have been legally assigned female. Sweet Brian College will admit a trans woman if she has been able to change her birth certificate to female. Stephens College admission policy says they “will also admit and enroll students who were not born female, but who identify and live as women; those students will need to provide legal documentation that they are legally women or that they are transitioning to female” (Stephens College, 2018). Thus the regulatory definition would be Anyone who is legally recognized as a women (X) counts as a women (Y) in the context of applying to this institution (C).

Why have women’s colleges moved to accept transgender applicants? The core value that seems to inform the changing policies is a commitment to the cause of feminism, which includes an acknowledgement that women have long endured discrimination. Priya Kandaswamy, a faculty member at Mills College who was on the subcommittee that drafted their new transgender policy, is quoted as saying “We strongly identify with our original mission, but we do think that women's colleges were originally founded to make education more accessible for those who were discriminated against based on gender and today that includes transgender” (in Mitchell, 2014). In a public letter by Wellesley College’s President and Board of Trustees Chair announcing the decision to consider any applicant who “lives as a woman and consistently identifies as a woman,” it was noted that the origins of Wellesley was an important social-political accomplishment: “The creation of Wellesley College was a revolutionary act, challenging and confounding entrenched views about the roles and capacities of women.” They further noted that, “Despite all the progress of the past century, women still face hurdles in realizing their potential.” Accordingly, the feminist rationale for the formation of the College continues: “It is clear to us that the concept of a women’s college, and the reasons for having one, are as valid today as they have been at any time in the past” (Gates and Bottomly, 2015).

Feminist scholars were the first to describe the social and cultural variability of gender identity. Thus, for one graduate of Mills, allowing transgender women to apply was “the right move” to “remain a women’s college while also having a more inclusive view of gender
identity rather than relying on what it says on a person’s documents” (in Mitchell, 2014).

To summarize the paper thus far, women’s colleges have responded to the transgender exigency in various ways. Some do not admit transgender women, and those that do vary in the definitional criteria used to decide who “counts” as a woman for the purposes of admission. The colleges and universities that admit transgender women do so, it would seem, because they see “women” as a category in which cisgender and transgender women share similar social-political status.

MEN’S COLLEGES

As of 2020, the number of single-sex colleges for men has dwindled to four in the U.S.: Wabash College in Crawfordsville, Indiana; Morehouse College, a historically black men’s college in Atlanta, Georgia; Hampden-Sydney College in Hampden-Sydney, Virginia; and Saint John’s University in St. Joseph, Minnesota. Currently, two of the four decline to admit transgender men (Jaschik, 2019). St. John’s announced in November 2016 that it would consider transgender applicants: “In furtherance of our mission, tradition, and values as an undergraduate college for men, and in recognition of our changing world and evolving understanding of gender identity, Saint John’s University will consider for undergraduate admission those applicants who consistently live and identify as men, regardless of the gender assigned to them at birth” (SJU Trustees, 2016).

The mission of St. John’s University is specific to men: “Grounded in Catholic and Benedictine values and tradition, Saint John’s University provides young men a distinctive residential liberal arts education, preparing them to reach their full potential and instilling in them the values and aspiration to lead lives of significance and principled achievement” (SJU, 2020). Furthermore, the University identifies a set of values to which the institution is committed: Community, Openness, Respect, Depth, Sacredness, and Passion.

Less than three years later, Morehouse College announced that it would admit transgender men, though if a student transitions from a man to a woman, that student would be asked to leave (Dodd, 2019). Specifically, the policy states that, “In furtherance of our mission, tradition, and values as a men’s college, and in recognition of our changing world and evolving understanding of gender identity, Morehouse will now consider for admission applicants who live and self-identify as men, regardless of the sex assigned to them at birth” (Morehouse College, 2019).

The mission statement of Morehouse is worth quoting here: “The mission of Morehouse College is to develop men with disciplined minds who will lead lives of leadership and service. A private historically black liberal arts college for men, Morehouse realizes this mission by emphasizing the intellectual and character development of its students. In addition, the College assumes special responsibility for teaching the history and culture of black people.” Like St. John’s, Morehouse also identifies a series of values that shape the College’s culture, including spirituality, community, accountability, trust, respect, integrity, honesty, civility, and compassion.

The point is that St. John’s University and Morehouse College saw no conflict between their mission and values as men’s colleges and a definition of “men” that includes transgender men. They both ask only that applicants “live and self-identify” as men. The definitive attributes identified here are twofold: To self-identify is an explicit act that is at the discretion of the applicant. To live as a man is obviously more vague, given that there are many ways of living as a man. In an email exchange with a former administrator at St. John’s University, I learned that they do not necessarily expect evidence of a past commitment but rather are looking toward the future: There is no requirement for “legal documentation or previous requirement of identifying as a trans man. Our expectation has been that the trans applicant intends to identify as a man going forward. In other words, we would accept a trans student who intends to identify as a man throughout his college career.” Vice President for Student Development at the College of Saint Benedict, Mary Geller, who helped formulate the admission policy for both Saint Benedict and St. John’s, confirmed that the future intention is more important than past duration (Geller, 2020).

Thus, for all practical purposes at St. John’s, the two attributes collapse into one and function in a manner similar to women’s colleges that only require self-identification.

Hampden-Sydney College (or H-SC) only allows applicants who were assigned male at
birth and identify as male (Jaschik, 2019; Stimpert, 2020). H-SC is the 10th oldest college in the US, founded in 1775. It is located in Prince Edward County, notoriously known for having refused to abide by the Supreme Court’s desegregation decision in Brown v. Topeka Board of Education (Green, 2015). Vestiges of racism linger: In 2012, a group of about 40 students protested the reelection of Barack Obama as President, gathering outside the minority students’ union. Students “shouted racial slurs, tossed bottles, set off fireworks and threatened physical violence,” leading to four of the protesting students being disciplined (Winter, 2012).

There is no question that there are progressive elements within the college and student body; nonetheless, H-SC has earned a reputation overall of being conservative, and that conservatism apparently includes gender politics. For example, In 2016 the college first terminated, then reappointed, a visiting faculty member who had made public statements that were interpreted by some as advocating violence against transgender women who use a women’s restroom (Kapsidelis, 2016). More recently, the Editor-in-Chief of the student newspaper published an editorial titled “Transgender Lies Become Tyrannical” that, among other things, refers to the “false ideology of transgenderism” and considers the word “transphobic” to be a “nonsense word.” Proclaiming that, “The transgender delusion has carried on far enough,” the author argues that opposition to “transgenderism” is being censored to a degree he considers tyrannical (Bredin, 2019). The editorial is consistent with other conservative press coverage that treats transgender claims with skepticism, such as the headline “Women’s college to admit male students posing as women” (Haverluck, 2018). Implicit in the H-SC editorial is a commitment to biological determinism, though obviously it cannot be assumed that commitment is shared by the College’s administration. Furthermore, the editorial swiftly received substantial criticism from parties from within and outside of H-SC (see, for example, Utzinger, 2019).

Dr. Larry Stimpert, President of Hampden-Sydney College, explained that H-SC’s commitment to form “good men and good citizens” dates back to the college’s founding and continues to inform its policies today (2020). The admissions policy has evolved since 2011 from requiring that applicants be legally considered male (which, in theory, might allow a transgender applicant who had changed his birth certificate) to a 2017 requirement that applicants must be born and identify as male. President Stimpert did not identify a rationale for excluding transgender men other than the historic commitment to being a men’s college.

With the University of Virginia beginning to admit women as undergraduates in 1970, and the Supreme Court requirement that the Virginia Military Institute admit women in 1996, H-SC is the last men’s college in Virginia. Stimpert noted that an on-going concern of alumni and Board of Trustees is staying true to that commitment and tradition, and that there is resistance to changes that might be interpreted as moving the college toward becoming co-educational. Admitting transgender applicants could be perceived by some as just such a move. At the same time, Stimpert noted that there have been discussions among senior leadership about what to do if a current H-SC student transitioned to become a woman, and the unanimous response was that the College would support such a student to complete their degree at H-SC rather than requiring the student to leave.

Wabash College’s Student Senate debated the question of admitting transgender men several times and rejected the idea because they felt admission would, in fact, hinder the college’s pursuit of its mission. A spokesperson for Wabash told Inside Higher Ed that “the college’s admissions policy is to evaluate candidates based on our singular and historic mission to be a liberal arts college for men chartered in the state of Indiana. All of our programs and policies are designed to support our mission.” Asked if this meant that the college would admit only those classified by the government as male, he said, “legally male as defined by the state in which we are chartered’” (Jaschik, 2017).

The explicit Mission Statement for Wabash College is not all that different from those of Morehouse or St. John’s: “Wabash College educates men to think critically, act responsibly, lead effectively, and live humanely” (Wabash, 2020). The core values of Wabash are often referenced as constituted by what is called the Gentleman’s Rule.

One might interpret the emphasis on the Gentleman’s Rule, competition, independence and self-reliance as reflecting certain traditional masculine norms, and, indeed, there is evidence that at least some who opposed the admission of
transgender students were motivated by a desire to maintain those norms. Though one needs to be careful not to overgeneralize, concerns have been expressed about the degree of sexism on campus. An account in the Chicago Tribune reported that some faculty “worry about the locker-room talk that sometimes erupts in classrooms, and the sexist attitudes some students express. Classroom discussions that touch on women’s issues can be particularly strained” (Breslin, 2001). A student editorial in the school newspaper, The Bachelor, defends Wabash as a Brotherhood of Men, and argued that “allowing a transgender individual here would violate our single-sex education as well as our Brotherhood” (Russel, 2018). Criticizing the idea that “traditional male gender roles are harmful,” the author defends the norms of “self-reliance, competition, and dominance” as “helpful in life.” Echoing what I have described earlier as biological determinism, the student states, “I believe, as do many of my brothers, that a person is born with their sex determined” (Russel, 2018). An equally strong statement about the biological basis for sex was articulated by a Student Senator who opposes the admission of transgender students: “I fully disagree with the idea that somehow somebody’s perception in their mind changes their biological and genetic nature. Honestly the only common denominator when it comes to manhood is that genetic [component]. You are genetically male or female” (Block, 2016, p. 3). Another student editorial argued, “it is unproductive to push for the admittance of women who claim to be men, not only because it would cease to make Wabash an all-male school, but it would utterly distort the nature of authentic manhood on campus” (Kaufman, 2016).

The author’s choice of words here, referring to “the nature of authentic manhood,” is described by myself and others as the language of essentialism (Schiappa, 2003, p. 36). The language of essentialism refers to linguistic practices that reflect and depend on metaphysical absolutism—the belief that things have independent, “objective” structures or essences that are knowable “in themselves” (Barnes 1982, pp. 79–83). One can discern such metaphysical absolutism when a distinction is made between “real” versus “apparent” Xs, as in this case between “the nature of authentic manhood” versus, implicitly, inauthentic or only apparent manhood. My argument in Defining Reality is that the language of essentialism is problematic for two reasons.

First, metaphysical absolutism is a mostly discredited philosophical doctrine, at least when it comes to the practice of definition. Most philosophers have long since rejected the idea that we can identify timeless essences to describe what the “nature” of things are (Schiappa, 2003, pp. 39-41). Our culture is very far from a shared understanding of what “the nature of authentic manhood” is.

Second, deploying an alleged metaphysical distinction often obfuscates important social needs and values that are involved in acts of definition. As William James pointed out over a century ago, what we deem as an “essential” attribute of a thing is motivated by our purposes: “The essence of a thing is that one of its properties which is so important for my interests that in comparison with it I may neglect the rest” (1981, p. 961). That is why, for example, Rebecca R. Helm stipulated, “as a developmental biologist, I define male/female as organisms producing sperm/eggs” (2020, emphasis added).

If someone says “oh that is not ‘real’ music” or “he’s not a ‘real man’,” we can be sure that the person has a preferred form of music or definition of manhood that s/he has deemed “essential,” “authentic,” or “real.” Thus, in a definitional controversy, it is important to put one’s cards on the table, so to speak, and identify the attributes that define “men” or “manhood” in the context of a college setting most valuable. Only then can an assessment of whether transgender men should “count” as men in that context be made.

Wabash and Hampden-Sydney rely on one’s assigned sex at birth to define men and women. Why? At least the case of Wabash, there is some evidence that the exclusion of transgender men is based on a belief in biological determinism: “[Our] brotherhood exists due to the very nature of our experience grounded in and shaped by our biological masculinity that sets us apart, but not above, women. Once we make one move to change this standard, it will compromise what manhood means at this

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1 I asked the President and Director of Admissions at Wabash College to provide a brief explanation of why they do not admit transgender men applicants, and was told they had nothing to add other than what was reported in Jaschik (2017).
institution and we will never recover from that” (Kaufman, 2016).

One might ask why Morehouse College and St. John’s University decided otherwise? It is worth noting that Morehouse and St. John’s both coordinate with sibling all-women’s colleges—Spelman College for Morehouse and the College of Saint Benedict for St. John’s. The institutions share curriculum and access to certain facilities of the other. The conversation at Morehouse was prompted, at least in part, by Spelman College’s decision in 2017 to admit transgender women (Jaschik, 2019). I suspect it would difficult to explain why a woman’s college should accept transgender applicants while their sibling men’s college should not. If a commitment to self-identification and living as a woman is sufficient for the woman’s college, why should it not be functionally similar for the affiliated men’s college?

To sum up, there are two regulatory definitions at work for men’s colleges. Excluding transgender applicants, the first can be formulated as: Only those assigned the sex male at birth (X) counts as a men (Y) in the context of applying to this institution (C). Including transgender applicants, the second can be described as: Those who consistently live and identify as men, regardless of the gender assigned to them at birth (X) counts as men (Y) in the context of applying to this institution (C).

CONCLUSION

Regulatory definitions have three characteristics. First, regulatory definitions are formulated and authorized by recognized organizations or institutions. In this case, individual schools have been the organizations formulating the definitions. National or organizations have demurred from advocating specific policies and definitions so far. There is, at this point in time, no particular legal or regulatory mechanism to compel a common definitional practice across the nation.

Second, regulatory definitions are designed to promote denotative conformity; that is, when using language we want to be able to observe a phenomenon and agree that X is a Y. It is clear that at this point in time, we lack denotative conformity with respect to gender identification for admission to single-sex schools because the definitions vary in a nontrivial manner. For some institutions, only cisgender males or females “count” as men or women for the purposes of admission. For others, a transgender applicant can count as an eligible boy or girl, woman or man, but the specific definitive attributes vary significantly, requiring only self-identification on one end of the spectrum, to some evidence of duration in the middle (“consistently live and identify as Y”), to having “legally” transitioned to the school’s gender on the other end of the spectrum.

What this means is that we are still in a state of definitional rupture, wherein a specific person would be defined as a boy or man by one school and a girl or woman by another.

A third characteristic of regulatory definitions is that words are defined to serve one or more specific purpose and promote certain values or interests for those involved. It is reasonable to infer that when there are different and competing definitions, it is a result of competing values and interests at work. This point is, I believe, key to understanding why different single-sex schools have generated different definitions.

It seems reasonable to generalize that colleges permitting transgender women to apply have done so because such institutions often have feminist histories, values, and commitments—by which I mean a distrust of biological determinism (often used to justify the oppression of women), an acknowledgement that transgender women face discrimination similar (though not identical) to what cisgender women’s experience, and a desire to empower women for success in a largely sexist world.

The four remaining men’s colleges are currently divided. Both Saint John’s and Morehouse will admit applicants who “consistently live and identify as men,” but there is little public indication of why. Saint John’s simply says the change was made “in recognition of our changing world and evolving understanding of gender identity” (SJU, 2016). Morehouse offers identical wording: “in recognition of our changing world and evolving understanding of gender identity” (Morehouse, 2019). Again, it is worth noting that both schools work closely with partner women’s schools. In either case, it is clear that neither institution sees a problematic conflict between their historical missions, traditions, and values as men’s colleges and the admission of transgender men. The other two men’s colleges, Wabash and Hampden-Sydney, are reluctant to make public statements explaining their decision,
but from the limited available evidence it seems evident that there remains a commitment to biological determinism and traditional notions of masculinity.

REFERENCES


The Kritik-Focus Model of Debate

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In 2013 Emporia SW became the first team to “Unite the Crowns” of American Policy Debate by winning the National Debate Tournament and the Cross Examination Debate Association Tournament. This historic run was controversial, in part, because both championship rounds were won on the Affirmative using the Kritik; it accelerated the spread of Kritikal arguments about race and the de-centering of the Plan-Focus Model. While affirming herculean efforts to develop the Kritik as a valid form of argument when positioned as the adversary of the Plan-Focus Model, Uniting the Crowns also exposed a gap in the literature about Kritikal debate. There is no academic defense of a formal model of debate that puts the Kritik at the center of an adversarial mode of competition despite similarly hard-fought opposition from detractors. Proponents of the Kritik respectfully disagree on strategic use of Kritikal arguments but there is near-universal agreement that the value of the Kritik is in creating opportunities for necessary conversations about critical and cultural issues. In order to establish a defense of a Kritik-Focus Model I will collect qualitative data during interviews with coaches and alumni of Cross Examination debate who have gone on to become public advocates, activists, lawyers, and policy wonks invested in the future of the activity. I, along with stakeholders from both sides of the Clash of Policy and Kritik Civilizations, will engage in Community-Based Action Research to lay out a sustainable and formal Kritik-Focus Model of debate.

1. INTRODUCTION

College Policy Debate finds itself at the convergence of many ripples in the pond of the American Academy over the last 40 years. Argumentative innovations, the growing complexity of academic scholarship, the and the advent of Urban Debate Leagues, are among the factors that brought us an era in which students can “hack” the rules of debate by reading an Affirmative advocacy indicting the activity of Policy Debate in the finals of a national championship and win (Kraft, 2014). The advocacies are known as the Kritik. Teams that have won national championships by using the Kritik, such as Towson, Georgetown, Rutgers, and Emporia owe their success to a long-legacy of scholars, coaches, and supporters who created cracks in the door of Policy Debate and set the stage for the modern era.

Proponents of College Policy Debate (CPD) have traditionally vaunted what I call the Plan-Focus Model of Debate (PFM). Within the Plan-Focus Model, the Affirmative team proposes a Plan of action to solve an inherent problem in the status quo that is causing significant harm. The Plan is as an example of the larger Resolution, or topic, that debate organizations craft and vote on for a year of debate. Resolutions almost exclusively center on what the United States federal government should do about problems ranging from immigration, to democracy assistance, land use, and alternative energy. The PFM is argued to provide competitors with long-term research, decision-making, and critical thinking skills by debating both sides of the Resolution with well-reasoned arguments (Freeley & Steinberg 2013). Alternatively, proponents of the Kritik do not believe that the debate must center on a Plan of action by the government. Instead, Kritik debaters introduce arguments linked to philosophical questions raised by the Resolution, the debate community, and the norms and procedures of debate.

These two competing camps are engaged in an ongoing culture war known as the Clash of Civilizations which segregates the community along pedagogical, and often racial, lines (Dillard-Knox, 2014, Pg 6). Those who sit in the traditionalist camp have been regularly accused
of avoiding, rather than engaging, the arguments presented by teams that read the Kritik by objecting to the content of Kritikal arguments as a distraction from the Resolution (Odekirk & Reid Brinkley, 2012). The culture war intensified in 2013 when Emporia SW “United the Crowns” of CPD by winning both the Cross-Examination Debate Association and National Debate Tournament championships in the same season with two different Kritik Affirmatives. While this affirmed efforts to diversify debate and to validate the Kritik, it also shattered the glass ceiling over Kritik arguments and minority success in debate at-large. Uniting the Crowns spilled over to other evidentiary debate like Lincoln-Douglas, Public Forum, and some forms of College Parliamentary Debate.

Moreover, representatives of the debate community, including recent National Debate Tournament Champions from traditionalist and predominantly white institutions, publicly denigrate Kritik debate and scapegoated it for a decline in participation. Others have made this same claim even though the biblical end of the event has been prophesied since at least the early 1980’s– much earlier than any modern debaters or Kritiks were even thought of (Herbeck, n.d.; Parson, 1996; Louden, 1997). The American University remains under fire and will face renewed financial and political pressure because of the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. The CPD community is not exempt from these concerns and will face increased visibility due the upcoming season of online debate. Together, all these things serve as a reminder to justify the learning community we have created. A reasonable fear of we who are” diversity-enhancing” is that the traditionalists who disengage from us and our pedagogical goals now will not defend our programs tomorrow.

Kritikal debate does not have a direct and singular academic defense of our model. Extant literature on the Kritik is focused on recording history, creating and documenting important theoretical and cultural justifications for Kritikal arguments, engaging in rhetorical criticism, responding to racial hostility, or discussing Kritik innovations (Mitchell, 1998; Haig, 2005a; Haig, 2005b; Reid-Brinkley, 2008; Polson, 2012; Reid-Brinkley, 2012; Smith, 2013; Vincent, 2013; Alston, et.al. 2014; Dillard-Knox, 2014; James, 2017; Kelsie, 2019) My research into this question shows that the CPD community, and proponents of the Kritik specifically, spend insufficient time describing pedagogical value to those outside of our community (Llano, 2014). A priority must be to mount an internal defense of the Kritik-Focus Model (KFM) of debate. A second priority must be translating that defense to external actors. This paper will serve both goals, in part, as an addition to the literature on the Kritik that explicates some of the pedagogical benefits of the KFM.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The Kritik is hard to define because part of its strategic and pedagogical value is that it questions everything. At its core, the Kritik is a philosophical argument introduced into a Policy Debate that questions the,” cherished assumptions of policy decision making” that undergird the Plan-Focus Model of debate (Hasian and Panetta, 1998). Since its introduction in the 1980’s the Kritik has become a strategy competitors must be knowledgeable of. An opponent introducing the Kritik into a round can broadly question, “presuppositions and assumptions about rules, frameworks, structures, and systems of thought.”, to win (Bennet 1996). While there are many styles and types of Kritiks, they can be categorized into Kritik’s of language and value that are used when potentially “dangerous” words or ethical frameworks are part of an opponent’s advocacy (Bennet, 1996, p 1). Early proponents of the Kritik argued that it is essential that we understand that Kritiks supplement but don’t supplant, policy analysis because, “When one implements a policy, one also implements a value system” (Gherke 98, Pg 29). The Kritik was originally introduced by the Negative team to indict an Affirmative Plan. Naturally, the Kritik pushed past that constraint and transitioned to the Affirmative.

Kritikal Affirmatives follow a similar structure to the one used by PFM debates. The Affirmative team finds an inherent problem in the status quo that is causing significant harm and presents a Resolution-based change that can solve those harms*1. The Affirmative articulates their advocacy through what is called a “methodology” (or Method of change) that is advanced with a philosophical framework for evaluating the debate. Affirmative methods are often, “pragmatically grounded in the physical presence of advocates, underwritten by evidence of the advocate’s speechmaking capabilities (Gordon, 1998). Kritikal Affirmative Methods are similar to plans where the Affirmative team can...
still logically be held, “responsible for the consequences of their advocacy” but are vaguer in the area of the mechanism (Brovero,2019). Affirmative Methods are diverse and may be framed as demands, advocacies, or just “arguments”. The level of specified detail required for a team to win a ballot is up for debate, similarly to PFM debates, since the Negative can press for those details in cross-examination and in their speeches.

It should be noted that the Plan-Focus Model planted the seeds of Kritikal arguments. When an Affirmative team justifies its Plan by raising the issue of Inherency, they are not limited to Structural (a legal barrier), Attitudinal (oppositional attitude of the American public), or Gap (absence of action in a policy area) Inherency. Affirmative teams have always had the ability to frame their arguments around existential barriers to solving the myriad problems that plague humanity, even if that barrier is humanity itself. Existential Inherency, like all other arguments, has evolved. Moreover, Policy Debate has built-in mechanisms for having debates about the norms and procedures of debate in Topicality arguments. Topicality requires constant innovation and rethinking of the boundaries of the game. The idea of reading a “topical” Plan, a mere subset of the Resolution, could represent the topic was a pre-requisite to Kritikal readings of the topic. Finally, many of Policy debate’s most successful programs are linked to Communication departments where communities of learners have always studied debate and public speaking variety of critical lenses (Goodwin,2001 Pg. 63). The development of the Kritik was inevitable; our job it to maximize the benefits of having it.

An educational model is a, “blueprint for the future” (Kwong,2016). The KFM ,then, has to detail what debate looks like when the Affirmative Method is the focus of the debate rather than the Plan. In CPD, the long-standing litmus test for change is how it might affect the a year’s worth of rigorous academic debate (Wade, 1996). The most prestigious awards, outside of championships, are based on season-long excellence. Defenses of College Policy Debate’s PFM argue that a model of debate is required to meet the following 3 criteria. First, any topic worthy of debate has to be able to sustain a year’s worth of argument innovation. Teams should be able to find new arguments on both sides of the topic through intense research. Second, there must be a role for the Affirmative team. The

Affirmative team should be able to defend some change to the status quo that is not morally repugnant or otherwise indefensible. Finally, there must be a role for the Negative team. They have to predict, research, and adequately respond to an Affirmative advocacy presented at any part of the season. The Negative should not be required to respond to an uncontroversial argument that is not the Resolution . I argue that the Kritik-Focus Model meets these three criteria.

3. METHOD

Community-Based Action Research (CBAR) is the method used in this paper (Burns, et. al.,2011). It takes the debate community itself as a unit of analysis and documents the experience of those invested in the future of the community. It prescribes the KFM as future action for the betterment of the community.

I polled 10 of the most successful coaches and debaters at the 2019 Blake Winter Invitational, a tournament with a long history of supporting diversity, to start this project. I inquired about the benefits of Kritik debate, which “Flex Teams” (those willing to have PFM and KFM debates) were most successful, and who best represented the traditionalists. In addition to the names I got from this poll, I reached out to those people I knew were doing social justice work, regardless of their ideological predispositions. I conducted 12 interviews. Three interviews were excluded; one person was too far-removed from debate. Two of the interviews created potential conflicts of interest. Because of limited space, only 6 of those interviews are used here. The others will contribute to a second paper.

Each interview was performed by phone or video call, was recorded, and lasted approximately one hour. Any information relayed in the interview that I was asked to exclude was removed. Each person was presented with a rough draft of quotes from their interview and was given the opportunity to confirm their portrayal.

4. MODEL OF DEBATE

To create a blueprint, the Kritik-Focus Model must have a purpose. Proponents of Kritik debate argue that it creates opportunity for epistemological growth that students do not experience elsewhere because they are
incentivized by ballots to research a wide variety of arguments that challenge their understanding of the world.*1 This is consistent with Roger Solt’s (1995, p. A9-10) claim that decisions in any debates represent provisional judgements that produce, “our moral and political belief system[s]”. At the end of a season or a career, each person is fundamentally transformed by the conversations they have been a part of. Alternatively, defenders of the PFM argue that competitive equity and a fair decision is the only thing each round should represent. However, the competition for its own sake is unacceptable in an educational activity. Tiffany Dillard-Knox, Director of The University of Louisville Malcolm X Debate Society and former participant in “The Louisville Project” *2 warns us against such a mode of competition:

“Competition at all costs is dangerous...Our argument was that people wanted to win and would do anything to win regardless of the dehumanizing effects of particular strategies...like the Malthus argument...it was all about winning...Competition at all costs creates harmful effects because we’re not thinking about the people we are debating against...”

Prior to Kritik debaters pushing back on competition at all costs, judges would allow students to make racist, sexist, or otherwise discriminatory arguments because, as Director Dillard-Knox explains,” ... literally anything went”. Today, judges are willing to penalize debaters for creating a hostile environment because competition is no longer our sole priority. To avoid this pitfall, KFM will prioritize that the educational environment and the growth of students over any marginal benefits of improved competition.

The Kritik-Focus Model starts with the Affirmative team. It is their burden to choose a critical/cultural perspective based, at least partially, on academic research and apply it to the Resolution. Perspectives run the gamut from Critical Race Theory, Womanism, Latinx, and Marxist perspectives to broader theories of Ontology, Epistemology, and Cosmology. From their critical/cultural understanding of the Resolution, the Affirmative must advocate a Method of change that departs from the status quo. The Negative team has the burden of rejoinder—they must prove that the Affirmative Method is not desirable. To prove that the Affirmative is not desirable, the Negative must choose a critical/cultural perspective, evaluate the Affirmative, and respond. After a year of Kritikal debates on the Resolution, a single student would have been exposed to dozens of critical perspectives and would have a deep understanding of forgotten or sublimated histories that they do not learn anywhere else. By the end of a debate career, competitors would be incentivized to be proficient and well-read across all parts of the academy. The NDT champion, CEDA, or TOC champion would represent the team with the best ability to evaluate, apply, and articulate critical/cultural theories and methods to global problems.

KFM Affirmative Methods must make a good faith effort to be tied to the topic. Opponents of this argument that this allows the Affirmative to choose an advocacy outside of the topic. I, however, am arguing that we re-think what it means to debate the Resolution. Those who compete under the KFM understand debatable arguments to be limited by something I call the Travel Test. When teams are traveling to competitions and someone inquires about the topic, well-worn travelers know not to rattle off the entire Resolution. Instead, we provide the key words that describe the larger topic being debated. This year’s CPD topic is Military Alliances. No proponent of KFM would be surprised to hear an Affirmative that reduces a commitment to the system of Militarism itself. This is a predictable, controversial premise for a Kritikal argument linked to the core of the topic.

PFM advocates object to shifting from “The” Resolution controversy to “A” topic controversy even though they may acknowledge that many Kritikal Methods are controversial. William Repko, Director of Debate at Michigan State University explained his take on this issue:

“There are debates in critical/cultural theory that don’t center on the state but that have a lot of clash. At times I do see non-traditional teams run an Aff that is dipped right from the heart of a fight that’s academically occurring in critical/cultural theory. To me, there would be no excuse for a Negative team to stand up and be like ‘Topicality’ because there are arguments to be had there. And students would learn and grow if the community could agree on a critical/cultural theory [Resolution]”
While Director Repko and I agreed on many issues and solutions for problems facing the debate community, the conditional embrace of the benefits of the KFM was not one of them. One of the very reasons Kritikal Affirmatives are valuable is because they speak truth to power to resist those inequitable arrangements. The voting blocs among powerful traditional schools, which run along the racial lines of the Clash of Civilizations, means that the controversies that appeal to KFM teams will not be chosen. This imbalance in institutional power is what inspired the broad readings of the topic by teams like Louisville, Towson, and Emporia. Much like number runners, the informal consensus among KFM teams about what controversies matter is a means for those without power to claim it by “hacking” the game. The fact that championship winning Kritik teams and coaches are able to identify, predict, and prepare for all of the “unpredictable” and “undebatable” Kritikal Affirmatives means that there is some stable point of departure. Rather than understanding the Resolution in a vacuum, Kritik teams boldly acknowledge that the Resolution is contextualized by recent ground-breaking rounds, the larger history of debate, and academic debates taking place when “The” controversy is considered ripe. The confluence of these factors, and the value that teams find in these debates, is what allows KFM teams to attune themselves to what I think of as a Radical Stasis Point and the mechanics of this model.

Director Repko also finds that engaging the Kritik does require more from coaches and students. We talked briefly about his team’s shift in preparation after Georgetown AM won the 2012 NDT on the Complexity Kritik. He notes that, “… [A] lot of my time I spent pouring my familiarity into the heads of our students. There’s a learning curve…” As someone who has been consistently been direct about his hesitance to fully embrace the KFM, I do take his concerns about time and competition shaping incentives seriously. Rather than understanding the Resolution in a vacuum, Kritik teams boldly acknowledge that the Resolution is contextualized by recent ground-breaking rounds, the larger history of debate, and academic debates taking place when “The” controversy is considered ripe. The confluence of these factors, and the value that teams find in these debates, is what allows KFM teams to attune themselves to what I think of as a Radical Stasis Point and the mechanics of this model.

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Srinidhi Mupalla, a software engineer, wanted debaters to temper their instinct to argue that maximizing details via an exclusive use of PFM is in anyone’s best interest. In high school Srinidhi qualified to the TOC as a PFM debater in the D.C. area and went on to create one of the most successful flex teams as one half of Berkeley MS *3. He compared the details that you learn in Policy Debate to those works of literature:

“I read that when you read a book or a novel, generally, over time you don’t really remember the details, but you remember the shift in perspective or thinking. …[E]ventually you’ll forget all the little factoids learned and all you’ll have is the singular perspective that you got from that. But if you do different kinds of debate you learn all the different perspectives… I don’t really remember the details of [Ballistic Missile Defense] anymore… That stuff is useful, but you’ll get that anyway. You don’t need 8 or 9 years of that…”

As our conversation continued, Srinidhi explained that there are diminishing returns when exclusively engaging in PFM. Unless a team was
“exploring across the academy” he did not feel like they would be able to produce nearly a decade of “meaningful education”. His college debate partner Violet Spurlock, a former TOC champion and non-profit researcher, referred to their Marijuana Affirmative on the Legalization topic in 2014 that focused on building rhetorical strategies to, “... shift the [legalization] movement towards decarceration and anti-racist ends...”. She argued that it allowed them to learn about legalization policy from the perspective of activists, policymakers, and special interest groups while understanding how discourse around policy shapes implementation.

5. BEING NEGATIVE

This paper has already established that there are often debatable controversies in the literature that give the Negative ground. By re-thinking what it means to evaluate the Resolution from a Radical Stasis Point and by reading across the academy, Negative teams can win within the KFM. There are countless Kritikal First-Round teams that prove that this is possible. TFW should be an option of last resort under the KFM (unless you are debating an undisclosed Affirmative) because it is overwhelmingly used to disengage from the content of the Affirmative (Odekirk & Reid-Brinkley, 2012). There are three types of Kritik arguments that always engage the Affirmative—Case Turns, Counter-Methods, and Ethics Argument. Each of these operate similarly to PFM Disadvantages, Counterplans, and Structural Kritiks, respectively. Where teams generally falter is thinking through link the arguments that indict the Affirmative Method.

Violet explained, as an incredibly flexible and successful 2N, that you need to first broaden your idea of what a link argument is. At first, she struggled with identifying places to clash with Kritik Affirmatives but realized that there are different “levels” of links that you can think through. Violet suggests that teams, “Think about the rhetoric of [the 1AC]. What kinds of language, metaphors, constructions of identity, value, and community are being invoked in this argument? How can we talk about the way that those rhetorical constructions shape the actual performance of the advocacy?” Moreover, Violet believes the easiest way to beat a Kritikal Affirmative is to respond to the 2AR, not the 1AC. By scouting other teams, historicizing the concepts and terms they use, and finding academic support for your links arguments she says you can find a specific strategy for every Affirmative.

Alternatively, there is nothing wrong with a generic strategy in either a PFM or KFM. PFM teams generally argue that the Negative ground in Kritik debates is bland and unappealing. This claim would be more persuasive if there were not as many versions of the Antiblackness Kritik to learn, outside of any other argument, as there were viable Politics scenarios during the 2019-2020 debate season. The challenge of the Kritik is finding literature that interests you and establishing conversations between that scholarship and the other team’s.

Dr. Sean Kennedy of Kansas KQ, one of most winningest and flexible teams of the decade, shared some of his thoughts about approaching the role of the Negative. As someone who coached multiple First-Rounds, Copeland Panelists, and top speakers under both the PFM and KFM his thoughts here are uniquely valuable for thinking through debate pedagogy. The first time he remembered debating a Kritikal Affirmative that was completely outside of his sphere of training, he was Negative against the 3-Tier Process Method *4. Before the round his coach, a Kansas debater, told him to try his best to engage, to be open-minded, and to move on the fly. When the Affirmative asked him to use certain types of evidence or styles of argument he did. From that one debate he learned a lesson about being Negative. He said from then on, “...[m]y thing was always just if the other team is doing this thing that is a little different from whatever the norm is just try and roll with it”. In the early 2000’s this approach was rare; most coaches and judges were trying to suppress the spread of the Kritik.

Moreover, Dr. Kennedy could not recall a time when a coach or lab leader at summer workshop told him that he could not engage Kritikal Affirmatives. By the time he was in college he thought of himself as just a debater, not wed to either side of the culture wars, engaging other people on the merits of their arguments. As a coach he taught his Kritikal students to manage the workload of Kritik debate by breaking possible affirmative cases up into “genres”, preparing for those areas broadly, and continuing to get more specific as you progress. Debating “genres” of arguments under the KFM is hard because it is uncomfortable to rethink cultural assumptions. Srinidhi, with distance from his years as a competitor, realized that,
“Kritik debate requires one more element of critical thinking. You have to think about the thing you’re reading, yourself in relation to it, and yourself in relation to the other people that you’re debating… It asks more in evaluating something previously unknown…” However, this is a feature of KFM, not a bug. To achieve the goal of epistemological growth, students must struggle with tough ethical and theoretical questions.

6. TOPICALITY AND FRAMEWORK

A major objection to the Kritik-Focus Model of debate is that Topicality and Framework arguments that mandate the focus on the debate be the PFM are considered an option of last resort. The status quo of debate for the last twenty years for many teams has been to use TFW as a first option, regardless of the content or value of the Affirmative Method they faced in a debate. The reliance on TFW is ideological and relies on the enthymemes of “clash” and “preparation” that reflect the echo chamber of the traditionalists. Alternatively, many judges have increased burdens for Kritikal explanations of an inclusive model of debate. When given a “right” to TFW as a first option, the pedagogical benefits of the KFM can be skirted since traditionalists will return to their comfort zone. Unlike the university, students in debate should not have the ability to self-select out of conversations that center race, gender, class, or other critical points of departure.*6 While we should not preclude TFW in all instances, we should hesitate to think that debating in the echo chamber of tradition is inherently valuable or fair. It is inherently unfair to students to allow them to go an entire season or debate career without gaining the education, critical thinking skills, or experiencing the epistemological growth provided by the KFM because of their fear of the unknown.

Tying the KFM to the incentive structure of debate while substantially increasing the burden on students who would read TFW as a first option is necessary to avoid self-selection. We can take the 2020 Copeland Panel as a case study of argument avoidance. The Copeland winning team Berkeley FG had approximately 40 Negative debates and were slotted to negate against Kritik Methods 10 times. In each instance they used TFW to self-select out of critical conversations. The 5th and 4th Place teams, Kansas BD and Berkeley NR, Kritik teams, did not read TFW the entire year; they invested their time in creating more 12 distinct Kritikal strategies. The 3rd Place team Northwestern JW went for the 1-Off Kritik in at least 2 debates against traditional teams but never against the half dozen Kritikal teams. Finally, the 2nd place team of Emory GS lost an early elimination debate at a major against a Kritikal First-Round team because they were ideologically invested in the idea of TFW and uninterested in the would-be round winning Kritik that was under covered by the IAR.

The clear problem with prioritizing TFW arguments, as Violet explained, is that they, “are just presumptive.” Students that prioritize TFW, “decide what debate is” rather than having, “openness about what debate could be” (Violet). Robel had a similar line of thinking about traditional debate and the fact that it, “pre-suppose[s] a certain value set”. Upon reflection on his time as a traditional debater he feels that, “If debate actually believes it is an activity that tests ideas and really encourages each other to fine tune what those look like, I feel leftist scholarship necessarily has to be a part of that.” Argument engagement, alongside the pedagogical perks, also increases one’s chance of winning debates. Director Repko worked with one student on reading the Kritik on the Negative who saw his, “…win percentage sky-rocket as soon as he gave himself options.” Students and coaches who have learned to engage Kritikal Affirmatives are rewarded for their efforts under the KFM.

7. CONCLUSION

The Kritik-Focus Model of debate is a necessary addition to our collective defense of College Policy Debate. It is indebted to the work of those who fought to create space in our community to ask questions, push boundaries, and to learn deeply about injustice. Using Community-Based Action Research I have laid out formal articulation of a model of debate that maximizes the epistemological return on, what I hope can be, our collective investment in the Kritik as a source of epistemological growth.

This model of debate meets the criteria for change: sustain a season of academically rigorous debate, an ethical role for the Affirmative, and a clear and engaging role for the Negative. Without the option of self-selecting out of critical conversations, debaters would have to meet a higher burden of academic rigor over the course
of a year and a career. Affirmatives limited by the Radical Stasis Point that has empowered black and minority students would advocate clear changes from the status quo. The Negative, with a broader understanding of what engagement means, would directly clash with genres of Affirmative arguments using Case arguments, Counter-Methods, and Ethics arguments. As many Kritikal First-Rounds, Copeland Panelists, and CEDA and NDT champions have proven—the Negative can and will continue to win in Kritik debates.

While there is certainly more work to be done on articulating the Kritik-Focus Model of debate, this paper serves as the beginning of a community conversation about the Kritik in 2020 and beyond.

ENDNOTES

1. I am indebted to additional conversations in late 2019 with Shunta Jordan, Christopher Randall, Daryl Burch, Edward Williams, Aaron Timmons, Edward Lee, Hannah Stafford, Shane Stafford, and Sandra Berkowitz for my understanding of epistemological growth in students.

2. There are more esoteric Affirmative and Negative Kritiks that might question the idea of “solving” or even calculating “harm”, but those arguments rely on this structure.

3. See her thesis to understand how she troubles the term “Project” (Dillard-Knox, 2014, Pg 37).

4. Berkeley MS qualified to the NDT 4 times and were on the Copeland Panel multiple times. They received multiple prestigious Round Robin invitations, were in deep elimination rounds of every major national tournament, and Violet Spurlock claimed Top Speaker at the NDT.

5. The 3-Tier Process Method has been covered extensively in the work of Director Dillard-Knox in her thesis (2014) and the dissertation of Dr. Reid-Brinkley (2008)

6. Tommy Weddington, coach at Rochester, provided me with the line of thinking about self-selection at the 2019 Yale Open.

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Policy Debate Training:
A Technique to Enrich Political Discourse in The United States

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In their recent New York Times essay, Jonathan Ellis & Francesca Hovagimian declare that policy debate training is not “good for our politics.” There are many elements of policy debate training that occur outside of the actual competition ignored by Ellis & Hovagimian in their critique of the activity. Their criticism ignores policy debate’s ability to teach students to interrogate facts, develop community building skills, and in many cases spark a life-long passion for policy issues. Essential component of robust political discourse are the capacities of formulate sophisticated argument strategies and forcefully debate them in a competitive environment. These talents are forged by rigorous policy debate training. In short, policy debate is a complex argumentative community which effectively trains students to positively contribute to public life.

INTRODUCTION

In October 2019, Jonathan Ellis and Francesca Hovagimian’s New York Times editorial article posed the often-asked question, “Are Debate Competitions Bad for US Political Discourse?” Opinion articles such as this one circulate in a larger genre many argumentation scholars refer to as “Quit Lit.” Their essay introduces problems with scholastic, competitive debate tournaments. Our essay offers a rebuttal to their article and a defense of policy debate competitions. We regard debate competitions to be a perpetual and dynamic process of social construction, maintenance, and change, rather than an isolated product of one or a few tournament speech presentations. We argue Ellis and Hovagimian’s critique captures only a snapshot of tournament competition which misses three valuable parts of scholastic policy debate: fact interrogation, community building, and development of life-long passions. These three benefits demonstrate scholastic intercollegiate debate is good for United States political deliberation, as well as individuals’ intellectual growth and development.

FACT INTERROGATION

In the current political moment, one of policy debate’s greatest benefits is allowing students the opportunity to participate in repeated, research-intensive exercises to learn how to build arguments supported by evidence. It is well known that we are already in a “post-truth” era in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief.*1 In a fact-free world, teaching young students to debate using a switch-side debating format is essential to protect democratic principles and teach younger generations how to evaluate evidence in important public controversies. There are in many contexts important operating principles, which function as facts which allow for a robust discussion of public policy matters. In this section we defend policy debate’s immense value
as research driven, evidence-based policy debate against Ellis and Hovagimian’s accusation that “school debate” is merely technique driven rhetoric.

First, because of the research intensity, switch-side policy debate teaches students how to evaluate evidence in public controversies. As Star Muir (1993) explains, switch-side debate is not simply a matter of speaking persuasively or organizing ideas clearly (although it does involve these), but of understanding and mobilizing arguments to make an effective case. Proponents of debating both sides observe that the debaters should prepare the best possible case they can, given the facts and information available to them.*2 This process, at its core, involves critical assessment and evaluation of arguments.*3 Similarly, O’Donnell et. al (2010) argue policy debate teaches analytical skills, whereby students practice identifying errors in reasoning and proof, recognizing inconsistencies in arguments, assessing the credibility of sources, challenging assumptions, and prioritizing the salience of points. Policy debate encourages debaters and judges to arrive at conclusions based on a careful examination of fact and reason.

Second, switch side policy debate teaches students how to evaluate the best policy options in a public controversy. The guiding debate topic example in Ellis and Hovagimian’s article was the proposition “recreational drug use should be legalized.” Policy debate does not teach students to necessarily approach that topic as a yes/no question. As debaters analyze the potential affirmative cases and the potential negative cases, including the possibility of negative counter plans, they begin to realize the complexity of most contemporary problems. They learn not only that most problems of contemporary affairs have more than one side, but also that even one side of a proposition embodies a considerable range of values. A student slated “against” the recreational drug legalization topic may advocate a counter proposal for how to best achieve legalizing recreational drugs. In this case, both teams find themselves largely in agreement about the controversy/topic and that action must be taken to depart from the status quo, but disagree on the best research method, framework, philosophy or policy to address to address a common public problem. Thus, switch side policy debate gives students opportunities to offer justifications for one’s own views and actions, but also to listen to criticisms, objections, and the justificatory reasons that can be given in favor of alternative proposals.*4

Third, switch side policy debate teaches students skills to find the best available research to use in a debate about a timely, public controversy. Interscholastic policy debate coaches often teach middle and high school students how to use library e-databases such as Lexis Nexis, ProQuest, and JSTOR to find academic articles and law reviews to help support their arguments, whereas the average American does not learn how to use these databases until they are enrolled in college. Policy debate coaches encourage their students to read scholarly, academic journal articles and philosophy books at a young age to help prepare for upcoming debate competitions. Policy debaters are also taught how to conduct efficient internet searches with specialized advance search tools including tilde operators, minus operators, searching by recency, and more.

One of Ellis and Hovagimian’s critiques is that “school debate” rewards biased reasoning. In this section, we argue policy debate does quite the opposite: it is evidence-based and rewards critical thinking, empathy, and self-reflection. First, one unique aspect of policy debate is that students must research a broad problem area for an entire season, which means students are engaged in research for several months and learn to deeply interrogate a question over time. The year-long interrogation of a topic area is a particularly distinctive approach to learning in the current moment. All too often in the Age of Twitter, people move quickly from controversy to controversy developing intellectual breadth at the expense of depth of understanding. Beyond tournament competition, students meet in classrooms during or after school for debate team meetings. Team meetings are places and times when students can sharpen both research and critical thinking skills by working with coaches and teammates to prepare strategies for many dimensions of a broad research question.

Instead of rewarding bias, team meetings often involve students learning new perspectives from other team members and coaches who approach the debate topic from different frames
of reference. Esberg and Sagan’s (2012) research explains that although students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized speech and debate exercises force students to challenge their own assumptions about how governments behave and how their own government works.*5 Policy debate thus allows students a forum to actively research their government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others. Facts can change quickly in our current political moment, but policy debate teaches students how to contextualize and act on information. Even if a student has a bias towards a particular political party or mode of reasoning at the first meeting, repeated team meetings over the course of a season encourages open-mindedness by helping them to appreciate the complexities involved in policy dilemmas and normalizing that students are allowed to change their opinions after learning new information.*6 Effective squad meetings are inclusive moments where students listen to potential strengths and weaknesses of strategies that could be deployed in debates. The component of the policy debate experience is one ignored by Ellis and Hovagimian in their critique of our activity.

Another critiques in Ellis and Hovagimian’s article is that “school debate” discourages listening and reasoning in favor of learning to pounce on something the opponent said and use that to win. In this section, we argue debate teaches students how to converse and deliberate with those whom they disagree. First, students know that in order to be successful, they must listen to their partner, their opponents, and a judge. Students are evaluated by judges in large part based on how responsive they are to the claims made by the opponents. If a student does not carefully listen to all the opponent’s claims, actively take notes during the opponent speeches, and make direct responses in their later speeches, the conversation about the proposition being debated will not advance and they are also likely to lose the debate. In this respect, there are many reasons to listen to the opponent with whom they disagree and understand their reasoning. Since there is a judge, students must take care to learn how to deliberate with those they disagree (the opponents), but also with a neutral or undecided judge.

Rather than discourage listening, there is more evidence suggesting switch side policy debating is critical for students to develop empathy for their opponents’ position. Since debaters are forced to switch sides, they go into each debate knowing that a non-personal mindset will be necessary at some point because they will inevitably be forced to argue against their own convictions.*7 Students realize that they must listen and understand their opponent’s arguments well enough to become advocates on behalf of them in future debates.*8 Knowing that over the course of any given tournament students will inevitably debate both sides of the same resolution inculcates a deep-seated attitude of tolerance and empathy toward differing points of view. If students only debated one side of a topic, that style of debate would lead to an ego-identification with that side and the closemindedness the Ellis and Hovagimian critique.*9 If only debating one side, any other sides in contrast are seen only as something to be discredited. Thus, Ellis and Hovagimian’s critique of policy debate as it exists today is inaccurate.

Furthermore, we believe switch side debate promotes self-reflective thought and anti-dogmatism. The switch side format means that sometimes students have to be on a side they do not personally agree with, but also that they learn that investigating the other position is a way to explore one’s personal view.*10 To argue from opposing points of view not only helps to identify weakness and limitations in one’s own position, but also helps with the development of self-reflective thought. Students transition from holding fixed, static ideas to an attitude of doubt and questioning engendered by exposure to alternative views in social discourse.*11 Clinging to the certainty of one’s beliefs risks dogmatism, rigidity, and the inability to learn from new experiences. Keller et. al (2001) found that participation in a debate stimulates clarification and critical evaluation of the evidence, logic, and values underlying one’s own policy position.

No matter which side a policy debater is currently debating at a tournament in real-time, debaters know that they have to be prepared to
switch for their next debate. Flexibility to switch requires the process of self-examination by which one at various moments rethink and revises one’s views in light of encounters with new arguments and new considerations by one’s fellow deliberators.*12 Further, it imposes an obligation to continue to test their own views, seeking forums in which the views can be challenged, and keeping open the possibility of their revision or even rejection. Without switching, Talisse (2005) explains, polarization occurs. If we do not engage opposing views, but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point.*13 In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogenous arguments pools.*14 In the next section we develop how these heterogenous argument pools have another benefit as well: building community.

COMMUNITY BUILDING

A tournament competition is one performance or a few isolated performances, but being part of a team that competes in tournament competitions is a life experience. Ellis and Hovagimian focus on critiquing individuals, but forget that those individuals are, in many cases, part of a larger squad. Much like in team sports, there is a significant amount of time spent working on skills besides the debate tournament competition. During the entire school year, before, and after tournament competition students continue working on debating skills. Therefore, the snapshot presented in Ellis and Hovagimian’s critique is not an accurate representation of being part of a debate team. In this section we argue one of the benefits of policy debate is community building. Policy debate training teaches students valuable important social skills and teamwork skills.

First, policy debate teaches students important social skills. Students can make friends with students from other schools at summer debate workshops and tournament competition. Students also form bonds with students from their own school in team meetings and practices. Over time, debaters begin to consciously become part of a community and team. The friendships students develop are not on display at all times at any given tournament performance. Debate encourages students to meet new people each weekend, practice making small talk, find common ground and interests, and talk about their opinions and research on the pressing policy issues of our time. When debaters feel part of a team, they are more likely to feel appreciated and derive intangible benefits such as feelings of self-worth, happiness, and contentment. This provides young students stimulation, a sense of achievement, and intellectual learning. Because of the win-loss nature of policy debate, much like sports, students also celebrate together as a team when the team performs well over the course of a season. The social aspects of policy debate are one of the top reasons many policy debate programs both retain students each year and attract newcomers to the activity.

Second, policy debate teaches students important teamwork skills. Student competing in policy debate have a partner who they compete with at a tournament. Students also work in research teams amongst their own squad prior to a competition. Joining together, speaking in front of a group, listening to others in a research group, and collaborating on academic research are regular parts of the teamwork necessary to win policy debate competitions. Students are taught at an early age the importance of deadlines, responsibility, and accountability to complete assigned work and contribute to the team research effort. Eijkman’s research (2012) demonstrates that policy debate research and practice debates have the power to stimulate creativity, and is one of the most engaging and liberating ways for making group work productive, challenging and enjoyable. Once students begin to develop social and teamwork skills, policy debate also helps them develop important insights as a team about how to deliberate with others. Students on each team must work together to build and refine arguments that compellingly asserts their position on policy issues confronting the world.*15 As a team, they gain greater insight into the real-world legal dilemmas faced by policy makers.*16 As they work with other members of their team, they realize the complexities of applying and implementing laws.*17 Dickson (2004) reports students enjoy this element of debating in school, especially as part of a team effort, and they feel
empowered by becoming knowledgeable on a subject that the outside world has been debating as well. Students feel grown-up, discussing issues their parents and legislators might discuss and knowing that they are conversant on the subject.*18 In the next section, we discuss how the communities debaters are building do not end at the competition, but rather extend to their cities and life’s work.

DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE LONG PASSIONS

In addition to debate’s value as it pertains to community building and fact interrogation, scholastic and intercollegiate debate is immensely valuable towards the development of one’s life-long passions. Ellis and Hovagimian’s critique ignores the turn to civic engagement that has taken place in the policy debate community over the course of the last twenty-five years. In this section, we develop the ways basic argumentation skills are taught by policy debaters to middle schoolers and students who attend high school in less affluent communities. We also consider policy debate's function in training students in the modern world and professional occupations.

First, some schools in the United States now offer speech and debate as an elective class or after school program for middle schoolers. According to research from Bauschard and Rao (2015), middle school students who participate in speech and debate gain numerous public speaking and argumentation skills. Through learning these skills, they also develop many other academic skills and have the opportunity to grow as individuals as they develop from children into adults.*19 There is a growing body of research that demonstrates participation in debating competition promotes a host of fundamental skills that lead to academic and personal success.*20 Teaching middle school students policy debate offers students the opportunity at a very early age to address multiple sides of a topic, which helps them to develop empathy and understand the perspective of others. Research produced by Rogers (2002, 2005) indicates there is evidence that the switch side format of debating helps young debaters become more socially tolerant.*21

Second, over the last twenty-five years in the United States, the debate community has encouraged the creation and expansion of debate opportunities in urban areas, often called urban debate leagues. To take only a snapshot of tournament competition as the basis for evaluation of the activity, the way Ellis & Hovagimian do, does not capture the influence of urban debate leagues to provide academic enrichment and extracurricular programming across under-resourced high school students. To assess the impact of the Chicago Urban Debate League, academic researchers Mezuk et. al (2011) applied statistical analysis to compare debaters to similar students who did not participate in debate. Mezuk et. al (2011) found that students who participated in the Chicago Debate League were “significantly more likely” to graduate from high school than comparable non-debaters. Debating in the Chicago Debate League led to gains in grade-point average every semester a student continued to debate.*22 In contrast, GPA remained flat overall for high school students not involved in debate.*23 After adjusting for demographic and risk variables, debaters in every risk group were more likely than non-debaters to reach the college-readiness benchmark on the English, Reading, and Science sections of the ACT.*24 Similarly, the New York Urban Debate League also shows tremendous value for at-risk students. Winkler’s research (2011) demonstrates after-school debate programs often focus on oral reading activities and competitions against other students from other schools. In New York, these programs successfully provide below-grade-level readers a low-risk way to improve vocabulary, increase fluency, and enhance reading comprehension.*25 Bellon’s (2000) research from the Atlanta Urban Debate League similarly documents a connection between debate participation and decreased violence in turning previous gang members into cooperative students. These three urban debate leagues are only a sample of many in the fantastic work of urban debate leagues across the country. We would be remiss if we didn’t point out that work in Urban Debate programs adds to the development and personal growth of the many Intercollegiate debaters across the country who contribute to the programs.
Third, debate offers many benefits long after high school is over and individuals enroll in college, graduate school, and begin their professional careers or “life’s work.” For instance, Xu (2018) explained on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) graduate school website that policy debate helped her prepare for graduate school and a career in computer science. She believes the research skills she learned initially from policy debate helped prepare her to do advanced computer science research and literature reviews today in graduate school.*26 She also explains the argument organization skills she learned from debate helps her organize pro-STEM education and funding arguments in her grant proposals today and anticipate common counter arguments.*27 Lastly, the experience of losing debates and hearing judge feedback helped prepare her for manuscript and conference rejections and how to improve her arguments to revise them.*28

In addition to preparing students to excel at college and graduate school, policy debate trains to prepare students for civic engagement in the modern world. One prominent example is the 2008 Water Wars Debates hosted at the US Environment Protection Agency. These policy debates were a product of U.S. government agencies collaborating with outside scholars to untangle disparate threads of knotty technoscientific issues, in part by integrating structured debating exercises into institutional decision-making processes such as intelligence assessment and public policy planning.*29 The tournament style competition featured college policy debaters from a variety of universities such as Wake Forest University, Michigan State University, and the University of Mary Washington. After the policy debates were over, the EPA reported arguments from the debates contributed positively to internal EPA deliberation on a variety of science and environment issues.*30

Gordon Mitchell (2010) explains the success of these debates on EPA deliberation were not because of the “rhetoric” and “delivery” type of techniques that Ellis and Hovagimian suggest, but rather because of classical Greece rhetorical concept dissoi logoi, or pulling apart complex questions by debating two sides of an issue. In short, dissoi logoi was Protagoras’ principle that two accounts (logoi) are present about every “thing,” opposed to each other, and humans can “measure” the relative soundness of knowledge claims by engaging in give-and-take where parties would make the “weaker argument stronger” to activate the generative aspect of rhetorical practice, a key element of the Sophistical tradition.*31 Building on Protagoras, Isocrates incorporated the Protagorean dissoi logoi into synerchesthe, a broader concept that he used flexibly to express interlocking senses of inquiry, as in groups convening to search for answers to common questions through discussion; deliberation, with interlocutors gathering in a political setting to deliberate about proposed courses of action; and alliance formation, the exchange of pledges that deepen social ties.*32 Mitchell (2010) explains the policy debates at the EPA succeeded because they were a perfect example of these rhetorical techniques such as deliberative alliance building, the performative task of coming together deliberately for the purpose of joint inquiry, collective choice-making, and renewal of communicative bonds.

Lastly, although Ellis and Hovagimian spend the bulk of their article discussing how debate trains future politicians, one of the more likely career paths for former debaters is the legal field. Many policy debate skills easily translate to those with aspirations of attending law school and becoming a lawyer. Intercollegiate policy debate coach John Katsulas (2000) explains the major areas policy debate can help future lawyers excel are: critical thinking to quickly understand arguments, coming to grips with opponents’ arguments and forecasting how the judge might evaluate both positions.*33 Further, a survey directed to 82 prominent lawyers who were former debaters asking about the benefits of collegiate debating revealed strong support for the belief that debate taught them skills in oral advocacy, critical thinking, brief writing, research, and listening.*34 Acquiring research skills was ranked as the second greatest benefit of debate participation by those surveyed.*35
CONCLUSION

To review, when considering Ellis and Hovagimian’s question “Are Debate Competitions Bad for US Political Discourse?” we answered with a resounding “No!” Their critique misses the mark on some of the most valuable aspects of debate that cannot be observed by using only a few school debate tournament competition speeches as an example. Rather, policy debate’s enduring value must be evaluated as a process, over time. Our research here is not an exhaustive or comprehensive discussion and we welcome further research on the subject. Our preliminary conclusions are that participation in scholastic and especially policy debate has tremendous benefits for fact interrogation, community building, and the development of life-long passions. Policy debate is a complex argumentative community which effectively trains students to positively contribute to United States political discourse on issues of public concern and to make meaningful changes in their communities.

NOTES


*23. Mezuk et. al., 2011, 622-635.

*24. Mezuk et. al., 2011, 622-635.


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Qualities of a Good Debater in the Ancient Indian Argumentation Theory

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The fundamental theory of argumentation in India was developed by the Nyāya school and Buddhists. Although some authors have elucidated the logic employed in a debate, few studies have focused on practical aspects, that is, the role of debate and the participants’ qualities. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the conflict between Naiyāyikas and Buddhists, and to ascertain the content behind the term “four components” (caturāṅga) through examining contexts in which the terms regarding the argumentation appear within philosophical literature. In conclusion, I attempt to show that 1) the Indian argumentation theory is closely related to education, 2) Naiyāyikas reconstruct their theory to avoid criticism from Buddhists, and 3) over time, the qualities of proponent and opponent are mentioned very little because their suitability depends on the validity of inference; the qualities of judges, however, is mentioned much more because their excellence is indispensable in a hostile debate.

1. INTRODUCTION

In ancient India, the argumentation theory was developed by philosophical schools such as Nyāya, Buddhism, and Jainism. These philosophers discussed many topics regarding argumentation theory: types of debate, method of proof, rules of defeat, and sophistry. Although there are so many resources that inform us about argumentation theory in ancient India, previous researchers have often paid attention to only the aspect of logic, for example, inference (anumāna) and the (pseudo-)component (avayavāḥ) such as a proposition (pratijñā), a reason (hetu), and an example (drṣṭānta).

Logic is a crucial factor in a debate. In practical, moral, and ethical contexts, it is also important to examine what is the ideal debate style and what kind of person should participate in the debate. Some previous studies examined the role of the members participating in the debate (Vidyabhusana 1921; Solomon 1976; Kobayashi 2009; Ono 2011; and so on). In particular, Solomon 1976 is a monumental and immortal work dealing with Indian argumentation theory from various perspectives. However, new manuscripts and editions on the Indian logic or argumentation have been published. Therefore, we should reexamine prior research.

So far, I have edited and translated the argumentation theory chapter of the Nyāyamañjarī composed by Bhaṭṭajayanta (ca. 9-10c), Kashmiri poet and a philosopher belonging to the Brahmanical Nyāya (logic) school. By investigating the classical Sanskrit philosophical literature concerning the argumentation theory, I examined not only the logical aspect, but also the practical aspect of the debate. This kind of literature concretely describes some scenes that employ the debate and refer to its technical terms: proponent, opponent, judges, and so on.

This paper examines the context in which the terms related to the debate appears within Indian classical and philosophical works of literature. Through examination, I try to make it clear what kinds of qualities are demanded of a good debater (strictly, the participants of the debate).

2. LEARNING, TEACHING, AND DEBATING: THE ROLE OF DEBATE IN INDIA

Caraakasamhītā (ca. 200-300 B.C., CS), the text of “Science of Life,” speaks of three ways to obtain the knowledge: learning (adhyayana), teaching (adhyaśana), and debating with persons learned in that area of the knowledge.
Debate played an important role in education in ancient India. Additionally, it is well known that the Buddhist style of the debate was introduced into Tibet, China, Korea, and Japan, and has been inherited as 法会 (houte) or 論議 (rongi). In this way, these debates have been mainly conducted for educational and religious purposes in Asia.

3. TYPES OF DEBATE

As already shown in previous studies, the tradition of debate in India has a long history. We know some famous old types of debates, such as “brahmodya” in the Upaniṣads and “a scholarly or royal debate” described in the Milinda-Pañha. In another context, Dharmashastras, the treatises of law/customs (dharma), include a chapter on the legal procedure (Vyāvahāra). Some important technical terms in the debate appear there. Therefore, we could compare the similarity/difference of the character of debate between the judicial case and philosophical case regarding terminology.

In the philosophical context, almost all schools accept these two types of debate: 1) debate for those who are free from passion or wish for the truth (vitarāgakathā/tattvatvabhubhutsakathā) and 2) debate for those who desire their own victory (vijīgisukathā). A similar classification appeared already in Carakasamhita: friendly debate (samdhāyasambhāsa) and hostile debate (vigṛhyasambhāsa). Between them, “Naiyāyi-kas,” those who are following Nyāyasūtra, name the former “discussion” (vāda), and the latter “disputation” (jalpa) or “wrangling” (vitandā). Nyāyasūtra says this about members who engage in the former type of debate:

The friendly discussion is carried on with the pupil, the preceptor, the companion, an excellent person, and those who desire the bliss. [All of them] are apart from envy.

Later, Naiyāyiika Bhāsarvajña (ca. 10c) classified the fruits of debate into three terms regarding the proponent’s amount of knowledge. Generally, this type of debate brings out debaters some merits.

Opposingly, the latter, that is, a hostile debate, is explained below:

For protecting their own determination of the truth, [people] employ disputation (jalpa) and wrangling (vitandā). It is like for protecting sprouting seeds, [people] cover [them] with the hedge of thorns.

According to Naiyāyikas, in futile debate (disputation (jalpa) and wrangling (vitandā)), the debater could be allowed to use sophisticated arguments, for example, “distortion” (chala) and “false rejoinder” (jāti), and to defeat opponent by indicating “conditions of defeat” (nigrahasthāna).

Interestingly, in the Buddhist argumentation tradition, they generally admit only “vāda.” Some Buddhists such as Asanga (ca. 4c), classify “vāda” into six parts, including “disputation” (vivāda). Dharmakīrti (600-660 A.D.), one of the most influential and magnificent philosophers in medieval India, also admits just only [friendly] discussion (vāda) without any sub-categorization. For Dharmakīrti, the discussion is conducted by good people (satām vādaḥ). This contrast between Naiyāyikas and Buddhists reflects the difference in their attitude toward the debate; that is, for Dharmakīrti, the debate should be always a friendly debate for another’s welfare, and there should never be any sophistry or malicious arguments in this system of debate.

Naiyāyikas, however, do not intend to permit the use of “distortions and false rejoinders and conditions of defeat” (chalajātiningrāhasthāna) for cheating one another. As mentioned above, it is for protecting their determination of the truth against a foe. Accordingly, Bhaṭṭajayanta
justified usage of these techniques, by vividly describing hostile debate:

If an ignoble person comes from elsewhere to a teacher, who sits comfortably in a certain hermitage, revered by many pupils, teaches the secret truth, and is composed in mind, and then he (= the ignoble person) says with the stammering voice - 'Oh, poor man, what is told? Um ... I get it. This science named ‘logic’ is loved by a simple-minded person. There is no relation among the Vedas, authority, the knowledge of the truth about ātmā, and the emancipation,' and laughs slowly. And after that, he captures and confuses the deer (= the pupils) ... And if the teacher ignores him and does not blame him and does not put an end to him by using even cheating skills, although he cannot remember the proper demonstration, then after the [ignoble person] leaves, the pupils would stand up and say – ‘Ah, We are humiliated at the wrong place. Our teacher renowned Nyāya scholar was defeated by another sage coming today.’ Hearing these words, Other people also will become not to be able to believe the right path [taught by the teacher] and not to follow him immediately. Therefore, the garrulous guy should be led to the insuperable defeated situation [by using the cheating skills].”

Such descriptions of debate are rare in philosophical literature. During the medieval period in India, there were fewer sources that objectively described the real situation of the debates, although there has been a lot of discussion about inference employed in a debate. Exceptionally, Asaṅga presents the classification of debate spaces: in the royal residence (rājakula), in the residence of government servants (yukta kula), before the companion (sahāya), before the head of a trade (prāmāṇika), before the ascetics and Brahmins skilled in the dharma and meaning (dharma rāthakusalāḥ śravana brāhma nāḥ).”

4. THE QUALITIES AND DEEDS OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE DEBATE

According to classical texts like Carakasamhitā and Nyāyasūtra, we know that there are some participants other than the proponent and opponent. Now, I examine how Indian philosophers define the members of the debate, and I describe their qualities and deeds.

4.1 “Four components” (caturāṅga)

Some Jain literature, such as Pramāṇamāṁśa and Pramāṇaṇayatavālokālaśīkā, lists “four components” (caturāṅga): “proponent” (vādin), “opponent” (prativādin), “those who are in the assembly/ judges” (sabhāyāḥ, prāśīnīkāḥ, sadasya, pariṣad), and “the president of the assembly” (sabhāpāti).” As a similar case, Tārātikaraśā, later Naiyāyika’s work, proposes the proper procedure of debate as having “six components” (sadoṅga), and it refers to others’ “four-fold,” which corresponds to the items of “four components.” As examined below, although they were not clearly defined in ancient times, these concepts are common among the argumentation theories.

4.1.1. Proponent and Opponent

Carakasamhitā lists the qualities of not only proficient pupils or teachers but also suitable debaters:

The congenial debate takes place when the other party is possessed of learning, specialized knowledge, capacity to discuss, is not easily irritable, is one whose learning is not bombastic, is not malicious, can be reasonably persuaded, that is to say, is not dogmatic in views, is well-versed in the art of persuasion, is tenacious and fond of discussion … The merits considered good in a debater or disputor are learning, specialized knowledge, retentive grasp, genius, and eloquence. His demerits are irritability, lack of proficiency, shyness or timidity, lack of retention of the grasp or of retentive grasp, and inattentiveness.”

As mentioned above, Carakasamhitā lists in detail the characteristics that an ideal debater should possess. On the contrary, Naiyāyikas do not say much about the qualities of a good debater. This is probably because they systemize “conditions of defeat” (nigrahaśthāna) and then, it becomes the basis of whether the debater is
good or bad. Namely, old Naiyāyikas examine the faults of debaters rather than their virtues. A similar case could be seen in the inference field. That is, the Nyāyasūtra lists pseudo-reasons (hetvābhāsa) as one of their sixteen primary topics and it directly does not lists sound reason (hetu). 23

It is interesting that Buddhist Asaṅga refers to the qualities of debaters in detail as six-fold “ornaments of debate” (vādālanākāra): “knowledge of one’s own and another’s doctrine” (svaparasamayajñātā), “accomplishment of speech [that is non-vulgar, non-rustic, easy, energetic, coherent, and significant] composition [that is not confused, not violent, understandable, proper length, cogent, well-timed, to the point, clear, and continuous]” (vākkaraṇasampat), “confidence [in any kind of assemblies]” (vaiśāradyam), “uninterrupted flow of statements” (pratibhāhānā), “steadfastness” (sthairyan), an “kindness” (dāśśhyam). 24 In terms of virtuous speech in conversation, in the Mahābhārata, the most famous Sanskrit epic of ancient India, there is also enumeration of the qualities and blemishes of speech. According to Tirpathi 2006:152ff, these qualities and blemishes could be compared to Marcus Tullius Cicero’s theory. 25

Also in the Nyāya tradition, Udayana (ca. 1050-1100), a late Naiyāyika and the reformer of the Nyāya theory, constructed the secret maxim (rahasya) for becoming a good debater by reversing the “conditions of defeat.” 26 This is probably the first time that Naiyāyikas systematized the qualities of a good debater. Moreover, Udayana distributes all of the twenty-two “conditions of defeat” among four categories: “what never happens” (asambhāvaniyam eva), “what could happen but was never indicated” (samabhavad api anubhāvya eva), “what should be indicated” (udbhāvyamātaram), and “what belongs to the end of the debate” (kathāvasāṅkikam). 27 Udayana’s reconstruction was probably forced from the need to react against the Buddhists, such as Dharmakīrti, who reasonably justified the vāda and eliminated the Naiyāyikas’ conditions of defeat. 28

4.1.2. Judges and a President

4.1.2.1. The historical development of concept “judge” in the Nyāya tradition

The judges are called various Sanskrit terms in philosophical literature. In the old period, the term pariṣad, literally “those who are sitting around,” is frequently used as members other than proponent and opponent. As shown in Katsura 2000, Carakarasamhitā teaches that, in order to win, the debater should know a lot about the opponent and the audience (pariṣad). 29 In Nyāyasūtra, the same term appeared twice in the definitions of two “conditions of defeat”: “unintelligibility for the audience and the opponent” (avijñātārthā), “impossibility to repeat another proposition understood by the audience, and repeated three times” (anamabhāśanam). 30 In this context, pariṣad does not necessarily mean “judges” but just “audience.”

Vātsyāyana (ca. 4c), a commentator on Nyāyasūtra, expands the role of pariṣad. According to him, they should indicate a debater’s fault overlooked by another when asked “who is defeated?” 31

Uddyotakara (ca. 5c), a commentator on the work of Vātsyāyana, hardly uses the term pariṣad; instead, he uses prāśnika, which literally means “an inquirer.” The usages are concentrated in the context of his criticism of Buddhist’s definition of debate, that is, “convincing a head person [in the assembly]” (adhitkaranapratyāyaṇa). Accordingly, the term could be introduced by Buddhists into the philosophical debate. Considering this point, it is interesting that in the Nyāyapravesaka, composed by the Buddhist Śaṅkarasvāmin (ca. 500-560), the demonstration is defined as the method of making an uncomprehended thing clear for judges (prāśnika). In this context, the judges has an important role as an arbiter who finally decides who will win or lose the debate. 32 The final position of Uddyotakara is that judges are necessary for hostile debate conducted by those who seek profit, honor, and fame, but they are not necessary in friendly debate between a preceptor and a pupil. 33 Here, we can see the transition from “audience” to “judge.”

Vācaspatimiśra (ca. 10c), a commentator on the work of Uddyotakara, also shares Uddyotakara’s concept. He says that “in the friendly debate, the judges are needless to be employed but would not be excluded when they come by chance.” 34 Moreover, he describes another role of the judges (prāśnika). The debater should know the cheating skills for indicating them used by a foe when asked by the judges belonging to assembly (sabhyāḥ) - “what kind of cheating is this?” 35

In the Nyāya tradition, the primitive concept of “four components” appears in Bhaṭṭajayanta’s Nyāyamaṇjarī. He refers to two distinct judges:
1) the president (sabhāpati) or a chief judge (prāhīvīkā) and 2) the judges appointed by the president (sabhāpatinyuktaḥ prāšnikāḥ). It tells that there are two types of judges in a debate.\(^{36}\) Bhāṣarvajña, probably contemporary to Jayanta, directly argues that “the four components are proponent, opponent, president, and inquirers.”\(^{37}\) As far as I know, he is the first Naiyāyika who refers to four components. Therefore, Udayana introduces two terms, anuvidheya and stheya, corresponding to both “a president” and “judges.”\(^{38}\) Later Naiyāyikas, (for example, Varadarāja (1150 A.D.) and Śāṅkaramiśra (1430 A.D.)) seem to follow his terminology.\(^{39}\) According to their explanations, anuvidheya is such as “a king” (rāja) who procure honor for either debater, and stheya are impartial persons free from passion. As with Vācaśpatimsirā, they say that both judges are unnecessary in friendly debate because both debaters wishing the truth never long for any honor and definitely possess all the qualities which judges have.\(^{40}\)

Some terms, like sabhā, sabhyāḥ and prāṅivēka, often appear in judicial literature, such as Manusmrīty and Kātyāyanasmrī. Therefore, it is assumed that at some point the terminology of “judge” would be introduced from the judicial theory into the Nyāya or Indian argumentation theory.

4.1.2.2. The Qualities and Deeds of Judges and the President

The qualities and deeds of judges and the president are concretely described in Nyāya, Vedānta, and Jain literature. These descriptions about their deeds basically seem to depend on the Udayana’s definition:

The business of anuvidheya is to indicate both respect and disrespect according to the ability and the rules. ... The business of stheya-s are 1) to determine the particular procedure and style of the debate, 2) to specify the order of both debaters, 3) to ascertain their merits and demerits, 4) to awake his defeat to either debater, and 5) to explain the result of the finished debate to people.\(^{41}\)

Late Naiyāyikas such as Varadarāja and Jains, such as Vādidevasūri explain their deeds almost in the same way.

Moreover, Varadarāja and Vādidevasūri describe the qualities in detail.

Judges:

Judges (sadasyāḥ) should be approved as those who are accepted by both proponent and opponent, and versed in the essence of their doctrines, free from passion and hatred, conversant with understanding, remembering, and explaining what is said by others. The number of them should be uneven and at least three.\(^{42}\) (Varadarāja’s Tārikarakṣāsārasamgraha)

Judges (sabhāḥ) are approved by both proponent and opponent as those who are familiar with the truth of their doctrines, having a good memory, erudite, bright, patient, and impartial.\(^{43}\) (Vādidevasūri’s Pramāṇanayatattvālokālakāra)

The president:

The president should be approved as those who are accepted by proponent, opponent, and judges, and free from passion and so on, and properly judging their defeat and non-defeat.\(^{44}\) (Varadarāja’s Tārikarakṣāsārasamgraha)

The president is endowed with intelligence, authority, lordliness, patience, and impartiality.\(^{45}\) (Vādidevasūri’s Pramāṇanayatattvālokālakāra)

As defined above, Judges in a debate, especially a hostile debate, require impartiality, cleverness, and greatness. As another example, Madhva (1238-1317 A.D.), a famous Brahmanical philosopher belonging to the Dvaita (dualism) school of Vedānta, also describes the qualities of judges as below:

The uneven judges or one judge should be known as those who are apart from passion and hatred, and proficient in all sciences. When there is only one judge, he should be known as a person who completely removes doubts, lacks doubts, is highly intelligent, and free from all faults. Whether only one or many, judges should be devoted to Bhakti for Viṣṇu. This is because Bhakti for Viṣṇu is the nature of all virtuous people.\(^{46}\)

It is interesting that judges are characterized by the Bhakti (devotion or love) for the God Viṣṇu
as reflected by their theological background. Indeed, in the Indian philosophical context, the topics of debate are mainly religious dogmatic subjects such as the existence of omniscient or God, the eternity of *Veda*, and so on.

4.1.3. Other Roles in the Debate
In Tārkikakarśa, Varadarāja lists another member, i.e., a clerk (lekhaka). This role is also mentioned in Nyāyasudhā on Anuvyākhyaṇa on *Brahmasūtra, Vedānta* literature, which refers to the system of argumentation. However, in this paper, I could not analyze other schools’ literature in detail. Further consideration will be needed to yield any findings about this topic of enumerating the roles in debate, as well as their qualities and deeds in other schools’ works.

5. CONCLUSION
This paper has examined the context in which the concepts of debate appear in philosophical Sanskrit literature. First, the role and types of debates in ancient India were briefly sketched in relation to education. Then, it discussed the difference in the classifications of the debate between Buddhists and Naiyāyikas. This conflict prompts Naiyāyikas to reconstruct their traditional argumentation theory, as represented by Udayana’s *maxim and distribution of the “conditions of defeat.” Concerning the qualities of the proponent and opponent, some ancient literature, like the Carakasamhitā, Mahābhārata, and Abhidharmasamuccaya, provides concrete instances that show the virtues of a good debater. In the medieval period in India, Naiyāyikas’ literature mentions a little about it, but Buddhist Dharmakīrti adds some features to the friendly debate. This probably shows that the main concern about the argumentation theory moved from their practical aspects into an logical investigation of sound inference, correct reason, or logical fallacies. The definitive basis of the judgment in a debate is syllogism in philosophical demonstrative discourse. The practical debate, nonetheless, should be conducted over the ages. Other schools, such as Jain or Vedānta, developed their own argumentation theory based on the Naiyāyikas’ fundamental theory. As proof of that, they defined the number of components in debate and described the qualities of the judges in detail.

NOTES
* This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP20H00332.
*1. CS *Vidmānasthāṇa* 8.6. (p. 217).
*2. As far as I am aware, the same usage of this term *gurukula* are rarely seen in classical Sanskrit literatures.
*7. Ono 2011 examines “the six steps” (*sātpaksin, śaṭkotika*) argued by Naiyāyikas and Buddhists. Similar steps are mentioned in the legal procedure.
*10. NS 1.2.1-3. (pp. 39-41). Some Naiyāyikas had different classifications such Bhāsarvajñā and according to Vādivinoda, Sānatāti, Ratnakoṣa and so on. Carakasamhitā also has these three terms, whereas the meanings are different from Nyāyasūtra.
*12. NBh ad NSā (p. 21).
*14. NS 1.2.2. (p. 40).
*18. NM II (pp. 601-602). It is partially translated in Ono 2003a: 191*4.
*20. PM 2.30:xxx, SVR 8.10. (p. 1131).
*23. NS 1.1.1. (p. 2).
REFERENCES


NS Nyāyasūra: See. NBh.


Commodore M. C. Perry’s Expedition of an American Squadron to Japan, 1853 and 1854: A Case of “Nested Deliberation”

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Our georhetoric analysis of Commodore Perry’s Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan includes four-dimensions of argumentation ethnography of this new cultural encounters: intercultural encounter, information exchange, dialogical argumentation, and negotiation (Suzuki & Foreman-Takano 2004). The study looks at the beginnings of competition and cooperation, conflict and construction, borrowing and learning uniqueness between the United States and Japan. The complex dynamics of argument weave into place across time argumentation that comes to define and continue to entangle relations among nations. The case of Japan-US relation is one model; other initial encounters likely exhibit across dimension different outcomes and relations, and outcomes.

Commodore Matthew C. Perry’s Expedition of an American Squadron to Japan, 1853 and 1854 is a celebrated case of first formal encounters between nations. The American History of the Republic defines the event as an “opening” of Japan after its long night of withdrawal from international relations.

Japan had been closed for two centuries to all foreign intercourse, save a strictly regulated trade with the Dutch and Chinese at Nagasaki. Her government was feudal, her economy medieval—no factories, no steamships or steam engines, only small. Junks allowed to be built in order to keep the Japanese at home. Foreign sailors wrecked on the shores of Japan were not allowed to leave, and Japanese sailors wrecked on foreign coasts were not permitted to return. (Morrison, Commancher, Leuchtenburg, 1980, p. 575)

At a time when European nations were extending colonization practices globally, the United States, a rising power, and Japan, an ancient civilization experienced a different encounter. We explore its legacy of the historical event that initiated a unique relationship through a formal ethnography of nested deliberation.

The American-Japan exchange encounter created an East-West deliberative space that lead after two years to the Kanasaga treaty, a document initiating a line of human rights commitments. The US and Japan worked out reciprocal concerns and envisioning the means of most appropriate assuring trade. The visit is celebrated as initiating an overall productive formal relation among rising nations, peoples and cultures over two centuries. It represented a first meeting between an opening, new society, committed to democratic experiment, from the Western Hemisphere and an ancient society, committed to dynastic governance, and embedded in the domestic, Eastern cultural traditions. The encounter initiated at this first point of contact among government, people, and cultures has cast a long shadow over the Pacific frontier and world history.

Specifically, we propose a critical discourse ethnography that reads several prominent narratives of the time as they were constituted in argumentation. We take up Perry’s autobiography and several reports from the time. Our ethnography reconstructs ways of arguing between agents of power at an initial stage defining a nested deliberation. Nested deliberations are ongoing talks produced through acts of initiation, information assertion, gifts and exchange, time-capacitating dialogue, and self-
sustaining negotiation. In each dimension of deliberation, difference appears as an asset rather than a liability to immediate and long term talks. Our primary strategy in this paper is to examine selections from Commodore Perry’s diary and a contemporary observation on the scene of discussion. The paper is not a definitive inquiry but an initiating ethnography of historical argument. Historical argument is that reasoning which shapes public memory. Herodotus and Thucydides began the tradition of analyze speech and events to reveal the consequences of actions. Neo-classical and modern historians continue to inquiry into discourse and events. Our analysis works within these traditions to show how communication among nations is achieved, but how its ambiguities create ambivalence that may turn around relationships.

Our analysis of Commodore Perry’s Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan includes four-dimensions of argumentation ethnography: appraisal of appearances in initial impression, information exchange, dialogical argumentation, and negotiation (Suzuki & Foreman-Takano 2004). The study looks at the beginnings of competition and cooperation, conflict and construction, borrowing and learning, and initiating the process of bridging differences between the United States and Japan. The complex dynamics of argument weave into place across time communication among state leaders, political parties, institutional actors, military institutions, market dynamics and publics that come to define and continue to entangle relations among nations.

The case of Japan-US relation offers a model of great success, marred by significantly by an imperial war fought largely in Asia and across the Pacific Ocean. Initial relations are set by the manner of which a relationship becomes first embodied and then extends across history in repetition, variation, and departures from traditions and breaks across time. We define this relation among two nations as ‘nested deliberation’ a historical, multiplex space for contestation and cooperation. Deliberations expand and build trust during times of peace and prosperity. Traditions, too, may be ignored or corrupted by propaganda, self-promoting ideology and claiming accommodation of difference to be acts of disloyalty and betrayal. The initial symbolic and argumentative discourse are important to recall for purposes of probative analysis and critique—with purposes of repair and building in mind.

1. FIRST APPEARANCES AND ENCOUNTER

A key dimension of argumentation ethnography refers to intercultural encounters, both intended and accidental, that generate cultural reciprocity and exchange (Suzuki & Foreman-Takano 2004). In this encounter, the visit may begin in partly out of curiosity or out a desire for benefits. Propinquity encourages the development of frontiers. China’s Old Silk Road constituted an ancient, mobile, cross cultural and material argument space. In modern cases, first encounters by Europeans were generated by the search for goods, turned commodities, then processed and entered into commerce. Spice constituted trade where goods brought about deliberation over practices, rights, and value between nations and powers.

Regarding the, “intercultural encounters,” that is the subject of our study, F. L. Hawks, the editor of Perry’s narrative, argues that a dispassionate read of an event contains distortions of interpretation brought on by national pride. So, Hawks claims in gathering elements of the story are to be read in Perry’s (2019) own reports:

[T]he facts here embodied were to be gathered not merely from the pages of [Perry's] own journal, but from those also of several of his official reports to him, he thought it better to confide the compilations to a disinterested third party, who might weave the various materials into a connected narrative of all the important events, uninfluenced by that partiality for his own words or acts, from which, owing to the infirmities of human nature, the most honest and best of men are not always entirely exempt. (p. 2)

Hence, Perry concluded that the constitution of initial encounters between cultures are often made not by an individual hero, but by a group of people who, with different purposes, pursue a threshold objective. Thus, intercultural encounter is often at the same time involves a mesh of interpersonal and formal encounters among individuals drawn together over time as a group. A group of mixed national agents who participate
in multiple symbolic, material, and experiential argument create fresh, nested deliberation.

Perry was not the first United States officer to lead an American mission with the goal of opening bi-lateral relations with Japan. In 1836 President Andrew Jackson sent Edmund Roberts who only made it to Macao, then died. In 1837 Jackson sent Charles W. King with a ship. King was turned back at Uraga by force and ordered to go to Nagasaki if he wished to make contact. In 1846, President Polk sent James Biddle with two warships. Biddle had negotiated diplomatic relations with China, but his experience with a compliant Qing dynasty were not to be repeated in Japan. On July 20, 1846, he anchored two warships USS Columbus and USS Vincennes in Uraga Channel at the mouth to Edo Bay. The Shogun sent out a Junk and he was asked to come aboard. He did. An accident occurred. Mistakes were made. A Tokugawa shogun apologized, but he also told Biddle that the US representative would get no talks and no deal. Biddle sailed off without sufferance. The Mexican war broke out. No future ambassadors were sent, so Biddle’s mis-expectation and accidental encounter with Japan combined to fail the mission. Further US absence was interpreted by Japan as disinterest. The United States was not one of the prime international powers, yet it continued to look West. James Glynn was sent in 1849 and did manage to rescue some sailors. In 1851 Captain Aulick was sent, but had to be removed for reasons of abuse. The young democracy was working out how to project interest into international waters.

The opium wars of the 1840s and the European treatment of China after those shameful conflicts rendered the issues of opening relevant. International engagement had been strictly regulated for some time. Japanese boats did not venture into international waters. On the other hand, Japanese ships became lost and their sailors marooned—not allowed to return to home. Similarly, shipwrecks on the Japanese coast left surviving sailors without recourse to home. International questions arose in Japan and European colonialism offered a looming, dreadful example of leaving the question of opening, open. Ship wrecks could offer pretexts for interventions in the name of national property and citizen rescue. A nest of issues knit together. Shipwrecked seamen were but the product of accidents, but as such they constituted beginning points rendering urgent a concrete, successful response to the larger question of international relations to be addressed—before European invaders took the issue into their own hands (Minohara and Iokibe, 2017, p. 5).

President Polk assigned Perry the task of opening of diplomatic relations with Japan in 1842, permitting the use of force, only as a last resort. Commodore Perry, the brother of a famous American naval war hero, took the mission seriously. He studied every book he could find on Japan, an area of the world little known (save for books by Dutch traders and writers). He commented that “[v]iewed in any of its aspects, the Empire of Japan has long presented to the thoughtful mind an object of uncommon interest. And this interest has been greatly increased by the mystery with which, for the last two centuries, an exclusive policy has sought to surround the institutions of this remarkable country. The curiosity of Christendom has been on the alert; and the several votaries of various pursuits have naturally longed to add more to the little that is known of this self-isolated Kingdom” (2019, p. 18).

Therefore, Perry believed that it was a mission and opportunity of the United States of America, as the youngest world power, to be the first country to ratify the Friendship and Trade Treaty with Japan in history. This orientation to situated argument was unusual for the 19th century, which generally represented Nihon as either a romantic scene of mystery or a barbaric place of violence.

2. INFORMATION EXCHANGE

A second dimension of nested deliberation is constituted by information exchanges that spread useful concepts and important knowledge (Suzuki & Foreman-Takano 2004). Information literally means what is in-formation within which existing institutions and orders are being transformed into new ones. The transfer of religious or philosophical traditions is a prime example. Such an information and knowledge forms practical expectation, for good or for bad. Informing contributes to constructing “Otherness.” For instance, Perry (2019) learned from previous approaches made by the United States: “In 1846 an expedition was sent from the government of the United States to Japan: its business was, if possible, to open negotiations with the Empire. … The answer of the [Shogun Tokugawa] to the application for license was very short: ‘No trade can be allowed with any foreign nation except Holland’” (p. 62). After
careful examination, Perry (2019) believed that “under all the circumstances, there was a favorable opportunity for our country to establish commercial relations with Japan, and the avowed his belief to several of his brother officers, as well as to some of the dignitaries the government, and eminent citizens, long before the subject was publicly discussed, and the expedition resolved on” (p. 91). In fact, he evaluated the nature of Japanese people highly by saying that they “are an exceedingly industrious and ingenious people, and in certain manufactures are surpassed by no nation” (2019, p. 64). Perry informed himself of relevant features of the situation before embarking.

*Information exchange* is useful in identifying constraints; but, unplanned knowledge kicks in, too, to generate part confusion (to be worked out) and part opportunity (to be used in negotiation). For example, Perry takes pain to describe not only the mainland of Japan but also Lew Chew (currently known as Okinawa) islands (See Ch 7, 8, 9, 11, 15, 17 & 25) and Ogasawara islands (See Ch 10) where he visited before meeting representatives of the Edo Samurai Government of Japan. Ryukyu was an independent nation at that time. So, the path that Perry took before visiting the mainland likely influenced his thinking and actions when meeting representatives of the Edo Government. We must of course accept that the capital city is not the sole representation of a country in terms of culture, society, and above all people. So Perry’s extrapolation of experiences of a quasi-China Japan intermediary were not correct, but the information did contribute to productive ambiguities, a place to start.

Perry grew to regard Lew Chew as a nexus between China and the mainland Japan. Perry actually spent a huge space and energy to describe his visit to Lew Chew and his interaction with people there. He (2019) stated:

It is a question yet discussed to what power Lew Chew belongs. By some it is said that to be a dependency of the Prince of Satzuma, of Japan; others suppose it to belong to China. The probabilities, however, are all on the side of the dependence, more or less absolute, of Lew Chew on Japan, and probably, also, of some qualified subordination to China, as they undoubtedly send tribute to that country. Language, customs, laws, dress, virtues, vices, and commercial intercourse, all are corroborative of such an opinion. But of this more will be said hereafter. (p. 184)

Regarding the identity problem of Lew Chew people, who lived some years in Lew Chew, believed for several good reasons that “the country, though independent to a certain extent, (its ruler being permitted, for a good contribution to Pekin, to assume the high-sounding title of king,) yet is, to all end and purposes, an integral part of Japan” (as quoted by Perry 2019, p. 274). Also, the English Bishop of Victoria who, in the discharge of his official duties, visited Lew Chew in 1850, thus, spoke of this subject:

On the whole, it seems far the most probable opinion that Lew Chew was peopled by a colony form Japan, to which people their physiognomy, language, and customs have a close affinity; and that to China they owe the far more important debt of their partial civilization and literature. The government of the country appears to consist in a grievous oligarchy of literati immediately dependent upon Japan. They stand in great fear of the latter country, and look to it, and not to China, for protection in time of need. They have an historical tradition that a few hundred years ago, during the Ming dynasty, a war broke out between China and Japan, during which the former, wanting to detach Lew Chew from the latter, raised it to the dignity of a separate kingdom. In token of vassalage, every new king receives a formal investiture from a Chinese officer, specially deputed and sent for that purpose from Foo Chow; to which city, also, a biennial tribute-junk is sent from Lew Chew. At the Tartar invasion of China, and the commencement of the present foreign dynasty, above two hundred years ago, about thirty-six Chinese families, unwilling to confirm to the Tartar changes of custom and rule, emigrated to Lew Chew, the descendants of who have become, generally, the schoolmasters of the country, and amalgamated with the people. (as cited by Perry, 2019, p. 275)

Perry (2019) concluded from these observations that “the Lew Chew were a mixture, made up possibly of Japanese, (who preponderated,)
Chinese, Formosans, and, Malays; and that the island, commencing its population at a very early period, from some accident, such as shipwreck, had, from time to time, added to its inhabitants from the adjacent regions, until the whole was fused into the present stock” (p. 275).

Perry returned to Lew Chew and established hopes for a coaling station, thereby creating a power projection of modern commerce into a space that exhibited a mix of Japanese and Chinese historical characteristics. Since Lew Chew had an ambiguous identity, Perry and the Shoguns could draw upon the place as a potential space of agreement, with the Commodore fulfilling two ambitions: coal station and a place to repair boats or save sailors. All information is situated and so binds rationality in ways that are planned and unplanned. Impressions here were not entirely correct, but the places ambiguity created room for both sides to contemplate opening a space for a treaty.

3. DIALOGICAL ARGUMENTATION

Dialogical argumentation constitutes the third element of our discourse ethnography of nested deliberation (Suzuki & Foreman-Takano 2004). Many people, East and West, conceive of argumentation as a disruptive, even hostile activity. Yet, one manifestation of argumentation is its capacity to generate co-operative, critical discussions where people genuinely strive to discover an outcome that is right and good for both contesting parties. For example, engaging in argumentation enables nations to succeed conflict management for better mutual understanding. Alternatively, a national quarrel can escalate into a catastrophic violent confrontation. Public debate and discussions about possible alternatives to the status quo requires dialogical aspects of nested deliberation to prevail. Dialog refers to discussion between parties present at an initial international event; it also includes succeeding visits by the public of its time, and by others who participate within the tradition. The Commodore achieved dialog through impersonal display that mobilized a game metaphor where reciprocity and power were in play—at the highest levels.

Perry presented a detailed analysis of "First 10 days of his initial visit" (See Ch 12, 13 & 14). His story of the dialogues intrigued American publics and furnished the attributed understanding of the strange world he experienced across 19th century generations. Interestingly, Perry (2019) applied the game metaphor to his mission:

The question of landing by force was let to be decided by the development of succeeding events; it was, of course, the very last measure to be resorted to, and the last that was desired; but in order to be prepared for the worst, the Commodore caused the ships constantly to be kept in perfect readiness, and the crews to be drilled as thoroughly as they are in time of active war. He was prepared, also, to meet the Japanese on their own ground, and exhibit toward them a game at which he could play as well as they. It was well to let them know that other people had dignity also, which they knew how to protect, and that they did not acknowledge the Japanese to be their superiors. Hence he forbade the admission of a single Japanese on board any of the ships, except those officers who might have business with him; and the visits even of such were to be confined to the flag-ship, to which they were admitted only on the declaration of their rank and business. The Commodore, also, was well aware that the more exclusive he should make himself, and the more unyielding he might be in adhering to his declared intentions, the more respect these people of forms and ceremonies would be disposed to aware him; therefore it was that he deliberately resolved to confer personally with no one but a functionary of the highest rank in the empire. (p. 289)

Games are an important aspect of communication through strategic argument. The visual power of gun-ships and formal regalia and rituals imply an awareness of significance and respect for power, a fitting beginning place to initiate relations.

Dialog between nations includes formality in address. Instead of landing by force, Perry prepared the following letter to the Emperor:

“United States Steam Frigate Susquehanna,

Uraga, July 12, 1853.

“The Commander-in-chief of the United States naval forces in these seas, being
On July 14, 1853, Perry finally submitted three letters from the President of the United States to the Emperor by which he meant the Tokugawa Shogun who were in charge of the governmental function. The following excerpt from one of the letters stated clearly the aim of the United States:

We know that the ancient laws of your imperial majesty’s government do not allow of foreign trade, except with the Chinese and the Dutch; but as the state of the world changes and new governments are formed, it seems to be wise, from time to time, to make new laws. There was a time when the ancient laws of your imperial majesty’s government were first time.

About the same time America, which is sometimes called the New World, was first discovered and settled by the Europeans. For a long time there were but a people, and they were poor. They have now become quite numerous; their commerce is very extensive; and they think that if your imperial majesty were so far to change the ancient laws as to allow a free trade between the two countries it would be extremely beneficial to both.

If your imperial majesty is not satisfied that it would be safe altogether to abrogate the ancient laws which forbid foreign trade, they might be suspended for five or ten years, so as to try the experiment. If it does not prove as beneficial as was hoped, the ancient laws can be restored. The United States often limit their treaties with foreign States to a few years, and then renew them or not, as they please. (2019, pp. 311-312)

Moreover, Perry was glad to have a good excuse for waiting until the ensuing spring for the final answer from the Japanese government because he knew that some of his ships were required to protect American interests on the coast of China. Consequently,

The Commodore preferred, then, to wait until the ensuing spring, when he would be able to concentrate his whole force, and he prepared with store and coal vessels, and all other conveniences for remaining an indefinite time to secure whatever concessions the Japanese should be disposed to make. His policy, though in conformity with the exigencies of his position, was at the same time a courteous concession to the deliberate ceremoniousness of Japanese diplomacy; and was crowned by the happiest result. (2019, p. 328)
In essence, there are a number of results to be outlined of Perry’s initial (1852) visit to Japan (Perry 2019, pp. 329-330). First is the release of the American squadron from the perpetual presence of the Japanese guard-boats, which had always hitherto surrounded foreign ships, and placed them, as it were, under arrest during their visits. In addition, the accomplishment of the Commodore’s predetermined intention to confer with no one but a dignitary of the highest rank in the Empire, and to obtain a reception of diplomatic courtesy recognized by American institutions. Additionally, the letters nested deliberation in a warm proposal to a joint “experiment”, time situations deliberation in a duration in which ripeness for decision matures. Distancing is a dialogical strategy, not often acknowledged by philosophical approaches. Perry could have asked for fresh supplies from facilities at hand in Edo. Rather than show a sign of weakness and create dependency, he sailed out of view, leaving his partners to think through the single proposal at hand.

4. NEGOTIATION

The final dimension of our ethnography is negotiation about what specific programs of relations can be created and contracted to advance mutually national interests (Suzuki & Foreman-Takano 2004). Negotiations take place in 1853. Negotiations take on a personal, material side with the exchange of gifts and cultural observations and performance (ambiguously construed). Negotiations also take place over legal and geographical particulars of immediate and long term purposes set in the language of a treaty (ambivalently conceded). Regarding the final framework, Perry explained how each party acted (See Ch 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 & 24). In the end, such a process leads to complicated acts of transformation, making international agreement, and forming consensus about the protocols of relationships.

The squadron sailed into waters leading to Edo February 13, 1854. Negotiations began on land March 8, 1854 and extended for 3 weeks. The exchanges of culture and material gifts were set up near a village. Onlookers were attracted, as were ship members to the village and local country side. The ship interpreter, for example, comments on the cultural negotiations that underwrote the nest of good will which guided objections and additions to the treaty. Japan officials had moved from ‘diffidence’ to a cautious construction on the side of formal relations. Success in the technical realm fed curiosity and good feelings generated by the energizing moments of exchange.

On March 8, 1853, Perry “made every preparation to distinguish the occasion of his second landing in Japan by all necessary parade, knowing, as he did, the importance and moral influence of such show upon so ceremonious and artificial a people as the Japanese” (2019, p. 410). During the meeting with the Japanese representatives, Perry (2019) received a first reply letter with the following content:

It is quite impossible to give satisfactory answers at once to all the proposals of your government, as it is most positively forbidden by the laws of our Imperial ancestors; but for us to continue attached laws, seems to misunderstand the spirit of the age; however, we are governed now by imperative necessity.

At the visit of your excellency last year to this Empire, his Majesty the former Emperor [12th Shogun Ieyoshi] was sick, and is now dead. Subsequently, his Majesty the present Emperor [13th Shogun Iesada] ascended the throne; the many occupations in consequence thereof are not yet finished, and there is no time to settle other business thoroughly. Moreover, his Majesty the new Emperor, at the succession to the throne, promised to the princes and high officers of the Empire to observe the laws. It is therefore evident that he cannot now bring about any alteration in the ancient laws.

[...] However, we admit the urgency of, and shall entirely comply with, the proposals of your government concerning coal, wood, water, provisions, and the saving of ships and their crews in distress. After being informed which harbor your excellency selects, that harbor shall be prepared, which preparation it is estimated will take about five years. Meanwhile a commencement can be made with the coal at Nangasaki (sic) by the next Japanese first month, (Siogoots,) (16th of February, 1855)

After receiving the letter, Perry (2019) remarked that “it would be better for the two nations that a treaty similar to the one between the United

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States and China should be made. He had been sent, he continued, by his government to make a treaty, and if he did not succeed, the United States would probably send more ships to make one; but he hoped that everything would be soon settled in an amicable manner, and that he would be enabled to send two of his ships, as he desired, to prevent others from coming” (p. 417).

The four “black warships” had left an impression. The power of a modern naval squadron that had sailed the Pacific Ocean was something to behold. The second meeting, Perry came ashore. The formality of spectacle rendered the appearance of “gravity and dignity” two values where the virtues of a dynasty and a republic converge.

The meeting of dignitaries featured an exchange of gifts. “Conferences were held at the little village of Yokohama, where gifts were exchanged: lacquers and bronzes, porcelain and brocades, for a set of telegraph instruments, a quarter-size steam locomotive complete with track and cars, Audubon’s Birds and Quadrupeds of America, an assortment of farming implements and firearms, a barrel of whiskey, and several cases of Champagne” (Morrison, Commanger, Leuchtenberg, 1980, p. 575). Diplomatic arguments are not reducible to words or timing; rather, the act of exchange between cultures remains quite meaningful. In this exchange, Japan offers objects of beauty, value, and aesthetic quality—the product of a sophisticated arts, a key feature of cultures deemed to be civilized, if not “advanced.” The American officers offer the gifts of modernity in a broad range signaling optics, transportation, machinery, naturalism—everything but finance and management.

The movement of ships, the rituals of initial encounter, the sharing of Presidential letters were important in initial encounter. In the second visit, an event of exchange was built and a space for deliberation open. Treaty negotiations could begin. Perry asked for 4 times as much access to ports as he did initially. The expression of confidence set up the Commodore in an advantageous bargaining position.

The American gift sight included the mini-railroad line and the telegraph wires. These were made operational and were popular, as were the treaties of China culture to the Americans.

Indeed there was a curious mélange today, a junction of east and west, railroads and telegraph, boxers and educated athletae, epaulets and uniforms, shaven pates and night gowns, soldiers with muskets and drilling in close array, soldiers with petticoats, sandals, two swords and all in disorder, like a crowd—all these things, and many other things, exhibiting the difference between our civilization and usages and those of this secluded, pagan people.” (Wells, 1910, p. 148)

The exchange of cultural gifts from a warehouse and supplies underwent days of presentation, eating, viewing, and performance. The attributed exoticism of cultural performance was matched against an appreciation (through walking farm lands and forests) that Japan was a highly cultivated society, judging from the farming of richness soils. The Commodore took advantage of his “toughness” tactics, too. Perry had expanded requests from one port to five, according to his interpreter. Still “friendly” talk was exchanged about details of space, time, and prospects of an extended relations.

The outside context drove Japanese flexibility, too. Already in 1842 it had muted its harsh ship wreck policy. The harsh realities of Opium sales and the drug wars inflicted on the Qing dynasty were known. Progressive elements persuaded the Shogun to sign the Treaty of Kanagawa (31 March 1854). The treaty of Kanagawa was a limited opening, but a bounded-peer basis of agreement between nations. The pressures on Japan were known by the US captain: “… it was Perry’s proud boast that without firing a shot he had effected what European nations had failed to do by using force” (Morrison, Commanger, Leuchtenberg, 1980, p. 575). “Cushing’s Chinese treaty and Perry’s Japan Expedition were far more significant than their immediate results. They mark the beginning of an active role for the United States in East Asia” (Morrison, Commanger, & Leuchtenberg, 1980, p. 576). From a Japan standpoint, this agreement opened the pathway to the Meiji era restoration where Japan pursued its own, unique pathways into modernization and creating a global presence.

In this general context of “game” strategic maneuvering, Commodore Perry’s ideas about negotiations in the context of his second encounter are worth pursuing. What could be accomplished? How to negotiate not only the legal particulars of access but also what conditions would create future productive relations. Japanese people’s “inordinate curiosity”
appears to be key to his complex self-negotiated vision for future development and prosperity of Japan-US relations. In his journal, he observes a noticeable quality of people, drawn from his immediate encounters:

The Japanese always evinced an inordinate curiosity, for the gratification of which the various articles of strange fabric, and the pieces of mechanism, of ingenious and novel invention, brought from the United States, gave them a full opportunity. They were not satisfied with the minutest examination of all these things, so surprisingly wonderful as they appeared to them, but followed the officers and men about the seized upon every occasion to examine each part of their dress. […]

At the same time, Perry (2019) noticed that the Japanese people were shy and hesitant to show their own cultural aspects to foreigners:

Notwithstanding the Japanese are so fond of indulging their curiosity, they are by no means communicative about themselves. They allege, as a reason for their provoking reserve, that their laws forbid them to communicate to foreigners anything relating to their country and its institutions, habits, and customs. Their silence on the part of the Japanese was a serious obstacle to acquiring that minute knowledge of Japan, until some of our men of intelligence are established in the country in the character of consular agents, merchants, or missionaries, who may thus be enabled to acquire the language and mingle in intimate social relations with the people. (p. 430)

The contradiction of open and closed qualities appeared duplicated in his formal negotiations. After several interactions, including the exchange of letters, with the Japanese representative, on March 28th, 1854. The bargain embedded complicated mix of affordances and hesitations, at the same time agreeing and disagreeing on port access,

the Commodore landed to have a conference in regard to the three ports [to be opened to the United States], and directed his interpreter to read it in Dutch. When the document had been thus read and afterwards carefully perused by the Japanese, they stated that they were prepared to concur in everything except as to the immediate opening of Shimoda. After discussion, it was finally settled that thought the port might be opened, the Japanese would address a note to the Commodore, stating that everything which might be wanting by ships could not be furnished there before the expiration of ten months, but that would and water, and whatever else the place possessed would be supplied immediately; and to this note the Commander promised to reply, and express his satisfaction with such an arrangement. (2019, pp. 449-450)

In addition to the future implication of the treaty, Perry (2019) argues that there “is observable
throughout, the predominating influence of the national prejudice against the permanent introduction of foreigners among them:"

The word “reside” is but once used in the whole treaty, and that in the eleventh article relative to consuls. The details of conferences, already given, show how anxiously they sought to avoid having consuls at all. Indeed, Commodore Perry says, “I could only induce the commissioners to argue to this article, by endeavoring to convince them that it would save the Japanese government much trouble, if an American agent were to reside at one or both of the ports opened by the treaty, to whom complaints might be made of any mal-practice of the United States’ citizens who might visit the Japanese dominions.” They wanted no permanent foreign residents among them, official or unofficial. (p. 459)

In the final analysis, Perry (2019) believed that “all, and indeed, more than all, that under the circumstances, could reasonably have been expected, has been accomplished.” He concluded with an optimistic view on the future negotiation with Japan:

Japan has been opened to the nations of the west, and it is not to be believed, that having once effected an entrance, the enlightened powers that have made treaties with her will go backward, and, by any indiscretion, lose what, after so many unavailing efforts for centuries, has at last been happily attained. It belongs to these nations to show Japan that her interests will be promoted by communication with them; and, as prejudice gradually vanishes, we may hope to see the future negotiation of commercial treaties, more and more liberal, for the benefit not of ourselves only, but of all the maritime powers of Empire, for the advancement of Japan, and for the upward progress of our common humanity. (pp. 461-462)

The treaty itself outlined restricted agreements to solve problems of recovery and repair and so sailor safety and ship refueling did increase, as did trade. To negotiate as peers is a unique strategy for the times. Perry thinks the attitude of ethnic isolation will gradually disappear and in some cases he is right, as Japan as contributed cosmopolitan diplomacy to the contemporary world. However, reluctance to accept foreigners and suspicion of outsiders remained part of the deliberative nest, a branch of thought weakening the deliberative space developed through this first encounter. Argument ambiguity was a necessary part of “caution” in signing a treaty. Argument ambivalence about strangers was a difference maintained by the treaty’s reluctant concessions. The nested ambivalence signaled a nationalist commitment that would stress and break the friendship among nations in the greater pacific war.

5. CONCLUSION: ARGUMENT, ETHNOGRAPHY, AND NESTED DELIBERATION

The histories of legacy shaping events are filled with arguments that are handed down through the century. This paper develops a way of examining the ways arguments are made through encounter. The initial conditions of confrontation and disagreement are studied, the position of information among those working to create an exchange or communicate are examined, the dialogical time and space to accommodate deliberation are isolated and finally the cultural, material and political terms of negotiation are examined. We found in the case of the opening of Japan, difference played a role in each place of argumentation. The mutual choice to start cautiously and to create a unique legacy of mutual regard and seriousness was a unique feature, not characterizing European or China-oriented US policy efforts. Iokibe and Minohara (2017) point out:

The Bakufu’s chief negotiator, scholar-diplomat Hayashi Fukusai, and a number of other Bakufu officials accepted Perry’s request to shelter American castaways since it was a purely humanitarian issue. Hayashi wisely suggested that because the issue of trade relations was less pressing it should be discussed in depth at a later date. Perry concurred, and on March 31, 1854, a 12-article treaty entitled the Treaty of Peace and Amity between the United States and the Empire of Japan (Nichibeiwashinjōyaku) was drafted. This treaty, known more commonly as the Treaty of Kanagawa, marked the official
beginning of relations between the US and Japan.

The Treaty was later reviewed and the Meiji relations continued to develop international relations, even with the stresses contained in the negotiation remained built in ambivalence to Japan’s national and international roles, as well as American inconsistency between human rights and trade profits. The ethnographic study of nested deliberations offers an addition to analyses of peace and the argumentative relations among nations. Argumentation studies needs address further the nested deliberative spaces that define the relations among nations over time. Such ethnographic inquiries will contribute to understanding the “georhetorics” of our day (Goodnight and Hingstman, 2019).

REFERENCES


An Analysis of Arguments on the Radiation Risk of Thyroid Cancers in the Fukushima Nuclear Accident: Application of the Toulmin Model

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In response to the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011, the Fukushima prefectural government has begun a thyroid cancer screening program. The data showed higher rates of thyroid cancer than had previously been observed in Japan. The findings induced massive controversy regarding whether the high incidence rate was due to radiation exposure. The experience revealed that a gladiatorial arena is suitable for the model of risk communication, which concerned how to secure the underlying conditions of democratic debate. This paper aims to demonstrate how argument analysis by Toulmin’s model could help resolve issues regarding radiation risks and show that sound scientific argument needs to accompany sufficient data and warranted claims. The paper revealed that the analysis can provide useful information to foster rational debate and that fostering an affective disposition of critical thinking in the authors is necessary. Further studies to facilitate a rational debate on health risks is warranted.

1. INTRODUCTION

During the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011, anxiety concerning the health effects of radiation exposure rose drastically (Kitada, 2013) (Shinoda, et al., 2014) (Nakayachi, et al., 2015). Particularly for parents of children and adolescents, the risk of thyroid cancer became a primary concern. After the Chernobyl accident, a notable increase in thyroid cancer incidents in children and adolescents was observed within the group who experienced high thyroid gland exposure to radioactive iodine (UNSCEAR, 2011). It was estimated that the cumulative effective dose of radiation to the thyroid gland of children in the Fukushima accident was significantly lower than that of the Chernobyl accident (UNSCEAR, 2013). However, to relieve parental concerns, the Fukushima Prefectural Government began a thyroid cancer screening program called the Fukushima Health Management Survey for children and adolescents living in areas near the affected plant (Yasumura, et al., 2012). Contrary to that goal, the screening program increased parental anxiety. The data from the survey of the program showed 30-fold higher thyroid cancer rates than had previously been observed in the national cancer registries in Japan (Tsuda, et al., 2016a). The findings induced substantial controversy between some experts and activist groups who insisted that the high incidence rate was due to radiation exposure and governmental experts on radiation health effects who argued that detected cases might have been prevalent, subclinical cases, or "overdiagnosis" of cancers by screening, rather than radiation-induced cancers (Suzuki, 2016). A controversy ensued involving international organizations.

Experts developed the debate from both sides in the international academic journal "Epidemiology." However, even one year after the debate in the journal, there remained some discourses in which both parties were convinced that their opinions were correct and that the other party's argument was not "scientific." An UNSCEAR expert, Makoto Akashi said:

"Professor Tsuda of Okayama University has published a paper to argue that the effects of radioactive substances released from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant induced the increase of thyroid cancers in children in Fukushima. This paper was written based on the scientifically deficient study, so its scientific quality is unacceptable. However, since this paper was judged to be "a paper that has a great social impact," it was deliberately evaluated…. It is essential to rightly criticize "a paper whose method is scientifically
inappropriate despite its large social impact”. Simply rejecting it means that UNSCEAR has overlooked a paper that has a social impact, and if UNSCEAR does not explicitly criticize it, UNSCEAR will lead to a misconception that "this paper is evaluated as sufficient to adopt from a scientific point of view." (Hattori, 2018)

On the other hand, an expert from the other party claimed that UNSCEAR’s evaluation is hindering “science.” "….the UNSCEAR 2016 White Paper distorted the debate that took place in the academic journal "Epidemiology." In particular, UNSCEAR completely ignores Tsuda's response to the letters to the editor, which criticizes the electronic version of the Tsuda paper... UNSCEAR is hindering science." (Yamauchi, 2018)

It is not clear what "scientific" argument refers to; however, the conclusion in the field of epidemiology differs from that of other natural sciences. In areas such as physics, chemistry, and biology, experimental results can directly show conclusions. For example, substance A and substance B reacted in chemical reaction C; then it generated substance D. However, in epidemiological studies, epidemiological findings cannot directly indicate conclusions. Suppose the group exposed to harmful substance A had a higher prevalence of disease B than the unexposed group; such an observation does not directly suggest that substance A is responsible for disease B. Substance C may cause the disease if the group was exposed to not only substance A but also substance C, or the difference in age distribution between the exposed and unexposed groups may give rise to the result. By eliminating the effects of these confounding factors (factors that affect both exposure and endpoints) one by one, the study may conclude that substance A is the likely cause of disease B.

Thus, epidemiological studies are a kind of argument based on data and warranted claims and are well suited to argument analysis using informal logic. However, risk communication researchers have used a simple model without paying attention to how the message sender argued, although risk communication mainly takes care of the public health risks that epidemiological studies cover. Scholars of the social amplification of risk framework (SARF) employed the “sender-message-receiver model” to model risk communication (Kasperson & Kasperson, 1996). In this model, the main issue that must be resolved concerns the process of “information transfer.” Namely, media reports do not adequately transmit information from governments and experts to the general public (Frewer, 2003) (Smith & McCloskey, 1998). This model is based on the historical conception of power advocated by Max Weber in which power refers to the ability to compel compliance with “rules and commands independent from the subjugated group’s convictions.” (P.185 in (Renn, 1992))

On the other hand, scholars in the field of policy analysis proposed the model of policymaking as a gladiatorial or sporting arena in which several competing powerholders battle for advantage and public support (Renn, 1992). Murdock et al. developed this model and proposed the arena model of risk communication (Murdock, et al., 2003). The arena model consists of six major sets of players, i.e., government and state agencies, opposition parties, campaigning groups, corporations, scientific and expert communities, and the media. The players continually compete for position and advantage in terms of commanding public communications and attention.

In the arena model, the main problem concerns how to secure the underlying conditions of democratic debate. Jürgen Habermas has most forcefully advocated the idea of open, rational debate as to the touchstone of the democratic process in his model of the public sphere. Rational debate should forge a communicative bridge between civil society's concerns and the government's operations (Habermas, 1989). The Fukushima accident experience revealed that authorized information from international organizations and governmental experts' statements are no longer protected and unchallenged. It means that the model of risk communication as a gladiatorial arena, in which several competing powerholders battle for public support (Murdock, et al., 2003), obviously fits the situation of risk communication on radiation health risks.

Since risk communication aims to persuade the general public, it is a kind of rhetoric advocated by Aristotle. Aristotle defines rhetoric as complying with credibility/trust (ethos), emotions/values (pathos), and logic (logos). In risk communication, trust in experts (ethos) is an essential element, and the general public shows an emotional reaction (pathos) from media reports with photos of specific cases. However, the most crucial part should be the
logic that evaluates epidemiological research results. Initially, the health effects of harmful factors are physical phenomena, so they should not involve ethos and pathos (excluding physiological disorders). Thus, analyzing the mainstream and anti-mainstream argument as informal logic is a meaningful attempt consistent with the "scientific" argument claimed by both parties.

This paper aims to reveal how the argument analysis could help resolve the issues of radiation health risks and shows that good scientific argument needs to accompany sufficient data investigation and warranted claims. For this purpose, the paper demonstrates a structural analysis of the argument using the Toulmin model and discusses how the model can provide useful information to foster a rational debate among the parties involved.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Fukushima Health Management Survey
The accident of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in 2011 released a massive amount of radioactive substances into the surrounding environment. The equivalent doses and health risks on children in Fukushima were evaluated in the report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) in 2013.

UNSCEAR was established by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1955. Its mandate in the United Nations system is to assess and report levels and effects of exposure to ionizing radiation. Throughout the world, governments and organizations rely on the Committee's estimates as the scientific basis for evaluating radiation risk and establishing protective measures.

As for the radiation dose exposed, UNSCEAR estimated that "settlement-average absorbed doses to the thyroid of up to about 80 mGy for 1-year-old infants who were evacuated", and "for infants who remained in the non-evacuated areas, district-average doses were up to about 50 mGy." As for the health risks by the exposure, UNSCEAR stated that "most of the absorbed doses to the thyroid were in a range for which an excess incidence of thyroid cancer has not been observed in epidemiological studies." UNSCEAR also stated that "the occurrence of a large number of radiation-induced thyroid cancers as were observed after the Chernobyl accident can be discounted because doses were substantially lower." (p. 78, para 175 in (UNSCEAR, 2013))

The Fukushima Health Management Survey was launched to monitor residents' long-term health, promote their future well-being, and confirm whether long-term low-dose radiation exposure has health effects. It includes a basic survey to estimate levels of external radiation exposure among all 2.05 million residents and detailed surveys that comprise a thyroid ultrasound examination for all Fukushima children aged 18 years or younger, a comprehensive health check for all residents from the evacuation zones, and an assessment of mental health and lifestyles of all residents from the evacuation zones (Yasumura, et al., 2012). Furthermore, for establishing control groups to compare with the observed groups in the Fukushima Survey, a survey, using similar equipment and screening criteria, of approximately 4,000 children and adolescents was also administered in the prefectures of Aomori, Yamanashi, and Nagasaki, which were mostly unaffected by the accident (Taniguchi, et al., 2013).

2.2. Argument on the Increase of Thyroid Cancers among Children in Fukushima
In 2016, a paper published by Tsuda et al. argued that "we could infer that the incidence of thyroid cancer in Fukushima rose more rapidly than expected based on the cumulative attributable thyroid cancer risk over 15 years", and "the radiation burden to the thyroid in Fukushima Prefecture might have been considerably higher than estimated." (Tsuda, et al., 2016a) The authors reported a 30-fold excess in Fukushima Prefecture without precise records of radiation exposure in residents in Fukushima;

"Although precise measurements of both external and internal radiation exposure in Fukushima were not obtained, in external comparison, we observed an approximately 30-fold increase in the number of thyroid cancer cases among children and adolescents using the area/district of residence to provide a surrogate for exposure information." (Tsuda, et al., 2016a)

In the "external comparison," Tsuda et al. calculated the incidence rate of 9 districts in Fukushima prefecture from the Fukushima
health survey's baseline rate. The incidence rate is the frequency with which a disease or other incident occurs over a specified period. Tsuda et al. estimated incidence rate ratios (IRR) calculated by the incidence rate in nine districts in Fukushima divided by the reference incidence rate. The reference rate was derived from the data from 2001 to 2008, as reported by the Japanese National Cancer Center. The authors argued to justify that the study employed areas and districts as a surrogate for exposure estimation;

“We employed areas and districts as a surrogate for exposure estimation, which could have introduced nondifferential exposure misclassification that can bias the effect estimates toward the null…. There is little potential for spatial confounding both in Japan and within Fukushima Prefecture because the subjects in this study are all residents 18 years old and younger, as noted below. Furthermore, before the accident, no evidence existed that natural radiation was higher in Fukushima Prefecture than in the rest of Japan.” (Tsuda, et al., 2016a)

Furthermore, the authors argued that a bias created by a screening effect was insufficient to explain their results, because the magnitude of the incidence rate ratio was too large;

“One concern is that the approximately 30-fold increase observed in the number of thyroid cancer cases in external comparison might be the result of a screening effect. This concern is based on the potential presence of silent thyroid cancer among children and adolescents in the unscreened regions of Japan. However, the magnitude of the IRRs was too large to be explained only by this bias.” (Tsuda, et al., 2016a)

2.3. Refutations from experts
The findings of Tsuda et al. (2016a) induced much controversy among experts who argued that detected cases might have been prevalent, subclinical cases, or “overdiagnosis” of cancers, rather than radiation-induced cancers. A controversy unfolded involving international organizations. Initially, the debate was done using the format of letters to the editor in the Journal "Epidemiology," which published the paper in question. Jorgensen argued the paper's conclusion was based on "the flawed inferential logic, known as ecologic fallacy" because of lack of individual dose data; (Jorgensen, 2016)

“The flawed inferential logic, known as ecologic fallacy, threatens all studies that draw risk inferences based on community incidence rates without individual dose data, yet that is but one of problems with ecologic studies…..”, “the Tsuda article goes beyond failing to acknowledge that it is ecologic. It actually hides its design by using “the residential address of the subjects in March 2011…as a surrogate for individual [dose].” and then reports measures of association with odds ratios and relative rates—risk metrics typically employed in case–control and cohort studies, respectively. These two alternative study designs are much more reliable because they are based on individual dose data and, therefore, not prone to be influenced by factors that vary between communities.” (Jorgensen, 2016)

Takamura argued that the incidence rate of the nonexposure group employed in the paper does not represent the real prevalence because “the prevalence of thyroid cancer detected by advanced ultrasound techniques in other areas of Japan does not differ meaningfully from that in Fukushima Prefecture”; (Takamura, 2016)

“We recently conducted thyroid ultrasound screening, using the same procedures as the Fukushima Health Management Survey, in 4,365 children aged 3–18 years from three Japanese prefectures, and confirmed one patient with papillary thyroid cancer (prevalence, 230 per million). Furthermore, we recently reviewed findings of thyroid ultrasound screening conducted in Japan. In one survey, 9,988 students underwent thyroid screening and four students (including one foreign student) were subsequently diagnosed with thyroid cancer (prevalence, 300 per million). In another study at Okayama University that examined 2,307 students, three patients with thyroid cancer were found (prevalence, 1,300 per million), while at
Keio High School, of 2,868 female students examined, one was found to have thyroid cancer (prevalence, 350 per million). These results show that the prevalence of thyroid cancer detected by advanced ultrasound techniques in other areas of Japan does not differ meaningfully from that in Fukushima Prefecture.” (Takamura, 2016)

Wakeford et al. argued that screening programs could dramatically increase the incidence rate in proportion to the participation rate of the screening, based on the experience in South Korea. They also argued that no dose-response relationship was observed (Wakeford, et al., 2016).

“Thyroid disease screening with ultrasound can have a dramatic effect on the detection of thyroid nodules. A 15-fold increase in the incidence of thyroid cancer occurred in South Korea after the introduction of a national cancer screening program in 1999, with the incidence rate in regions increasing in direct proportion to the percentage of screened people. Consequently, it is inappropriate to compare the data from the Fukushima screening program with cancer registry data from the rest of Japan where there is, in general, no such large-scale screening.” (Wakeford, et al., 2016)

“” (D)irect estimation from ultrasound screening data among 47,203 examinees in the unexposed or relatively low contaminated areas in Belarus would be more appropriate, where no cancer cases were detected (95% confidence interval: 0–78 per million examinees),16–19 as shown in eTable 1 of our article”. (Tsuda, et al., 2016b)

“Takamura presented another example of inappropriate comparison with the all-school screening program started at Okayama University, Japan in 2012. Although the Okayama study did detect three thyroid cancer cases by palpation among 2,307 freshmen (ages 18 or older) in 2012, no other cases were detected among the total of 36,927 students enrolled between 2012 and 2015”. (Tsuda, et al., 2016b)

Furthermore, the authors presented new arguments that screening effects cannot explain the new cancer incidents found in the second round (Tsuda, et al., 2016b).

“In addition, a likely underestimated but clear increase (eight cases: IRR = 12 with 3 years as a latent duration) of thyroid cancer incidence was observed in the second round screening among cases who were screened and cancer free in the first round. This result cannot be explained by the screening effect because most occult thyroid cancer cases would have been harvested in the first round screening”. (Tsuda, et al., 2016b)

For evidence of the screening effects in South Korea, Tsuda et al. argued that South Korea’s data were not applicable because of different diagnostic criteria and ages of patients (Tsuda, et al., 2016b).

“Furthermore, although disregarded by some of the letters, comparability, for example by age and diagnostic criteria, should be considered when using the
findings from South Korea. Screening in South Korea was conducted among adults with different diagnostic criteria from Fukushima, where one quarter of surgical patients had tumors less than 5.0 mm in diameter, whereas no cancers in this size range were detected in Fukushima". (Tsuda, et al., 2016b)

2.5. Summary of the Argument by UNSCEAR
UNSCEAR summarized the debate over the issue and concluded that "the Committee does not consider that the study by Tsuda et al. presents a serious challenge to the findings of the 2013 report" (p. 25, para 112 in, (UNSCEAR, 2016)) based on the following:

"111. One paper (Tsuda, et al., 2016a) and a subsequently published response to criticisms (Tsuda, et al., 2016b) claimed to demonstrate that there had been a radiation-induced increase in thyroid cancer incidence: the authors reported a 50-fold (95% CI: 25, 90) excess in Fukushima Prefecture. However, the study design and methods were too susceptible to bias (Jorgensen, 2016) to warrant this interpretation. Tsuda et al. (Tsuda, et al., 2016b) did not adequately account for the impact of the sensitive ultrasound screening of the thyroid upon the observed rate of thyroid cancer. Their conclusions were based on a comparison of the rate of thyroid cancer among those people screened by FHMS with the rates found elsewhere in Japan where few children had undergone thyroid screening. Studies of other populations screened in childhood, particularly those who underwent ultrasound screening in three unexposed Japanese prefectures (Hayashida, et al., 2013; Hayashida, et al., 2015), as well as other screening studies of young people in Japan (Takamura, 2016), found baseline rates of thyroid cancer in the absence of radiation exposure that were similar to the FHMS rates. Similarly, the Republic of Korea experienced an apparent large increase in thyroid cancer rates once they instituted universal screening (Ahn, et al., 2014)." (p. 25, para 111 in (UNSCEAR, 2016))

3. ANALYSIS
3.1. Brief background of the Toulmin model
The Toulmin model of argumentation is the methodology for structural analysis of informal logic often used in the field of speech communication (Toulmin, 1958). This paper employed the model to provide objective analytical grounds for argumentation. The model comprises data, claim, warrant, rebuttal, and backing. The definitions of the terminology of the model are widely presented and varied in detail. The author employed the following methodology. Claim: Assertion one wishes to prove. Data: Factual information that supports the claim and appeals as a foundation for the claim. Warrant: A bridge between the data and the claim shows that the step to the claim from the data is an appropriate and legitimate one. Rebuttal: A statement that addresses potential objections to the claim. Backing: Factual information without which the warrant itself would possess neither authority nor currency. The original example of the model by Toulmin is shown in Figure 1. (Toulmin, 1958)

![Figure 1. An example of the Toulmin model of argument](image-url)
3.2 Analysis of Argument over Thyroid Cancer

Tsuda et al. asserted a claim that “there had been a radiation-induced increase in thyroid cancer incidence.” The data were presented as “in external comparison, we observed an approximately 30-fold increase in the number of thyroid cancer cases among children and adolescents”. The external comparison was the comparison between the incidence rate of 9 districts in Fukushima and the average rate in the cancer registration before the accident. Thus, the claim needs a warrant (warrant 1) as “the residential address of the subjects in March 2011…as a surrogate for individual [dose]”. The backing of the warrant was “before the accident, no evidence existed that natural radiation was higher in Fukushima Prefecture than in the rest of Japan.” Furthermore, Tsuda et al. added another warrant (warrant 2) as “the magnitude of the IRRs was too large to be explained only by this [screening effect] bias.” The structure of the argument could be analyzed, as shown in Figure 2.

The rebuttal presented by Jorgensen was “the flawed inferential logic, known as ecologic fallacy, threatens all studies that draw risk inferences based on community incidence rates without individual dose data.” For a better understanding of the rebuttal, an epidemiological study usually identifies the individual exposure (radiation dose) and their endpoint (a thyroid cancer), and then compares the incidence rate of the endpoint observed in an “exposure group” and that in a “nonexposure group.” Because the individual endpoint was assumed to be caused by individual exposure, however, the individual dose exposed to children in Fukushima was unknown. Even in the same regional district, the ambient radiation dose rate varied geographically and temporally. This means that the ambient dose might not represent the radiation exposure.

Furthermore, Wakeford et al. presented the backing for the rebuttal as “there is no statistically discernible difference in thyroid cancer prevalence between the low, intermediate, and high contamination areas of Fukushima Prefecture.” This backing contradicts and weakens the warrant (warrant 1).

In summary, without individual dose data, even if a difference in the ambient dose between the reference area and Fukushima was observed, other differences may have been the causes. In this case, the data did not support the claim which asserted causal relationships between ambient dose and the increase in thyroid cancer. Thus, to support the claim, further warrant needed to hold to show that nothing other than
radiation effects is possible to induce 30-fold thyroid cancer increase. Warrant 2 is a typical example of the warrant. Generally, this logic was called “Ad ignorantiam,” in which a lack of contrary evidence is used to prove that a proposition is true. (Ziegelmueller & Kay, 1997).

3.3. Analysis of UNSCEAR’s summary and conclusion

UNSCEAR concluded that “the Committee does not consider that the study by Tsuda et al. presents a serious challenge to the findings of the 2013 report” (p. 25, para 112 in, (UNSCEAR, 2016)). To justify the conclusion, UNSCEAR presented as a rebuttal that “the study did not adequately account for the impact of the sensitive ultrasound screening of the thyroid upon the observed rate of thyroid cancer (rebuttal 2)”. UNSCEAR also presented as the backing of the rebuttal that “studies of other populations screened in childhood, particularly those who underwent ultrasound screening in three unexposed Japanese prefectures, as well as

![Figure 3. Structure of Argument in accordance with UNSCEAR summary](image-url)
other screening studies of young people in Japan, found baseline rates of thyroid cancer in the absence of radiation exposure that was similar to the FHMS rates (backing 1). The other backing was presented that the “Republic of Korea experienced an apparent large increase in thyroid cancer rates once they instituted universal screening (backing 2)”. The structure of the argument could be analyzed, as shown in Figure 3.

To respond to the rebuttal, Tsuda et al. provided four backings to strengthen the warrant that “the magnitude of the IRRs was too large to be explained only by this [screening effect] bias (warrant 2).” For the argument on unexposed populations, three backings were presented as “in ultrasound screening data among 47,203 examinees in the unexposed or relatively low contaminated areas in Belarus, no cancer cases were detected” (backing 1), “although the Okayama study did detect three thyroid cancer cases by palpation among 2,307 freshmen (ages 18 or older) in 2012, no other cases were detected among the total of 36,927 students enrolled between 2012 and 2015” (backing 2) and “a clear increase of thyroid cancer incidence was observed in the second round screening among cases who were screened and cancer free in the first round. This result cannot be explained by the screening effect.” (backing 3)

For the argument on South Korea’s data, a backing was presented as “screening in South Korea was conducted among adults with different diagnostic criteria from Fukushima, where one-quarter of surgical patients had tumors less than 5.0 mm in diameter. In contrast, no cancers in this size range were detected in Fukushima.” (backing 4)

3.4. Argument on Prevalence of the Unexposed Group
The study of Takamura and Hayashida quoted in UNSCEAR’s response (Rebuttal 2’s backing 1) showed that the prevalence of students’ thyroid cancer screening was 230, 300, 1300 and 350 per million. (Takamura, 2016) (Hayashida et al., 2015) On the other hand, the incidence rate in 9 districts in Fukushima was between 236 and 605 per million (Tsuda, et al., 2016a). Thus, baseline rates of thyroid cancer in the absence of radiation exposure were similar to the Fukushima health survey rate.

In particular, the study of three Japanese prefectures (Aomori, Yamanashi and Nagasaki) was initially intended to be used as a control group for the Fukushima health survey; therefore, the period of implementation, age distribution, and procedure of screening were similar to those of the survey. Thus, it is highly reliable for comparison. (Taniguchi, et al., 2013) The prevalence in that study was 230 per million, and the rate of other studies was consistent with it.

Tsuda et al. (2016b) failed to refute these data, except at Okayama University (backing 2). For the data of Okayama University, the prevalence calculated from their asserted data (4 out of 36927) was 80 per million, which is 6.7 times higher than the rate used as a reference in the paper, which weakens their conclusions. Tsuda et al., however, did not provide any discussion of this result.

Based on these data, it is reasonable to estimate that the baseline rate is on the order of hundreds, and it is almost the same as the level observed in the Fukushima health survey. Thus, the effect of screening can explain the 30-fold excess in the incidence rate, and the warrant "the difference is so large that the screening effect cannot explain it" is hard to hold. The lacking of the warrant significantly weaken the argument of Tsuda et al.

Tsuda et al. (2016b) cited the Chernobyl data as counterevidence (backing 1), but it did not strengthen the argument. Their warrant is "the difference is so big that it cannot be explained by the screening effect," so if the young Japanese population’s prevalence data could explain the reason for the 30-fold difference, other data does help to establish the warrant. Besides, the Chernobyl data did not weaken the credibility of the data in Japan. The reliability of the Japanese data is higher than that of the Chernobyl data because the data of the three prefectures in Japan have the similar medical skills, performance of the equipment used, screening criteria and the age distribution of target population.

Back 3 asserted that screening effects cannot explain the new detection of cancers in the second screening (eight cases: incident rate ratio = 12 with 3 years as a latent duration). The backing, however, assumed the reference incident rate from the National Cancer Registry. Namely, the controversial incident rate was used as the premise during the argument over what value was the true incident rate. The logic of the backing circulates and does not reinforced the warrant 2.

3.5. Argument on screening data in South Korea
As for the screening effects in South Korea,
Tsuda et al. (2016b) refuted "screening in South Korea was conducted among adults with different diagnostic criteria from Fukushima, where one quarter of surgical patients had tumors less than 5.0 mm in diameter." (backing 4)

The difference in the target age is not a valid rebuttal. The cancer detection rate depends on the performance of the equipment used and the medical practitioner's skill, and the cancer detection rates would not differ between adults and children for cancers of the same size. On the other hand, cancer diagnosis (biopsy), including smaller nodules, can be reasonably estimated to increase cancer detection rate. Tsuda et al. might argue that if the screening effect in South Korea induced a 15-fold increase of detection, screening effects should be discounted by 25%, 11-fold at most, and was not enough to explain a 30-fold increase.

However, this counterargument ignores the fact that South Korea’s detection rate increased “in direct proportion to the percentage of screened people,” as pointed out by Wakeford et al. (2016). The participation rate in South Korea screening is only approximately 10% to 25% (Ahn, et al., 2014), while that of Fukushima is 74% to 88%, which is several times higher than that of South Korea. Therefore, extrapolating the Fukushima participation rate to the South Korea data gives the same level of screening effects as the Fukushima survey. Therefore, the experience of South Korea can be additional evidence to deny to hold warrant 2 and significantly weakens the argument.

4. DISCUSSION

4.1. Lessons learned from the perspective of an epidemiological study
The geographical analysis of prevalence is a useful method for some cases such as preventing infectious diseases. Suppose an infectious disease concentrically spreads from a well; the well may be the source of infection. The analysis method is useful and has no other practical way for non-quantitative exposure, such as exposure to a virus. However, in cases of quantitative exposure such as radiation exposure, geographical distribution of prevalence is not suitable and accurate to assess the exposure. Even in the same regional district, the ambient radiation dose rate varied geographically and temporally. The radiation dose exposure depends on when and where children were located. Actually, immediately after the outbreak of the accident, the government of Japan ordered residents within 20 km from the affected plant to evacuate. They left their residential areas for various destinations including those outside of Fukushima prefecture through various routes and timings. (Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations, 2012) Thus, it is unreliable to assume that the address in 11 districts in Fukushima before the accident can represent their radiation dose exposure in the early stages of the accident. No matter how researchers analyze unreliable data, it cannot improve the reliability of the conclusions drawn.

4.2. Effectiveness of Informal Logic Model
The current paper's analysis shows that the informal logic model is useful for the analysis of argumentation. A simple fact check cannot handle the complex argument using many pieces of evidence. Evidence does not constitute argumentation by itself; rather, structural components construct argumentation. Argument analysis needs to clarify whether each component of the argument is well established or not, in other words, strong or weak, whereas the analysis does not judge which argument is correct or incorrect.

The analysis of the argument using the informal logic model can help a third party to judge the result of the debate by clarifying the strong and weak points. The analysis can also foster a rational debate by identifying the point to be argued further. Sharing the points of discussion can encourage both parties to research questions lacking evidence and to deepen their analysis for resolving the issue. Argumentation analysis is particularly essential when data and definitive evidence are insufficient or lacking because, with definitive evidence, the conclusions are definite and no debate occurs.

4.3. Lessons learned from Argumentation pedagogy
A number of epidemiological papers have attempted to draw intentional conclusions from inadequate epidemiological evidence. Two characteristics were observed in such studies. The first was that the author had strong beliefs in a specific direction and lacked a critical thinking disposition. The second was that the epidemiological data were incomplete or biased.
When the two overlapped, the paper had high potential to conclude inadequate epidemiological analysis in a manner consistent with the authors’ beliefs. Many studies emphasized the necessity of critical thinking as a prerequisite for establishing a rational debate (e.g., Colbert, 1987). Full employment of critical thinking needs to include not only critical thinking skills but also its affective disposition to make use of these skills (Ennis, 1987) (Facione, 1990). Facione (1990) summarizes the list of affective dispositions to be good critical thinkers based on a consensus of experts. The list includes dispositions such as “honesty in facing one’s own biases, prejudices, stereotypes, egocentric or sociocentric tendencies” and “willingness to reconsider and revise views where honest reflection suggests that change is warranted.” (Facione, 1990)

To realize a rational debate on health risks, criticizing the study from an epidemiological perspective is not sufficient, and fostering an affective disposition of critical thinking in the authors is necessary. It is beyond this paper's scope to discuss what kind of efforts are effective to cultivate critical thinking dispositions for researchers in natural sciences. At present, to avoid bias in research results, research papers of natural sciences (especially medical science) are obliged to specify conflicts of interest. However, there is no education to foster critical thinking dispositions in higher education in the natural sciences in Japan. There is no doubt need for further study of argument pedagogy to enhance the dispositions in natural science researchers.

5. CONCLUSION

Few studies have analyzed arguments on health risks. A couple of reasons may explain this lack of research. Sufficient knowledge on informal logic and training in argumentation skill is prerequisite to unearth the week points of arguments that seem sound prima facie and to explain them. Furthermore, researchers need to have expertise in the field of natural sciences for analyzing the arguments on health risks. Hence, an interdisciplinary approach is indispensable for conducting such research. These difficulties do not lessen the need to analyze arguments on health risk. To generate productive dialogues and rational debate on the issue, further studies are warranted.

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An Examination of Source Credibility of Evidence in Japanese Debate: From the Aspect of Critical Thinking Disposition

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This study investigated, using questionnaires and interviews, the attitudes of debaters who have experienced junior and senior high school debate tournaments to find whether they approached information sources with critical thinking disposition in selecting evidence and examining evidence-based arguments. The results showed that they knew basic principles of evidence (critical assessments of source credibility and the importance of quoting from credible sources) but did not always act accordingly. Also, some students did not exercise critical thinking disposition to refute or indict the weakness of source credibility during the competition, given the difficulty of such refutation and the weight of other factors in the strategic choice of arguments. There are reasons behind such practices. One is that some students want to find “quotable” texts to directly support their claims regardless of source credibility. Another is that some debaters find it easier for the judges to accept arguments supported by evidence from low-credibility sources than those without any evidence at all.

1. INTRODUCTION

The debate is often used as a practical way to develop students’ critical thinking (CT). In “policy debate,” one type of academic debate, debaters quote “evidence” from published sources in the style of direct quotations to support their arguments. This evidence significantly affects the outcome of debate because it is theoretically the foundation of all arguments (e.g., Nakazawa, 1996). When selecting evidence from a variety of information and using it, debate requires CT to appropriately evaluate the credibility of information sources, contents, and to quote them accurately (Freeley & Steinberg, 2014).

Source credibility is closely related to the overall credibility of the evidence as many debate textbooks suggest (e.g., Ando & Tadokoro, 2002; Tenpaku, 2007; Nakazawa, 1996; Kruger, 1960). Ziegelmueller and Kay (1997) stated, “the credibility of factual and expert opinion evidence is, in large part, dependent on the ability and willingness of a source to perceive and interpret the situation accurately and fairly” (p. 88). However, source credibility of evidence does not seem to be emphasized in competitive interscholastic debate in practice. Trapp (1993) criticized the fact that debaters read the evidence quickly, without considering the rationale on which the opinion was based and the credibility of the sources. Fine (2001)’s ethnographic study of the high school debate clarified that “few pieces of evidence are indicted in the round over the qualification of the source, except for a few controversial individuals or organizations” (p. 74). Debate educators such as Cram (2012), and Ulrich (1986), warned that the source credibility has been undervalued in debate. Most of previous writings refer to debate practices in the United States, while research in Japan has not studied the credibility of information sources in detail, except for my own works (Zhang, 2017; 2019).

Due to the diversification of searching methods and the development of technology, a large amount of information with mixed quality can be discovered; hence, making a critical judgment on the source credibility of information is necessary when selecting evidence. This paper’s purpose is to conduct qualitative research on the use of evidence in Japanese debate for better future argumentation and CT education. This study used questionnaires and interviews with debaters who have experienced junior and senior high school debate tournaments (so-called Debate Koshien) in Japan to determine whether they approached information sources with a CT disposition in selecting evidence and examining
2. RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE AND METHOD

2.1 Research Perspective: Critical Thinking Disposition

Recently, CT has increasingly attracted considerable attention due to its educational merits against the backdrop of a rapidly evolving information society. In Japan, various efforts have been undertaken to develop CT, such as debate activities and other classroom lessons. Cognitive abilities/skills and affective dispositions are the two primary CT dimensions. CT abilities/skills are concerned with clarification of issues, examinations of sources and contents of information, validity of inferences, etc. Affective dispositions include items related to the willingness or attitude to think critically by executing CT abilities/skills (e.g., Facione, 1990; Siegel, 1988; Ennis, 1987). It also includes some critical spirit, personal traits, or habits of the mind to doubt information credibility (Facione, 1990; D’Angelo, 1971), to seek diverse knowledge and information (Ennis, 1987; D’Angelo, 1971), to fairly appraise one’s own and others’ argument and evidence (Paul, 1995), to use reliable sources of information and make judgments upon valid evidence (Ennis, 1987; Kusumi, 2011), and to pursue alternatives for claims that seem weak in reason (Ennis, 1987; D’Angelo, 1971).

To become a good critical thinker, CT abilities/skills are not enough; one must develop those thinking dispositions. Full employment of CT must include its dispositions to make use of the given abilities/skills (Ennis, 1987; Facione, 1990; Siegel, 1988; Wade, 1997). In addition, the cultivation of these dispositions is particularly essential to transfer CT across domains (Kusumi, 2011; Halpern, 1998; Edman, 2008). Depending on the situational factors such as purpose and time, which influence judgments related to CT, even if people possess CT abilities/skills, they may not exercise them, or, even if they apply CT abilities/skills and dispositions, they may not turn their judgments into actions, e.g., in writing and speaking (Tanaka & Kusumi, 2007; Tanaka, 2009; Kusumi, 2010).

Previous studies have extensively discussed the effects of CT ability development and debate education (e.g., Colbert, 1987; Hill, 1993). However, few studies have investigated CT disposition and its effects on the debate. None of them analyzed CT disposition towards the selection and evaluation of evidence for competitive debate.

Accordingly, this research will clarify whether debaters approached the source credibility of information/evidence with a CT disposition by analyzing the following three questions: (1) What criteria do debaters use to find evidence from the information?; (2) Do debaters evaluate the source credibility of information/evidence?; and (3) Do debaters pay attention to the credibility of the source cited by the opposite side during the competition?. The analysis and discussion will also consider possible reasons when debaters’ CT disposition is apparently inhibited.

2.2 Research Methods

The questionnaire survey in this study was carried out at the Debate Koshien National Tournament held in Tokyo from August 4 to 6, 2018. The question items consisted of 19 questions about the qualitative evaluation of the evidence and 12 questions about the citation method. A total of 430 questionnaires were distributed, and the number of responses was 260. Of these, 241 were valid responses, resulting in 56% of the total (101 junior high school students, 53 males and 48 females, 65 debaters with more than one year of debating experience; 140 high school students, 82 males and 58 females, 101 with more than one year of debating experience). Individual and group interviews were conducted with debaters from eight schools, who were taking breaks during the competition after explaining the purpose to them. Additional interviews were conducted with seven Japanese university students who had participated in other occasions. When interviewing university students, they were asked to recall their experiences of participating in the Debate Koshien and describe their preparation for it.

All interviews were conducted in Japanese, recorded with permission, and transcribed by the author for analysis. The excerpts in this paper were translated into English by the author.
3. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

3.1 Finding Evidence
For efficient CT, it is first crucial to accurately understand the underlying information and perform an appropriate analysis, including assumptions, argument structures, and definitions (Ennis, 1987; Facione, 1990; Kusumi, 2011). Hence, it is necessary to critically read the material to grasp the context, obtain sufficient information, and understand the content. This is also vital for evaluating source credibility (Inch & Warnick, 2011; Herrick, 1995). Ziegelmueller and Kay (1997) highlighted that “we must look carefully at the premises, facts, and opinions expressed by a source to determine whether or not they are consistent with each other. Inconsistencies between or among premises, facts, and opinions expressed by a single source raise serious questions concerning the credibility of the source of data” (p. 81). Knowing how the debater searches for and extracts evidence from various sources of information helps predict the degree of emphasis placed on source credibility. This was revealed by the interviews.

Generally, the resolution of Debate Koshien is announced about half a year before the national debate tournament. After the announcement, the debaters start with a general survey mainly using search engines such as Google, Yahoo!, as well as reading books and newspaper articles, while referring to the commentary on the resolution released by the tournament organizer. They search the information around the topic by arranging the keywords in search engines, addressing what the issues are, and where the issues are contested. After narrowing down the important issues and subordinate claims to some extent, they begin to understand more specific information for supporting their claims and arguments. They search for such content by typing specific sentences or phrases that represent their claims. If the identified content is considered useful by debaters through this process, chunks of texts will be extracted and accumulated as a collection of evidence.

The interviews also reveal ways of how and how much information to read. These aspects depend on certain criteria, such as the amount of time, the length of retrieved texts, and the researcher (one’s own research or someone else’s). Some debaters try to confirm the whole text by reading the information from beginning to end, while others attempt reading the full text only when it is short. Furthermore, some debaters try to interpret the author’s intention correctly by reading the texts before and after what they want to quote. Others only read the texts they intend to quote. And some debaters only thoroughly scrutinize the information they find but do not do so about the information found by other team members.

Debaters seemed to focus more on whether the discovered source included the sentences and phrases they wanted to use to support their claims. One of the interviewees clearly stated that the evidence’s value depends on whether the useful phrases are written in:

It is a characteristic of debate; time is limited, well, short, and easy-to-understand statements are essential evidence for winning the round. Of course, what the author wants to convey is very important when reading. However, when it comes to evidence for debate, a good text is judged on whether [what a debater wants is explicitly] written as a criterion for the value of evidence. When searching for debate evidence, as a reading method, I first give a cursory reading and then pick up the place where I think certain words are good. (A female senior high school student with 4 years of debate experience).

From the above mentioned, one of the debater’s criteria to decide whether the information can be extracted as evidence is based upon its content, such as “good sentences and words.” Previous studies have also indicated this point. For example, Cram (2012) pointed out that “The digital manipulation of evidence enables researchers to more directly render text into the specific language or claims needed for debates over ‘what the evidence literally says’ in ways that speak to the needs of debate strategy as opposed to the facts of the issue. This incentivizes research that can pinpoint specific wording or verbiage over researching the strength of competing claims or the merit of the source, which is exacerbated by the current agnosticism in source quality” (p. 146). Debaters should be advised to read and understand the entire material critically, confirming that the quote corresponds with the author’s intention, in order not only to obtain accurate and sufficient content from various information but also to quote from reliable sources.

Nevertheless, it is not easy in practice to request debaters to conform to this principle...
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strictly because it requires considerable time and energy to read the whole text for every piece of information. Freeley and Steinberg (2014) proposed that, since advocates cannot read all information, sources including scholarly and professional journals, qualified authorities, competent and objective persons, and those who have a reputation for accuracy should be given priority for careful, detailed study. Others also argued that debaters need to focus on or select specific or highly reliable sources to quote (e.g., Edwards, 2008; Nakazawa, 1996). In other words, it is considered more efficient to extract the evidence from a highly reliable source. Do debaters judge sources’ credibility when looking for evidence, or are they citing sources from highly reliable sources?

3.2 Source Credibility

As mentioned beforehand, it is essential to exercise critical judgment on the credibility of information sources when selecting evidence. Ennis (1987), Facione (1990), and Kusumi (2011) also recommend the use of reliable sources from the perspective of CT dispositions. Regarding source credibility, some items need to be examined based on debate textbooks: source identification, source accessibility (geographical/chronological), experience, ability, expertise, self-interest, past reputation, moral character, and internal/external consistencies in statements (e.g., Freeley & Steinberg, 2014; Ziegelmueller, Harris, & Bloomingdale, 1995). Upon this, the questionnaires and interviews yielded some findings to verify whether the debaters judged source credibility and its determination method, followed by particular attention to “authority” in evidence.

In the questionnaire, 150 out of 241 respondents selected the answer always judge when asked “When quoting evidence, do you judge whether the sources are credible?” When examining the evidence, the interviews showed that some debaters first looked at the source and then confirmed the content, while others focused on the content from the beginning. Concerning the source credibility, they first tried to verify who published the information and whether their identity was apparent. Therefore, debaters are aware that it is not appropriate to quote from blogs or Wikipedia where the author’s identity is not specified3. Some debaters also considered the presence of reasons for the author’s opinion, the author’s career, experience, job title, objectivity, authority, year of publication, etc.

When quoting the evidence, it is necessary to read three elements (author’s name, title, and publication year) of the source to the judges in the debate speech, as stipulated in the rules of Debate Koshien4. The debaters, in turn, seemed to confirm these, as one debater’s response testified in an interview: “Rather than quoting nothing, if we know the job title, author’s name, and year of publication, our argument will become more credible than such argument that with no evidence quoted.” If debaters can identify these three elements, they will believe that the source has a certain degree of credibility.

When asked, “Do you trust the literature if it is published?” 68 respondents out of 240 chose always trust and 124 chose often trust, indicating that most debaters seemed to trust the published literature. This and the above interview excerpts point to their agreement that the evidence has a certain degree of credibility if the source is published and the author is identified. Thus, some debaters judge these sources worth quoting as evidence. This finding raises the question of whether the information is deemed quotable in students’ minds even if its source is not highly reliable. This was reflected in their answers to the question: “Do you use information even if the source has low credibility but contains the content you want?” There was a degree of similarity between the number of debaters who used low-credibility sources (always use (15), often use (17), sometimes use (82); 114 debaters in total) and those who rarely used these sources (do not use much (88), never use (39); 127 debaters in total).

The questionnaire also included another question: “In support of your claim, even if the quality of the evidence cited is not good, do you think it is better than no evidence quotation at all?” The results showed that more debaters (158 out of 240) thought that quoting evidence was better than no quotations—even if the weak quality (the result of considering both the source and the content) of that evidence. That is, even if the source of information was not highly reliable, debaters may extract evidence from it and use it in the competition.

Furthermore, if the source was not highly reliable, some debaters tried to search for more reliable evidence. If they could not find such a required evidence type, they reconsidered their argument as weak and did not use it. CT dispositions also encourage to withhold conclusions and consider other alternatives if insufficient information or reasons are found.
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(Ennis, 1987; D’Angelo, 1971). However, since some debaters pursued “good phrases and sentences,” they used them even if the source had little credibility. As one debater said, when there is a lot of information that expresses what he wants to quote, he will choose the more reliable one; when the information is little, however, he uses it as long as it is not from an anonymous site.

Moreover, many debaters seemed to believe that, regardless of the degree of source credibility, it is easier to get their arguments accepted by the judges by quoting evidence from a published third party rather than saying it in their own words without evidence quotations. In a comparable U.S. context, Winebrenner (1995) also expressed concern about such practice: “Contemporary debate practice, with few exceptions, treats all testimony as equal. An evidence claim, no matter how poorly reasoned, is assumed superior to an unverified claim, no matter how well intuitively sound that claim might be” (p. 27). However, debate textbooks published in Japan and the U.S. had different teaching. Ando and Tadokoro (2002) stated that the existence of evidence alone does not determine a win—it is the job of the debater to advocate the superiority of their own evidence and indict the deficiencies of their opponents (p. 85). Besides, Tenpaku (2007) mentioned that “it is difficult to trust something as evidence if the source is not reliable, no matter how good the content is” (2.2 probative value, §2 credibility, paragraph 1). Hence, it is necessary to focus on the quality of sources and content more than symbolically or ritualistically quoting the evidence, from a certain pedagogic viewpoint.

“Authority” is one of the criteria that reflect the source credibility both in debating and CT in general (e.g., Tenpaku, 2007; Freeley & Steinberg, 2014; Inch & Warnick, 2011). Regarding the “authority” of an information source, the reference points of evaluation include expertise, skill, knowledge, credentials, reputation among the peers, qualifications, published work, etc. (e.g., Eisenberg & Iiardo, 1980; Rybacki & Rybacki, 2012). In the current questionnaire, 113 debaters out of 240 answered that they always investigate the author’s expertise or authoritativeness when asked the following question: “If the evidence cited is the author’s opinion, do you investigate whether the author is an expert or has authority?” How do debaters then make a specific judgment?

Interviews revealed that some debaters judged the source’s “authority” by investigating knowledge, experience, and relationships to the topic’s field. Even for experts, they tried to confirm whether their research fields matched, exhibiting a CT disposition. There seems to be a general recognition among the debaters about what kinds of sources are desirable to quote. According to them, the statements of university professors are considered quite trustworthy and often quoted. When quoting the professor’s statement, it is necessary to verify his/her specialization, related research directions, etc. However, some debaters said, “I look at the profile and field of the professor,” while others clearly stated, “I do not look at it at all” and “I trust it unconsciously.” Based on the interview, it seemed that debaters give much credit to papers written by professors, as they did not take further steps to examine the professors’ research. Moreover, if the professor’s specialty was not particularly inconsistent with the debate topic’s area, their statement was quoted as evidence.

It is important to be suspicious of any information without believing it immediately (e.g., Michida, 2000; D’Angelo, 1971). The debaters might not exercise CT dispositions in evaluating professors’ remarks. Also, previous studies disclosed that the source of information is easily trusted if the author is a professor or an expert (Tanaka, 2009; Beins, 2008). Similarly, they noted that the CT attitude/disposition is easily inhibited in these conditions. However, Miyamoto (1997) stated that the foundation of CT is “a doubtful mind.” Nakazawa (1996) also remarked that CT is the disposition and ability to reconsider what is considered conventional. Furthermore, Palmer (2012) explained that “arguing from authority is an appropriate strategy when a person is an expert in the field you are discussing; however, part of your job as a critical thinker is to determine whether a person truly is an authority” (p. 75). Therefore, even for experts, such as professors, one should practice applying CT attitudes to consider specific information—for example, why they are authoritative and whether they have enough knowledge and experience to discuss the topic, as well as their potential biases due to their own interests and stakes in their research.

3.3 Arguing against Source Credibility

CT dispositions are required not only for one’s own argument but also for the opponents’ claim and evidence. As discussed earlier, not all
debaters always quote evidence from reliable sources. The debaters seem to be conscious of this; therefore, it can be predicted that, during the competition, the debaters will pay attention to the reliability of the source cited by their opponents with a CT disposition and point it out in the cross-examination or rebuttal speech if they find that the sources have little or no credibility. Debate textbooks also explain the rebuttal against the source credibility of opponents as one of the refutation methods (e.g., Patterson & Zarefsky, 1983; Ando & Tadokoro, 2002). Do the debaters focus on the credibility of the source cited by the opposite side during the competition?

After confirming this point in the interview, the following responses were given by some debaters:

I place importance on the contents first, so I look at them, rather than credibility….Even if you say in your own words that the evidence is not credible, the judge will wonder why it is not credible. For the judge, the reasoning is unclear. Thus, there is a possibility that judges will not take our arguments over source credibility. If I have time, I will [spend it to] defend the contents [of our own arguments] (A male junior high school student with 3 years of experience)

Rather than saying that there is no point in refuting source credibility, I think the time is limited…Hence, even if the opponent’s materials lack credibility, if I can only compete there, I will say it. But since there probably are other criteria, I think it’s best to win by paying attention to these other criteria, so I usually overlook them. (A female junior high school student with 1.2 years of experience)

According to the first debater above, if he had the same or competing evidence, he could argue that the evidence lacked credibility by specifically pointing to the problem. However, without such evidence, it is difficult to refute credibility. This is similar to another debater’s opinion: “If we know the person isn’t an expert, that’s great, but if we don’t know, we can’t point out anything.” Debaters read the author’s name, title, and year of publication before reading the evidence’s contents during the competition, but they do not always disclose the author’s background in detail. Accordingly, when the same evidence is not at hand, it is difficult to immediately judge whether the source is reliable after hearing the source’s title presented by the opponent. In addition, some debaters responded in the interview that they would not attack the source unless it was the only way to compete on the issue the evidence was concerned with, as in the second testimony above.

Since there is limited speech time during a debate round (one rebuttal speech is three minutes in the junior high school format and four minutes in the senior high school format), debaters cannot refute all arguments and pieces of evidence. Therefore, they need to make a proper refutation choice to guarantee winning (Ziegelmueller & Kay, 1997; Matsumoto, 2006). Debaters also said they could not convince the judges to discard the evidence entirely, even if indicting the source credibility. Consequently, they considered it an object of refutation only when they did not have other ways to refute the argument at hand. On the contrary, one debater said that he often suspects the unreliability of the contents if the source credibility is low. Another debater announced that she cast doubt in her mind on the credibility of the source cited by opponents. However, both debaters considered source credibility as a secondary priority resulting from weighing it against the overall win and loss in the particular round. Fine (2001) declared that “given the amount of information in a round, and given the reality that debaters do not have ‘indicts’ on any but a few critical sources, this contributes to a culture in which one source tends to be as good as another” (p. 74). Similarly, Ulrich (1986) also criticized that the evidence is assumed to be true as long as it appears on the evidence card. There seems to be a similar tendency in the Japanese debate.

In a debate, the direct goal is to persuade the judge. To have the judge accept their arguments and win their ballots, the debaters, of course, engage in argumentation according to the judge’s judging criteria. From the above responses, there is some awareness among the debaters that arguing over source credibility does not lead to winning. According to the provided experiences, different judges place different degrees of emphasis on credibility. Another interview about this topic revealed the following:

The results will differ even depending on the judges in different regions. Some judges decide who wins based on the source credibility of the constructive speech, or some others decide by watching
the flow of the competition on the assumption that the information is entirely correct for the time being. As far as I hear these judgments, where the emphasis occurred is wholly different…” (A female senior high school student with 2 years of debate experience)

CT is goal-directed in its nature; therefore, its utilization depends on the goal setting (e.g., Paul, 1995; Tanaka & Kusumi, 2007). Surely, debaters consider winning the round/tournament a direct/immediate goal. Therefore, even if they have dispositions to think critically, it can be predicted that they may suppress those dispositions after considering such a goal. This point also surfaced in the interviews. Debaters think that a practice of critically examining and evaluating the credibility of a source before the round, and pointing it out and refuting it during the round, does not usually lead to winning. Thus, they suppress their CT dispositions, or they may find weaknesses in source credibility but do not express it in speech.

From the results of the above interviews and questionnaire responses, we find that debaters do not quote all their evidence from credible sources. Nevertheless, during the competition, they try not to argue about credibility; additionally, some judges neglect the importance of source credibility. The following interview answers confirm the above:

Even if the source is not credible, I feel it is OK to quote. There is no indictment about the source. High-level schools also use it, so even if it is not credible, I would like to try using them, so it is not indicted very much. (A female junior high school student with 2.8 years of experience)

Rather than arguing about authority, the one who crushes the argument content tends to win. Consequently, nobody will point out the problem of or refute the credibility of the source. Hence, some low-authority materials and sloppy quotes appear. (A male college student with 3 years of experience)

The first debater emphasized a lack of indictments about sources; in addition, she talked about high-level schools that quoted the low-credibility sources in competition. The second debater thought that some low-authority sources and sloppy quotations emerged because all ignored the source credibility. We can infer that neither the judge nor the debater emphasizes source credibility; thus, various sources with low credibility may have appeared in the competition.

In the limited speech time of the debate tournament, it is necessary to be careful about time allocation when examining the argument. It may be impossible to impose the demands of critically doubting and evaluating the credibility of all the sources of evidence in the competition. It is also impossible for junior and senior high school debaters to do all the background checks of authors they encounter during the debate season. It may be the case that many of the low-quality sources are in fact eliminated through the shared practices of research, practice rounds, and local/national rounds (or at least it is so hoped) (N. Inoue, personal communication, July 12th, 2020). However, saying that one cannot argue about credibility during a particular round does not lead to the conclusion that one can use less credible sources. The purpose of debate education is to build persuasive arguments and foster CT. Thus, it is valuable to make an argument about credibility when realizing that a source’s reliability is low. Besides, if individual debaters emphasize source credibility from the beginning of the process of selecting evidence, there may be no need to argue about it during the competition.

4. CONCLUSION

By conducting questionnaires and interviews, this paper has clarified the debaters’ attitudes towards the credibility of the source of information/evidence from the perspective of CT disposition. As a result, we find the following attitudes and behaviors. When selecting the evidence, debaters evaluate the source credibility within a specific range. They tend to confirm who sends the information and their minimum qualifications such as their affiliation (job title). Some debaters also study the presence of reasons for the author’s conclusion, objectivity, experience, and authority of the sources during the evaluation process. When discovering no credible sources, some debaters judge that the argument they constructed as weak, and hence do not use those low-quality sources. Therefore, these debaters are supposed to have the disposition to think critically.
Furthermore, some debaters consider the identification of the author’s name, title, and year of publication as standard criteria for source credibility. Also, a “good phrase or sentence” (i.e., directly supporting the intended claim) is considered one of the judging criteria that determine whether the evidence should be recorded for use, rather than the source credibility. Thus, some debaters cite well-phrased evidence from low-credibility sources. In addition, some debaters who do not cite evidence from high-quality sources think that quotations from unreliable sources are better than no quotations for the judges to accept their arguments.

Even if debaters have CT dispositions, some do not exercise those dispositions to argue against the credibility of sources during the competition, given the difficulty of arguing and weight of other factors in judging. They think that attacking a source’s credibility cannot lead to winning; thus, although they find that low-credibility sources are quoted by the opponent, they do not indict it. Moreover, some debaters seem to have suppressed CT disposition from the beginning. Since source credibility is not usually indicted and power-house schools well-known among debaters also use low-quality sources, some debaters consider it acceptable to quote it in the competition even if it is not highly credible. In addition, someone accept university professors’ statements as credible without critically scrutinizing their specialty and research.

Due to the limited number, location, and time of interviews and questionnaires conducted for this analysis, we should avoid applying the above findings to all junior and senior high school debaters in Japan. Furthermore, since the quality of the evidence is also subject to the quality of its contents, I would like to consider the debaters’ attitudes towards the reliability of the information content as a future topic. It will further clarify the relationship among different aspects of CT applicable to evidence in debate and other contexts of CT application, all of which have time and other constraints that preventing exhaustive efforts of critical evaluation of all the aspects of the available evidence.

NOTES

*1. Debate Koshien is a tournament held in August every year, targeting junior high and high school students nationwide to decide the national champions in Japan. Local preliminaries are held in June and July.

*2. Debaters do use this loanword from English. It usually refers to a job title and a field of specialization, e.g., professor of economics.

*3. This does not mean debaters do not quote evidence from blogs. Those better-quality blogs should be distinguished from low-quality, anonymous blogs.


*5. In Debate Koshien, unlike in the U.S. Policy Debate and intercollegiate English debating in Japan, specific judging philosophy statements are not available, but debaters may know which judge is more open to evidence attack from the shared experiences and other means.

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Kyushu Debate Workshops: A Rationale for Policy Debate Training

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Since 1958, argument scholars all over the world have defined argument in alignment with Stephen Toulmin’s description in his groundbreaking book, *The Uses of Argument*. Toulmin claimed that the three core ingredients of an argument include a claim, a warrant, and data. Perhaps no other exercise better trains students in the construction, defense, and rebuttal of argument than competitive debate. It can be argued given its emphasis on research, policy debate fosters the best training for all three of the core elements of argument (whereas other debate formats focus on only claims and warrants). While policy debate still thrives in the United States, it is nearly absent elsewhere in the world, falling prey to the hegemony of parliamentary debate. In this paper, however, I describe one last bastion of policy debate pedagogy outside of the U.S. – Kyushu University in Japan. During the many Kyushu debate workshops, students are introduced to, and then trained in, policy debate. While most of the debaters go on to compete in parliamentary tournaments, their training in policy debate helps them research current topics and critically question the types of evidence (or absence of evidence) presented by their opponents. As such, this paper argues that the Kyushu policy workshop is not only unique as an example of policy debate outside the United States, but it also serves as an exemplar for debate workshops around the globe for producing well-rounded practitioners of argument – and all of its key components.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

In post-truth world filled with misinformation, fake news, and politicians winning elections based on affect rather than reason, it has become imperative that citizens learn how to identify weak arguments and be able to defend political positions of their own with evidence and solid reasoning. Indeed, we live in a conjunctural moment filled with uncertainty and an inability to think critically when it concerns arguments. For many, the political process is daunting, thereby fostering a sense of inadequacy and confusion. For others, while the Internet promised available information at our fingertips, it instead has created information overload, where citizens are bombarded with information 24/7, and much of that information is conflicting. The idea of being a critically-informed citizen can be overwhelming, and for the majority of citizens around the globe, they simply rely on what others say who have theoretically processed the information, or they simply try to ignore the social, economic, and political world around them as if they play no part in its operations.

The problem, of course, is that if we believe that democracy has value and offers hope for a better future, then it requires citizen involvement. Furthermore, people who rely on the information processing of others open themselves up to receiving inaccurate, even dangerous, information. What is needed is a concerted pedagogical effort at teaching citizens how to identify arguments, then critique them, and then offer a reasoned defense of their own positions; in short, people need to be taught how to think. Many scholars have lamented the current state of affairs, but they have found a glimmer of hope in debate training and competition, arguing that debate fosters critical thinking skills and the type of advocacy skills necessary for a functioning democracy.

To complicate matters, there are a variety of debate formats, and each one has its proponents who often criticize and demean the other options. Unfortunately, the one area of education that could possibly make the world a better place is riddled with squabbles, which provides critics of debate ammunition for their rebukes. While I believe that all debate is valuable, I will be arguing in this paper that policy debate offers a
unique format that best trains individuals how to think critically by defending and countering arguments. As such, I will focus on a specific case study of a policy debate training workshop where international students learn the process and application of policy debate. I end this project by examining the effectiveness of training policy debate in general, and the value of the workshop in particular. Ultimately, even if readers do not share my perspective about policy debate, I hope they will join me in advocating for debate pedagogy as a means to improve the quality of arguments in political discourse.

2.0 ARGUMENT IN CONTEXT

Since 1958, argument scholars all over the world have defined argument in alignment with Stephen Toulmin’s description in his groundbreaking book, *The Uses of Argument*. Toulmin claimed that the three core ingredients of an argument include a claim, a warrant, and data. Perhaps no other exercise better trains students in the construction, defense, and rebuttal of argument than competitive debate. It can be argued given its emphasis on research, policy debate fosters the best training for all three of the core elements of argument (whereas other debate formats focus on only claims and warrants).

2.1 Educational Institutions

Although there are very few criticisms of debate as an educational process, one will be hard pressed to find debate in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. Many school districts provide public speaking classes that are either compulsory or electives. While public speaking is extremely valuable, its focus is on presentation and delivery, with only a cursory and superficial glance at the use of argument in persuasive speaking – and that is if it is included at all. Some schools offer debate as an extra-curricular activity, but rarely is debate presented as a class. Even in the unusual instance when debate classes exist, they are electives, meaning that only students who are already predisposed to thinking critically will likely enroll in the course. The students who really need the class are typically never exposed to its subject matter.

This phenomenon is not specific to the United States. Although, in most parts of the world, debate courses are even more scarce. The United States has a long history of teaching debate, focused primarily on training students for academic competitions, but also as an extension of public speaking. In fact, nowhere else in the world does debate exist in this sort of context. Where debate does exist, it almost always viewed as an extra-curricular activity. Additionally, in some countries, like the United Kingdom, debate is not affiliated with schools at all. It exists because clubs have been formed simply due to the interest young people may have in arguing.

Furthermore, not only do our educational institutions not teach debate, but they also generally do not teach argument or critical thinking either. Many school districts, particularly in the U.S., morph classes to appear as if they teach critical thinking, but they either do not actually teach it, or they define critical thinking so broadly that it operationally could encompass almost any subject. In either case, the value of actual argument training is diluted, and students do not learn how to effectively – or usefully – argue or think critically. Some readers may contest my pessimistic view of our primary and secondary school systems. Of course, there are exceptions. And even in the case where critical thinking and argument are taught in non-debate situations, such classes rarely focus or emphasize the development and critique of argument, nor do they make critical thinking the focus of the course. Additionally, adding debate courses to teach this material would only supplement any current efforts, rather than supplant them. As is frequently the case with education, repetition and applying concepts in different contexts will yield better learning and retention.

2.2 Our Post-Truth World

As if the state of affairs of our educational systems was not bad enough, we also are living in a so-called “post-truth” world. Various definitions of post-truth exist, but generally it refers to a culture where truth is no longer important, valued, or necessary when communicating. While the obvious reaction to this perspective is that without truth we have no bearings on how to evaluate competing claims or even a barometer to gauge the validity of statements, proponents of the post-truth era respond with a position premised on *pathos*. Affect, or emotional appeals, govern our reasoning now, so their argument goes, which means there is no longer any need to use or view *logos* appeals. And, if our response and adherence to statements are affective in nature, then we no longer need to concern ourselves with...
things such as facts, logic, or truth because our new truth is formed based on how the statement makes us feel.

A post-truth society also fosters a climate where fake news runs rampant. While American president Donald Trump frequently invokes the term “fake news” to refer to any news with which he disagrees, the concept of fake news can also actually mean “fake” news, i.e., news that is untrue, fabricated, or embellished to the point of constituting virtually no resemblance to the truth. Webpages that mimic legitimate news sources publish concocted stories that have no basis in reality. The user-generated nature of the Internet permits average people to blog about their opinions with no evidentiary support. Self-proclaimed journalists who are actually entertainers or pundits who polarize for profit fabricate statistics or examples to legitimize their stories or justify their claims. And, despite his attacks against what he calls “fake news,” Donald Trump engages in his own fake news by utilizing hyperbole or outright lying. Regardless of the manner of fake news, it is almost omnipresent as it festers and spreads virally in social media, online news platforms, and then legitimized when reported by mainstream news media.

I mention the post-truth phenomenon and fake news because they alarmingly demonstrate the crucial need for citizens to think critically and understand how arguments function. But, we cannot solely count on our education systems, with their habits that are difficult to break, mammoth bureaucracies, and territorial funding disputes. So where can we find adequate argument training? The answer can be found in the age-old practice of debating.

3.0 THE VALUE OF DEBATE

At the core of any style of debate lies an issue of controversy with at least two sides contesting each other’s positions. In competitive debate, a judge or panel of judges chooses a winner at the conclusion of the debate round. If there are more than two teams competing in a round, then the judge or judges rank the teams in terms of most effective to least effective, again, depending on the style of debate. Some styles emphasize the persuasive presentation of arguments, whereas others stress the argument content, and still others combine both perspectives. Regardless of the format, debaters are trained in constructing arguments, responding to opposition arguments, and thinking critically about the entire round by means of carefully evaluating the relative strengths and weaknesses of positions advocated during the debate.

3.1 Debate Teaches Argument

Of course, in the process of building, presenting, and refuting positions of advocacy, debaters craft arguments to support such positions. In fact, debate is the name given to a competitive process of argument delivery. In some formats, debaters may have some of their speeches, or portions thereof, prepared. Most debate speeches, however, are extemporaneous, although argument briefs may be constructed before a tournament and then used in part of a debater’s speech. When preparing these briefs or prepared speeches, debaters carefully consider the language used for their claims, the best evidence that supports those claims, and the examples or line of reasoning that connects the evidence to their overall position. In this way, debaters prepare their positions in conjunction with Toulmin’s famous model of an argument, which has as its three basic components, a claim that is the sum of evidence (data) and reasoning (warrants).

Because most of a debate round is extemporaneous, including periods of cross-examination or points of information, participants must practice argument development with speed and accuracy under stressful conditions. They often train feverishly in simulated debate rounds so that when they enter competition, their deployment of arguments occurs almost as second nature.

3.2 Debate Teaches Critical Thinking

Just as debaters practice constructing and refuting arguments, they also train to think critically in similar ways. In simulated practice debates, participants use different arguments that opponents may use in order to process the relationships between positions and ideas. In this way, they also practice evaluating the merits and drawbacks of advocacy positions. This process specifically helps the last speakers who need to synthesize and assess the round as they try to persuade the judge or judges to vote for their side.

3.3 Debate Fosters Political Engagement

Because debate teaches argument and critical thinking, it makes sense that it is a suitable teaching tool for civics and political involvement. Many scholars have discussed the relationship between debate experience and political
engagement, and almost all are in agreement that debate helps promote political and civic participation (Zompetti & Williams, 2007, 2008). As a result, I do not need to rehash all of those points here, except to state the obvious for purposes of clarity: when students learn about advocacy, refuting oppositional arguments, and how to thoroughly evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of ideas, then they develop the necessary skill sets to be engaged citizens.

4.0 POLICY DEBATE IN CONTEXT

As I said at the outset, all debate is good debate. However, different debate styles have different strengths and drawbacks. Typically, members of one style will defend their way of debating as supreme and characterize other styles as inferior. But the reality is that no style is perfect, and each have value. There are two dominant formats, although a variety exist. The two primary formats are parliamentary style and policy debating, and each has variations (e.g., there is Asian parli, American parli, British parli, etc.). Essentially, despite the minor differences with specific styles, parliamentary debate is extemporaneous, with multiple teams in a specific round, and each round has a different topic motion. The types of motions debated can range from fact, value, or policy in their orientation. Since the subject matter changes from round-to-round, prepared research is minimized, and debaters focus on the presentation of general arguments that are primarily based on common knowledge and commonly understood examples.

Policy debate, on the other hand, usually involves one topic for a full year or for half a year, which permits and necessitates in-depth research. Topics are policy-oriented, which means that a course of action is proposed for an agent of change to theoretically pursue (e.g., “That the government should reduce fossil fuel consumption”). During competition, teams are paired to debate each other in preliminary rounds as they switch sides from round to round. The best teams during the preliminary competition advance to elimination rounds until, finally, an overall winner is decided. Given the “switch-side” nature of the activity and that the topic is debated for many months, there is an expectation that the participants have researched the issues thoroughly. As the year progresses, the individual arguments become more advanced and in-depth. Creative teams will find ways of “linking” other issue areas to the overarching topic. By the end of the season, an individual debater could have easily amassed enough research – by themselves – that rivals lengthy Ph.D. dissertations.

4.1 The Case for Policy Debate

As I just described, policy debate involves teams debating a central topic against other teams where they must advocate both sides of the issue. While some formats differ slightly, the teams are usually two-person teams (except in American NFA “Lincoln-Douglas” policy debate, which is one-on-one; or Karl Popper debate that may have a policy topic, which is three-on-three), and each round requires that each debater give at least one speech (usually two), and there are always cross-examination periods. These structural elements are important, as are all structural components for all variations of debate styles. For policy debate, the cross-examination period fosters careful, quick decision-making skills while maintaining consistency with one’s partner. But policy debate advances several other very important skills that are either not found in other styles or are not as prominent.

Perhaps the most obvious skill set learned in policy debate is the ability to conduct thorough, targeted research. I already briefly mentioned the amount of research that occurs in policy debate. As the debate season progresses and participants find new, unique ways of discussing the topic, they must learn how to carefully focus their research skills. With the world moving almost entirely online, the sheer volume of information at our disposal is practically infinite. As a result, in order for debaters to process usable information for evidence in debate rounds, they need to know how to remain focused and not fall victim to online distractions (such as social media or instant messaging) or to websites that seduce users through clickbait. They must also learn how to synphon the valuable from the irrelevant. While students engage in policy debate over the course of a couple of years, their research abilities progressively advance and become important skills they can use in other areas in life.

Another set of proficiencies developed in policy debate are critical thinking skills. Of course, all debate formats can enhance critical thinking, but policy debate is uniquely structured to emphasize the critical thinking process. We already know that policy debate competitions are orchestrated to require participants to “switch sides,” meaning they must defend both sides of a debate motion. Unlike other debate styles where
the motion changes each round, policy debate requires investigation of the same motion for each round during a tournament, so all participants must engage in the topic area by supporting and opposing it. This process naturally fosters critical thinking skills since debaters must learn and defend multiple sides of an issue. Additionally, policy debate’s inclination for voluminous research suggests that participants are exposed to many perspectives of an issue, rather than the perspective the students already embrace. Learning how others view a controversial issue as well as exposing oneself to a diversity of perspectives cultivates critical thinking and prepares participants for a multicultural and globalized world.

With copious research and a litany of argument possibilities, policy debaters must develop sophisticated organizational techniques. These may range from incorporating a specialized organizational system, color-coded files, computerized file notations, or other mechanisms. Different debaters will no doubt find different processes that fit their personalized style. Nevertheless, the nature of policy debate necessitates a developed system of organization. In this way, policy debate promotes very important organizational skills.

In virtually all debate formats, it behooves participants to listen to their opponents carefully so they may adequately and efficiently respond to particular arguments. This typically involves taking meticulous notes, often called “flowing.” Such note taking skills enable the debater to record every argument presented, including – if the student is particularly adept – citations and quotes from pieces of evidence. The ability to craft such notes not only provides the debater a list of key arguments that require attention and response, but it is an ability that also assists the student in a variety of other contexts, not the least of which is when they must register lecture material in their classes.

And, like all debate, policy debate improves listening skills. Obviously, to adequately and persuasively respond to an opponent’s argument, the debater needs to carefully listen to the declaration of the argument in the first place. The way an adversary crafts their positions and describes contentions during cross-examination may also reveal important strategic objectives that are not easily discernable unless the student is listening closely. When debaters of different cultures are matched against each other, policy debate can also bolster listening skills since different accents, idioms, and preferences for argument support vary between cultures (Zompetti, 2006a).

Finally, policy debate promotes useful advocacy skills. Advocacy simply means the characterization and support for a particular position regarding an issue of controversy with the hope of persuading others (Zompetti, 2006b). Advocacy is usually witnessed when attorneys advocate on behalf of their clients in a court room. However, advocacy is also a crucial behavior for citizens who would like to see their society change for some reason. Often referred to as “civic engagement” or “political engagement,” citizen advocacy occurs when everyday people argue for social change. When such advocacy happens, citizens typically need to convince other citizens in order to generate a sufficient mass of people who can then inflict political leverage on elites to effect social change. Policy debate, with its requirement of switch-side debate and comprehensive understanding of political controversies, facilitates simulated advocacy – and, hence, teaches the requisite advocacy skills – unlike any other educational activity (Zompetti & Williams, 2007, 2008).

4.2 The Kyushu University Debate Workshop

While policy debate teaches these important skills to students, one might wonder where the students learn to participate in policy debate. In the United States, for example, some classes teach policy debate at the middle school, high school, and university levels. The rest of the world generally does not offer such classes because there are no formal teacher education systems that train educators how to teach debate in general, and policy debate in particular. As a result, non-American students (and even some American students depending on their geographical location) rely on “debate camps” to introduce them to, and train them in, debate practices.

Debate camps, also called “workshops,” typically transpire in the off-season for students so that they do not conflict with formalized and compulsory school attendance. These workshops have happened all over the world, notably in Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, North America, various Asian and African countries, and throughout Europe. However, debate workshops specifically catered for policy debate only exist in the United States and Japan. One such debate camp, called the Kyushu University Debate Workshop, has occurred in slightly different
variations roughly every year since 2009. Hosted and organized by Kyushu University in Fukuoka, Japan, this debate camp usually offers credit to Kyushu students but also invites debaters from other countries. As such, students from Thailand, South Korea, China, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Chile, the UK, the U.S., and of course Japan have participated in this workshop.

Debate in Japan has roughly modeled the debate practices in the United States, although policy debate has encountered both praise and criticism throughout the years, which has culminated in various periods of relative popularity or disdain. The history of educational and competitive debate in Japan is not the focus of this essay, but a brief examination of such history can be found on a blog written by Edmund Zagorin (2013). For our purposes, it is important to note that even when policy debate enjoys considerable popularity, the only sustained debate workshop can be found at Kyushu University.

Established and organized by long-time argument professor at Kyushu University, Dr. Narahiko Inoue, the Kyushu Debate Workshop typically features an invited and noted debate scholar from another university who plans and provides policy debate lectures for the first part of the week-long camp. Since the students attending the workshop arrive with different backgrounds, the lectures are structured to accommodate the unexperienced debater, but the camp has time budgeted to provide one-on-one training for those with some experience. After the fundamentals of policy debate have been taught, different forms of practices and simulations take place, with the camp culminating in a mini-tournament at the very end.

The topic of the workshop usually mimics the current high school Japanese policy debate topic so that inexperienced debaters can have a basis for beginning their research. The invited instructor who delivers the lessons also usually provides a research packet for the students so they will have a guide and frame of reference for argument development along with materials ready at the very beginning for practice sessions.

To facilitate the ease of instruction, all lessons are taught in English, and all debates and research materials occur in English. For some students this poses a unique challenge, but it also creates an opportunity for participants to improve their English language skills – another unique benefit to attending this debate workshop. However, since the camp is populated with participants from various countries, the workshop also provides the valuable opportunity to improve one’s intercultural knowledge. While it is not uncommon for students to encounter peers from other countries during their university experiences, students can – and often do – find ways to stick with their compatriots and avoid students who are different than them. In contrast, the debate workshop facilitates an intense environment where the students must work together and learn from each other.

5.0 IMPLICATIONS

In addition to teaching students the process of policy debate and how to engage in the joy of competition, the debate workshop also teaches a unique method of thinking that benefits all sorts of students, including science and engineering students, who would otherwise unlikely encounter the activity. Debate – and policy debate in particular – trains the mind to cognitively process information at high rates of speed, but in a meticulous manner that improves efficiency and accuracy in decision-making. With all of the various skills that accompany debate learning, the activity offers learning opportunities that simply do not exist in any other educational capacity. By emphasizing critical thinking, but also offering a set of additional skills, policy debate and the Kyushu policy debate workshop offer extremely important opportunities for students. Not only will students learn abilities that will help them throughout life, they will also learn crucial skills necessary for democratic, citizen engagement. The educational life of a student will undoubtedly improve as a result of this experience. And, so too might the overall quality of our society as more and more citizens learn and embrace these valuable advocacy skills.

REFERENCES


Critical Thinking Education and Development of Web-Based Apps

This panel discusses a research project to develop a web-based app for beginning critical-thinking exercises for Japanese students and its learning effects. Although the need for critical thinking education has been called for, the lack of teaching materials and qualified instructors has been pointed out. Such a gap may be filled by self-study materials, especially online apps.

Against this background, the five chapters report the following topics. Chapter 1 (Takenaka) introduces the overall project. Chapter 2 (Zhang) reviews the concept of critical thinking. Chapter 3 (Takenaka & Jikuya) overviews the development of a critical thinking app with simple gamification. Chapter 4 (Jodoi) reports and discusses the effects of using the apps with and without gamification to compare the learning effects. Although the experimental group did not show an apparent gain in the post-tests from the gamification, it was confirmed that learning with a web-based app, regardless of the gamification, did have a positive learning effect. Finally, Chapter 5 (Uchida & Inoue) discusses some implications of using critical thinking apps in education.
目標思考的思考など、広範な思考を包括した概念であるが（楠見、2011）、詳細については2章（張）で論じる。

まず、クリティカルシンキング教育への社会的要請が高まっている背景について述べる。近年ではソーシャルメディアによって、いとも簡単にフェイクニュースが拡散され、一部の人々がそれを受け鵜呑みにしてしまうことによって、いわれのない誹謗中傷事件が起きたり、真偽不明の情報が有権者の行動に一定の影響を与えるというケースも確認されている。また各人がオンライン環境で自身の意見に近い情報ばかりを目にするためその意見が増幅されててしまう、「エコーチェンバー現象」といった新たな問題が生じている。アルゴリズムの働きによって各人の興味や志向に沿った内容のコンテンツが表示される傾向にある上、ソーシャルメディアでも自身と近似した興味関心・思想を持つ同士で繋がることで、自分の意見に沿う偏った意見ばかり目にしてしまうことが原因である。真偽不明の報道やエコーチェンバー現象は今回の新型コロナウイルスをとりまく言説においても、多くの人が経験したことであろう。世界に溢れる情報に対して、クリティカルな姿勢で向き合い判断していくスキルは市民にとって必須である。

また経済を支えている社会人、企業人としてもクリティカルシンキングは大いに役立つであろう。それはロジカル・コミュニケーションや意思決定のプロセスを円滑に進めていく土台となる。また新型コロナウイルスの世界的な流行をその一つであるが、社会を取り巻く環境は刻々と変化していくため、過去の成功体験からの脱却やまだ存在しないイノベーションを追求していくことが課題である。

学びや研究者としてもクリティカルシンキングを鍛錬し続けることは重要である。近年世界の主要各国と比べて日本の論文数の減少が指摘されており、国際的にインパクトある質の高い研究成果を産み出していくには、研究資金をさることながら備えておくべき能力と言えるであろう。大学生も受動的な「勉強」の姿勢からの脱却が不十分で、客観的・批判的な視点を持ちながら「研究」する姿勢が徹底されていない現状がある。

このように社会的趨勢に合わせてクリティカルシンキング教育の必要性は提唱されているものの、その教育体制は整えられているとは言い難い。例えば、大学におけるクリティカルシンキング教育の現状を分析した先行研究によると、専門性を有した教育者の不足、教育メソッドや能力測定方法の未確立といった問題が指摘されている（田中・豊、2016；若山・梶谷・渡辺・赤堀、2014）。また、クリティカルシンキング教育のための汎用的な教材が日本において存在せず、教員の力量に重視されていることも指摘されている（若山他、2014）。もちろんインフォーマルロジックの分野であるクリティカルシンキングを教え、評価するのは難しさも伴うが、日本の大学のクリティカルシンキング教育体制は全体的に充実していないのが現状である。

本研究の目的は、これら教材不足・評価基準のばらつき・指導者不足といった現状を踏まえ、指導者がいなくても学習者が自主学習できるアクティブラーニング型教材のプロトタイプアプリ「C-training」の開発・検証を行うことである。アクティブラーニング手法を利用した教育方法が有効に機能し得るか、また教材としてウェブアプリのインターフェースが有効であるか、そしてゲームファイクーション要素を取り入れることでより学習効果を高められるか、という点について検討していく。

この「C-training」設計・開発にあたってはターゲットを大学生のクリティカルシンキング初学者とし、初歩的なゲームファイクーション要素も加えた。隙間時間に学習可能なスマートフォン
ベースの自主学習アプリを想定した。アプリで使用する問題としては、広範な能力を包むクリティカルシンキングのうち、基礎的な推論や議論といったサブセットのトレーニングが期待される「501 challenging logic & reasoning problems」(LearningExpress, 2005)を選択した。以下、本研究チームが開発したアプリは「CT アプリ」と表記する。本稿では次章（張）で、まず「クリティカルシンキング（批判的思考）」とは何か、定義や構成要素、測定方法について概観する。批判的思考に関する教育の現状と問題点についても触れる。第3章（竹中・軸屋）では CT アプリの設計・開発についてまとめている。続く第4章（上土井）では、開発した CT アプリを学生に利用してもらった実験の概要を示し、その後アプリの教育効果の検証結果を示す。最後に開発・検証したアプリを、どのように大学教育で教材として利用できる可能性が考えられるか示唆する（内田・井上）。章によって「クリティカルシンキング」が主に用いられている場合と「批判的思考」が用いられている場合があるが、本稿では両者を区別しないこととする。

第1章 参考文献

第2章 批判的思考についての考察（張 小英）
2.1. 研究の背景
は「生きる力」、高等教育では「学士力」や「社会人基礎力」を到達目標としながら、多様な分野でグループ学習や討論といった主体的・協働的に携わる授業や実践活動により批判的思考の育成に取り組んでいる（道田、2013；樋口、2012）。

2.2. 問題点
批判的思考の重要性は意識されながらも、日本の学生と生徒は必ずしもその力を十分育成していないことも言われている。例えば、2000年からOECDが3年ごとに実施されている国際学力評価調査（PISA）においては、2018年の結果を見ると批判的思考力が問われる生徒の読解リテラシー点の総合順位は低下しており、情報の探し出し、質と信頼性の評価、矛盾を発見し処理することに関わる問題の正答率が低く、根拠を明示して意見を述べることに課題があることが示されている（文部科学省・国立教育政策研究所、2019）。その原因の1つとして日本従来の知識伝達型の教育方法、つまり個別領域の知識やスキルの教師から学生への一方的な伝達がより重視されていることが挙げられる（楠見、2011）。例えば、高校の英語教科書では、文字通りの理解を求めるなど基礎的な読解力に比重が置かれ、批判的思考の伸展が伸びるような設問が少ないことが示されている（峯島・茅野、2013）。そして、田中・豊（2016）は「日本における言語教育の学習指導要領や教育の現場でも、論理的に考え、批判的に物事を見ることよりも、『物事の登場人物の気持ちになって考える』『相手の考えを理解する』という指向性が強い」（p.2）と指摘している。同じく、岩崎（2002）も国語で扱う文章の多くは論理的な文章ではなく、文学作品であり情動的な側面に重点を置いていた傾向があると述べている。また、批判的思考を高めるための実践がなされたとしても、教育現場では様々な問題が露呈されている。批判的思考の教育方法として大きく分けて4つのアプローチがある（Ennis, 1989）。第1のジェネラルアプローチ（general approach）は既存科目（existing subject-matter instruction）の学問分野ごとの主題内容と独立し、論理学やライティングといった特設科目で批判的思考の一般原則（能力と態度）を示的につながる方法である。第2のインフュージョンアプローチ（infusion approach）は既存科目で批判的思考の要素を示的につながり、各教科の知識・内容を批判的に考えながら学習させるという教え方である。逆に、批判的思考の一般原則を示的につながり、学習者が既存の知識・内容に深く没入させることを通じて思考を誘発するような指導方法はイマージョンアプローチ（immersion approach）だと称している。これら3つのアプローチを組み合わせる（general approach+immersion/infusion approach）のが第4の混合アプローチである。

日本の学校教育で実施されている実践活動はジェネラルアプローチとイマージョンアプローチがある（道田、2013）。前者に関しては、特定の科目に依存せずに批判的思考の各要素を示的につながり、学習者に既存の知識・内容をじっくりと深く没入させることを通じて思考を誘発するような指導方法がイマージョンアプローチと呼ばれている。これら3つのアプローチを組み合わせる（general approach+immersion/infusion approach）のが第4の混合アプローチである。日本の学校教育で実施されている実践活動はジェネラルアプローチとイマージョンアプローチがある（道田、2013）。前者に関しては、特定の科目に依存せずに批判的思考の各要素を示的につながり、学習者に既存の知識・内容をじっくりと深く没入させることを通じて思考を誘発するような指導方法がイマージョンアプローチと呼ばれている。これら3つのアプローチを組み合わせる（general approach+immersion/infusion approach）のが第4の混合アプローチである。日本の学校教育で実施されている実践活動はジェネラルアプローチとイマージョンアプローチがある（道田、2013）。前者に関しては、特定の科目に依存せずに批判的思考の各要素を示的につながり、学習者に既存の知識・内容をじっくりと深く没入させることを通じて思考を誘発するような指導方法がイマージョンアプローチと呼ばれている。これら3つのアプローチを組み合わせる（general approach+immersion/infusion approach）のが第4の混合アプローチである。日本の学校教育で実施されている実践活動はジェネラルアプローチとイマージョンアプローチがある（道田、2013）。前者に関しては、特定の科目に依存せずに批判的思考の各要素を示的につながり、学習者に既存の知識・内容をじっくりと深く没入させることを通じて思考を誘発するような指導方法がイマージョンアプローチと呼ばれている。これら3つのアプローチを組み合わせる（general approach+immersion/infusion approach）のが第4の混合アプローチである。日本の学校教育で実施されている実践活動はジェネラルアプローチとイマージョンアプローチがある（道田、2013）。前者に関しては、特定の科目に依存せずに批判的思考の各要素を示的につながり、学習者に既存の知識・内容をじっくりと深く没入させることを通じて思考を誘発するような指導方法がイマージョンアプローチと呼ばれている。これら3つのアプローチを組み合わせる（general approach+immersion/infusion approach）のが第4の混合アプローチである。日本の学校教育で実施されている実践活動はジェネラルアプローチとイマージョンアプローチがある（道田、2013）。前者に関しては、特定の科目に依存せずに批判的思考の各要素を示的につながり、学習者に既存の知識・内容をじっくりと深く没入させることを通じて思考を誘発するような指導方法がイマージョンアプローチと呼ばれている。これら3つのアプローチを組み合わせる（general approach+immersion/infusion approach）のが第4の混合アプローチである。日本の学校教育で実施されている実践活動はジェネラルアプローチとイマージョンアプローチがある（道田、2013）。前者に関しては、特定の科目に依存せずに批判的思考の各要素を示的につながり、学習者に既存の知識・内容をじっくりと深く没入させることを通じて思考を誘発するような指導方法がイマージョンアプローチと呼ばれている。これら3つのアプローチを組み合わせる（general approach+immersion/infusion approach）のが第4の混合アプローチである。日本の学校教育で実施されている実践活動はジェネラルアプローチとイマージョンアプローチがある（道田、2013）。前者に関しては、特定の科目に依存せずに批判的思考の各要素を示的につながり、学習者に既存の知識・内容をじっくりと深く没入させることを通じて思考を誘発するような指導方法がイマージョンアプローチと呼ばれている。これら3つのアプローチを組み合わせる（general approach+immersion/infusion approach）のが第4の混合アプローチである。
いることや批判的思考を促す双方向な授業になっていないこと（田中・豊、2016）、授業内容・
目標が定められずに（カリキュラム全体を通して、あらゆる分野にわたって批判的思考を養うこ
とを目指した取り組みはほとんどされておらず）その指導は各教員の裁量に委ねられているこ
と（久保田・池田、2015；若山他、2014；田中・豊、2016）も問題点として挙げられている。次に、
批判的思考の定義について見てみよう。

2.3 批判的思考の定義

批判的思考は様々な分野でその重要性が主張され、指導や実践活動がなされているにも関わ
らず、その定義や概念は研究者や分野、強調点、目的・目標、統括範囲、などによって必ずしも
完全な一致をされていないことは多くの研究で指摘されている（例えば、抱井、2004; Hitchcock,
2017, 2018; 道田、2001, 2003）。そして、同じ研究者でも時代の流れに伴い定義を修正したもの
もある*1。いくつかの定義を取り上げてみよう。

- active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of
  knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends,
  constitutes reflective thought. (Dewey, 1910, p. 6)
- Critical thinking is the process of evaluating statements, arguments, and experience. An
  operational definition of critical thinking would consist of all the attitudes and skills used in the
  evaluating process. (D’Angelo, 1971, p. 7)
- Critical thinking is reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or
do. (Ennis, 1987, p. 10)
- A critical thinker, then, is one who is appropriately moved by reasons: she has a propensity or
  disposition to believe and act in accordance with reasons; and she has the ability properly to
  assess the force of reasons in the many contexts in which reasons play a role. (Siegel, 1988, p.
  23)
- We understand critical thinking to be purposeful, self-regulatory judgment which results in
  interpretation, analysis, evaluation, and inference, as well as explanation of the evidential,
  conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or contextual considerations upon which that
  judgment is based. (Facione, 1990, p. 3)
- I will define critical thinking as a logic and rational process of avoiding one’s preconceptions by
  gathering evidence, contemplating and evaluating alternatives, and coming to a conclusion.
  (Smith, 1994, p. 2)
- Critical thinking, which we define as the ability and willingness to assess claims and make
  judgments on the basis of well-supposed reasons, serves as the guiding philosophy both in our
  teaching and in our textbooks. (Wade, 1997, p. 153)
- Critical thinking is purposeful, reasoned, and goal-directed. It is the kind of
  thinking involved in solving problems, formulating inferences, calculating
  likelihoods, and making decisions. (Halpern, 1998, pp. 450-451)

20世紀の批判的思考のルーツとして、しばしば言及されているのはアメリカの哲学者兼教育者
であるデューイが提唱した「反省的思考」(reflective thinking)の概念である。これは、「いかなる
信念や想定される知識を、それを裏付ける根拠とそこから導かれる結論に基づき、積極的、永
続的、慎重的に考慮する」（Dewey, 1910, p. 6; 筆者訳）という内容である。その後、
定義「何を信じるか、何をすべきかを決定することに焦点を当てた、合理的で反省的な思考」（p.
23, 筆者訳）、Facione(1990)の定義「解釈、分析、評価、推論をもたらす目的のある自主規制的
訓練を通じて身につけられる思考」と整理した。この定義にも目的性、反省性、合理性の3要素が含まれていることが分かる。

2.4. 批判的思考の構成要素

批判的思考の概念や定義は研究者や分野によって異なるが、その構成要素に認知的側面である能力・スキルと情意的側面である態度（attitude）・傾向性（disposition）があることには広範な合意がなされている（例えば、Ennis, 1987; Facione, 1990; Siegel, 1988; Halpern, 1998; Wade, 1997; Edman, 2008; 道田, 2003; 楠見, 2011, D’Angelo, 1971）。批判的思考を発揮するには、能力だけでは十分でなく、態度も重ね備えることが必要不可欠である。批判的思考能力には、情報や問題に含まれる論点、定義や論理構造を明確化すること、情報源の信頼性や情報内容を評価すること、推論の合理性を検討すること、行動を決定することなどが含まれる。一方、批判的思考態度には、物事を信じ込まずに疑いを持つ「懐疑心」、多様な知識や情報を求める「探究心」、対立する見解でも同じ基準で客観的に評価する「公平さ」、信頼性のある情報源を使用し、確たる証拠に基づく判断を行おうとする「根拠主義」、根拠が弱いと思われる主張に対して他の可能性を追求すること、批判的思考能力を使用しようとすること等が含まれている。以下でそれぞれについて説明する。まず、批判的思考能力について概観する。

2.5. 批判的思考能力


Halpern(2007)によると、高次認知スキルとは、分析・評価・統合が必要な比較的複雑なものの、暗記的または機械的な方法とは異なるスキルであり、高次思考(Higher-order thinking)は反省的、文脈依存的な自己監視的な思考である(p.6)。具体的例を挙げると、計算演算(computational arithmetic)は文脈や他の要素をほとんど考慮せずに決まった式を適用するのに対して、高次思考でないのに対し、文脈を含む多様な要素を考慮する情報源の信頼性判断には高次思考スキルが適用される(p.6)という。

主要結論とそれを支持する前提および理由、さらなる前提および理由の特定と区別、議論の全体構造あるは推論連鎖の特定と区別、中間結論、明示されていない前提や仯説、背景情報の特定と区別といった6つの下位項目を示している。このように、同じ項目に対しても研究者によって提示する下位項目に共通点も相違点も見られる。


批判的思考能力の測定
批判的思考を測定する主な方法やテストとして多肢選択式から自由記述式まで多様なものが存在している（文献レビューとして、楠見, 1996, pp. 53-55; 平山, 2004, p. 295; 平山・楠見, 2011, p. 117)。多肢選択式テストとして、用語の定義や説解、推論（帰納的・演錶的）、議論や論証の評価、仯設同定、信頼性の評価、情報の十分性や関連性の評価に関わる内容があり、具体的な課題として、演錶的推論課題、意思決定課題、議論評価課題、実験評価課題、統計的推論問
題、確率的選択課題、仮説検証課題などが使われている。自由記述式テストとは、ある情報や資料を与えられ、結論、信頼性、他の可能性などに関する記述をさせて評価するという方法であり、結論生成課題、原因推論課題、文章評価課題などが用いられている。

日本においても、批判的思考の教育実践が行われており、その成果を図るために様々な方法が使用されている。例えば、標準化された客観的な多肢選択式テストとして、ワトソン・グレーザー日本語版(久原・井上・波多野、1983)があり、多くの研究で使われている(例えば、平山・楠見、2006; 藤岡、1987; 向暁、2012)。そして、コーネル批判的思考テスト・レベルＺの日本語版(平山・田中・河崎・楠見、2010)、楠見・子安・道田・林・平山・田中(2010)が開発しているテストもある。他に、論理的な誤り(前後論法、適度な一般化など)を指摘させる記述式テスト(道田、2001; 田中、2009)、多肢選択式テストや自己評価、記述式テストなどを組み合わせた測定法(例えば、楠見・田中・平山、2012; 武田・平山・楠見、2006)などもある。批判的思考の定義や着目する要素は異なるため、実践効果を測定する際に、定義や実践が目指すものに適合するテストを使うことによって、実践が生徒・学生に及ぼした変化を敏感に把握できると述べられている(平山・楠見、2011; 平山・田中・河崎・楠見、2010)。

2.7. 批判的思考態度


批判的思考態度の重要性は認識されているにも関わらず、用語も定義も、またはそれを具体化する下位項目も研究者によって一様ではない。道田(2000)は批判的思考態度を「見掛けに感わされずに、ものごとに疑いを持つ心である」(p. 54)と述べており、批判的思考の発揮に態度は最初に重要だとみなしている。Siegel(1988)は批判的思考態度を理由の評価に従事するよく発達した傾向性(well-developed disposition)や判断と行動を理由に準拠させる意欲(willingness)だと捉
批判的思考者(critical thinker)は理由を評価する能力に加え、批判的態度(critical attitude)や批判的精神(critical spirit)と呼ばれる「態度(attitude)」、「傾向性(disposition)」、「思考習慣・心的習慣(habits of mind)」、「個人的な特性(character traits)」が必要だと記述している(p. 39)。そして、Facione(1990)は批判的思考態度の説明を行う際に、良い批判的思考者(good critical thinkers)は批判的態度(critical spirit)、様々な問題に関する探究心(inquisitiveness)、理由・根拠や信頼できる情報を希求する熱意・意欲(eagerness)といった性質を備えていると述べている。さらに、Ennis(1987)が提示している批判的思考態度の項目に批判的思考能力を使用しようすることと思考習慣(例えば、be open-minded, be sensitive to the feelings, level of knowledge, and degree of sophistication of others)に加えて、信頼性のある情報を使用すること、他の代替案を探すことといった行動に言及する要素も挙げている。このように、批判的思考態度には能力を使用しようとする態度と、物事を信じ込まずに疑いを持つ「懐疑心」、多様な知識や情報を求めるようとする「探究心」、同じ基準で自他の議論や証拠を評価する「公平さ」といった傾向性・習慣(habits of mind, critical spirit)の両側面を含んでいると考えられる。


注
*1Ennis(1962)では批判的思考を「陳述を正しく評価する(the correct assessing of statements)」(p. 83, 筆者訳)と定義し、批判的思考「能力」だけを挙げているのに対して、1987年の研究では定義に行動と信念を加え、批判的思考「能力」以外に「態度」と「知識」の重要性にも言及している。
*2道田(2003)は Social Science Citation Index の 1991-2002年のデータで、タイトル、キーワード、要旨に「critical thinking」が含まれる論文740本の中で、よく引用されている(被引用数が多い)7名の研究者(Ennis; Paul; Pascarella; Facione; Watson & Glaser; Brookfield; McPeck)の批判的思考の定義の共通点と相違点を分類した。
性」「証拠の重視」という4因子からなる。そして、日本ではこの尺度は多くの研究で使用されている（例えば、鶴田・有倉、2007；楠見・田中・平山、2012；菊島・寺本・柴原、2018）。

第2章 参考文献
一般社団法人 日本教育心理学会.


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Proceedings of the Tokyo Conference on Argumentation, Volume 6
第3章 CTトレーニングアプリの開発（竹中野歩・軸屋邦彦）

3.1. 開発の概要

CTアプリ開発にあたって検討したのは、簡単なゲーム化を搭載することで、学習者のアプリ使用の頻度を上げ、学習量を増やす、結果的に学習効果が高くなるという仮説である。ゲーム化とは、「ゲームにおいてプレイヤーを引きつけ継続して遊ばせる要素である『ゲームの考え方』、『ゲームデザイン』、『ゲームメカニクス』(中略)を使って、ゲーム以外の、例えばサービス、リハビリ、教育等をより魅力的にしようという活動」と定義される(岸本 & 三上, 2012)。研究チームはゲーム化要素がユーザーの学習効果につながるかどうか考察するため、ゲーム化あり版と無し版の2つのプロトタイプアプリを作成し、その比較検証を行った。開発作業については「株式会社Get It」に発注し、代表の軸屋邦彦氏からゲーム化についてのアドバイスも受けつつ研究チームで話し合いを重ねた。

まず、ゲーム化あり版と無し版両者の掲載問題自体は全く同じであり、ライセンス契約の「501challenginglogic&reasoningproblems」(LearningExpress, 2005)から一部の問題を日本語訳してアプリに掲載した。「ゲーム化なし版」はアプリで単に9~10問セットになった問題を解き、正否や正答・解説が表示されるのみの簡単なデザインになっている。学習したセットには正答率に応じて星マークに色がつくため、自身の学習履歴や習熟度はある程度は把握可能である。しかしそれ以外に楽しみながら学べるゲーム要素は搭載していない。一方「ゲーム化あり版」については大きく分けて4点のアプリデザインを行った。①難易度別問題掲載、②個人及びチームのランキング、③学習進捗具合の可視化、④1日に挑戦できる問題数の制限、である。以下で詳しく説明する。
3.2. CTアプリ内のゲーミフィケーション要素

（1）難易度別の問題掲載
詳細は4章（土生井）で取り上げるが、開発前に大学生を対象に、アプリに掲載する「501 challenging logic & reasoning problems」（LearningExpress, 2005）の問題群に回答してもらい、各設問の正答率を測定した。得られた結果に基づき、問題を難易度別にセット（1セット3-5問）に分けてアプリへ掲載し、学習者が簡単な問題から徐々に難しい問題に挑戦し、達成感を得られるようレベルデザインした。また、アプリ内で各設問の下部に、事前に測定した正答率を明記し、回答者が解く前に難易度を意識できるようにした。多様なゲーミフィケーションの中でも、難易度設定はその根幹をなす要素である。元々当該問題集は難易度が設定されていなかったため、独自に難易度の出し分けを実施した。

（2）個人及びチームのランキング
CTアプリに取り入れた主たるゲーム要素が、ランキング機能とチーム対抗戦の概念である。
1. 平均正解進捗率（％） = クリアした問題セット/トータル問題セット数（約70セット）
2. 平均初回正答率（％） = 初回回答したときに正答率/初回解いた問題数
この2種類のランキングを個人とチームそれぞれでアプリ内に表示されるようにした。これにより、事前に指導者が設定したチーム（3-5人程度）毎に、平均正解進捗率と初回平均正答率を確認したり競い合ったりすることができる。自分の所属するチームのメンバーはアプリ内で確認することが可能である。尚、個人のランキングについてはプライバシーの観点から上位半分のみが表示されるよう設定した。平均正解進捗率については単純に自身やチームの学習量を把握しやすくするために、また平均初回正答率についてはユーザーが真剣に問題に取り組む意欲を促進するために取り入れた。
一般的なソーシャルゲームでも個人で淡々と取り組むとユーザーはモチベーション不足になりがちであるため、共同で敵を倒す等のチームプレイ要素はゲームを続けてもらう大きなポイントとなっている。チーム内の相互作用でメンバーにやる気を起こさせたり、他のチームとの競争で意欲を引き出したりできるため、CTアプリにも取り入れた。チーム制することで「他のメンバーのためにもアプリ学習しなければ」という意識が働き、多くのユーザーがコンテンツに継続的に取り組めるようにと検討した結果である。

（3）学習進捗状況の可視化
まず、アプリにログイン後の画面の目立つ位置に、上記ランキングのパーセンテージを常に表示し、学習進捗状況をユーザーに意識してもらうと考えた。既に書いた通り、問題は難易度別に平易なものから順にアプリ内に掲載している。セット毎に星マークが表示されており、初回で正解すると緑に、2回目以降で正解すると紫に色づく仕様である。また全問正解するまで次の問題セットはオープンできない設計となっている。星の色によって自身の苦手な問題セットが一目で把握でき、復習することが容易にできるようにデザインした。
(4) 1日に挑戦できる問題セット数の制限

ゲーミフィケーション無し版 CT アプリが，制限なく一気に全ての問題を解くことが可能である一方，ゲーミフィケーション有り版 CT アプリでは1日に挑戦できる問題セット数に制限を加えることにした。これは一般的なゲーム内のいわゆる「ライフ」の概念で，挑戦できる回数がユーザーにとって「目標」となりうる。ゲーム内でクリアする目標を設定することも重要で，一日の小さな達成感を積み重ねて取り組みを習慣化してもらう狙いがある。また一気に問題回答して単なる“課題の片付け”にならないようにする狙いもあった。

これらのゲーミフィケーション要素を備えた「ゲーミフィケーション有り版」CT アプリと「ゲーミフィケーション無し版」を用意し，比較実験した結果は次章で詳述する。

第3章 参考文献

第4章 CT アプリ使用による教育効果（上土井宏太）
本章では3章（竹中・軸屋）で紹介したCT アプリ（ゲーミフィケーション有り版・無し版）によるトレーニング効果を測定した実験とその学習効果について述べる。

A大学1年生，B大学1年生，B大学ESS（English Speaking Society）に所属する学生を対象として，2ヶ月間本研究チームで開発したクリティカルシンキング能力向上を目的としたアプリ「C-training」（以下，CT アプリ）を使用してもらった。使用前にpre-test，使用後にpost-testを受験してもらい，アプリを使用したことによる教育効果を測定した。実験ではまず，アプリに掲載する問題を被験者に回答してもらい，各問題の正答率を測定した。その正答率をもとにアプリに掲載する問題の順番を決定し，pre/post-testを作成した。

4.1. アプリに掲載した問題と難易度測定テスト
4.1.1. 概要
2章（張）で既述の通り，クリティカルシンキングは多様な能力やスキル，そして態度を包括する思考力であるが，CT アプリは初学者向けであるため，基礎的な演繹論理や帰納推論といったクリティカルシンキングの一部のスキルをトレーニングすることを狙いとしている。アプリ内で問題はスキル別に表示されるようにし，スキルの名称は「501 challenging logic & reasoning problems」（LearningExpress, 2005）に掲載されている名称を日本語訳し使用した。また何をトレーニングしているのかを学習者が理解できるよう独自のスキル説明文を提示した（表1を参照）。
表1. 各セクションの説明文

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>各セクションの名称</th>
<th>各セクションの説明</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Matching Definitions</td>
<td>定義に合うか判断するとは、ある言葉の定義の元で、特定の状況がその定義に当てはまるかどうか判断する能力を鍛えます。例えば、仕事をする上で、ある状況が法律や条例に違反しているかどうか判断することがありが、その際に必要とされる能力です。</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making Judgement</td>
<td>条件に合うか判断するとは、状況設定や条件、情報などが与えられ、状況を正しく、正確に理解する能力を鍛えます。研究や仕事で文章を読む機会は多くありますが、その際に文章の意図を正しく、正確に理解することは非常に重要で、その能力を鍛えます。</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal Reasoning</td>
<td>文章から推理するとは、与えられた文章から、論理的に正しい選択肢を導く能力を鍛えます。議論の流れを追う上で必要とされる能力です。</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logic Problems</td>
<td>単純な論理関係を判断するとは、短い文章が複数与えられ、それらから論理的にある条件を導くことができるか判断する能力を鍛えます。企業の採用試験でよく用いられるSPIなどでも問われる能力です。</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logic Games</td>
<td>複雑な論理関係を判断するとは、やや長い文章や複数の条件が与えられ、それらから論理的に導くことができる文章を判断する能力を鍛えます。この能力もSPIなどの採用試験でしばしば問われます。</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyzing Arguments</td>
<td>議論を分析するとは、このパートはいくつかの問題で構成されています。</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 1つのパラグラフが与えられ、そのパラグラフでの主張を正確に理解する能力を鍛えます。</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- ある議論を強めるための主張、弱めるための主張を判断する能力を鍛えます。これらは、採用試験でしばしば用いられるグループディスカッションで議事を整理し、論理的に裏付けのある主張を導くために必要な能力です。</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

このようなスキルをトレーニングするための「501 challenging logic & reasoning problems」(LearningExpress, 2005)の問題214問を7つに分け、国立A大学の1年生54人及び国立B大学ESSに所属する学生18人にテストに回答してもらった。A大学の学生には1セットずつ、B大学のESSの学生には2セットずつ、それぞれ制限時間60分でテストを行った。問題数、回答人数の詳細は表2を参照のこと。
表 2. 難易度測定テストの問題数と A 大学、B 大学 ESS の回答者数

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>問題セット記号</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>G</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>問題数</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 大学</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B 大学 ESS</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1.2. 難易度測定テスト実施結果

A 大学の学生と B 大学 ESS の学生の平均正答率、最高得点率、最低得点率、標準偏差を表 3 に、それぞれの結果のヒストグラムを図 1 に示す。また、各セクションの A 大学と B 大学 ESS の平均正答率のデータを表 4 に示す。最後に、それぞれの問題毎に、A 大学と B 大学 ESS のどちらの正答率が高いか比較した結果を各セクション毎に表 5 に示す。

表 3. 難易度測定テストの結果

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>平均正答率</th>
<th>最高正答率</th>
<th>最低正答率</th>
<th>標準偏差</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A 大学</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B 大学 ESS</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![図 1. A 大学と B 大学 ESS の正解率とその問題数のヒストグラム](image)
表 4. 難易度測定テストにおける各セクションの平均正答率

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>セクション</th>
<th>A 大学</th>
<th>B 大学 ESS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Matching Definitions</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>（定義に合うか判断する）</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making Judgement</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>（条件に合うか判断する）</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal Reasoning</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>（文章から推理する）</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logic Problems</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>（単純な論理関係を判断する）</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logic Games</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>（複雑な論理関係を判断する）</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyzing Arguments</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>（議論を分析する）</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

表 5. 難易度測定テストにおける A 大学、B 大学 ESS の正答率をセクション毎に比較した際の該当する問題

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>セクション</th>
<th>正答率の比較</th>
<th>正答率同じ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A 大学&gt;B 大学</td>
<td>B 大学&gt;A 大学</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matching Definitions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>（定義に合うか判断する）</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making Judgement</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>（条件に合うか判断する）</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal Reasoning</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>（文章から推理する）</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logic Problems</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>（単純な論理関係を判断する）</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logic Games</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>（複雑な論理関係を判断する）</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyzing Arguments</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>（議論を分析する）</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>合計</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1.3. 難易度測定テスト考察

表 3 より、平均正答率は B 大学 ESS の方が A 大学よりも 0.09 ポイント高いことが分かる。これは、B 大学 ESS の被験者は、日常生活からディベート活動を行い、論理的思考力を鍛える訓練を行っていることから正解数に差がついたと考えられる。B 大学 ESS では原則として週 2 日、ディベートの練習を行い、ジャッジからのフィードバックを受けることで、日常生活からクリティカルシンキングを鍛えている。

表 4、表 5 より、今回アプリに掲載した 6 つのカテゴリーの問題群のうち、A 大学と B 大学で正答率の差が大きかったのは、「Matching Definition」と「Analyzing Arguments」の 2 つである。
4.2. pre/post-test の作成

4.1 で示した難易度測定テストにより、CT アプリに掲載する 214 問全ての難易度を算出した。この結果をもとに、pre/post-test の設計を行った。pre-test、post-test には、CT アプリに掲載する問題の 6 つのカテゴリーから少なくとも 1 問は問題を含むようにし、全 13 問を選択した。各問題のカテゴリー、正答率を表 6 に示す。

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>表 6. pre-/post-test の問題カテゴリーと正答率</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


各カテゴリーから、難易度を考慮しつつ問題を適切に選択した結果、pre-test の平均正答率は 0.707、post-test の平均正答率は 0.701 とほぼ同じ正答率のテストを作成することに成功した。これらのテストを用いて、本研究で開発したアプリの教育効果の測定を行った。

4.3. CT アプリを用いた教育効果の測定(2019 後期)

A 大学 1 年生（グループ A）、B 大学 1 年生（グループ B）、B 大学 ESS（グループ C）に所属する学生に 2 ヶ月間 CT アプリを使用してもらい、その前後で pre-test、post-test を実施し、得点の変化を観察した。CT アプリは、ゲームフィクション有り版と無し版の 2 つを用意し、ゲームフィクションの有無が与える教育効果の差に関しても観察を行った。

4.3.1. 実験概要

表 7 に示すように、グループ A を 2 つ、グループ B を 3 つ、グループ C を 2 つに分けた。A-1 及び B-1 はゲームフィクション有りの CT アプリを使用する実験群、A-2 及び B-2 はゲームフィクション無しのアプリを使用する実験群、B-3 及び C-2 はアプリを使用しない対照群とした。

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>表 7. 教育効果測定実験の各グループの条件(2019 後期)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>グループ A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>グループ B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>グループ C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GM=ゲームフィクション
4.3.2. pre/post-test の結果
各実験群、対照群の pre/post-test の結果を表 8 に示す。対照群である B-3、C-2 については pre-test と post-test の間で統計的に有意な差は見られなかった。CT アプリを使用した A-1、A-2、B-1、B-2 については、それぞれ pre-test と post-test の間で統計的に有意な差を観察することができた。

表 8. 実験群、対照群の pre/post-test の結果(2019 年後期)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GM の有無</th>
<th>平均正答率</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>t-test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre</td>
<td>Post</td>
<td>変化</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-1 Yes</td>
<td>0.795</td>
<td>0.888</td>
<td>0.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-2 No</td>
<td>0.769</td>
<td>0.876</td>
<td>0.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-1 Yes</td>
<td>0.769</td>
<td>0.907</td>
<td>0.138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-2 No</td>
<td>0.823</td>
<td>0.968</td>
<td>0.139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-3 N.A.</td>
<td>0.784</td>
<td>0.837</td>
<td>0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-1 Yes</td>
<td>0.821</td>
<td>0.883</td>
<td>0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-2 N.A.</td>
<td>0.855</td>
<td>0.889</td>
<td>0.053</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GM=ゲーミフィケーション

4.3.3. ゲーミフィケーションの有無による教育効果に関する考察
今回の実験では、ゲーミフィケーション有りの CT アプリを使ったグループ（A-1、B-1）とゲーミフィケーション無しの CT アプリを使ったグループ（A-2、B-2）共に post-test の結果が pre-test に比べて上昇し、CT アプリを使用することでのクリティカルシンキングの能力の向上が観察されたものの、ゲーミフィケーションの有無による有意差は見られなかった。

この原因を分析するため、それぞれのグループで、被験者が CT アプリに搭載された問題のうち、何％の問題を回答したか分析を行った（表 9）。A 大学で比較すると、ゲーミフィケーション有りの CT アプリを使用した群の平均進捗率は 70.1%、ゲーミフィケーション無しの CT アプリを使用した群は 87.1%であり、ゲーミフィケーション無しの CT アプリを使用した群の方が平均進捗率が高いという結果が得られた。これは、「ゲーミフィケーションを駆使することで、被験者がより多くの問題に回答する」という目的とは逆の結果であった。この理由として、ゲーミフィケーション有りの CT アプリには継続的にアプリを使用する目的で、1 日 3 セットまでしか回答できないという機能が搭載されている一方で、ゲーミフィケーション無しの CT アプリは、1 日に何問でも回答可能であるために、使用期間終了の直前に集中して回答した事例が見られたことが 1 つの理由と考えられる。

B 大学についての比較では、ゲーミフィケーション有りの CT アプリを使用した群の方が若干平均正答率は高くなくなっているが、ゲーミフィケーション無しの CT アプリも使用した群も 86.4%の平均進捗率であり、両方とも高い進捗率だったため、差がつかなかったと考えられる。
表 9. CT アプリ使用群の問題回答数と進捗率

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GM の有無</th>
<th>被験者数</th>
<th>総回答数</th>
<th>回答数 / 人</th>
<th>平均進捗率(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6654</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>70.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7374</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>87.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2875</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>96.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2803</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>86.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GM=ゲーミフィケーション

4.4. CT アプリを用いた教育効果の測定（2020 前期）

2019 年度後期の結果を受けて、一部の条件を変更して再び教育効果の測定を行った。変更点は、(1) ベンチマーク要素として導入していた 1 日に回答可能な問題数を 3 問から 10 問に増加させた。 (2) アプリ利⽤のインセンティブとして、2019 年度後期の実験では進捗度に応じて最大 5%の成績への加点を行っていたが、2020 年度は試験に同様の問題を出すことのみで、事前に学生に対しフィードバックをしない而成績への直接的な加点は行わなかった。

4.4.1. 実験概要

D 大学 1 年生 49 名、E 大学 3、4 年生 20 名、F 大学 15 名を表 10 のようにゲーミフィケーション有り版のアプリと無し版のアプリを使う群に分けて実験を行った。

表 10. 教育効果測定実験の各グループの条件（2020 前期）

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>グループ D</th>
<th>グループ E</th>
<th>グループ F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D-1</td>
<td>D-2</td>
<td>E-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>被験者数</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT アプリの使用有無</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GM の有無</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GM=ゲーミフィケーション

4.4.2. pre/post-test の結果と考察

ゲーミフィケーション有り版のアプリを使った群とゲーミフィケーション無し版のアプリを使った群の pre/post test の結果を表 11 に示す。

表 11. 実験群の pre/post-test の結果（2020 年前期）

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>平均正答率</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>t-test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre Post</td>
<td>Pre Post</td>
<td>t 値</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.707 0.875</td>
<td>0.167 0.146 0.129</td>
<td>7.327 &lt;0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.710 0.866</td>
<td>0.156 0.144 0.128</td>
<td>7.724 &lt;0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GM=ゲーミフィケーション

2019 年度後期の実験と同様に、アプリの使用前後において平均正答率の上昇をゲーミフィケーション有り版と無し版で確認することができた。それぞれの群のアプリの進捗率（アプリ使用中の総正解数を全問題数で割って算出）は、ゲーミフィケーション有り版が 17.1%、ゲーミフィケーション無し版が 19.0%と、2019 年後期の実験と比べて小さい値となった。
考えられる要因として、2020年度前期の講義形態の変化がある。2020年2月頃から新型コロナウイルスの拡大が日本全国で見られ、2020年度前期は今回実験を行った大学を含む多くの大学でオンラインでの講義が行われた。教員によって講義の形式は異なるものの、Zoomなどのソフトウェアを用いて同期形式で行われたものや、自ら撮影した動画をアップロードして非同期で行うものなど、多くの工夫が凝らされた教材が作成された。

そのような状況下で、我々が開発したアプリの新規性が2019年度に比べて相対的に低くなり、さらに初のオンライン講義に対応しなければならない学生の負担もあり、アプリの進捗があまり進まなかったと考えられる。

2回の実験を通して、開発したアプリを使用することで、クリティカルシンキングが上昇することが確認できたので、今回得られた知見を活かして、さらに「使ってみたい」と学生が思うアプリの開発に向けて検討を進めていきたい。

第4章 参考文献

第5章 大学教育におけるCTアプリの利用（内田諭・井上奈良彦）

第5章では、結びに代えて、本研究の実験結果を踏まえて、大学教育におけるこのような教材アプリの使用について若干の検討を加える。

5.1.アプリを取り巻く状況の変化

4章（上土井）で述べた通り、本研究ではいくつかの大学で2019年後期と2020年前期の2つの期間にクリティカルシンキングアプリ「C-training」（以下「CTアプリ」）を学生被験者に一定期間試用してもらい、効果検証を行った。しかし、この2つの実験期間には大きな環境の変化があった。2019年後期においては通常の教室授業において自習教材としてアプリを紹介した。一方、新型コロナウイルス感染対策のため、2020年前期の授業は授業開始及びアプリ使用期間中は完全オンラインでの授業となかった。このため、2つの実験期間中での生活環境は大きく異なり、アプリの使用方法も大きな影響を受けた可能性がある。

我々が開発したCTアプリの前提の一つは、学生が「わざわざ机に座り本を開いて学習するのではなく、気軽に隙間時間にスマホでオンライン学習する」というものであった。しかし2020年度開始直前に状況は変わり、大学の授業はオンライン学習が主流となった。CTアプリもたくさんの電子教材、オンライン教材の一つとして、学生にとって新規性は感じられなくなってしまったかもしれない。「隙間時間」も通学途中の車中や授業の合間の食堂や図書館といった場面から、自宅における余暇活動や学習活動の合間となった。今後もリスクを回避したい大学側の意向も
重なり、さらに多くの電子教材が大学の教育現場で開発・使用されていくのではないか。このような流れを踏まえ、CTアプリの教育場面における位置付け、活用の仕方について考えたい。

5.2.アプリ使用の効果

CTアプリの「ゲームフィクション有り版」ではチームプレイができる機能や、他のユーザーや個人同士やチーム同士で進捗率や初回正答率を競い合う機能を備えた。それらの設計はゲーム性が備わっていることで、ユーザーの学習意欲が高まり、より多くの問題を解いてくれるだろうという仮説に基づいていた。しかし、一連の実験を通じてたどり着いた結論は、問題を解けば解くほど一定の学習効果は認められるものの、ゲームフィクションの有無によって学習量や学習効果に差があるわけではないという結果であった。この結果をどのように解釈できるだろうか。

まず、実験の対象者は比較的学力が高いと考えられる大学の学生であり、彼らの学習意欲にとってゲーム性があるかどうかはほとんど関係なかった可能性がある。また、CTアプリ利用は任意と通知していたものの、教師から紹介されたアプリなら使わなければならない、これは「宿題」である、と考える学生が多かった可能性もある。このような動機付けはゲームフィクション有り版と無し版に関係なく、二つの版の動機付けの差を無効化する結果となったかもしれない。この可能性は、アプリの使用感についてのアンケートやインタビュー結果からも示唆されている。ゲーム要素は関係なく、トレーニング問題を解くこと自体が面白いと考えている学生がいることもわかった。

さらに、今回「ゲームフィクション無し版」としているアプリについても、広義にはゲーム性を有していると言える。アプリ内でボタンをタップして解答し、すぐフィードバックが得られる点や、問題内容が学習者の現実の世界の経験と直接結びついていない「架空」の問題である（そういう意味では教育で取り扱う題材は多くは架空である）点はまさに一種の「ゲーム」と言えるだろう。

もちろん、もっと高度なゲーム性を備えれば、ゲームフィクション有り版無し版のトレーニング量の差が生まることも考えられる。例えば問題を解けば解くほどアプリ内で報酬を獲得できる、自分のアイコンを作る、悪役をやっつけるというようなロールプレイ仕立てにする、等が考えられる。

実験結果のまとめとしては、このアプリを通したクリティカルシンキングトレーニングによって一定の学習効果が得られることが検証できた。また、インタビュー結果からは我々の狙い通り、学生は電車移動等の隙間時間にスマホを使って解いていることがわかった。学生にとって使い慣れたスマホで学習できる教材はトレーニング頻度を高めることができる期待されるため、今後もこのような電子教材を発展させていくことは重要であろう。冒頭で述べた収束の見えにくいコロナ時代にあって、ますます電子教材の需要は高まっているだろう。

使用後アンケートの結果からは、アプリ学習がクリティカルシンキング問題を解ける自信にもつながっていることがわかりたため、初学者が苦手意識を少しでもなくしてくれたのなら、アプリ開発は一つの成果と言えるであろう。
5.3.今後の展望と授業における位置づけ

今回の実験には利用していないが、CTアプリ開発プロジェクト全体では、異なる種類の問題内容の搭載を検討してきた。既に紹介した演繹論理や帰納推論に関する問題だけでなく、別のタイプの問題の掲載も取り組んでいる。その中には、結論や前提の特定、各種の推論の型（論拠の種類）、根拠種類と検証、多様な誤謬議論、などが含まれ、広範囲なクリティカルシンキングスキルの訓練に役立つと考えている。

さらに、もう一つ別の種類の問題群として、教育ディベートの試合で用いられる論題の分析に基づき、論題に関連する争点や議論の組み立てを理解する多肢選択式問題を検討している。ディベートにおいては、その準備段階で潜在的な議論を網羅する膨大な利用の「ブリーフ（準備書面）」の作成や、実際の試合における肯定・否定の議論が展開されることによって、CTのスキルと態度が養われるとともに、そのデータを基に多くの議論を抽出することができる。そこから作成した問題をアプリで解答することは、多くの古典的な現代的な論争を扱うことによる動機づけとより実践的な問題によるクリティカルシンキングの訓練が期待できる。

大学授業との関連において、そのようなアプリは対面やオンラインのディベート授業の補完的役割も期待できる。ディベート初学者にとってきわめめて実践を積むことは精神的にも負担となる場合もあるので、アプリでディベート論題を通じて批判的思考の訓練を積むことによって、ディベートに参加する心理的ハードルを下げることもできるかもしれない。また、現在対面式の授業や、学生が向かい合って発言をするような状況を避けなければならない大学が多いため、ディベートの議論教育はその教室内活動の見直しを迫られている。もちろんオンライン上でビデオや音声を用いて擬似的な教室活動を行うことも可能である。しかし、その難しさは多くの教員がこの数ヶ月で経験したことである。また、それも、対面授業などでは十分時間を取り得てディベートの実践を行うことはカリキュラムやカリキュラムの観点から難しいことも多い。このような状況では、アプリを使ったディベート問題の学習を行うことは一定の意味のあることだと考えられる。また、昨今の教室内外の活動の組み合わせの多様化によって、このようなアプリが負担する繰り返しの問題練習の位置づけを検討するきっかけになる。アプリでできる内容は授業時間外で行き、教員が指導する授業やオンラインの「授業」は、その特性を生かした活動を中心にすべきである。

CTアプリ学習は、2章（張）で外観したような多様なクリティカルシンキングのごく一部を取り扱うにすぎない。このアプリは比較的単純であるがゆえに、多肢選択式では測れないような奥深い議論教育に学生をつなげる、足がかりのような位置づけならなければならないと思う。指導者不足、評価基準のばらつき、教材の不足といったクリティカルシンキング教育の課題を考慮すると、学生が特別な指導を受ける個人やグループで楽しみながら自主学習できる方法の一端を提供すると考えてもクリティカルシンキング教育の強化に寄与するものである。

最後に、今回多様な研究者が参加した共同研究という側面にも触れしておく。本研究プロジェクトは10年ほど前から、元々大学時代にESSで英語競技ディベートに参加し、その後も指導や研究でディベートに関わってきた者が集まり共同研究を継続してきた。その多くはディベートとは別のそれぞれの研究教育分野があり企業活動等に従事している。その中で議論教育・ディベートやクリティカルシンキングの重要性を認識し活動を続けてきた。そこから発展し、今回の研究
グループには、アプリ開発に向けさらに認知言語学・外国語教育の専門家、情報教育やオンライン教材開発の専門家、教育アプリ開発の経験がある企業の代表者、学際分野の修士号を持つ研究室事務補佐員、図書館職員、TA/RAを務める大学院生等が加わり、多分野の融合と産学連携を図るチームを作りあげることができた。研究開発の過程ではそういった多様なメンバーからなるチーム活動の困難さもあったが、お互いに学ぶところも多かった。また、そういった多様な研究グループの強みが学内外の競争的資金獲得にも役だったかもしれない。

謝辞
本研究はJSPS科研費JP18H01055と「QRプログラムつばさプロジェクト30102」（九州大学）の助成を受けたものです。
Proceedings of the Tokyo Conference on Argumentation, Volume 6

ISSN 2436-8067
URL: https://japan-debate-association.org/proceedings-tca-vol-6

発行日 2021年12月4日
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Proceedings of the Tokyo Conference on Argumentation, Volume 6