

## Qualities of a Good Debater in the Ancient Indian Argumentation Theory

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The fundamental theory of argumentation in India was developed by the Nyāya school and Buddhists. Although some authors have elucidated the logic employed in a debate, few studies have focused on practical aspects, that is, the role of debate and the participants' qualities. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the conflict between Naiyāyikas and Buddhists, and to ascertain the content behind the term "four components" (*caturāṅga*) through examining contexts in which the terms regarding the argumentation appear within philosophical literature. In conclusion, I attempt to show that 1) the Indian argumentation theory is closely related to education, 2) Naiyāyikas reconstruct their theory to avoid criticism from Buddhists, and 3) over time, the qualities of proponent and opponent are mentioned very little because their suitability depends on the validity of inference; the qualities of judges, however, is mentioned much more because their excellence is indispensable in a hostile debate.

### 1. INTRODUCTION

In ancient India, the argumentation theory was developed by philosophical schools such as Nyāya, Buddhism, and Jainism. These philosophers discussed many topics regarding argumentation theory: types of debate, method of proof, rules of defeat, and sophistry. Although there are so many resources that inform us about argumentation theory in ancient India, previous researchers have often paid attention to only the aspect of logic, for example, inference (*anumāna*) and the (pseudo-)component (*avayavāḥ*) such as a proposition (*pratijñā*), a reason (*hetu*), and an example (*dṛṣṭānta*).

Logic is a crucial factor in a debate. In practical, moral, and ethical contexts, it is also important to examine what is the ideal debate style and what kind of person should participate in the debate. Some previous studies examined the role of the members participating in the debate (Vidyabhusana 1921; Solomon 1976; Kobayashi 2009; Ono 2011; and so on). In particular, Solomon 1976 is a monumental and immortal work dealing with Indian argumentation theory from various perspectives. However, new manuscripts and editions on the Indian logic or argumentation have been published. Therefore, we should reexamine prior research.

So far, I have edited and translated the argumentation theory chapter of the *Nyāyamañjarī* composed by Bhaṭṭajayanta (ca. 9-10c), Kashmiri poet and a philosopher belonging to the Brahmanical Nyāya (logic) school. By investigating the classical Sanskrit philosophical literature concerning the argumentation theory, I examined not only the logical aspect, but also the practical aspect of the debate. This kind of literature concretely describes some scenes that employ the debate and refer to its technical terms: proponent, opponent, judges, and so on.

This paper examines the context in which the terms related to the debate appears within Indian classical and philosophical works of literature. Through examination, I try to make it clear what kinds of qualities are demanded of a good debater (strictly, the participants of the debate).

### 2. LEARNING, TEACHING, AND DEBATING: THE ROLE OF DEBATE IN INDIA

*Caraakasaṃhitā* (ca. 200-300 B.C., CS), the text of "Science of Life," speaks of three ways to obtain the knowledge: learning (*adhyayana*), teaching (*adhyāpana*), and debating with persons learned in that area of the knowledge

(*tadvidyasambhāṣā*).<sup>\*1</sup> According to this, pupils (*śiṣya*) should learn from a preceptor (*guru*), the preceptor should teach them, and the pupils and the teacher should discuss various topics with their peers, that is, a physician in this context. Even in modern India, the education system seems to be called *Gurukula*, a place where a preceptor and pupils live like a family.<sup>\*2</sup>

*Nyāyasūtra* (ca. 1-2c, NS), one of the oldest manuals of Indian logic and argumentation, shared almost the same concepts:

[For the attainment of emancipation, there is also] the repetition of grasping the knowledge and friendly discussion (*saṃvāda*) with persons learned in that department of knowledge.<sup>\*3</sup>

Debate played an important role in education in ancient India. Additionally, it is well known that the Buddhist style of the debate was introduced into Tibet, China, Korea, and Japan, and has been inherited as 法会 (houe) or 論議 (rongi).<sup>\*4</sup> In this way, these debates have been mainly conducted for educational and religious purposes in Asia.

### 3. TYPES OF DEBATE

As already shown in previous studies, the tradition of debate in India has a long history.<sup>\*5</sup> We know some famous old types of debates, such as “*brahmodya*” in the Upaniṣads and “a scholarly or royal debate” described in the *Milinda-Pañha*.<sup>\*6</sup> In another context, Dharmaśāstras, the treatises of law/customs (*dharma*), include a chapter on the legal procedure (*Vyavahāra*). Some important technical terms in the debate appear there. Therefore, we could compare the similarity/difference of the character of debate between the judicial case and philosophical case regarding terminology.<sup>\*7</sup>

In the philosophical context, almost all schools accept these two types of debate: 1) debate for those who are free from passion or wish for the truth (*vītarāgakathā/tattvabubhutsukathā*) and 2) debate for those who desire their own victory (*vijigīṣukathā*).<sup>\*8</sup> A similar classification appeared already in *Carakasamhitā*: friendly debate (*saṃdhāya-sambhāṣā*) and hostile debate (*virghya-sambhāṣā*).<sup>\*9</sup> Between them, “Naiyāyī-kas,” those who are following *Nyāyasūtra*, name the

former “discussion” (*vāda*), and the latter “disputation” (*jalpa*) or “wrangling” (*vitandā*).<sup>\*10</sup> *Nyāyasūtra* says this about members who engage in the former type of debate:

The friendly discussion is carried on with the pupil, the preceptor, the companion, an excellent person, and those who desire the bliss. [All of them] are apart from envy.<sup>\*11</sup>

Later, Naiyāyika Bhāsarvajña (ca. 10c) classified the fruits of debate into three terms regarding the proponent’s amount of knowledge.<sup>\*12</sup> Generally, this type of debate brings out debaters some merits.

Opposingly, the latter, that is, a hostile debate, is explained below:

For protecting their own determination of the truth, [people] employ disputation (*jalpa*) and wrangling (*vitandā*). It is like for protecting sprouting seeds, [people] cover [them] with the hedge of thorns.<sup>\*13</sup>

According to Naiyāyikas, in futile debate (disputation (*jalpa*) and wrangling (*vitandā*)), the debater could be allowed to use sophisticated arguments, for example, “distortion” (*chala*) and “false rejoinder” (*jāti*), and to defeat opponent by indicating “conditions of defeat” (*nigrahasthāna*).<sup>\*14</sup>

Interestingly, in the Buddhist argumentation tradition, they generally admit only “*vāda*.” Some Buddhists such as Asaṅga (ca. 4c), classify “*vāda*” into six parts, including “disputation” (*vivāda*).<sup>\*15</sup> Dharmakīrti (600-660 A.D.), one of the most influential and magnificent philosophers in medieval India, also admits just only [friendly] discussion (*vāda*) without any sub-categorization. For Dharmakīrti, the discussion is conducted by good people (*satām vādaḥ*).<sup>\*16</sup> This contrast between Naiyāyikas and Buddhists reflects the difference in their attitude toward ideal debate; that is, for Dharmakīrti, the debate should be always a friendly debate for one another’s welfare, and there should never be any sophistry or malicious arguments in this system of debate.<sup>\*17</sup>

Naiyāyikas, however, do not intend to permit the use of “distortions and false rejoinders and conditions of defeat” (*chala-jātī-nigrahasthāna*) for cheating one another. As mentioned above, it is for protecting their determination of the truth against a foe. Accordingly, Bhaṭṭajayanta

justified usage of these techniques, by vividly describing hostile debate:

If an ignoble person comes from elsewhere to a teacher, who sits comfortably in a certain hermitage, revered by many pupils, teaches the secret truth, and is composed in mind, and then he (= the ignoble person) says with the stammering voice - because of his pride has arisen from limited, ill-acquired knowledge – ‘Oh, poor man, what is told? Um ... I get it. This science named ‘logic’ is loved by a simple-minded person. There is no relation among the Vedas, authority, the knowledge of the truth about *ātman*, and the emancipation,’ and laughs slowly. And after that, he captures and confuses the deer (= the pupils) ... And if the teacher ignores him and does not blame him and does not put an end to him by using even cheating skills, although he cannot remember the proper demonstration, then after the [ignoble person] leaves, the pupils would stand up and say – ‘Ah, We are humiliated at the wrong place. Our teacher renowned Nyāya scholar was defeated by another sage coming today.’ Hearing these words, Other people also will become not to be able to believe the right path [taught by the teacher] and not to follow him immediately. Therefore, the garrulous guy should be led to the insuperable defeated situation [by using the cheating skills].<sup>\*18</sup>

Such descriptions of debate are rare in philosophical literature. During the medieval period in India, there were fewer sources that objectively described the real situation of the debates, although there has been a lot of discussion about inference employed in a debate. Exceptionally, Asaṅga presents the classification of debate spaces: in the royal residence (*rājakula*), in the residence of government servants (*yuktakula*), before the companion (*sahāya*), before the head of a trade (*prāmāṇika*), before the ascetics and Brahmins skilled in the *dharma* and meaning (*dharmārthakuśalāḥ śramanabrāhma-nāḥ*).<sup>\*19</sup>

#### 4. THE QUALITIES AND DEEDS OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE DEBATE

According to classical texts like *Carakasamhitā* and *Nyāyasūtra*, we know that there are some participants other than the proponent and opponent. Now, I examine how Indian philosophers define the members of the debate, and I describe their qualities and deeds.

##### 4.1 “Four components” (*caturāṅga*)

Some Jain literature, such as *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* and *Pramāṇanayatattvālokāṅkāra*, lists “four components” (*caturāṅga*): “proponent” (*vādin*), “opponent” (*prativādin*), “those who are in the assembly/judges” (*sabhyāḥ*, *prāśnikāḥ*, *sadasya*, *pariṣad*), and “the president of the assembly” (*sabhāpati*).<sup>\*20</sup> As a similar case, *Tārkikarākṣā*, later Naiyāyika’s work, proposes the proper procedure of debate as having “six components” (*ṣaḍaṅga*).<sup>\*21</sup> and it refers to others’ “four-fold,” which corresponds to the items of “four components.” As examined below, although they were not clearly defined in ancient times, these concepts are common among the argumentation theories.

##### 4.1.1. Proponent and Opponent

*Carakasamhitā* lists the qualities of not only proficient pupils or teachers but also suitable debaters:

The congenial debate takes place when the other party is possessed of learning, specialized knowledge, capacity to discuss, is not easily irritable, is one whose learning is not bombastic, is not malicious, can be reasonably persuaded, that is to say, is not dogmatic in views, is well-versed in the art of persuasion, is tenacious and fond of discussion. ... The merits considered good in a debater or disputer are learning, specialized knowledge, retentive grasp, genius, and eloquence. His demerits are irritability, lack of proficiency, shyness or timidity, lack of retention of the grasp or of retentive grasp, and inattentiveness.<sup>\*22</sup>

As mentioned above, *Carakasamhitā* lists in detail the characteristics that an ideal debater should possess. On the contrary, Naiyāyikas do not say much about the qualities of a good debater. This is probably because they systemize “conditions of defeat” (*nigrahassthāna*) and then, it becomes the basis of whether the debater is

good or bad. Namely, old Naiyāyikas examine the faults of debaters rather than their virtues. A similar case could be seen in the inference field. That is, the *Nyāyasūtra* lists pseudo-reasons (*hetvābhāsa*) as one of their sixteen primary topics and it directly does not lists sound reason (*hetu*).<sup>\*23</sup>

It is interesting that Buddhist Asaṅga refers to the qualities of debaters in detail as six-fold “ornaments of debate” (*vādālaṃkāra*): “knowledge of one’s own and another’s doctrine” (*svaparasamayajñātā*), “accomplishment of speech [that is non-vulgar, non-rustic, easy, energetic, coherent, and significant] composition [that is not confused, not violent, understandable, proper length, cogent, well-timed, to the point, clear, and continuous]” (*vākkaraṇasampat*), “confidence [in any kind of assemblies]” (*vaiśāradyam*), “uninterrupted flow of statements” (*pratibhānam*), “steadfastness” (*sthairyam*), an “kindness” (*dākṣiṇyam*).<sup>\*24</sup> In terms of virtuous speech in conversation, in the *Mahābhārata*, the most famous Sanskrit epic of ancient India, there is also enumeration of the qualities and blemishes of speech. According to Tirpathi 2006:152ff, these qualities and blemishes could be compared to Marcus Tullius Cicero’s theory.<sup>\*25</sup>

Also in the Nyāya tradition, Udayana (ca. 1050-1100), a late Naiyāyika and the reformer of the Nyāya theory, constructed the secret maxim (*rahasya*) for becoming a good debater by reversing the “conditions of defeat.”<sup>\*26</sup> This is probably the first time that Naiyāyikas systematized the qualities of a good debater. Moreover, Udayana distributes all of the twenty-two “conditions of defeat” among four categories: “what never happens” (*asambhāvanīyam eva*), “what could happen but was never indicated” (*sambhavad api anudbhāvyam eva*), “what should be indicated” (*udbhāvyamātram*), and “what belongs to the end of the debate” (*kathāvasānikam*).<sup>\*27</sup> Udayana’s reconstruction was probably forced from the need to react against the Buddhists, such as Dharmakīrti, who reasonably justified the *vāda* and eliminated the Naiyāyikas’ conditions of defeat.<sup>\*28</sup>

#### 4.1.2. Judges and a President

##### 4.1.2.1. The historical development of concept “judge” in the Nyāya tradition

The judges are called various Sanskrit terms in philosophical literature. In the old period, the term *pariṣad*, literally “those who are sitting around,” is frequently used as members other

than proponent and opponent. As shown in Katsura 2000, *Carakarasamhitā* teaches that, in order to win, the debater should know a lot about the opponent and the audience (*pariṣad*).<sup>\*29</sup> In *Nyāyasūtra*, the same term appeared twice in the definitions of two “conditions of defeat”: “unintelligibility for the audience and the opponent” (*avijñātārtha*), “impossibility to repeat another proposition understood by the audience, and repeated three times” (*ananubhāṣaṇam*).<sup>\*30</sup> In this context, *pariṣad* does not necessarily mean “judges” but just “audience.”

Vātsyāyana (ca. 4c), a commentator on *Nyāyasūtra*, expands the role of *pariṣad*. According to him, they should indicate a debater’s fault overlooked by another when asked “who is defeated?”<sup>\*31</sup>

Uddyotakara (ca. 5c), a commentator on the work of Vātsyāyana, hardly uses the term *pariṣad*; instead, he uses *prāśnika*, which literally means “an inquirer.” The usages are concentrated in the context of his criticism of Buddhist’s definition of debate, that is, “convincing a head person [in the assembly]” (*adhikaraṇapratyāyana*). Accordingly, the term could be introduced by Buddhists into the philosophical debate. Considering this point, it is interesting that in the *Nyāyapraveśaka*, composed by the Buddhist Śaṅkarasvāmin (ca. 500-560), the demonstration is defined as the method of making an uncomprehended thing clear for judges (*prāśnika*). In this context, the judges has an important role as an arbiter who finally decides who will win or lose the debate.<sup>\*32</sup> The final position of Uddyotakara is that judges are necessary for hostile debate conducted by those who seek profit, honor, and fame, but they are not necessary in friendly debate between a preceptor and a pupil.<sup>\*33</sup> Here, we can see the transition from “audience” to “judge.”

Vācaspatimiśra (ca. 10c), a commentator on the work of Uddyotakara, also shares Uddyotakara’s concept. He says that “in the friendly debate, the judges are needless to be employed but would not be excluded when they come by chance.”<sup>\*34</sup> Moreover, he describes another role of the judges (*prāśnika*). The debater should know the cheating skills for indicating them used by a foe when asked by the judges belonging to assembly (*sabhyāḥ*) - “what kind of cheating is this?”<sup>\*35</sup>

In the Nyāya tradition, the primitive concept of “four components” appears in Bhaṭṭajayanta’s *Nyāyamañjarī*. He refers to two distinct judges:

1) the president (*sabhāpati*) or a chief judge (*prāñvivāka*) and 2) the judges appointed by the president (*sabhāpatiniyuktāḥ prāśnikāḥ*). It tells that there are two types of judges in a debate.<sup>\*36</sup> Bhāsarvajña, probably contemporary to Jayanta, directly argues that “the four components are proponent, opponent, president, and inquirers.”<sup>\*37</sup> As far as I know, he is the first Naiyāyika who refers to four components. Thereafter, Udayana introduces two terms, *anuvīdheya* and *stheya*, corresponding to both “a president” and “judges.”<sup>\*38</sup> Later Naiyāyikas, (for example, Varadarāja (1150 A.D.) and Śāṅkaramiśra (1430 A.D.)) seem to follow his terminology.<sup>\*39</sup> According to their explanations, *anuvīdheya* is such as “a king” (*rāja*) who procure honor for either debater, and *stheya* are impartial persons free from passion. As with Vācaspatiśiśra, they say that both judges are unnecessary in friendly debate because both debaters wishing the truth never long for any honor and definitely possess all the qualities which judges have.<sup>\*40</sup>

Some terms, like *sabhā*, *sabhyāḥ* and *prāñvivēka*, often appear in judicial literature, such as *Manusmṛti* and *Kātyāyanasmṛti*. Therefore, it is assumed that at some point the terminology of “judge” would be introduced from the judicial theory into the Nyāya or Indian argumentation theory.

#### 4.1.2.2. The Qualities and Deeds of Judges and the President

The qualities and deeds of judges and the president are concretely described in Nyāya, Vedānta, and Jain literature. These descriptions about their deeds basically seem to depend on the Udayana’s definition:

The business of *anuvīdheya* is to indicate both respect and disrespect according to the ability and the rules. ... The business of *stheya*-s are 1) to determine the particular procedure and style of the debate, 2) to specify the order of both debaters, 3) to ascertain their merits and demerits, 4) to awake his defeat to either debater, and 5) to explain the result of the finished debate to people.<sup>\*41</sup>

Late Naiyāyikas such as Varadarāja and Jains, such as Vālidevasūri explain their deeds almost in the same way.

Moreover, Varadarāja and Vālidevasūri describe the qualities in detail.

Judges:

Judges (*sadasyāḥ*) should be approved as those who are accepted by both proponent and opponent, and versed in the essence of their doctrines, free from passion and hatred, conversant with understanding, remembering, and explaining what is said by others. The number of them should be uneven and at least three.<sup>\*42</sup> (Varadarāja’s *Tārikarakṣāsārasaṃgraha*)

Judges (*sabhyāḥ*) are approved by both proponent and opponent as those who are familiar with the truth of their doctrines, having a good memory, erudite, bright, patient, and impartial.<sup>\*43</sup> (Vālidevasūri’s *Pramāṇanayatattvālokāṅkāra*)

The president:

The president should be approved as those who are accepted by proponent, opponent, and judges, and free from passion and so on, and properly judging their defeat and non-defeat.<sup>\*44</sup> (Varadarāja’s *Tārikarakṣāsārasaṃgraha*)

The president is endowed with intelligence, authority, lordliness, patience, and impartiality.<sup>\*45</sup> (Vālidevasūri’s *Pramāṇanayatattvālokāṅkāra*)

As defined above, Judges in a debate, especially a hostile debate, require impartiality, cleverness, and greatness. As another example, Madhva (1238-1317 A.D.), a famous Brahmanical philosopher belonging to the *Dvaita* (dualism) school of *Vedānta*, also describes the qualities of judges as below:

The uneven judges or one judge should be known as those who are apart from passion and hatred, and proficient in all sciences. When there is only one judge, he should be known as a person who completely removes doubts, lacks doubts, is highly intelligent, and free from all faults. Whether only one or many, judges should be devoted to *Bhakti* for Viṣṇu. This is because *Bhakti* for Viṣṇu is the nature of all virtuous people.<sup>\*46</sup>

It is interesting that judges are characterized by the *Bhakti* (devotion or love) for the God Viṣṇu

as reflected by their theological background. Indeed, in the Indian philosophical context, the topics of debate are mainly religious dogmatic subjects such as the existence of omniscient or God, the eternity of *Veda*, and so on.

#### 4.1.3. Other Roles in the Debate

In *Tārikakarṣā*, Varadarāja lists another member, i.e., a clerk (lekhaṇa).<sup>\*47</sup> This role is also mentioned in *Nyāyasūdhā* on *Anuvyākhyāna* on *Brahmasūtra*, *Vedānta* literature, which refers to the system of argumentation. However, in this paper, I could not analyze other schools' literature in detail. Further consideration will be needed to yield any findings about this topic of enumerating the roles in debate, as well as their qualities and deeds in other schools' works.

## 5. CONCLUSION

This paper has examined the context in which the concepts of debate appear in philosophical Sanskrit literature. First, the role and types of debates in ancient India were briefly sketched in relation to education. Then, it discussed the difference in the classifications of the debate between Buddhists and Naiyāyikas. This conflict prompts Naiyāyikas to reconstruct their traditional argumentation theory, as represented by Udayana's maxim and distribution of the "conditions of defeat." Concerning the qualities of the proponent and opponent, some ancient literature, like the *Carakasamhitā*, *Mahābhārata*, and *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, provides concrete instances that show the virtues of a good debater. In the medieval period in India, Naiyāyikas' literature mentions a little about it, but Buddhist Dharmakīrti adds some features to the friendly debate. This probably shows that the main concern about the argumentation theory moved from their practical aspects into an logical investigation of sound inference, correct reason, or logical fallacies. The definitive basis of the judgment in a debate is syllogism in philosophical demonstrative discourse. The practical debate, nonetheless, should be conducted over the ages. Other schools, such as Jain or *Vedānta*, developed their own argumentation theory based on the Naiyāyikas' fundamental theory. As proof of that, they defined the number of components in debate and described the qualities of the judges in detail.

## NOTES

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\*1. CS *Vimānasthāna* 8.6. (p. 217).

\*2. As far as I am aware, the same usage of this term *gurukula* are rarely seen in classical Sanskrit literatures.

\*3. NS 4.2.47. (p. 280). Cf. Solomon 1976: 10, Preisendanz 2000.

\*4. Cf. Repp & Inoue 2012.

\*5. Cf. Solomon 1976, Katsura 2000, Tripathi 2016.

\*6. Cf. Katsura 2000: 1-4.

\*7. Ono 2011 examines "the six steps" (*ṣaṭpakṣin*, *ṣaṭkoṭika*) argued by Naiyāyikas and Buddhists. Similar steps are mentioned in the legal procedure.

\*8. Cf. Solomon 1976: 45.

\*9. CS *Vimānasthāna* 8.16. (pp. 225-226). Cf. Solomon 1976, Katsura 1998, Okazaki 2005, Preisendanz 2000.

\*10. NS 1.2.1-3. (pp. 39-41). Some Naiyāyikas had different classifications such *Bhāsarvajñā* and according to *Vādivinoda*, *Sānatāni*, *Ratnaśoṣa* and so on. *Carakasamhitā* also has these three terms, whereas the meanings are different from *Nyāyasūtra*.

\*11. NS 4.2.48. (p. 280) Cf. Solomon 1976: 11.

\*12. NBhū ad NSā (p. 21).

\*13. NS 4.2.50-51. (pp. 281-282). Cf. Solomon 1976: 119.

\*14. NS 1.2.2. (p. 40).

\*15. Cf. Wayman 1999: 3ff, Solomon 1976: 339.

\*16. Cf. Sasaki 2013b: 62.

\*17. Cf. Sasaki 2013a.

\*18. NM II (pp. 601-602). It is partially translated in Ono 2003a: 191\*4.

\*19. AS (my reconstruction from Li 2014): *vādādhikaraṇaṃ rājakulaṃ yuktakulaṃ sahāyaḥ prāmāṇikaḥ dharmārthakuśalāś ca śramaṇa-brāhmaṇāḥ* // Cf. Li 2014: *vādādhikaraṇaṃ rājakulaṃ yuktakulaṃ sahā(ya)ḥ prā* /// [44a2] *rmārthakuśalāś ca śramaṇabrāhmaṇāḥ* |<> Cf. AS, T1605 (p. 693): 第二論處, 謂或於王家, 或於執理家, 或對淳質堪為量者, 或對善伴, 或對善解法義沙門, 婆羅門等而起論端. Cf. Kajiyama 1984: 64-66, Wayman 1999: 3ff, Tripathi 2016: 13ff.

\*20. PM 2.30xxxx, SVR 8.10. (p. 1131).

\*21. See Ono 2003a: 188, Ono 2003b.

\*22. CS *Vimānasthāna* 8.17-18. (pp. 226-227). Cf. Solomon 1976: 74-75, Katsura 2000: 5.

\*23. NS 1.1.1. (p. 2).

\*24. AS (my reconstruction from Li 2014): *vādālaṅkāraḥ svaparasaṃmayajñātā vākkaraṇasampat vaiśāradyaṃ pratibhāṇaṃ sthairyam dākṣiṇyaṃ ca* // Cf. Li 2014: *vādālaṅkāraḥ svaparasaṃmayajñātā vākkarmanasampat* \* {II} *vaiśāradyaṃ pra-tibhāṇam* {I} *sthairyam dā* ○ *kṣiṇyaṃ ca* <II> Cf. Solomon 1976: 339, Wayman 1999: 26-31, 40. The supplement explanations are from *Abhidharmasamuccaya-ṭīkā* translated in Wayman 1999: 3ff.

\*25. Cf. Chakrabarti, Arindam. (2014). Just Words: An Ethics of Conversation in *Mahābhārata*: *Mahābhārata now*. Chakrabarti and Bandhyop-

- dhyaya (Eds.).
- \*26. Cf. Ono 2006.
- \*27. NVTP ad NS 1.2.1. (pp. 310-311).
- \*28. Cf. Ono 2006.
- \*29. CS 6.8.20-24. (pp. 228-231).
- \*30. NS 5.2.9. (p. 313), NS 5.2.16. (p. 316).
- \*31. NBh ad NS 5.2.21. (p. 328)
- \*32. Cf. Kobayashi 2009.
- \*33. Cf. Okazaki 2005: 359ff.
- \*34. NVTI ad NS 5.2.21.(pp. 695-696).
- \*35. In fact, Vācaspatimiśra refers to this passage in the context of the justification of the teaching sophistic false rejoinder (*jāti*) in *Nyāyasūtra*. In the same context, Uddyotakara uses the term “inquiry” (*praśna*).
- \*36. NM II (p. 676, p. 712).
- \*37. NSā ad NS 1.2.1. (p. 332).
- \*38. NVTP ad NS 1.2.1. (p. 311).
- \*39. TR (p. 133), VV (p. 9).
- \*40. NVTP ad NS 1.2.1. (p. 311), TR (pp. 133-134), VV (p. 9).
- \*41. NVTP ad NS 1.2.1. (p. 311). Cf. Solomon 1976: 340-350.
- \*42. TR (pp. 133-134).
- \*43. PNTL 8.18. (p. 1133). Cf. EIPh XIV (p. 326ff).
- \*44. TR (p. 134).
- \*45. PNTL 8.20. (p. 1134). Cf. *ibid*.
- \*46. KL 5-7. (p. 59).
- \*47. Cf. Ono 2003b.
- REFERENCES**
- AS *Abhidharmasamuccaya*: See. Li 2014.
- CS *Carakasamhitā: Agniveśa's Carakasamhitā (Text with English Translation & Critical Exposition Based on Cakrapāṇi Datta's Āyurveda Dīpikā)*. Ram Karan Sharma & Vaidya Bhagwan Dash (Eds.). New Delhi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1977.
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